Caught in the Crossfire: The Plight of the Bawm Community and Unveiling the Complex Ties Between the Bangladesh Military and the Kuki-Chin National Front

Written on 09 September 2024. Posted in News

After recent weeks of unrest that began in July over protests seeking to abolish a civil service job quota system, leaving more than 757 dead^[1], Bangladesh is in a process of rebuilding. Former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina resigned and fled the country to India and criminal cases against her and other minsters have already been filed to take responsibility over the deaths.

Meanwhile, the country is being led by an interim government with Nobel laureate Muhammed Yunus as its head.

For Indigenous Peoples in the country this could open an opportunity to secure more recognition and protection of their rights and to fully exercise their rights, which continued to be seriously violated during Hasina’s 15-year iron-fisted rule. They seek proper Constitutional acknowledgement and at least one legitimate seat at the table as a partner in the new process of state building.

Indigenous Peoples in the CHT are especially eyeing this shift with caution.

They want the inclusion of a legitimate Indigenous CHT representative in the interim government because history has shown that at every hopeful turn since the signing of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Accord in 1997^[2], promises have not been kept and they have not been properly represented by Indigenous people they themselves select.

Unfortunately, however, it seems that decisions are progressing as normal and the nominated CHT representative is seen by some as more of the same, government-led ideology.^[3]

On 22 May 2024, Amnesty International^[4] launched a campaign urging the Bangladesh government to halt its crackdown on the Bawm community, one of the smallest Indigenous groups residing in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), primarily in Bandarban district. This call to action highlights the ongoing struggle faced by the Bawm people, a situation that has drawn significant international concern.

Since April 2023, the International Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission (CHTC) has been consistently advocating for the protection of Bawm civilians amidst a complex political landscape marked by the emergence of the armed group, the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF), in Bandarban. However, given that the CHT is effectively a military-controlled area, there has been a media blackout regarding the human rights situation of the Bawm community.

Since October 2022, more than 4,000 Bawm have been displaced from their ancestral lands due to the severe crackdown on Bawm civilians in the name of raids against KNF, and since 7 April 2024, at least 10 civilians have been killed by the military.

The safety situation for the Bawm continues to deteriorate exponentially. In just four months, since April 2024, 126 Bawm individuals have been imprisoned, more than double the number of those imprisoned in all of 2023. This puts the current number of imprisoned Bawm individuals at 186. Additionally, more than 20 others remain in military custody and have yet to be handed over to the courts or police.

To understand the current plight of the Bawm people, it is crucial to also examine the history and background of the KNF's rise within the complex political landscape of the military-controlled CHT. Specifically, it is important to understand why the Bawm, a particular Indigenous community, are being targeted by security forces and the nature of their relationship with the KNF.

To answer these questions, the authors of this article, who prefer to remain anonymous for safety reasons, are well-known to IWGIA and have extensive experience researching CHT issues. They have well-established connections in the CHT and conducted extensive interviews on the ground. Based on these interviews^[5] and evidence from the field, this article sheds light on the dire conditions faced by the Bawm community due to the ongoing military crackdown, which can almost be termed ethnic cleansing. Interviewees who have witnessed the formation and rise of the KNF also provided the authors photographic evidence and documents. Based on this information, the first part of this article explores the history of the KNF's emergence, detailing the reasons behind their formation, who sponsored them, and later what led to the crackdown on both the KNF and the Bawm community. Additionally, we address the speculation regarding possible links between the unrest in the CHT involving the KNF and other Kuki-Chin issues in India and Myanmar. And finally, the second part of the article elaborates on the grim conditions imposed on the Bawm community due to the activities of the KNF and its patrons, shedding light on the severe impact on their lives and livelihood.

PART 1: History of the Emergence of KNF

Public Appearance of KNF’s Armed Group

In 2021, a social media page titled "Kuki-Chin National Army (KNA)" appeared on Facebook, claiming to be the armed faction of the "Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF)".^[6] From the outset, the page posted photos of its armed members and showcased their training activities led by Nathan Lanchew Bawm, the founding president of the group. The page began asserting that the CHT once belonged to the six Kuki-Chin descendant groups—Bawm, Pangkhua, Lushai, Mro, Khumi, and Khyang—who were displaced by the arrival of other larger communities such as the Chakma, Marma, Tanchangya, Tripura, and others^[7]. The KNA's posts declared their goal to reclaim this land and establish an autonomous Kuki Chin territory, encompassing areas from Bilaichari, Baghaichari, Barkal, and Jurachari Upazilas (subdistricts) of Rangamati district, as well as Ruma, Thanchi, Lama, Rwangchari, and Alikadam Upazilas of Bandarban district.  However, although the KNF/KNA claimed to represent the six Kuki-Chin clan groups living in CHT, in reality, hardly anyone outside of the Bawm community was involved with the formation of KNF. Hence, in the CHT, they are commonly known as the Bawm party^[8].

Photo: Map of the proposed Kuki-Chin State. Source: Obtained from KNF's Facebook page.

Initially, their demands on Facebook were directed at the Chakma community in particular, accusing them of monopolizing jobs and opportunities at the expense of the Kuki Chin groups^[9]. They also criticized the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Samhiti Samiti (PCJSS^[10]), labeling it as an organization exclusively for Chakmas, and the CHT Regional Council^[11], claiming it represents only Chakmas. Frequently, their posts spread hatred against the Chakma people. While openly expressing their animosity towards the Chakma community on their Facebook page, they also praised the activities of the Bangladesh military in the CHT. The KNA's rhetoric included accusations and inflammatory statements aimed at creating division among the Indigenous groups of CHT, particularly against the Chakmas^[12].

Photo: Nathan Bawm pictured in the center alongside his fellow KNF members. Source: Obtained from KNF's Facebook page.

How it All Started: The Origins and Bangladeshi Military’s Support of the KNF

Although the KNF/KNA declared its first public appearance through social media in 2021, their formation and background date back much further. It began with the establishment of the Kuki-Chin National Development Organization (KNDO) in Ruma, Bandarban on 9 November 2008, under the leadership of Nathan Bawm as president and Vanchunlian Bawm as general secretary^[13]. Bawm individuals and civil society members we spoke to, who have known Nathan since childhood and witnessed the formation of KNDO and its transformation into KNF/KNA, mentioned that since its inception, KNDO and Nathan had massive support from the Bangladesh military for the establishment of the KNDO.

From junior-ranking military officers in Ruma Upazila to the highest military officer in the Bandarban district, Nathan enjoyed widespread military backing. They further alleged that since its inception, the entire cost of KNDO was borne by the military. When KNDO’s central office was inaugurated in Ruma on 10 November 2013, Brigadier General Syed Siddiqui, of the Bandarban Brigade attended the event as the chief guest and also made a donation to KNDO. Top military officials in Bandarban frequently visited Nathan in Ruma or summoned him to meet with high-ranking Bangladeshi military officials.^[14]

Photo: Brigadier General Syed Siddiqui, from the Bandarban Brigade, giving a speech at the inauguration of KNDO's central office. On his left is Lt. Col. Ariful Bari, the former Ruma Zone Commander, and on the far left is Captain Nahid from the Ruma Zone. Source: Provided by anonymous sources who prefer not to disclose their name/s.

Photo: The individual to the left of Nathan Bawm is the former Brigadier General of the Bandarban Brigade, Naqib Ahmed Chowdhury, at an event hosted by KNDO in Eden Road, Ruma in 2015. He was later promoted to Major General and assumed the role of military secretary at the Prime Minister's office. Source: Provided by anonymous sources who prefer not to disclose their name/s.

From Development Organization to Political Entity: The Rise of KNDO and Nathan Bawm's Vision for Zo Nationalism

Although Nathan Bawm originally established the Kuki Chin-National Development Organization (KNDO) as a development entity, it quickly transitioned into a political organization allegedly under military patronage. The KNDO began claiming to represent the six most under-represented Indigenous groups of the CHT: Bawm, Pangkuwa, Lushai, Mro, Khumi, and Khyang. Bawm leaders interviewed alleged that this transformation was guided by the military as a strategy to divide the Indigenous groups of the CHT, disrupt the collective Jummo movement^[15], and create an entity opposed to the implementation of the CHT Accord and the PCJSS, the political group that signed the Accord.

Allegedly, supported directly by the military, Nathan worked tirelessly to unite the Zo^[16] hnahthlak [Zo descendants] six Indigenous groups in the CHT while spreading animosity against other major Indigenous communities, particularly the Chakmas. During this period, Nathan organized numerous workshops and meetings with the Zo descendant groups and their leaders in the CHT, promoting Kuki-Chin (Zo) nationalism. He emphasized their distinct identity and the need for unification under Zo nationalism.

It is indeed true that historically, these six groups are descendants of the Mizo-Chin-Kuki (Zo) groups, the majority of whom reside in Manipur and Mizoram in India and Chin State in Myanmar. Culturally and linguistically, they share more similarities with the Zo groups in Myanmar and India than with other Indigenous communities in the CHT, such as the Chakmas, Marmas, Tripura, Tanchangya, and others. However, this has never disrupted their communal harmony with other Indigenous groups in the CHT, despite the military's long-standing attempts to create division (further elaborated in the next part of this article).

