The Indigenous World 2025: Bolivia
According to the Bolivia Population and Housing Census 2012, 41% of the Bolivian population over the age of 15 is of Indigenous origin, although projections from the National Institute of Statistics (INE) produced in 2017 indicate that this percentage is likely to be nearer 48%. Of the 36 recognized peoples in the country, the majority of those living in the Andes are Quechua (49.5%) and Aymara (40.6%), and they self-identify into 16 different nationalities.
The major peoples in the Lowlands are the Chiquitano (3.6%), Guaraní (2.5%) and Moxeño (1.4%) who, together with the remaining 2.4%, make up the 36 recognized Indigenous Peoples. To date, Indigenous Peoples have consolidated 25 million hectares as collective property under the status of Community Lands of Origin (TCO), representing 23% of the total area of the country. With the approval of Decree No. 727/10, the TCOs acquired the constitutional title of Peasant Native Indigenous Territory (Territorio Indígena Originario Campesino - TIOC). Bolivia has ratified the main international human rights conventions and has been a signatory of ILO Convention No. 169 since 1991. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) has been in full force since the approval of Law No. 3760 on 07 November 2007. With the new State Political Constitution in 2009, Bolivia adopted the name of Plurinational State.
This article is part of the 39th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. The photo above is of an Indigenous activist Funa-ay Claver, a Bontok Igorot, standing alongside Indigenous youth activists and others. They are protesting against the repressive laws and human rights violations suffered through the actions and projects of the Government of the Philippines and other actors against Indigenous Peoples at President Marcos Jr’s national address on 22 July 2024 in Quezon City, Philippines. The photo was taken by Katribu Kalipunan ng Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas and is the cover of The Indigenous World 2025 where this article is featured. Find The Indigenous World 2025 in full here
Social conflicts over judicial elections and Evo Morales’ decision to run for re-election
Elections for the highest judicial authorities should have been held in October 2023 but have been successively postponed due to a lack of parliamentary consensus to approve the law needed to call for this process.[1] This has resulted in a serious institutional crisis since the six-year constitutional mandate of the magistrates expired on 31 December 2023. Faced with this situation, the judges of the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal (TCP) themselves issued Declaration No. 0049/2023 extending the mandates of all judicial authorities until elections could be held.[2] Several magistrates nevertheless decided to step aside and vacate their posts as of January 2024 on the understanding that they no longer had the legitimacy to continue.
It was against this backdrop that the stand-off between legislators supporting the government of Luis Arce and those supporting former president Evo Morales deepened, preventing an agreement from being reached on an electoral process. The background was (and continues to be) the government's refusal to allow the former president to run for a further term in the next national elections in 2025, resulting in political polarization that resulted in conflict virtually all year long.
Since the start of 2024, former president Evo Morales has been mobilizing supportive social and political sectors to get the criminal proceedings against him dropped and to ensure that his candidacy is the only Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) candidacy recognized by the electoral body. Throughout the year, a wide range of protests were implemented, including a national road blockade between mid-October and the first week of November, which lasted 24 days.[3] Criminal proceedings are underway in which Morales is accused of statutory rape and human trafficking, due to allegedly having had at least two intimate relationships with minors of 14 and 15 years of age.[4] As a result, the Departmental Prosecutor's Office of Tarija issued an arrest warrant for the crime of “aggravated human trafficking”.[5]
In a context of tensions due to roadblocks throughout the country and the legal actions against Evo Morales, Radio Kawsachun Coca (RKC) radio station reported that, on Sunday 27 October, the former president had suffered an attempt on his life, broadcasting several videos showing a chase and shooting at the vehicle in which he was travelling in the Tropic of Cochabamba-Chapare area. The former president was unharmed, but his driver was injured.[6] According to media linked to the former president, it was an assassination attempt carried out by agents linked to drug trafficking, with the likely acquiescence of the government of Luis Arce and his Minister of the Interior, Eduardo del Castillo. In contrast, both the government and the opposition claimed that it was a “self-imposed attack”. The president undertook to conduct a thorough investigation, although no results have been made known to date.
