The Indigenous World 2026: Tanzania
Tanzania is estimated to have a total of 125 – 130 ethnic groups, falling mainly into the four categories of Bantu, Cushite, Nilo-Hamite and San. While there may be more ethnic groups that identify as Indigenous Peoples, four groups have been organizing themselves and their struggles around the concept and movement of Indigenous Peoples.
The four groups are the hunter-gatherer Akie and Hadzabe, and the pastoralist Barabaig and Maasai. Although accurate figures are hard to arrive at since ethnic groups are not included in the population census, population estimates[1] put the Maasai in Tanzania at 430,000, the Datoga group to which the Barabaig belongs at 87,978, the Hadzabe at 1,000[2] and the Akie at 5,268. While the livelihoods of these groups are diverse, they all share a strong attachment to the land, distinct identities, vulnerability and marginalization. They also experience similar problems in relation to land tenure insecurity, poverty and inadequate political representation.
Tanzania voted in favour of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 2007 but does not recognize the existence of any Indigenous Peoples in the country and there is no specific national policy or legislation on Indigenous Peoples per se. On the contrary, a number of policies, strategies and programmes that do not reflect the interests of the Indigenous Peoples in terms of access to land and natural resources, basic social services and justice are continuously being developed, resulting in a deteriorating and increasingly hostile political environment for both pastoralists and hunter-gatherers.
This article is part of the 40th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. Find The Indigenous World 2026 in full here
Land rights and displacements
Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA)
In response to peaceful demonstrations in Ngorongoro in 2024 over Maasai land rights and resident relocations, President Samia Suluhu Hassan met with Maasai traditional leaders on 1 December 2024,[3] and subsequently established two presidential commissions of inquiry. One commission was mandated to examine land-related grievances raised by residents, while the second was tasked with evaluating the voluntary relocation programme to Msomera in Handeni District. The commissions have continued their work throughout 2025; however, their findings have not been publicly released and there is limited information on whether their recommendations have been implemented. Meanwhile, community concerns persist, with reports of ongoing restrictions, livestock forfeitures, and alleged human rights violations during 2025.
At the relocation site in Msomera, relocated families continue to raise concerns regarding insufficient grazing land, water scarcity, limited access to social services, and delays in housing and compensation commitments. Some families state that the relocation process did not fully reflect the expectations presented to them. These ongoing challenges highlight continued uncertainty about livelihoods and long-term stability for those who relocated from Ngorongoro. Further, the relocation programme has led to land disputes and rising tensions between Msomera residents and the newcomers. Several original residents have filed lawsuits challenging the claim that there is unused land available for relocation. Eight residents of Msomera filed cases in 2025 at the Tanga High Court against the government and some of the relocated individuals. They are contesting the government’s decision to acquire their land and allocate it to others without compensation.
Continued violation of Indigenous Peoples’ rights in Loliondo
The creation of the Pololeti Game Reserve in 2022 continues to directly impact Indigenous Peoples’ rights and access to grazing land in 2025. The creation of this physical fortress design for conservation displaced the Maasai from their ancestral lands and transformed the 1,500 km2 of legally recognized village land into a restricted reserve. The two most affected villages of Kirtalo and Ololosokwan particularly revealed a systematic strategy of “impoverishment by fines”, where the state uses the boundaries of this new reserve to drain the community of its only capital: livestock.
In Kirtalo village, in 2025 alone, 35 livestock owners were forced to pay a combined total of TZS 456,900,000 (approx. EUR 148,000) in fines. This is not a standard regulatory fee; it is an astronomical penalty that averages over TZS 13 million (approx. EUR 4,200) per household—a sum that no rural family can afford to lose and remain self-sufficient. The situation is equally dire in Ololosokwan village where, between November 2025 and January 2026, the authorities seized 1,423 heads of cattle and 879 sheep with a combined market value of TZS 150,000,000 (approx. EUR 48,700). Within this tiny two-month window, the total economic loss for these two villages exceeded TZS 614,000,000 (approx. EUR 200,000).[4]
Eviction from Kilimanjaro International Airport (KIA)
The crisis at KIA, which has intensified since 2023[5], is no longer a threat—it is an active tragedy. Over 20,000 residents from eight villages, including Tindigani, Sanya Station, and Malula, have watched their land and legal rights vanish overnight. In May 2025, the government moved from dialogue to force, deploying the military to install boundary beacons and demolish homes. For the Maasai families there, this “expansion” meant the immediate destruction of seven decades of investment, including homes, rainwater collection tanks, and schools. Families were forced to open bank accounts and accept “compensation” as low as TZS 800,000 (approx. EUR 260), a sum that is not a payment but a final insult that leaves a family homeless in an economy where a single acre of land costs millions.