However, the leaders of the six Zo descendant groups, including Nathan’s own Bawm civil society members and elders, turned him down sensing it was a “divide and rule policy plot” from the Bangladesh military. Nathan’s own Bawm civil society leaders and elders further warned him that he was spreading seeds of division among the Indigenous groups of the CHT and being used by the military to create communal division. Despite his efforts, Nathan failed to convince the leaders of the Zo descendant groups or the respected elders and leaders within his own Bawm community. Only a small fraction of the Bawm community, mainly the younger generation who saw the Army’s backup for Nathan as a path to achieving anything in the CHT, became his followers. This group even started lauding Nathan as a visionary leader of the Bawm.^[17] Nevertheless, the Bawm elders, civil society members, and educated Bawm individuals recognized the danger and warned Nathan about the communal instability his actions could cause among the Indigenous groups of the CHT. They further cautioned him about falling into a military trap, but Nathan remained steadfast in his vision. A Bawm leader interviewed remarked, “Nathan became so delusional, he was daydreaming about becoming the leader of the Bawm territory that the military had promised him.”^[18]

Nathan's Appeal for Support from Zo Communities in India and Myanmar and the Rise of KNF/KNA

Besides fostering Zo nationalism within the CHT, Nathan Bawm consistently sought support from the Zo community leaders outside Bangladesh. Zo leaders in India interviewed, confirmed that since 2010/2011, Nathan regularly visited Mizoram and Manipur, meeting with Zo leaders to inform them about the Zo groups in the CHT and to seek backing for his dream of establishing a Zo territory there. During this time, he also met leaders from the Mizoram-based Zo Reunification Organization (ZORO), including then-president Pu R. Thanmawia. Nathan explained them the plight of Zo descendants living in the CHT and requested their intervention. Zo contacts in India provided an old interview with Nathan Bawm, published on August 15, 2013, by the Manipur-based Zo media outlet "Zogam Today. In the interview, Nathan mentioned that ZORO leaders declined his request, stating: “They said those problems were out of the purview of their interference”^[19].

Nathan's persistent efforts finally bore fruit, however, around 2016, when the Chin National Front (CNF), a Chin nationalist political organization from Myanmar's Chin State, called on all Zo descendant groups to join its armed wing, the Chin National Army (CNA), to fight the Myanmar military, Tatmadaw, in Kachin State. Nathan saw this as a prime opportunity to obtain military training for his followers and subsequently use them in the CHT and thus began recruiting  Bawm youth to join the CNA.

In 2017, Nathan allegedly sent 42 Bawm individuals to Chin State, where they were later transferred to Kachin State for training and combat as CNA members.^[20] A few individuals who witnessed Nathan’s recruiting process in Bandarban alleged that the Bangladesh military had full knowledge of it. They further alleged that before the 42 Bawm individuals headed to Chin State, they had to provide a copy of their National Identity Card at the Ruma Zone. They also mentioned a Bawm person from Bandarban who currently lives in Canada, worked as a facilitator between the Chin National Front and Nathan Bawm. A journalist who worked in the CHT for over a decade further alleged in an article that these Bawm members “went to Chin State of Myanmar for military training with the help of some top officials of local security forces”^[21].

Return of Bawm Militants and the Formation of KNF/KNA

Although the 42 Bawm youth trained and fought as CNA members in Kachin State, establishing the rights of the Chin people was never their primary intention. Their main goal was to gain military training and experience for future use in the CHT, a hidden agenda unbeknownst to the CNF and CNA^[22].

During combat with the Tatmadaw, two of the 42 died, and the remaining 40 fled the CNA camp, returning to Bandarban in 2019. Nathan then formed the Kuki-Chin National Army (KNA) with these trained Bawm youth and began training others. As all members of this group were from the Bawm community, locals began referring to it as the "Bawm Party" instead of KNF/KNA. According to information we obtained from the ground, the current size of the armed KNF members is estimated to be around 200-250.

The KNA's first headquarters and training center were established at the tri-junction area (Indo-Bangladesh-Myanmar border) in Remakri Pangsha Mouza of Ruma. They later moved their headquarters to Renklan Hill (some Indigenous groups also call it Kuki Mountain/Hill in the hilly range between Rainkhyong valley and Thega hill), then to Ramjung Pahar (the Bawm call it Sippi Hill), one hour walking distance from the Ronin Para Army camp. Sippi Hill served as their headquarters until October 2022, when the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) initiated their first crackdown due to evolving circumstances, which are detailed later in this article.^[23]

Alleged Collaboration between KNF/KNA and Bangladesh Military: Witness Accounts

Despite the formation of KNF's armed wing, KNA, the Bangladesh military openly continued supporting Nathan and the KNF. According to civilians interviewed, senior officials from Ruma Zone frequently met with Nathan and KNF members in front of Bawm civilians, held meetings with Bawm elders to show support for KNF, and even provided cash in front of Bawm civilians on several occasions. A villager from Ronin Para recalled an incident just before RAB's first operation against KNA in October 2022, where Lieutenant Colonel Shahriar Iqbal, Commanding Officer of Ruma Zone, 28 Bengal Regiment, held a meeting with armed KNA members at a village elder’s house in Ronin Para.^[24] KNF’s armed members, led by the so-called Brigadier General (KNF’s General Secretary), were also present at the meeting. During the meeting, Lieutenant Colonel Shahriar handed over 30,000 Taka (approx. 235 Euro) to Brigadier Moya and mentioned that he had previously given 23 lakhs Taka (approx. 18,000 Euro) to Nathan Bawm.^[25]

As mentioned earlier, Nathan had garnered significant backing from high-ranking military officers in Bandarban, including the General Officer Commanding of the Chittagong Division since 2008. According to interviewees, following the emergence of Nathan's armed group in 2021, alongside Lieutenant Colonel Shahriar, at least three other senior military figures supported him and were noted as key patrons of Nathan and the KNF.

Since KNA started operating, supplies for its armed members were provided by the Bangladesh Army, according to witnesses. Supplies for KNF used to be transported from Rwangchari to a location two miles before the Ronin Para army camp in open jeeps, locally known as "Chander Gari," sturdy four-wheel vehicles strong enough to operate in hilly areas. This point marked the final stretch of road leading to Ronin Para, as vehicles could not proceed further due to inaccessible road conditions. However, road construction is currently in progress in the area. Supplies would be unloaded there early in the morning under the supervision of the military from Ronin Para Army camp, who would then inform the Village Defense Police (VDP) members from Ronin Para to bring Bawm porters from the village to carry and deliver the items to KNF’s camp. Sometimes, the amount of supplies was so immense that they required 20-30 porters to transport them in the hilly terrain leading to KNF’s base. Observing the close relationship between KNF and the Bangladesh military, local Bawm began to think that KNF was part of the Bangladesh military or government, and many believed that it was only a matter of time before Nathan would establish his promised autonomous Bawm territorial area.^[26]

Photo: KNF and Bangladesh Border Guard members (circled in red) patrolling together in the ongoing Border Road Construction area in Ruma. Source: Provided by anonymous sources who prefer not to disclose their name/s.

KNF/KNA: Simply another Instrument for Implementing the Military's Divide and Rule Strategy

Many readers might question why the Bangladesh military would support such an armed group and what they stand to gain from it. To understand this, we must examine the Bangladesh military's involvement in their purported peacebuilding efforts in the CHT more closely.

The military and its intelligence have a notorious history of pitting one Indigenous group against another to thwart the collective movement of the Jummo community (collective name for the Indigenous Peoples in the CHT, who traditionally practice Jum cultivation (shifting cultivation)). For instance, in the mid-1980s, the army allegedly facilitated the formation of the “Murong Bahini” or Mro Party, an armed group comprising Mro Indigenous community members, and incited them against the PCJSS during the insurgency period.

The authors had the opportunity to speak with a former commander of the Murong Bahini, who claimed during that time they received armed training from the military to combat the Shanti Bahini, PCJSS's guerrilla group that surrendered their arms in 1997 as part of the signing of the CHT Accord. In return for fighting the Shanti Bahini, Murong Bahini members were provided a monthly ration and monthly sum of Taka 700 (approx. 6 Euro). Although the Shanti Bahini’s armed movement ended with the signing of the CHT Accord, this support and patronage of the Murong Bahini persists till now.

At a military-sponsored Mro conference in Alikadam of Bandarban on 11 July 2022, Alikadam Zone Commander Lt. Colonel Monjurul Hasan openly commended the Murong Bahini's activities, and said: “the Murong community has been playing a great role in eradicating terrorism in the hills along with the army. They have formed the Murong Bahini and are maintaining peace in the hills by confronting the separatists” (translated from Bengali).^[27]

Following the signing of the Accord, the military regularly organizes and sponsors such separate dialogues and conferences with various Indigenous groups in CHT, instructing them not to support the Jummo movement and to take action against those advocating for the CHT Accord's implementation and Jummo rights, a group they consider to be "terrorists/separatists." They also interfere with CHT's traditional systems, organizing "Headmen/Karbari conferences" very often without consulting the respective traditional Circle Chiefs^[28], and instruct the Headmen and Karbaris^[29] in attendance to do the same —to refrain from supporting the Jummo movement.^[30]

Photo: Murong conference organized by the military on 11 July 2022. Credit: Bangla News.