The political crisis worsened with the paralysis of sessions in Parliament, as legislators sympathetic to the Arce government blocked the bill calling for judicial elections, demanding that Congress first adopt a resolution approving the extension of the judges whose terms had expired and the approval of several credit lines that required legislative approval. A political agreement reached between Evo Morales’ MAS and the opposition resulted in a call for candidates, but this process was systematically interrupted by a series of injunctions and tutelage actions by candidates alleging that the lists presented by the Plurinational Legislative Assembly did not comply with the criteria for parity and inclusion of Indigenous candidates. This caused the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal to annul the call for candidates for election to the Supreme Court of Justice in Beni and Pando, and to the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal in Cochabamba, Tarija, Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando, leaving 28 candidates out of the competition. Finally, the process was held on 15 December with high participation and also very acceptable approval levels, unlike in the 2011 and 2017 processes. The most popular candidate for the Agro-Environmental Court was a lawyer from the Mojeño people, Rocío Vásquez Noza, who represents the Indigenous Peoples as well as the department of Beni on that body.[7]
Political conflicts were also fuelled by a worrying downturn in indicators of the Bolivian economy. Exports decreased markedly in 2024 due to a decline in income from the sale of gas to Brazil and Argentina, sales that previously accounted for almost 80% of revenue. This is because the wells, having been exploited for over 20 years now, are beginning to be exhausted. This situation was compounded by a decline in the once enormous international foreign exchange reserves, which have largely been used to finance a fuel subsidy, enabling the price at the pump to be maintained at USD 0.37 per litre since 2005.[8] This has resulted in a gradual decline in public sector investment in things such as public infrastructure and the financing of State-run universities, previously sustained by the extraordinary income the country was receiving from the sale of gas. This year, it has become common to see thousands of citizens standing in long lines to fill up with fuel, especially for trucks, buses and heavy machinery.
Attempted coup d'état
On 26 June, then commander of the General Army, Juan José Zúñiga, staged a military uprising that was labelled by the government as an “attempted coup d'état”. Zúñiga moved several units to Plaza Murillo, in La Paz, and entered the Palacio Quemado, an historic building and former seat of the Executive.[9] There, and in front of a crowd that was not supportive of his actions, along with all political sectors of the country, he confronted President Luis Arce, who had dismissed him for press statements considered to represent a serious act of indiscipline. The crisis was resolved with the appointment of a new commander and the arrest of those who had led the movement, which the opposition and General Zúñiga himself labelled as a “self-imposed coup”, blaming the government for the attempt.[10]
Environmental catastrophe due to forest fires
If 2023 was a year of crisis due to forest fires in eastern Bolivia,[11] 2024 literally witnessed an environmental catastrophe, the worst on record to date. The previous record stood in 2019, when more than five million hectares burned;[12] nonetheless, by the end of October 2024, when the first rains arrived, close to 12 million hectares had been affected.[13] According to the Director of the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA), Eulogio Núñez, as of the first week of October, there had been 9.8 million fires throughout the country, 61% of which were concentrated in forested areas. Santa Cruz was reportedly the most affected department, with 68% of the fires, followed by Beni with 28% and La Paz with 3%.[14]
Unlike in previous years, the fires started early. In the eastern region of the country, intense heat, drought and low humidity usually occur between September and November, creating the ideal conditions for hot spots and for subsequent uncontrolled fires. During 2024, the crisis began in July in the Pantanal, the world's largest freshwater wetland of 158,000 km2, declared a Ramsar site and which also extends into Brazil and Paraguay.[15] The San Matías Natural Integrated Management Area (ANMI-SM) is a national protected area that protects the Pantanal ecosystem and other associated formations, as well as the Pantanal Indigenous Territory of the Chiquitano people.[16] The ANMI-SM was the area most affected by fires for the longest and most extensive period of time, almost across its entirety.
