The Indigenous World 2025: Tunisia

Written on 25 April 2025. Posted in Tunisia

As elsewhere in North Africa, the Indigenous population of Tunisia is formed of the Amazigh. There are no official statistics on their number in the country but Amazigh associations estimate there to be around 1 million Tamazight speakers, accounting for some 10% of the total population. Tunisia is the country in which the Amazigh have suffered the greatest forced Arabization. This explains the low proportion of Tamazight speakers in the country. There are, however, increasing numbers of Tunisians who, despite no longer being able to speak Tamazight, still consider themselves Amazigh rather than Arab.

The Amazigh of Tunisia are spread throughout all of the country’s regions, from Azemour and Sejnane in the north to Tittawin (Tataouine) in the south, passing through El-Kef, Thala, Siliana, Gafsa, Gabès, Matmata, Tozeur, Djerba. As elsewhere in North Africa, many of Tunisia’s Amazigh have left their mountains and deserts to seek work in the cities and abroad. There are thus a large number of Amazigh in Tunis, where they live in the city’s different neighbourhoods, particularly the old town (Medina), working primarily in skilled crafts and petty trade. The Indigenous Amazigh population can be distinguished not only by their language but also by their culture (traditional dress, music, cooking and Ibadite religion practised by the Amazigh of Djerba).

Since the 2011 “revolution”, numerous Amazigh cultural associations have emerged with the aim of achieving recognition and use of the Amazigh language and culture. The Tunisian state does not, however, recognize the existence of the country’s Amazigh population. Parliament adopted a new Constitution in 2014 that totally obscures the country’s Amazigh (historical, cultural and linguistic) dimensions. The Constitution refers only to the Tunisians’ sources of “Arab and Muslim identity” and expressly affirms Tunisia’s membership of the “culture and civilization of the Arab and Muslim nation”. It commits the state to working to strengthen “the Maghreb union as a stage towards achieving Arab unity […]”. Article 1 goes on to reaffirm that “Tunisia is a free state, […], Islam is its religion, Arabic its language” while Article 5 confirms that “the Tunisian Republic forms part of the Arab Maghreb”. The new Tunisian Constitution, adopted in July 2022, proclaims that “Tunisia constitutes a part of the Islamic nation” (article 5), that “Tunisia constitutes a part of the Arab nation and that the official language is Arabic” (article 6) and that “the Tunisian Republic constitutes a part of the Greater Arab Maghreb” (article 7). Article 44 stipulates that “the State shall ensure that the younger generations are rooted in their Arab and Islamic identity and their national belonging. It shall ensure the consolidation, promotion and generalization of the Arabic language”. Tunisia makes no reference to its indigenous Amazigh history, nor does it recognize the country's human, linguistic and cultural diversity.

On an international level, Tunisia has ratified the main international standards and voted in favour of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007. These international texts remain unknown to the vast majority of citizens and legal professionals and are not applied in domestic courts.

This article is part of the 39^th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. The photo above is of an Indigenous activist Funa-ay Claver, a Bontok Igorot, standing alongside Indigenous youth activists and others. They are protesting against the repressive laws and human rights violations suffered through the actions and projects of the Government of the Philippines and other actors against Indigenous Peoples at President Marcos Jr’s national address on 22 July 2024 in Quezon City, Philippines. The photo was taken by Katribu Kalipunan ng Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas and is the cover of The Indigenous World 2025 where this article is featured. Find The Indigenous World 2025 in full here

Presidential elections and consolidation of authoritarian rule

Voting took place on 6 October 2024 to elect the President of the Republic of Tunisia. Incumbent President Kais Saied was re-elected with 90.69%, according to the Independent High Authority for Elections of Tunisia (ISIE).^[1] The turnout was just 27.5%, the lowest ever in Tunisia.

According to the NGO Human Rights Watch, Kais Saied “has dismantled Tunisia’s democratic institutions, undermined judicial independence, and stifled the exercise of freedom of expression and the press”.^[2]

In a joint statement, several UN Special Rapporteurs said that the Tunisian Ministry of Justice uses the working notes mechanism arbitrarily, and outside of any legal framework, to modify the composition of courts, their presidents, public prosecutors, investigating judges and judicial chambers. They expressed deep concern regarding the independence of the judiciary after President Kais Saied dissolved the Supreme Judicial Council and summarily dismissed 57 judges in 2022. Noting numerous bans on meetings and impediments to associative activities, the UN Special Rapporteurs urged the Tunisian government to “put an end to all unjustified restrictions on the legitimate exercise of the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association”.^[3]