Photo: Military instructing the traditional Headmen/Karbari at a Headmen/Karbari conference organized by the military in March 2022 in Rajasthali. Source: Source does not want to disclose their name/s.

Besides KNF, the military is reportedly backing at least two other armed groups in the CHT that are involved in the targeted killings of political activists advocating for Jummo peoples’ rights and CHT Accord implementation and are causing terror in the region. One such group, the Marma Nationalist Party (MNP), also known as Magh Party or Marma Liberation Party (MLP), emerged in 2018 with some misguided Marma youth portraying themselves as an armed group seeking to secure Marma community’s rights. Similar to KNF, they are active on social media, regularly posting armed group photos threatening the Chakma community, PCJSS, and CHT Accord, while lauding the Bangladesh Army and even demanding expanded army presence in the CHT^[31]. Allegedly bolstered by military support, they have grown bold, conducting terror activities in broad daylight, even in Bandarban town, including armed roaming, extortion, and killings^[32].

On 20 September 2022, District Awami League President Kyaw Shwe Hla and Chairman of Bandarban Hill District council, himself hailing from the Marma community, expressed frustration after a large MNP group stayed overnight at a government primary school in Bandarban town, prompting him to call for an urgent press conference with over 30 journalists. He urged security force intervention to safeguard Bandarban residents from MNP, and said: “The fact that terrorists can enter a government primary school with so many weapons despite the presence of so many security forces in the district town is quite alarming (Translated from Bengali)”^[33].  Addressing the journalists, he further asked, "Now you tell me, what is left of Bandarban's security?"^[34] However, security forces never took any action. MNP remains very active, allegedly sheltered by the military, with armed bases in Bangalhalia Bazar of Bangalhalia Union (within 300 meters of Bangalhalia Bazar army camp) and Powaitu Para of Gaindya Union in Rajasthali Upazila.^[35]

Photo: MNP frequently shares photos like this of their armed group members on their social media pages. Source: Collected from MNP's social media page. Note: After being published publicly, this photo has since been deleted. However, they still have videos of their armed groups on their following pages: https://www.facebook.com/100092621020290/videos/272086235696521/ and https://www.facebook.com/100092621020290/videos/318712824556912/

Another alleged military-backed vigilante group, known as “UPDF-Democratic” but locally referred to as “Thengare bahini” or “Mukhosh bahini” (vigilante group), has been active since 2017 and involved in targeted killings of political activists. Their series of killings aimed at activists advocating for the rights of the Jummo people began with the assassination of Mithun Chakma on 3 January 2018^[36]. Their most recent victims were four youth activists killed on 11 December 2023^[37].

A video captured recently, and shared with the authors, from the morning of 4 May 2024, shows a group of 12 armed men from this military-supported vigilante group being apprehended by members of the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) at Erebuniya BGB camp in Barkal. The BGB initially were not aware that the group was a military-supported armed group. The vigilante group was traveling in two speedboats at the time of their interception. In the video, two individuals from the vigilante group, identified by locals, can be heard telling the BGB during the confrontation, "We informed the military before coming to this area; the military is aware of our route”. Interviewees from the area informed us that upon receiving a phone call from the military, the BGB was compelled to release all armed members along with their weapons and ammunition immediately. Following their release, the armed group proceeded to Erebuniya market, where they staged a showdown allegedly in support of an Awami League candidate who was running as Chairman for Barkal Upazila election.^[38]

Civil society organizations in the CHT and the Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission (CHTC) have been repeatedly voicing their concern about the alleged involvement of security forces in supporting, financially and with impunity, such vigilante groups^[39]. In an article published on IWGIA’s website in 2021, the Chakma circle chief wrote how these armed groups are “supported by the security forces, carry illegal weapons, extort money from businesses and harass Indigenous people”^[40].

The military's support of these vigilante groups serves several purposes. Firstly, it enables them to target Jummo political activists who advocate for the CHT Accord's implementation and Jummo peoples’ rights. Secondly, to destroy the Jummo's unified movement. From the military's strategic perspective, it's a matter of delegating the task to others so they avoid blame. Thirdly, creating such armed factions helps perpetuate conflict and violence in the CHT, thus fostering unrest that justifies the military's continued presence and the establishment of more security camps.

One Jummo leader described it as controlled violence to legitimize the military's presence: "The military needs to demonstrate a reason to remain in CHT. Therefore, they create these armed groups and manipulate the internal conflict to justify their presence. However, they maintain full control over the situation, ensuring it never spirals beyond their control”^[41].

Deciphering the Complexity of the KNF Crackdown and Military-KNF Relationship

As detailed earlier, since 2008, the Bangladesh military has provided direct support to Nathan, helping him rise to become the leader of the Bawm community. This support continued even after the formation of the armed group KNF/KNA. However, on 6 October 2022, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), a special paramilitary force, announced at a press conference in Dhaka that they would take action against KNF. Meanwhile, other armed groups allegedly sponsored by the military have remained active, facing no interference from authorities and working towards the military's agenda. This raises the question: What went wrong with KNF? Why did security forces target this group while keeping others active? We sought answers to these questions through interviews with a wide range of professionals at the ground level and found the following insights.

In addition to targeting PCJSS activists and supporters allegedly under military direction and interest, KNF has also involved itself in training some Islamic militants in their camps, which sets them apart from other military-supported vigilante groups. Hill Voice, an online media portal that reports on the CHT, published two reports, on 30 March 2022^[42] and 4 April 2022^[43], about the involvement of KNF in training an Islamic militant group called “Jamaat-e-Arakan”, allegedly under the direction of the Bangladesh Army.

The report published on 4 April included numerous details about the agreement made between KNF and the Islamic militant group. However, despite Hill Voice providing such details, neither did the Bangladesh government/authority take any steps to stop these activities, nor did any other Bangladeshi media come forward with any other report concerning this.

Then, six months later, on 6 October 2022, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) organized a press conference in Dhaka and announced that KNF is providing training to a group called “Jamatul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya” in Bandarban, a new Islamic militant group, in exchange for money. They further announced that RAB would conduct a raid operation in the CHT to counter this.

However, some questions arose.

KNF began their terrorizing  in Bandarban in 2021 and Hill Voice revealed KNF’s training of Islamic militants at the end of March/beginning of April 2022, so why did the authorities remain silent through all that time? And why, all of a sudden, did they decide to take action after so much time had passed? Further, if they wanted to take action against KNF and the Islamic militant group, then why organize such a large, public press conference and alert both groups so loudly beforehand?

Some CHT researchers spoken to made explained, highlighting an intriguing incident less than a month before RAB’s press conference: the visit to India by Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wazed from 5-8 September 2022.

The researchers noted that Indian intelligence and the government had long been aware of KNF's activities and its collaboration with Islamic militant groups^[44]. They believe that during Wazed’s visit to India, a request may have been made to address the KNF issue and the Islamic militant group operating near the Indian border. It's likely that Wazed was also briefed about the alleged role of the Bangladesh military in supporting KNF. Consequently, the RAB, which operates primarily in the plains and has limited knowledge of CHT's terrain, was tasked with cracking down on the KNF, rather than involving the local military, which is more familiar with the area.

As previously noted, less than a week before RAB announced its crackdown on KNF, the Commanding Officer from Ruma, met with KNA’s self-declared Brigadier Moya and gave him money, indicating that even at that point, the local military was unaware of the government's plan to crack down on KNF.

Another lingering question is the military's alleged involvement in KNF's training of Islamic militants, especially considering Bangladesh's past struggles with Islamic extremism.

Why would security forces allow such a threat to resurface?

While KNF aiding the military's agenda against PCJSS and Accord supporters is understandable, what remains puzzling is why did the military allow the presence of Islamic militants in KNF's camps.

CHT experts that we interviewed argue that the reason is because these militants posed no direct threat to Bangladesh as they were obtaining training for operations outside the country, in Myanmar's Arakan region. Additionally, though Hill Voice, the media organization that first rang the bell about this Islamic militant group, named the group as “Jamaat-e-Arakan”; but during their press conference, the RAB referred to the group as “Jamatul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya”. Intriguingly, a militant group by this name had never existed in Bangladesh before, and it was the first time the RAB had mentioned this name^[45].

CHT interviewees speculate that the omission of the name “Jamaat-e-Arakan” and the introduction of a completely new name was likely intended to downplay the use of Bangladeshi territory for training a militant group destined to operate abroad. Additionally, it is speculated that instead of quietly cracking down on the KNF and the Islamic militant group, the authorities organized such a big press conference and encouraged the media to loudly report on their actions to ensure that India clearly hears they are taking measures.