Another region affected was northern Chiquitanía, with vast areas damaged. Monte Verde saw 85% of its area (807,243 hectares) burned, Guarayos 72% (966,893) and Pantanal 63% (455,560).[17] In the case of Monte Verde, the fires forced almost all of the communities to take refuge in the former Jesuit Mission at Concepción as the fire surrounded their hamlets and completely destroyed their crops.[18] According to information from community members, the fire entered via Bajo Paraguá, a territory further north, where the human settlement policies being promoted by the State on behalf of settler communities (self-identified as intercultural) prevented people from getting through to fight the fires, which subsequently burned out of control.[19]
On 30 September, after several mobilizations, with seven million hectares affected up to that point and the situation completely out of control, President Luis Arce issued a National Disaster Decree enabling international aid and more urgent and effective handling of the emergency.[20] Aid had already also been activated through multiple civil society groups, via whom international cooperation, as well as friendly governments from Spain, Brazil and the European Union itself, had facilitated the arrival of firefighting experts.[21] Particularly noteworthy were the Forest Fire Fighting Reinforcement Brigades (GFFF-BRIF) and the FAST team, made up of experts in fire analysis and emergency management from Spain. These brigades intervened in the serious fires in the Lomerío and Monte Verde territories of the Chiquitano people where, despite the efforts of these specialists, the event overwhelmed all capacity for action.[22]
Meanwhile, in the midst of the crisis, and in the context of a Class Action Suit filed by the Ombudsman, Pedro Calisaya, the Second Constitutional Court of the department of La Paz established “the unconstitutional state of affairs” due to multiple violations of the rights of Mother Earth, of biodiversity and of Indigenous Peoples in voluntary isolation, as rights-holders, in respect of public health, territory and self-determination.[23] Resolution 233/2024 established a three-month period for all respondent ministries, departmental and local authorities to establish concrete coordination measures to address the public health emergency of those affected. Calls for the Legislative Assembly to annul the so-called “Incendiary Package”,[24] regulations that only encourage fires and deforestation and whose repeal has been demanded by the Indigenous and environmental movement for almost a decade, went unheeded, however.[25]
The Special Rapporteur on Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) conducted a country visit from 9 to 11 December to evaluate the impacts of the forest fires and to analyse the State's response to this crisis in the context of the climate emergency. One of the observations made by the Rapporteurship was that the regulatory framework in force in the country, the previously stated “Incendiary Package”, was partly responsible for the catastrophe.
The Rapporteurship emphasized that the main reason for the start and spread of forest fires in Bolivia had been the expansion of the agricultural frontier, induced by agricultural and livestock extractivism. The body established, at least preventively, that the crisis scenario had been exacerbated by the uncontrolled use of fire to convert forest into agricultural land, combined with an extraordinary period of drought and delays in adopting immediate measures, along with a lack of resources and adequate infrastructure for prevention and effective response.
In this context, the Rapporteurship suggested reforming the regulatory framework and replacing it with legislation that prioritizes environmental sustainability and the protection of human rights, in accordance with international standards. He also suggested that this reform should be aimed at preventing deforestation, promoting sustainable land use and strengthening monitoring, compliance and sanctions in order to avoid illegal practices. This process should be carried out with the participation, and drawing on the knowledge, of the affected communities, especially Indigenous Peoples. [26]
First Indigenous conservation area in the Amazon
On 3 October, the Autonomous Indigenous Government of the Multiethnic Indigenous Territory (TIM) approved, by means of Law No. 003/2024, the creation of the Loma Santa Conservation Area, with an area of 198,765 hectares.[27] Loma Santa is the first conservation area established and defined by an Indigenous government, to be managed and administered through its traditional authorities and the Indigenous government itself, in accordance with its own rules and procedures. The purpose of this area is to protect the flora and fauna of the zone, as well as the connection with the headwaters of the rivers that cross the TIM communities, which are fundamental to the economic, social and cultural life of the five Indigenous Peoples that inhabit the area.
The Ministry of Environment and Water has registered Loma Santa as an Indigenous protected area, a category that forms part of the subnational conservation areas, in light of the constitutional powers of the Indigenous governments to create this type of area. In Bolivia, Indigenous protected areas are considered a strategy contributing to the physical and political reconstitution of the territory, as well as an alternative form of control of vulnerable or ecologically important areas. These protected areas are fundamental to the life of the communities in the face of threats such as the plundering of resources, infrastructure works or extractive activities, where property titles are not sufficient to protect them.