In order to replace Decree-Law No. 2011-88 of 24 September 2011 on associations, deemed too lax, the Tunisian parliament tabled Bill of Law No. 2023-27 on the organization of associations.^[4] Among other things, the bill stipulates that associations must obey “principles of national orientation”, abandons the principle of creating an association by simple declaration and replaces it with “authorization” by a government department, and bans foreign funding. For the Tunisian authorities, these measures are aimed at Islamist and anti-terrorist organizations that receive substantial funding from abroad. They state that human rights and fundamental freedoms will still be respected. “We reject any infringement of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution and by international and regional texts.”^[5] However, civil society organizations and experts believe that the provisions of the new legislation excessively and disproportionately restrict human rights and fundamental freedoms.^[6] Amazigh organizations are particularly worried and feel targeted by this bill, which also plans to ban the creation of associations based on “ethnic” grounds. Does the new Tunisian government want to put an end to the existence of the few Amazigh associations there still exist?

Several Tunisian civil society organizations and international NGOs are criticizing the Tunisian government for its excessive and abusive use of Decree-Law No. 2022-54 on combating offences relating to information and communication systems^[7] aimed at repressing the right to freedom of expression. Article 24 of this decree-law stipulates a penalty of five years' imprisonment and a fine of up to 50,000 Tunisian Dinars (approx. USD 16,000) for using telecommunications networks to produce, send or disseminate “false news” or “rumours”; to harm, defame or incite violence against others; or to undermine public security or national defence, sow fear or incite hatred. The penalty is doubled if the offence targets a “public official or similar”. According to Human Rights Watch, the decree “violates the right to privacy and introduces harsh sentences for broadly and vaguely defined speech offenses. The authorities have frequently used article 24 of this decree to stifle dissent.”^[8]

After a decade of Islamist government marked by political confusion and a serious economic crisis and corruption, Tunisia has seen a return to authoritarianism since the election of Kais Saied, with a negative impact on human rights and freedoms.

Tunisia's Amazigh continue to suffer racism and discrimination

While the “revolution” of 2011 led to a certain renaissance of the long-banned Amazigh culture, the current context seems to have put a brutal halt to the Amazigh dynamic. The Head of State's threatening speeches against anything that might upset Tunisia's “Arab-Islamic national identity” and the repression of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and expression have been a deterrent to most Amazigh rights defenders. Anzar, an Amazigh activist from the Gafsa region says:

When Kais Saied (the President of the Republic) violently denounces the enemies of the Arab-Islamic nation, as an Amazigh I feel targeted because I am not an Arab. And there are no laws to protect me, even though I'm a native of this country. I live in insecurity and fear. To avoid getting into trouble, I hide my Amazigh identity and I keep quiet.^[9]

As a result, Amazigh cultural activities have declined sharply in recent years. Even the traditional Yennayer, Amazigh New Year, has been celebrated less, or more discreetly, in recent years.

In the village of Tamezret, in the municipality of Matmata in southern Tunisia, the locals hoisted the Amazigh flag, symbolizing their identity, alongside that of Tunisia. On 24 April 2024, Matmata municipal officials removed the flag without any explanation or discussion with the village's inhabitants. Although outraged by this act, considered racist and vexatious, the people of Tamezret did not commit any acts of violence.

The government provides no funding for Amazigh associations. Only a few craft activities (carpet weaving, pottery making and typical Amazigh jewellery), linked to tourism promotion, benefit from state economic support. Amazigh historical and archaeological sites have been abandoned).^[10] Local communities are trying to protect them albeit with very limited means. Some sites have been saved thanks to the generosity of foreign donors.^[11]

The government decided to conduct a population and housing census from 6 November to 31 December 2024.^[12] The operation was entrusted to the National Institute of Statistics (INS) and the results will be published in the first quarter of 2025. According to INS Director General, Bouzid Nsiri, the census was carried out in accordance with the standards and recommendations of the UN.^[13] However, at the request of Amazigh organizations, including the World Amazigh Congress, various UN treaty bodies have, on numerous occasions – in 2003, 2009, 2016 and 2021, asked the Tunisian government “to collect, on the basis of self-identification, statistics disaggregated by ethnic and cultural affiliation”. An examination of the questionnaire used to collect data for this census nonetheless reveals no questions on the use of the Amazigh language or on membership of the Amazigh community in Tunisia.^[14] Tunisia's 2024 population and housing census completely overlooks the country's Amazigh component, as if it did not exist.

Indigenous youth in Tunisia

Young Indigenous individuals are suffering from the economic and social slump that Tunisia has been experiencing since the 2011 “revolution”. They are faced with inactivity (the youth unemployment rate is 40%, and much higher in rural and mountain areas) and, as a result, they are shaken in their self-confidence and in society, which offers them few opportunities.