At the onset of RAB’s operation, there seemed to be a lack of coordination between RAB and the local military. There are even allegations that local security forces aided Nathan and Islamic militant leader Shamim Mahfuz's escape during RAB's raid^[46]. Residents near Ronin Para and KNF's camp were caught off guard by RAB's sudden crackdown, as they had long believed KNF to be aligned with security forces. Interviewees also revealed that during RAB's operation, Nathan was absent from Sippi headquarters, conducting banking transactions in Amirabad, Chittagong, allegedly with funds provided by the military. He was at Painkhiyong Para en route to KNF headquarters when RAB initiated their operation, prompting him to relocate to the Remakri Pangsha area, allegedly under the guidance of local military authorities.

RAB’s attack on Sippi camp did not go very well as it was done without any support from the local military who knows the area. Several RAB members were injured and our interviewees confirmed that the KNF captured some RAB arms. Later, the local military intervened and brokered a deal with KNF to recover the arms. Interviewees alleged to the authors that the military paid a handsome amount of money to KNF to recover RAB’s arms. After the negotiation, KNF left the arms next to a football field at Artha Para, around 12 km east of Ruma Bazar, where the military collected them.^[47]

Ultimately, the military had to revise their stance on KNF and joined the RAB in the raid. Despite this reversal, the military continued their manipulative tactics by involving non-state armed groups and their own supported vigilante group in the operation. According to interviewees, the Bangladesh Army also deployed a group of armed Arakan Army^[48] fighters to attack KNF bases at one point. On 16 November 2022, the Arakan Army attacked KNF members at Cheihkhiang Para (near the Myanmar border adjacent to Silopi Para) and Theikhiang Para (east of Keukaradong Hill, adjacent to Sunsong Headmen Para) in the 374 Remakri Panghsa Mouza of Ruma Upazila.^[49] This confrontation resulted in casualties and the loss of arms for the Arakan Army.

Following this incident, Nathan Bawm wrote a letter to Prime Minister Wazed dated 8 December 2022, stating: "It is indeed truly regrettable that our government has engaged a foreign militia group – the Arakan Army of Rakhine state, Myanmar – to wage war upon us, in an apparent bid to dislocate us from our own lands, for reasons best known to the government themselves”^[50].

After involving the Arakan Army, the military allegedly sent a group of UPDF (Democratic) armed members who committed massacres against Bawm civilians. In a press statement released on 12 April 2023, the CHT-Commission demanded a judicial investigation into the killing of Bawm civilians by this group, but such an investigation never occurred^[51].

Finally, the military’s raid against KNF came to a halt after KNF decided to pause their relationship with the Islamic militant group they were training and stopped sheltering them in their bases. However, before the Islamic militants left KNF’s base, KNF signed an agreement with them stating that their arms and ammunition would remain under KNF's care, with the obligation to return them when the militants could safely return to KNF’s bases. The authors have received a copy of the agreement, which also lists the details of the weapons and ammunition.

Photo: Copy of the agreement signed between KNF and the Islamic militants regarding the caretaking of the Islamic militant group’s arms and ammunition. Source: The copy was obtained from local sources who wish to remain anonymous.

Subsequently, a "Peace Establishment Committee" was formed on 30 May 2023, composed of members from various Indigenous groups, including representatives from the Bawm community, and headed by Bandarban Hill District Council Chairman Kyaw Shwe Hla. The committee aimed to handle the KNF situation peacefully. However, there remains some confusion regarding the motives and formation of this "Peace Establishment Committee." For instance, in an interview with Prothom Alo journalist Partha Shankar Shaha on April 7, 2024, State Minister for Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs, Kujendra Lal Tripura, stated that he had no knowledge of this committee and that his ministry did not approve anything about this committee^[52].  Also, the CHT Regional Council, the apex body established as part of the CHT Accord, was neither consulted nor informed about this peace committee or its initiatives^[53]. Rashed Khan Menon, President of the Workers Party of Bangladesh, further mentioned to Prothom Alo, "KNF and their peace talks – everything  remain a mystery to me. There is no transparency here”^[54].  However, despite not having any solid validation, after security forces halted their raid, the Peace Establishment Committee and KNF held two rounds of virtual meetings on 19 July and 4 August 2023^[55].

During the first virtual meeting, KNF agreed to a ceasefire and agreed to continue dialogue with the committee. In the second meeting, KNF presented a six-point list of demands to the government through this Peace Establishment Committee. We provide a brief summary of these key points below (the actual demand booklet is six pages long):   

• Formation of an autonomous Kuki-Chin Territorial Council (KTC), which will operate independently of the jurisdiction of the CHT District Council and CHT Regional Council.
• Land rights and tourism will fall under the jurisdiction of the Kuki-Chin Territorial Council (KTC), with no oversight from the Circle Chief. Even Bengalis can settle with permission from the KTC.
• Formation of a new police administration under the Kuki-Chin Territorial Council (KTC).
• Grant general amnesty to KNF members and withdraw all police cases against them.
• Rehabilitate Kuki-Chin refugees and displaced individuals.
• Establishment of the Kuki-Chin Armed Battalion (KAB) under the command of the General Officer Commanding of the 24th Infantry Division of the Bangladesh Army.

CHT experts strongly argue that these six-point demands are entirely concocted by the military. For example, the inclusion of clause 6, which proposes the establishment of the KAB, serves to legalize KNA's armed presence and place it directly under military control. Although KNA has covertly operated under military command since its inception, this clause would openly acknowledge and authorize it. Clause 6 primarily targets countering PCJSS in the envisioned KTC area, a key motive behind fostering KNA/KNF. Moreover, if KNF/KNA succeeds in negotiating a new agreement with the government and manages to establish the KTC, it would challenge Shantu Larma^[56] and PCJSS's representation as the Jummo group's collective voice. Additionally, the demand for KTC's exclusion (clause 1) from both the Regional and District Council's jurisdiction poses substantial obstacles to implementing the CHT Accord^[57]. Clause 2 of KNF’s demand is also alarming as it significantly aids the military in legitimizing land acquisitions, fostering their tourism ventures, and facilitating Bengali settlement, all of which counter the objectives of the CHT Accord. Interestingly, the second clause also explicitly mentions the “military’s tourism industry” falling under KTC's jurisdiction^[58]. Describing how the entire KNF issue and their demands are a plot by a vested interest group to hinder the implementation of the CHT Accord, a civil society leader from CHT stated in an interview with Prothom Alo:

"Even a child can understand who or what is really behind the activities of the KNF. The main purpose of these groups is to undermine the core spirit of the CHT Accord. A major vested interest group is supporting their activities from behind the scenes. This is not new in the hills. However, the government should never support them." (Translated from Bengali^[59])

Photo: Map illustrating the proposed Kuki-Chin Territorial Council (KTC). Source: Collected from KNF’s demand booklet sent to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wazed.

The first round of in-person meetings between KNF and the Peace Establishment Committee occurred on 5 November 2023, at Munlai Para in Ruma, Bandarban. This meeting involved representatives from the District Administration, Police, Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), and Directorate General of National Security Intelligence (NSI). Ander Lal Eng Lian Bawm, serving as KNF's representative for Peace Dialogue, signed a four-point mutual agreement with Kyaw Shwe Hla led Peace Establishment Committee during this session. Meanwhile, the relationship between KNF and security forces had apparently stabilized, allowing KNF to resume its brutal activities against various communities, including on their own Bawm community members who did not support them. These activities included extortion, torture, and even killings^[60]. On 5 February 2023, they abducted Laram Bawm, a vocal critic of KNF’s atrocities, whose lifeless body was discovered two days later^[61].

Photo: 4-point agreement between KNF and the Peace Establishment Committee, signed on 5 November 2023. Source: Obtained from contacts in Bandarban.

Photo: Two KNF members were photographed with a BGB member during peace talks, indicating a normalization in the relationship between KNF and security forces. Source: Source prefers to remain anonymous.

A second physical meeting took place on 5 March 2024, at Bethel Para, where seven mutual agreements were signed. These included commitments to address the implementation of KNF's six-point demands, release arrested KNF members, review the military's appointment of porters, provide health, education, and food support for the Kuki-Chin people, create favorable conditions for refugees to return, and KNF’s continuation of ceasefire and cooperation with security forces until the next meeting.

Both parties scheduled a third meeting for 22 April 2024. However, before this meeting could occur, the KNF robbed two banks on April 2 and 3 in Ruma and Thanchi, respectively. In response, Kyaw Shwe Hla announced the suspension of peace dialogues with the KNF at a press conference on 4 April 2024^[62].

Photo: 7 mutual agreements signed between KNF and the Peace Establishment Committee on 5 March 2024.

The motive behind the KNF's bank robbery during ongoing peace talks, especially when their relationship with security forces had normalized, remains unclear. Interviewees from Bandarban speculate that it was a strategic move to demonstrate their capability and exert pressure on the government regarding their six-point demands. For the scheduled third physical meeting, the KNF requested a high-level delegation from the central government in Dhaka, rather than the Bandarban-based committee led by Kyaw Shwe Hla^[63], knowing that the local committee lacks the authority and capacity to implement their demands. However, the government did not respond positively to this request^[64]. The bank robbery might have been an attempt to capture the government's attention.