Attempts to build a road in the Ñembi Guasu Guaraní ancestral territory and conservation area
For the past three years, a process of defence has been underway through the agro-environmental courts of this territory, located in the part of the Chaco bordering the Republic of Paraguay. Between 2013 and 2019, the State passed 81 administrative settlement resolutions for settler communities under its land distribution policy. When these communities began to clear their lands, large fires broke out, affecting more than 40% of the territory. In 2022, the Plurinational Agro-Environmental Court issued Order S1a 11/2022 confirming the Ecological Pause issued by a lower court. The purpose of this measure was to protect the biodiversity of the territory as a subject of rights, as well as to protect it as a transit area for segments of families in voluntary isolation from the Ayoreo people.[28]
This year, in coordination with the government of Alto Paraguay and the cattle-raising sectors of the municipalities of Roboré (Bolivia) and Bahía Negra (Paraguay), the Santa Cruz government began to energetically promote the opening of a road that would cross the Ñembi Guasu from north to south. This project would connect the Santa Cruz-Puerto Suárez bioceanic highway with its planned equivalent between the port of Santos, Brazil, and Iquique, Chile, crossing the Chaco Boreal and causing unprecedented environmental and socio-cultural impacts.[29] The entire organizational spectrum of the Guaraní people, as well as the Ayoreo people in both countries, have rejected the road through the Ñembi Guasu.[30]
In response to this onslaught, between 3 and 5 December, a binational meeting was held in the town of Boquerón (Paraguayan Chaco), convened by organizations representing the Ayoreo people of Paraguay and Bolivia. This historic event was an opportunity to discuss the overall situation of the Ayoreo people and expose the main threats to the great Chaco ecosystem due to infrastructure works and the uncontrolled deforestation of the region.[31]
The event emphatically rejected the attempt to build the road through the heart of the Ñembi Guasu because it would be lethal not only for the contacted Ayoreo people but especially for those living in voluntary isolation, for whom the Ñembi Guasu is a key ecosystem in their seasonal travel cycle. At the same time, a legal strategy and cross-border alliance was defined, in coordination with the Guaraní people of Charagua Iyambae in Bolivia, to defend this territory, as well as other areas of the Chaco that are being threatened by the promotion of infrastructure works and large-scale development.
Leonardo Tamburini is a graduate in Jurisprudence from the Università degli Studi di Macerata (Italy) and holds a Master’s degree in Indigenous Rights and Development from the Universidad Autónoma Gabriel René Moreno (Santa Cruz-Bolivia). He is currently Executive Director of ORÉ-Organización de Apoyo Legal y Social.
This article is part of the 39th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. The photo above is of an Indigenous activist Funa-ay Claver, a Bontok Igorot, standing alongside Indigenous youth activists and others. They are protesting against the repressive laws and human rights violations suffered through the actions and projects of the Government of the Philippines and other actors against Indigenous Peoples at President Marcos Jr’s national address on 22 July 2024 in Quezon City, Philippines. The photo was taken by Katribu Kalipunan ng Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas and is the cover of The Indigenous World 2025 where this article is featured. Find The Indigenous World 2025 in full here
Notes and references
[1] The judges of the Plurinational Agro-environmental Tribunal, the Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal, the Supreme Court of Justice and the Council of the Judiciary are all elected by popular vote from lists of candidates selected by the Plurinational Legislative Assembly.