In Tunisia, the marginalization of Amazigh-inhabited geographical areas and the policy of displacement and forced assimilation that has taken place for over half a century has virtually emptied traditional Amazigh territories of their inhabitants. Young Amazigh do not see themselves living in their parents' villages, as they feel they are “deprived of everything, even water is scarce”.^[15] Their future can only lie in the city or abroad, meaning an inevitable loss of native language, culture and memory.

This calls for special attention from all stakeholders, including the Amazigh communities and the State, to design and implement a specific development plan for these long-neglected territories.

Belkacem Lounes is a doctor of Economics, university teacher (Grenoble Alpes University), former expert member of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities in Africa of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (2016-2021), former member of the United Nations Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2018-2020), author of numerous reports and articles on Amazigh and Indigenous rights.

This article is part of the 39^th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. The photo above is of an Indigenous activist Funa-ay Claver, a Bontok Igorot, standing alongside Indigenous youth activists and others. They are protesting against the repressive laws and human rights violations suffered through the actions and projects of the Government of the Philippines and other actors against Indigenous Peoples at President Marcos Jr’s national address on 22 July 2024 in Quezon City, Philippines. The photo was taken by Katribu Kalipunan ng Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas and is the cover of The Indigenous World 2025 where this article is featured. Find The Indigenous World 2025 in full here

Notes and references

^[1] Independent High Authority for Elections of Tunisia (ISIE). Presidential Election 2024, 11 October 2024 https://www.isie.tn/election-presidentielle-2024/

^[2] Human Rights Watch. “Tunisia: Repression of civil society intensifies.” 17 May 2024. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/17/tunisia-deepening-civil-society-crackdown

^[3] Satterhwaite, Margaret; Romero, Gina; Khan, Irene; and Lawlor, Mary. “Tunisia: Interference in the judicial system and harassment of lawyers must stop (experts).” UN Info, 31 May 2024. https://news.un.org/fr/story/2024/05/1146071

^[4] Bill of Law No. 2023-27 on the organization of associations, https://legislation-securite.tn/latest-laws/projet-de-loi-n2023-27-portant-organisation-des-associations/

^[5] Dridi, Samir. “Funding of associations: Credibility comes through transparency.” La Presse, 28 October 2024. https://lapresse.tn/2024/10/28/financement-des-associations-la-credibilite-passe-par-la-transparence/

^[6] Ammar, Amir. “Draft law on associations in Tunisia: towards a weakened civil society.”

Village de la Justice, 29 March 2024. https://www.village-justice.com/articles/projet-loi-sur-les-associations-tunisie-vers-une-societe-civile-fragilisee,49288.html

^[7] Decree-Law No. 2022-54 of September 13, 2022, relating to the fight against offenses relating to information and communication systems, https://legislation-securite.tn/latest-laws/decret-loi-n-2022-54-du-13-septembre-2022-relatif-a-la-lutte-contre-les-infractions-se-rapportant-aux-systemes-dinformation-et-de-communication/

^[8] Human Rights Watch. “Tunisia: Authorities Escalate Clampdown on Media, Freedom of Expression.” 30 May 2024. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/30/tunisia-authorities-escalate-clampdown-media-freedom-expression

^[9] Interview by the author, 10 October 2024.

^[10] Porcher, Claire. “In the villages of Dahar, heritage is preserved between generations.” Inkyfada, 2 June 2024. https://inkyfada.com/fr/2024/06/02/village-dahar-patrimoine-generations/

^[11] Kapitalis. “Tunisia: American donation to preserve the Amazigh village of Douriet.” 28 August 2024. https://kapitalis.com/tunisie/2024/08/28/tunisie-don-americain-pour-preserver-le-village-amazigh-de-douiret/

^[12] Decree No. 2024-183 of 4 April 2024 on organizing the 13^th General Census of the Population and Housing, Official Journal of the Tunisian Republic, No. 47 dated 5 April 2024. https://www.iort.gov.tn/

^[13] First meeting of the 2024 National Census Committee, Tunis, 17 May 2024. https://www.ins.tn/evenements/premiere-reunion-du-comite-national-du-recensement-2024

^[14] Realites Online. “2024 General Population Census: Everything you need to know.” 5 November 2024, https://realites.com.tn/fr/recensement-general-de-la-population-2024-tout-ce-quil-faut-savoir/

^[15] Interview with Iman, a young Amazigh from Titawin.

Tags: Youth, Human rights, Cultural Integrity