Additionally, it remains a mystery why security forces did not take any action against the KNF while they were robbing the banks. Interviewees from the area informed that a group of armed KNA members had been staying at Bethelpara (the location of the last peace talk) for a few months before the bank robbery, maintaining a friendly relationship with security forces. Bethelpara is just one kilometer away from Ruma Sadar where the bank robbery occurred, and there are Army and BGB camps nearby. Locals find it suspicious that no response came from these nearby army camps during the bank robberies. For instance, the Ruma Bazar army camp is just 150 meters from Sonali Bank, yet the army did not intervene when KNA fired shots and retreated to Bethelpara. Similarly, in Thanchi, armed KNA members arrived in three jeeps during daylight from Chandakpara and Tongkyong Para and took the same route back after the bank robbery, yet faced no challenge from the military, despite the presence of BGB and Army camps right next to Thanchi Bazar^[65]. These camps are within 2-3-minute walking distance from the banks. Furthermore, CCTV footage that emerged in the media^[66] shows that KNF entered the banks with single-barrel nock volley guns, typically used for hunting in the CHT, and managed to take submachine guns from the police and paramilitary Ansar force^[67] with those hunting guns. If security forces from the nearby camps had responded, the KNF wouldn't have stood a chance with their hunting rifles. Also, despite having sophisticated automatic weapons, the KNF did not bring any of those, as if they knew they would not be challenged.

Is there a Connection Between the Bawm Plight in Bandarban and the Kuki-Meitei Conflict in Manipur?

With the current plight of the Bawm in Bandarban and the violence between the Meitei and Kukis in Manipur, many have wondered if there are connections between the two issues, given that the Bawm and Kukis in Manipur belong to the same Zo group. To explore this, we interviewed several Zo civil society leaders for their opinions.

One Zo leader who is well-connected with various Zo groups in the region, responded: "No connection at all. The Kukis in Manipur are busy dealing with their own issues at home. They neither have the time, energy, nor resources to pay attention to what’s happening with a handful of their Zo group members far away in Bandarban."

The leader acknowledged that Nathan was initially inspired by other Kuki-Chin^[68] movements from neighbouring states and sought their support. However, apart from receiving sympathy, the ongoing KNF or Bawm issue in Bandarban is unrelated to the conflicts involving the Kukis in Manipur, Mizoram, or the Chin state of Myanmar.

With the influx of Bawm refugees in Mizoram, various Mizo associations in Mizoram have been providing aid^[69] to the refugees and released statements demanding protection and safeguards^[70]. Even the Kuki association in Manipur issued statements supporting the refugees, urging an end to the atrocities against the Bawm in the CHT^[71]. Zo contacts confirmed that is the highest level of support the Kuki-Chin groups outside Bangladesh have provided; there is nothing more than that. There is neither financial nor any other support coming from outside the borders to assist the KNF movement in the CHT. They further mentioned that even the moral support KNF initially received diminished after revelations about KNF’s involvement in training Islamic militants and the atrocities faced by Bawm communities due to their miscreant activities in the hills.

On many occasions, Bawm civil society in Bandarban organized human chains and protests against the criminal and delusional activities of KNF and Nathan^[72], which Zo organizations outside the borders were aware of. Sources from the Zo community further confirmed there is no involvement of any outsider Zo person in the activities of KNF to establish their proposed KTC in the CHT. Despite Nathan Bawm's attempts to garner foreign support, he has never been successful, apart from sending Bawm individuals to join the Chin State Army in 2017. There is not a single member in KNF who hails from outside the CHT. They confirmed that KNF and their KTC issue is an entirely homegrown idea of Nathan Bawm and its alleged sponsor, the Bangladesh military.

However, despite the apparent lack of linkages between the Kuki issue in Manipur and KNF issues in Bandarban, a civil society leader in CHT warned:

“If the Bangladesh military does not stop these sponsored fratricidal conflicts and keeps meddling with Indigenous groups to create armed groups, CHT could turn worse than Manipur. In Manipur, there are only two groups fighting—the Kukis and the Meiteis. In CHT, it could turn into a multi-faceted conflict among the Bawm, Marma, Tripura, Chakma, Tanchangya, Mro, and others. Tracking who is killing whom would be even harder if the military does not stop soon."^[73]

Activists from CHT further informed that for some years, the military has been attempting to create another armed faction from the Tripura community living in Bandarban, though they have not yet been successful.

To ensure peace and harmony among Indigenous groups in the CHT and Bangladesh, it is crucial that the military abandon such foul-play and immediately dismantle all the armed vigilante groups supported by them. As the KNF issue has shown, playing with fire is dangerous and uncontrollable, often backfiring. Since the crackdown on KNF began, a few security personnel have also been killed and injured.

The above sections hopefully have clarified the history and rise of the KNF, their relationship with the Bawm community, and why the military is targeting only the Bawm community in their raids against KNF. It is very unfortunate how, due to the actions of a small number of Bawm individuals misled by Nathan and the military, the entire Bawm community is now paying a steep price in terms of lives and livelihoods. The Bawm civil society leaders interviewed said that security forces are accusing the entire Bawm community of being KNF supporters and treating all Bawm as KNF. It is regrettable how the military’s divide-and-rule policy and Nathan Bawm’s unrealistic ambitions have pushed the entire Bawm community to the verge of annihilation.

But what about the military personnel who orchestrated and sponsored the rise of KNF and Nathan Bawm? Will these military officers face any consequences?

In the next part, we explore the grim level of human rights violations that the Bawm community is currently facing.

PART 2: Human Rights Violations against the Bawn Community

According to Bangladesh's latest census report of 2022, there were only 13,193 Bawm people in the country. Since the first round of crackdowns on the Bawm community by Bangladeshi security forces beginning in October 2022 through 2023, the CHTC reported in two separate press statements^[74] that at least 12 civilians were killed and many were injured by the Bangladesh military and armed vigilante groups supported by the military A few hundred Bawm sought refuge in India, and more than 2,000 were displaced^[75].

In addition to robbing money from two banks and 14 firearms in April 2024, KNF also kidnapped a bank manager, who was released after a few days.

Nine First Information Reports (FIRs) were filed—four in Thanchi and five in Ruma—under various sections of the Special Powers Act 1974 and the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009^[76]. These FIRs included charges of bank robbery, arms theft, and kidnapping. Interestingly, no KNF members were named in any of the FIRs; instead, over 180 unnamed individuals were charged.

On 7 April 2024, Bangladesh Army Chief General SM Shafiuddin Ahmed visited Bandarban and ordered a military operation against the KNF^[77]. That same day, mass arrests of Bawm people began. Over 115 Bawm civilians have since been imprisoned, including children as young as two months old and elderly individuals as old as 72. Among the arrested are students, schoolteachers, pastors, government employees, businessmen and Jum farmers. At least 26 Bawm girls and women, including two pregnant women, are also among those arrested. Many Bawm civilians allegedly remain in the custody of security forces without being formally jailed, and numerous Bawm men are reportedly detained by military forces and being used as porters during the military's ongoing raid against the KNF. ^[78]

Media report^[79] indicated that security forces had already identified the KNF members involved in the bank robbery from CCTV footage. The Samakal further mentioned four names, quoting security officials, and confirmed that no women were involved^[80]. Despite this, surprisingly, none of these KNF members, including Nathan Bawm, the head of the KNF, were named in any of the FIRs. Instead, the crackdown has primarily targeted civilians within the Bawm community.

In the past, the Bandarban district administration, security forces, and intelligence agencies participated in two rounds of virtual and physical meetings with KNF members along with the Peace Establishment Committee. Yet, none of these KNF members were identified in the FIRs, not even Nathan Bawm, the head of KNF. Not mentioning any names in the FIRs is allowing security forces to conduct indiscriminate mass arrests of Bawm civilians and charge them under the filed FIRs.

Photo: CCTV footage of KNF’s bank robbery. Credit: Prothom Alo.

Photo: CCTV footage of KNF’s bank robbery. Credit: Prothom Alo.

Harrowing Plight of the Bawm Community amidst Military Raids

The ongoing crackdown has led to a significant displacement of the Bawm community. According to Bawm civil society members, during the first round of crackdown from October 2022 till May 2023, around 2,000 to 3,000 Bawm fled to India and Myanmar following the military raids. Since the operation in April 2024 began, the Times of India reported that 192 Bawm individuals crossed the border for safety^[81]. However, this figure includes only those refugees who are in government shelters. The actual number of Bawm refugees currently taking shelter in India is likely much higher.

Interestingly, not a single Bangladeshi media outlet has neither reported on any Bawm individuals crossing the border, nor have they mentioned the suffering, arrests, or killings of Bawm civilians. Following directives from the military, the entire Bangladeshi media has labeled all arrested and killed Bawm civilians as KNF members.

The Bawm civil society members spoken with estimate that the total number of displaced Bawm individuals since 7 April 2024 exceeds 2,000. They also mentioned that most recently, on 31 May 2024, another 163 Bawm individuals entered the Chamdur project area of Mizoram, which has not yet been reported by any media.

Photo: Bawm civilians fleeing to India, escaping military persecution in their village. Source: The source does not want to disclose their name/s.