[2] Constitutional Jurisprudence. (11 December 2023). “Constitutional Declaration P-0049/2023”. https://jurisprudenciaconstitucional.com/resolucion/125042-declaracion-constitucionalp-0049-2023#google_vignette
[3] “Bloqueo de caminos de Evo generó un daño económico de más de $US 3.000 millones”. Opinión, 27 December 2024. https://www.opinion.com.bo/articulo/pais/economia-bloqueo-caminos-evo-morales-genero-dano-economico-mas-us-3000-millones/20241227212932963695.html
[4] Tatiana Castro E. “Siete procesos acorralan a Morales y los evistas ven persecución política”. Los Tiempos, 06 October 2024. https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/pais/20241006/siete-procesos-acorralan-morales-evistas-ven-persecucion-politica
[5] “Fiscal boliviana anuncia orden de aprehensión para que Evo Morales declare en caso de trata”. EFE, 11 October 2024. https://efe.com/mundo/2024-10-11/fiscal-anuncia-orden-de-aprehension-contra-evo-morales/
[6] “Denuncian presunto atentado contra Evo Morales en el Trópico”. Opinión, 27 October 2024. https://www.opinion.com.bo/articulo/pais/denuncian-presunto-atentado-evo-morales-tropico/20241027081713958810.html
[7] Órgano Electoral Plurinacional de Bolivia. “Conozca los resultados oficiales de las Elecciones Judiciales 2024”. Separata de Información Pública No. 3, 29 December 2024. https://www.oep.org.bo/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Separata_resultados_Final.pdf
[8] It is estimated that the subsidy on liquid fuels, diesel and gasoline totals USD 2 billion, of which USD 600 million is lost through smuggling, i.e. removed from the country to be sold again at international prices in bordering countries. Twenty years ago, the subsidy was USD 200 million. Towards the middle of the year, the government proposed a national referendum to decide whether to maintain or remove the subsidy, a measure that did not prosper given its overwhelming rejection by the population. See Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy. (8 August 2024). Bolivia gasta $US 2.000 millones en subsidios a combustibles, pero pierde $US 600 millones en contrabando. Bolivia. https://www.mhe.gob.bo/2024/08/08/bolivia-gasta-us-2-000-millones-en-subsidios-a-combustibles-pero-pierde-us-600-millones-en-contrabando/
[9] “Cómo fue el ‘intento de golpe de Estado’ que denunció el presidente de Bolivia después de que militares tomaran el centro de La Paz y entraran en la antigua sede de gobierno”. BBC, 26 June 2024. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/c2jj33v45m7o
[10] Ernesto Estremadoiro Flores. “’Fue un autogolpe’, sostienen ‘evistas’ y opositores, piden a Arce no cerrar el Congreso”. El Deber, 26 June 2024. https://eldeber.com.bo/pais/fue-un-autogolpe-sostienen-evistas-y-opositores-piden-a-arce-no-cerrar-el-congreso_374328/
[11] Leonardo Tamburini. (2023). “Bolivia”. In The Indigenous World 2023, comp. Dwayne Mamo. Denmark: IWGIA. https://iwgia.org/doclink/iwgia-libro-el-mundo-ind%C3%ADgena-2023-esp/eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJpd2dpYS1saWJyby1lbC1tdW5kby1pbmRcdTAwZWRnZW5hLTIwMjMtZXNwIiwiaWF0IjoxNjgxNzcwMDMxLCJleHAiOjE2ODE4NTY0MzF9.Hn3W6HavIl8X0w7Nu12RoL8U4Bl9EUbcwmDGMcUajUg
[12] Leonardo Tamburini. (2020). “Bolivia”. In The Indigenous World 2020, comp. Dwayne Mamo. Denmark: IWGIA. https://iwgia.org/doclink/iwgia-el-mundo-indigena-2020-1/eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJpd2dpYS1lbC1tdW5kby1pbmRpZ2VuYS0yMDIwLTEiLCJpYXQiOjE2Mjg2ODA4MDcsImV4cCI6MTYyODc2NzIwN30.TQgRy_N69sApRt2FNqhmaQ2OQowYYeHtEdPC7xdbNf8
[13] Fundación Tierra, SATIF, FAN.
[14] “El INRA afirma que se quemaron 9,8 millones de hectáreas en todo el país”. Fides News Agency, 13 October 2024. https://www.noticiasfides.com/cuidado-de-la-casa-comun/el-inra-afirma-que-se-quemaron-9-8-millones-de-hectareas-en-todo-el-pais
[15] Ramsar. (2 October 2001). Ficha informativa de los humedales Ramsar. https://rsis.ramsar.org/RISapp/files/RISrep/BO1089RIS.pdf
[16] Leonardo Tamburini. (2019). Bolivia: Atlas sociopolítico de territorios indígenas. IWGIA. https://www.iwgia.org/images/documentos/Libros/ATLAS%202019.pdf
[17] CEJIS. (November 2024). Informe: Focos de calor y cicatrices de incendios en territorios indígenas de las tierras bajas de Bolivia. Bolivia. https://www.cejis.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Informe-2024-Incendios-en-Territorios-Indigenas.pdf
[18] “El fuego arrasa Monte Verde: más de 650.000 hectáreas ya fueron consumidas por las llamas”. El Deber, 04 October 2024. https://eldeber.com.bo/santa-cruz/el-fuego-arrasa-monte-verde-mas-de-650000-hectareas-ya-fueron-consumidas-por-las-llamas/
[19] “Grupo armado impide el paso de bomberos por Bajo Paraguá; desde la Csutcb culpan a Interculturales de San Julián”. El Cintinela Virtual, 21 September 2024. https://www.elcentinelavirtual.com/grupo-armado-impide-el-paso-de-bomberos-por-bajo-paragua-desde-la-csutcb-culpan-a-interculturales-de-san-julian/
[20] Supreme Decree No. 5235 of 30 September 2024. https://www.lexivox.org/norms/BO-DS-N5235.xhtml
[21] Ministry of Defence. (21 September 2024). Un equipo de 41 bomberos forestales y 8 especialistas provenientes de España llegaron a Bolivia para fortalecer los esfuerzos en la mitigación de los incendios forestales que afectan la región de la Chiquitanía, en el departamento de Santa Cruz. Bolivia. https://www.mindef.gob.bo/node/1047#:~:text=Santa%20Cruz%2C%2021%20de%20septiembre,el%20departamento%20de%20Santa%20Cruz.
[22] Gabriel Romano Burgoa. “Incendios en Bolivia «escapan a cualquier capacidad de contenerlos», según bombero español”. Swiss Info, 28 September 2024. https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/incendios-en-bolivia-%22escapan-a-cualquier-capacidad-de-contenerlos%22%2C-según-bombero-español/87637391
[23] “Justicia concede tutela planteada por el Defensor del Pueblo y resguarda derechos de la Madre Tierra, biodiversidad y Pueblos Indígenas”. Erbol, 01 October 2024. https://erbol.com.bo/gente/justicia-concede-tutela-planteada-por-el-defensor-del-pueblo-y-resguarda-derechos-de-la-madre
[24] Laws 741/15 and 1171/19, in particular, which allow for burning and clearing of forest areas and sanction fire violations with meagre fines.
[25] Resolución Constitucional Plurinacional 233/2024. Class Action. Second Constitutional Chamber of the Departmental Court of Justice of La Paz, 01 October 2024. https://www.defensoria.gob.bo/uploads/files/resolucion-constitucional-plurinacional-233-2024-accion-popular.pdf
[26] IACHR. (18 December 2024). REDESCA presents preliminary observations from its working visit to Bolivia. https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2024/320.asp&utm_content=country-bol&utm_term=class-vinl
[27] Its full name is “Loma Santa” Historical, Cultural, Social and Spiritual Heritage Conservation Area of the Indigenous Autonomous Government of the TIM.
[28] Leonardo Tamburini, Miguel Lovera, Norma Flores Allende, Miguel Ángel Alarcón y Jieun Kang. “Los ayoreo: los últimos aislados fuera de la Amazonía”. Debates Indígenas, 01 July 2021. https://www.servindi.org/actualidad-noticias/05/07/2021/los-ayoreos-los-ultimos-aislados-fuera-de-la-amazonia
[29] Jane Chambers. “Qué dicen en Paraguay de la construcción de la megacarretera que unirá dos océanos a través de su ‘infierno verde’”. BBC, 17 April 2023.
https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-65274560
[30] “El Pueblo Guaraní rechaza categóricamente la construcción de la carretera que amenaza atravesar el Ñembi Guasu”. Revista Nómadas, 01 October 2024. https://revistanomadas.com/el-pueblo-guarani-rechaza-categoricamente-la-construccion-de-la-carretera-que-amenaza-atravesar-el-nembi-guasu/
[31] Iniciativa Amotocodie. (06 December 2024.) Se realizó histórico Encuentro Binacional del Pueblo Ayoreo en el Chaco Paraguayo. https://www.iniciativa-amotocodie.org/2024/12/06/se-realizo-historico-encuentro-binacional-del-pueblo-ayoreo-en-el-chaco-paraguayo/
Tags: Land rights, Climate, Conservation