Photo: Bawm refugees in the jungle. Source: The source does not want to disclose their name/s.

Photo: Bawm refugees in the jungle. Source: The source does not want to disclose their name/s.

Since October 2022, more than 4,000 Bawm have been displaced from their ancestral lands due to the severe crackdown on Bawm civilians in the name of raid against KNF. The author managed to obtain firsthand interviews of several Bawm civilians who witnessed and managed to escape the military’s ongoing brutality against the Bawm community. Besides the mass arrest of civilians, since 7 April 2024, at least 10 civilians have been killed by the military, with victims as young as 13 years old. There have also been several allegations, confirmed by interviewees, of extrajudicial killings by security forces.

One interviewee recounted that on 2 May 2024, the military encircled Painkhyang Para in the Rowangchari sub-district, gathered all the villagers inside the church, tortured and harassed them, and arbitrarily arrested 21 Bawm men.

This is how it is described what happened inside the church:

“When the clock struck around three, we heard gunshots. After hearing them, all the women and children in the village started crying out of fear. We, the men, immediately decided to tell everyone to seek shelter inside the church. At the same time, a soldier urged us to take refuge inside the church. We all took shelter there.

However, soon after, a group of soldiers entered the church premises and threatened us severely. Then they went outside. After some time, they came inside the church again. Among them, an officer, whom I heard they were calling a captain, came directly to me and slapped me hard right next to my ear. Then, he verbally abused us, calling us Kuki terrorists, and kicked a Bawm person with a disability. There were around 60 men present, and the army hit and tortured all of us. They then left, only to return shortly and continue torturing us in the same manner. They took away a person named J, asking him about his daughter's whereabouts. When he said he had no daughter, they hit him with the gun under his ribs. They were torturing everyone in the same way. They slapped some of them so hard that they couldn't hear afterward. They snatched away all the phones from the females and also harassed and beat some of them.

From the female side, they moved to the men's side and took a person named C.T. outside, and immediately we heard gunshots. We all assumed they shot him dead, and we all started crying. Then they grabbed L.M.T, and again, immediately we heard gunshots. Then they took J.L.S. and others one at a time, and we heard gunshots. We assumed that they killed everyone who was taken outside.

We were all in extreme fear.

The military was scolding us and asking, ‘#Give us the names of who you've been talking to’. They kept us locked inside the church, hungry and terrified all day long. When they took R.K. outside, we heard gunshots again. Then they also took B.C, and we heard gunshots afterward again. Then the Army came later and ordered us not to go outside. They counted our numbers and strictly ordered us not to go outside. We were so scared and powerless inside the church that we couldn't even muster the courage to speak among ourselves.

Eventually, around 10 or 11 at night, we realized the army was no longer there, and then we slowly came outside. In total, they took 21 people outside; we don't know how many have been killed or sent to jail. After the events of that day, we were so terrified by the torture and abuse that we still live in fear.

The next day we moved out of the village, starving, and came to the jungle.”

Information was obtained indicating that at least two of the individuals taken from the church that day were killed by the military. The body of one person, named L.M.T. (age 25), was discovered in the jungle the next day. Police later retrieved the body and took it to Bandarban town for a postmortem examination. Villagers confirmed that L.M.T. was mentally challenged and entirely dependent on his family for daily activities. The dead body of another person taken by the military from the church, V. Bawm (age 38, married and father of two children), was found four days later, on 6 May, in the jungle. The police also recovered his body and transported it to Bandarban for a postmortem.

The authors learned that after the police recovered the two bodies and brought them to Bandarban, they were buried secretly under strict security force protection in Bandarban town, and no family members were allowed to attend the burials. Both deceased hail from Painkhyang Para.

The authors, from information obtained from interviewees, learned that the attack on the village was in retaliation to an attack on a military patrol team by the KNF at Kaplong Para in Rowangchari, resulting in several military personnel being injured.

The authors also managed to obtain an interview of another Bawm civilian from the area who was taken by the military to work as a porter on that same day. He described the events as follows:

“A total of 48 residents were taken by the military as porters. Very early in the morning, they fed everyone a little khichuri [one spoonful] each. Then we worked all day. Around 3:30 in the afternoon [estimated] on May 2nd, we heard the sudden sound of gunfire. A little later, half of the porters from my group [a total of 12 in the group] were allowed to eat, and we, the rest, continued working.

As the sound of gunfire intensified, the military gathered all of us [porters] together and warned that if any single army person was killed by gunfire, they would kill all 12 of us and pointed the gun at us. Then we were told to sit in one place. We were all very afraid. We were calling the creator. Then some of them left somewhere in a vehicle, and a little while later they returned.

In a downpour, they confined all of us in the small makeshift room. Then Yasheen [the army officer] started calling one by one, tying our hands, and keeping us together by tying everyone by the waist with the same rope.

Gradually, it was my turn. As I approached, they said, ‘Not you,’ and called someone next to me and tied his hands and waist. His name was M.

Among a total of 12, they tied up 6 of us. We all thought today was our last day. So repeatedly, we were calling God. I am myself a religious leader of our group, there was also a pastor named V. I told everyone to pray, because at that time we had no other way.

A little while later, I saw they were bringing the village headman towards us. They asked him to sit about 1 bamboo [20-30 feet] away from us and said, ‘You are the ones who said there are no Kuki here, you must be the ones who reported us to them and asked them to shoot’ — saying this, they grabbed branches of the Painnyagulo tree (a local fruit tree) from behind us that we had kept for work, and two of them kept hitting him very hard with those branches. They were hitting him in a way as if they were beating an animal. At some point, he could barely move from the beating. Then they tied his hands from behind and asked him to lie on the ground. As he could not move on his own, the military dragged and slammed him on the ground. Then Yasheen asked four other soldiers to beat him up further. They kept kicking him repeatedly, and also the gunfire continued nearby.

The rest of us were asked to continue working till 7.30 pm to complete making the makeshift huts. Then when it became dark, they told us to leave. We asked is it gonna be safe to walk back now? They said there would be no problem, we are here. If there is a problem, call Mr. Atik [a military officer]. Then we started walking back to the village and as we reached nearer, we shouted, ‘Atik Sir, Atik Sir,’ and then he approached us and asked us to sit down. Since we hadn't eaten all day, instead of rice, he gave us three packets of biscuits and said, ‘Don't go here and there, go straight home.’ Then we six, each started walking towards our home.

When I reached my uncle's house nearby, I heard the women crying. After seeing me, they started crying more because the military had also taken my uncle's son, and he hadn't returned until then. Then when I reached my home, everyone started crying after seeing me and said, ‘you are alive!’ I reassured them that I am fine and told them out of 12 people that the army took as porters from our village, they released 6 of us, and I don't know the whereabouts of the other 6.

Pastor V's wife caught hold of me and asked, ‘Where is your little brother [her husband]?’ I said, ‘I've returned! But I don't know about them.’ Then my household members grabbed me and kept crying. I consoled them and told them I would leave the village today, and you should come along. Then I took more than 30 villagers with me and fled the village that night amidst the rain. On the dark, rainy night, my grandson was bitten by a snake, his hand was swollen, so it was very difficult to run along with him and the bags. We had 3 women in the group who fled with us along with their 2-3 year old kids.

We are still alive because we fled the village but worry about those who remained in the village.”

These interviews reveal the severe hardships Bawm civilians are currently enduring. In the Remakri Pangsa Union and Swalok Union, most Bawm villages are either completely deserted or lack male residents due to ongoing military raids. During these raids, villagers are brutally tortured, collectively punished, and detained. In one shocking incident on 11 April in Eden Para, Ruma, Bandarban, the military forced the entirety of the village, including children, women, and the elderly, to stand under the scorching sun all day without food or water while enduring physical torture. Also, in the military's ongoing operation against the KNF, a handful of Bawm civilians are reportedly being used as porters, working without any pay or food. Last year, there were even allegations of civilians being used as human shields during raids against the KNF^[82].

Photo: Bawm refugees in the jungle. Source: The source does not want to disclose their name/s.

In Ruma and Thanchi, Bawm villagers are not allowed to carry more than 5 kilos of rice, in some places the limit is just 1 kilo. Their belongings are thoroughly searched, preventing them from carrying significant quantities of food, groceries, and medicine. Living in remote areas, it has become nearly impossible for them to go to the market for their daily necessities.^[83]

In Bandarban, every single vehicle is stopped, and all Indigenous-looking passengers are required to show their National Identity Cards. If Bawm individuals are found, they are taken out of the vehicles and detained by security forces^[84]. In Bandarban town, security forces have also raided the homes of Bawm individuals to detain/arrest them. Some have even been arrested from their workplaces, including government offices^[85]. Many are brutally tortured during detention; some are released if lucky, while others are charged and sent to jail. A handful of Bawm individuals who were released after torture are currently undergoing treatment in Bandarban for broken limbs, still considering themselves fortunate not to have been killed or jailed^[86].

Access to basic needs like food, healthcare, and education has become impossible for the Bawm community. The education of Bawm students in these areas is severely disrupted. Many Bawm students who study outside their hometown came home during the Eid vacation in early April and were arrested at checkpoints on their way back to their educational institutions. Many are currently stuck and displaced, and some have even been killed by security forces^[87].

Since 7 April, at least six Bawm students have been killed by the military, one of them just 13 years old^[88]. Local villagers and Bawm civil society leaders confirmed that the six students killed had no affiliation with the KNF. Despite this, every media outlet in Bangladesh, quoting the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), labeled all killed civilians, including these students as KNF members^[89]. Three students killed on 19 May 2024 were also professional football players who played for several third division clubs. Social media was flooded with posts from their club members, friends, and even the clubs' social media pages, emphasizing that they had no ties to the KNF. Some even recounted their recent phone conversations with them, where they described their grim conditions and desperate desire to leave their villages to join their clubs and play football. However, ongoing military raids prevented them from doing so. Yet, no journalist or media outlet conducted independent investigations. Instead, they uncritically labeled all these students as KNF terrorists based on ISPR press releases.

Photo: The killed students’ respective football social media posts mourning the killing of their football players. Source: Facebook.

The media^[90] also labeled the 13-year-old child killed as a KNF member, further frustrating civil society members and rights groups in the CHT. This practice highlights a broader issue in the de facto military-controlled CHT, where media outlets cannot publish anything related to the military’s human rights violations in the CHT.

The deliberate and indiscriminate arrests, torture, eviction, and killing of innocent Bawm civilians, including children, clearly show that the entire Bawm community is being collectively punished for the criminal activities of KNF members belonging to the Bawm community. The blanket labeling of the entire Bawm community as KNF affiliates raises serious concerns about whether security forces are pursuing an ethnic cleansing policy against one of Bangladesh's smallest Indigenous communities.

This systematic targeting not only violates human rights but also threatens the very existence of the Bawm people in the country. With nearly half of the Bawm population already displaced due to the ongoing crackdown, the future of the Bawm community in Bangladesh hangs in the balance.

We urgently appeal the government of Bangladesh:

• To immediately stop the arbitrary arrests, torture, and collective punishment of Bawm civilians.
• Ensure the protection of civilians, especially women, children, and the elderly, in the conflict-affected areas, and to provide safe shelter, food, and medical assistance to displaced Bawm individuals.
• Conduct an independent and transparent investigation into the alleged human rights violations, extrajudicial killings, and mass arrests of Bawm civilians, and ensure accountability for those responsible for the atrocities.
• Allow independent media coverage and reporting on the situation in the CHT without censorship or bias, and promote transparency and accountability in government actions and policies.
• Implement effective measures to facilitate the safe return of Bawm individuals who have sought refuge in India and Myanmar, ensuring their protection and rights upon their return.
• Provide immediate humanitarian assistance, including food, clean water, healthcare, and education, to affected Bawm communities, and collaborate with humanitarian organizations and NGOs to ensure effective delivery of aid.
• Conduct a thorough investigation into the alleged involvement of military officials in supporting KNF and other armed groups in CHT, and ensure that any accused military officials are held accountable through the justice system.
• Direct the military to promptly disband all armed groups that they are alleged to support, taking immediate action to dismantle these groups.
• Engage in long-term conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts in the CHT region, and foster inclusive dialogue, reconciliation, and mutual understanding among all Indigenous groups to promote lasting peace and stability.
• Implement the CHT Accord promptly without any delay and identify individuals within the military and security forces who are obstructing its implementation.

 Top photo: Caution notice board claiming land belonging to abandoned Army camp. Location: Pokkhimuro, Sindukchari. Source: The source does not want to disclose their name/s.

References and notes

^[1] https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/7asvdqv0e3

^[2] https://iwgia.org/en/cht

^[3] https://www.dhakapost.com/national/297794

^[4] https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa13/8076/2024/en/

^[5] The authors interviewed over a dozen eyewitnesses and individuals from various backgrounds and professions. However, for safety reasons, their details and professions are not disclosed. In addition to conducting individual interviews, we also held group interview sessions to cross-check the information received from the ground.

^[6] Although the Kuki-Chin National Army (KNA) Facebook page is no longer active, its counterpart, the Kuki-Chin National Front Facebook page, remains active. We have monitored both pages since their inception and have regularly downloaded materials posted on both.

^[7] Other groups of Indigenous Peoples in the Chittagong Hill Tracts who do not belong to Kuki-Chin group.

^[8] Based on ground-level interviews with those who witnessed the formation and rise of the KNF, they further mentioned that there was one individual in the KNF who was half Khumi on his father's side but grew up in a Bawm-inhabited village.

^[9] KNF frequently made posts like this on their Facebook page. For example, on 7 November 2022, they shared a lengthy status update referring to the 'CHT Accord' as the 'Chakma Accord,' claiming that only the Chakma people were benefiting from it: https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=115446691362769

^[10] PCJSS, the major political party in the CHT, signed the CHT Accord with the government of Bangladesh in 1997. However, the KNF's claim that PCJSS is exclusively a Chakma political group is entirely untrue. Since its inception, PCJSS has been leading the collective movement of the Indigenous Peoples of the CHT, with significant support and participation from all Indigenous groups in the region. While it is true that the Chakma, Tripura, and Marma communities are more numerous in the CHT and thus have greater representation within the party, PCJSS has always represented the broader interests of all Indigenous Peoples in the CHT.

^[11] The CHT Regional Council is the apex body formed under the provisions of the CHT Accord to oversee and coordinate the administration, development, and welfare of the entire CHT. Again, the claim that the CHTRC exclusively represents the Chakmas is entirely untrue.

^[12] Analyzing these statements, Partha Sanka Shaha described KNF's behavior as anti-PCJSS and anti-Chakma aimed at creating divisions: https://www.prothomalo.com/opinion/bcmktr3liv

^[13] Information gleaned from interviews and KNDO documents.

^[14] Based on interviews.

^[15] The Jummo movement emerged after Bangladesh's independence, demanding constitutional recognition and protection of the distinct identity, traditions, and culture of the 13 Indigenous groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), collectively known as Jummo. Successive governments, however, denied these demands, responding instead with militarization and suppression. Consequently, the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS), the unified political party of the Jummo, formed an armed faction called Shanti Bahini in the mid-1970s. After decades of conflict, the armed struggle ended in 1997 with the signing of the CHT Accord. Yet, the fundamental provisions of the Accord remain unimplemented, and militarization and human rights violations against the Jummo people continue unabated in the CHT.

^[16] The Zo communities, also known as Zomi, are Indigenous Peoples primarily residing in northeastern India, northwestern Myanmar, and parts of Bangladesh. They are referred to by different names depending on the region: "Kuki" in Manipur, Nagaland, and Assam; "Mizo" in Mizoram; and "Chin" in Myanmar. The Bawm, Pangkhua, Lushai, Mro, Khumi, and Khyang Indigenous communities in Bangladesh also descend from this larger Kuki-Chin group.

^[17] Information obtained from interviews with leaders from the Zo descendant communities in Bandarban.

^[18] Interview with civil society members who witnessed the rise of KNF/KNA since 2008.

^[19] Cited from the interview. The author's contacts from India have supplied a copy of Nathan's complete interview.

^[20] Based on interviews with Bawm civilians from Bandarban.

^[21] https://www.borderlens.com/features/knf-another-ploy-of-divide-and-rule-in-cht-of-bangladesh/

^[22] Based on interviews with witnesses who observed Nathan's recruitment, knew the KNF members sent to Chin State, and spoke with armed KNF members after their return to Bandarban.

^[23] Based on interviews with locals who witnessed the rise of Nathan Bawm and KNA since 2008.

^[24] We verified the information with several civilians who attended the meeting. They even provided us with the name of the villager at whose house the meeting took place, along with additional details.

^[25] Based on interviews with Bawm civilians who were present at the meeting.

^[26] Information obtained from interviews with locals.

^[27] https://www.banglanews24.com/national/news/bd/943255.details

^[28] Circle Chiefs are traditional administrative authorities in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), often recognized locally as traditional Kings.

^[29] Headmen and Karbaris are traditional village leaders in the traditional administrative system of Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) who operate under the supervision of the respective Circle Chiefs.

^[30] We spoke to Headmen and Karbaris who attended such meetings, they even provided us some audio recordings about what military had instructed them to do.

^[31] Since 2018, MNP has been operating numerous social media pages that the authors have been monitoring. Some of these pages have since been deactivated. Currently, they are using two pages, claiming to be managed by their commanders where they provide updates on their activities: https://fb.watch/sVZB8JXhBo/ and https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100092621020290

^[32] Hill Voice has consistently reported on the atrocities committed by their organization. For example: https://hillvoice.net/en/army-major-instructs-mog-party-in-rajasthali-we-want-dead-body-give-us-corpses/; https://hillvoice.net/en/an-innocent-jumma-shot-dead-by-mog-party-in-kaptai/ and https://hillvoice.net/en/a-jumma-villager-abducted-by-mog-party-terrorists-in-bangalhalia/

^[33] https://m.dailyinqilab.com/article/519611

^[34] https://www.chttoday.com/news/11589

^[35] Information obtained from local sources in CHT, MNP also sometimes openly reveals their location.

^[36] https://www.newagebd.net/article/32021/cht-commission-concerned-at-mithuns-murder

^[37] https://www.iwgia.org/en/bangladesh/5324-cht-commission-condemns-targeted-killings-jumma-activists-calls-urgent-government-action.html

^[38] Based on information obtained from the locals who were present there. There are also allegations that local candidates from the Awami League political party often collaborate with these military-sponsored vigilante groups during elections. For instance, please read: https://hillvoice.net/en/proxy-war-of-the-army-in-cht/

^[39] For example, please see: https://www.iwgia.org/en/bangladesh/5324-cht-commission-condemns-targeted-killings-jumma-activists-calls-urgent-government-action.html

^[40] https://iwgia.org/en/bangladesh/4541-lessons-from-the-implementation-of-the-chittagong-hill-tracts-accord.html

^[41] Interview with Jummo civil society leader.

^[42] https://hillvoice.net/en/army-backed-another-armed-group-kuki-chin-national-front-in-bandarban/

^[43] https://hillvoice.net/en/conspiring-deal-made-between-jamaat-e-arakan-and-the-knf/

^[44] Some of our interviewees in the CHT also confirmed that prior to the Prime Minister's visit to India, they were approached by Indian authorities to provide information about the KNF and their training of Islamic militant groups.

^[45] https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/crime/76j28wctvb

^[46] https://www.borderlens.com/features/knf-another-ploy-of-divide-and-rule-in-cht-of-bangladesh/

^[47] Interview with locals from the area.

^[48] Several Myanmar-based armed groups are allegedly sheltering in Bangladesh with the permission of the Bangladesh military. These groups include the Arakan Army (AA), Arakan Liberation Army (ALA), Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), and Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO).

^[49] Information obtained from interviews.

^[50] We have obtained a copy of the letter sent to the Prime Minister of Bangladesh signed by Nathan Bawm.

^[51] https://www.iwgia.org/en/news/5191-the-international-chittagong-hill-tracts-commission-is-shocked-at-the-death-of-eight-Indigenous-bawm-men-and-expresses-deep-concern-at-continued-human-rights-violations-in-the-cht.html

^[52] https://www.prothomalo.com/opinion/24trwm3k79

^[53] Ibid

^[54] Ibid (quote translated from Bengali)

^[55] https://bangla.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news-502671

^[56] Jyotirindra Bodhipriya Larma, also known as Shantu Larma, is the President of the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS), the political party of the Jummo that signed the CHT Accord with the government of Bangladesh. He also serves as the Chairman of the CHT Regional Council, established as part of the peace agreement to oversee the Accord's implementation and the region's development.

^[57] Even after 26 years since its signing, the major clauses of the CHT Accord remain unimplemented. If, as per KNF's demand, a new KTC area is established without the jurisdiction of the Regional Council or Hill District Council, it will not only pose a significant challenge to the already struggling implementation process of the CHT Accord but also impact the entire administrative system of the CHT.

^[58] For more information about the military's tourism ventures in the CHT, please see here: https://www.iwgia.org/en/news/4584-what-is-happening-to-the-land-of-the-mro-people.html and https://www.iwgia.org/en/bangladesh/4352-%E2%80%9Cif-i-lose-my-land,-i-am-no-one-i-have-nothing%E2%80%9D-a-desperate-plea-of-the-indigenous-mro-facing-eviction-from-their-land.html

^[59] https://www.prothomalo.com/opinion/bcmktr3liv

^[60] Hillvoice regularly reported on these activities of the KNF. Despite holding peace talks, they were committing numerous atrocities against civilians: https://hillvoice.net/en/8-people-beaten-harassed-by-knf-terrorists-in-ruma/, https://hillvoice.net/en/a-marma-villager-shot-extorted-by-knf-terrorists-in-ruma/, https://hillvoice.net/en/2-beaten-6-kidnapped-but-released-after-2-hours-by-knf-in-ruma/, https://hillvoice.net/en/paindu-up-chairman-kidnapped-by-army-created-knf-terrorists/, https://hillvoice.net/en/bawm-lusai-pangkhua-people-encounter-with-indiscriminate-extortion-by-knf/, https://hillvoice.net/en/rampage-of-knf-in-ruma-and-rowangchari-of-bandarban/ and more news links from Prothom Alo: https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/district/tfsxrw9bwf, https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/district/vsbo5lj6pr

^[61]https://hillvoice.net/en/dead-body-of-abducted-laram-bawm-recovered-in-ruma/ and https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/district/4ywvd4ibsp

^[62] https://www.daily-sun.com/post/742567

^[63] Our sources in Bandarban confirmed that the KNF requested a high-level delegation from Dhaka for the third round of meetings.

^[64] The author's contacts in Bandarban, who has connection with the Peace Establishment Committee, confirmed that KNF requested a high-level team from the government for their next meeting. However, there was no response from the top level of the government, and the peace committee was scheduled to hold the meeting with their local members instead.

^[65] The authors have previously visited the area and are familiar with the locations of the bank and the BGB and Army camps.

^[66] Please refer to the CCTV footages published here: https://www.prothomalo.com/opinion/bcmktr3liv, https://www.prothomalo.com/video/hq35keyfmu and https://www.prothomalo.com/opinion/24trwm3k79

^[67] The Bangladesh Ansar is a paramilitary auxiliary force responsible for maintaining internal security and enforcing the law. They are primarily deployed as armed security personnel.

^[68] As mentioned earlier, the Bawm community, along with the Pangkhua, Lushai, Mro, Khumi, and Khyang indigenous communities of Bangladesh, are part of the Zo group, also known as Zomi. The indigenous groups within the Zomi umbrella are referred to by different names such as "Kuki," "Mizo," and "Chin" depending on their regional locations. Collectively, they are sometimes referred to as the "Kuki-Chin-Mizo" group.

^[69] https://theprint.in/india/mizoram-opens-hearts-doors-to-bangladeshi-kuki-chin-refugees-like-jerusalem-for-israelis/1308965/

^[70] http://www.uniindia.net/news/east/politics-mizo-mnf/3223756.html and https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/national/cannot-push-back-bangladeshi-refugees-mizoram-cm-lalduhoma-tells-narendramodi

^[71] https://e-pao.net/GP.asp?src=12..011222.dec22

^[72] For example, see the news links about these protests: https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/lbbrugym63, https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/district/etjdhxrrvp, https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/district/kg0dz0oqe1

^[73] From interview with a veteran civil society leader in the CHT.

^[74] https://www.iwgia.org/en/news/5191-the-international-chittagong-hill-tracts-commission-is-shocked-at-the-death-of-eight-Indigenous-bawm-men-and-expresses-deep-concern-at-continued-human-rights-violations-in-the-cht.html and https://www.iwgia.org/en/news/5202-chittagong-hill-tracts-commission-demands-protection-civilians-bandarban.html

^[75] https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/over-300-kuki-chin-refugees-in-jungles-near-mizoram/articleshow/95655647.cms

^[76] https://www.bssnews.net/bangla/news-flash/134047

^[77] https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/j3v7atblac

^[78] https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa13/8076/2024/en/ and report from the ground with interviews with Bawm civil society organization, human rights activists, journalists, and victims.

^[79] https://samakal.com/bangladesh/article/234517

^[80] Ibid

^[81] https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/guwahati/127-refugees-enter-mizoram-from-bangladesh-total-now-1368/articleshow/110025985.cms and https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/65-more-from-chittagong-hill-tracts-in-bdesh-enter-mizoram/articleshow/110254921.cms

^[82] https://www.iwgia.org/en/news/5202-chittagong-hill-tracts-commission-demands-protection-civilians-bandarban.html

^[83] Information obtained from interviews at the ground-level.

^[84] Based on interviews with eyewitnesses and victims.

^[85] Ibid

^[86] Ibid

^[87] Amnesty International's campaign highlighted that 200-300 Bawm students are currently stranded in Bandarban: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa13/8076/2024/en/. Our interviewees confirmed this and in addition, provided a list and details of the students killed.

^[88] https://hillvoice.net/en/2-bawm-people-including-a-child-killed-in-a-joint-forces-crackdown-in-bandarban/

^[89] For instance, without any investigations, all these news media have referred all killed Bawm civilians as KNF members (not even suspected KNF members) based solely on information provided by ISPR or security forces: https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/crime-and-law/yzp2rmbvif, https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/oipeakozka, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/crime-justice/news/one-knf-member-killed-arms-recovered-army-raid-ruma-ispr-3593071, https://bangla.bdnews24.com/samagrabangladesh/94f7pmvgih, https://www.deshrupantor.com/510564/

^[90] All the news media outlets identified the 13-year-old as a KNF member, with some newspapers even labeling him a terrorist: https://www.ajkerpatrika.com/337769/, https://www.newsbangla24.com/news/244490/2-KNF-members-killed-in-firing-in-Bandarban, https://www.somoynews.tv/news/2024-05-23/KyCD66FA, https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/crime/347279/2-knf-members-killed-in-gunfight-with-joint-forces

Tags: Human rights