The human cost is measured in the silence that followed. Sacred sites such as Endonyo Olmorwak,[6] critical for Maasai rites of passage, are now behind airport fences, and social services, such as health centres that the community built themselves, have been levelled to make way for a VIP terminal and luxury hotels. Parents have been separated from children, and livestock, the heartbeat of the community, have no place to graze, forcing elders who were once self-sufficient into a life of begging or working as low-wage security guards on the very land they used to own. The “KIA Man” is now a stranger in his own home, watching international tourists land on a runway built over his demolished boma (a traditional Maasai circular homestead), while the state continues to ignore the 2023 and 2024 calls for an independent inquiry into this massive, forced dispossession.
Losimingori Forest Reserve in Monduli District
Since 2021, when the then Losimingori Forest Reserve was upgraded by the government to a Nature Forest Reserve, without the Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of the Maasai, management of the area has lain with the Tanzania Forest Services (TFS) and strict restrictions on human activity have been put in place, spurring tensions. These tensions reportedly further increased in 2025 as pastoralist access to traditional grazing areas and forest resources has become even more restricted.
Climate change and carbon credit schemes
Climate change has severely affected pastoralists across Tanzania, with many livestock dying due to drought and lack of pasture. In areas where grazing zones have been annexed, for example in Loliondo, where 1,500 km2 were forcibly taken by the government to form a Game Controlled Area, the impacts have been even more severe. Pastoralists have paid millions of shillings to recover their livestock from auctions after the animals were seized for grazing in areas that are now designated as protected land. As mentioned earlier, this situation has been described as “impoverishment by fines”. Many pastoralists who once lived in relative stability have lost their main sources of income, and the pressure has also contributed to serious mental health challenges.
Pastoralism depends on mobility as a key strategy for managing climate variability, drought, and maintaining ecosystem balance. Land annexation and restricted access to grazing areas have greatly limited this mobility, while repeated livestock detentions have significantly reduced herd sizes. Instead of strengthening conservation and climate resilience, current enforcement practices are only increasing vulnerability, dependency, and long-term insecurity.
Maasai villages in Longido, Monduli, and Simanjiro are being targeted for large soil carbon credit projects, which come with restrictions on land use for the duration of the project. The Longido and Monduli Rangelands Carbon Project (LMRCP), led by Soils for the Future Tanzania Ltd in partnership with international companies including Volkswagen Climate Partners, covers some 970,000 hectares for a 40-year period.[7] The Resilient Tarangire Ecosystem Project (RTEP), led by The Nature Conservancy, covers around 830,000 hectares with a 20-year crediting period, plus the possibility of extension.[8] These projects focus on villages that already have communal land titles and land-use plans, especially mapped grazing areas. While carbon developers present this as an opportunity, many Maasai fear further loss of control over their land, restrictions on grazing, and long-term impacts on pastoralism, land rights, and mobility. Given the long history of land alienation in Maasai areas through conservation and protected areas, there is deep concern that carbon projects could bring new forms of land control and future biodiversity credit schemes with additional restrictions.
Currently, in 2025, Indigenous civil society organizations (CSOs) have called for a moratorium on all carbon credit projects in northern Tanzanian rangelands, following research conducted in January 2025 that examined the two major projects.[9] Despite this, project proponents are continuing to push communities to sign agreements, with reports of pressure from district leaders. Some senior government officials have acknowledged that many communities do not clearly understand the carbon business and have stressed the need for proper information and consent. In Simanjiro, the district has temporarily paused the signing process for 30 days to allow responses to community concerns, showing that community voices are beginning to have an impact.
Creation of new hunting block allocations
In late 2024 and early 2025, the Tanzania Wildlife Management Authority (TAWA) conducted electronic auctions to allocate multiple hunting blocks. In addition, there is a proposed expansion involving the creation of 16 new hunting blocks covering approximately 15,856 km2.[10] This plan aims to convert nearly 70% of Maasai village land in districts such as Simanjiro into Game Reserves and Game Controlled Areas, affecting over 100,000 people.
New Game Reserves
An internal report from the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, based on its 2021–2026 strategic plan, shows that 15 new areas, covering nearly 7,000 km2, are proposed for conversion from Game Controlled Areas (GCAs) into fully designated Game Reserves. This shift would significantly change the land status and its management, bringing stricter conservation regulations and limiting community access to grazing and settlement areas. The plan is expected to affect the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of Indigenous people who depend on these lands for pastoralism and other traditional activities. It also includes an additional 4,000 km2 in the Lake Natron area, a region that is both ecologically sensitive and central to Maasai livelihoods.[11]
East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP)
PINGO’s Forum conducted a mixed-methods study[12] on the impacts of the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP) using key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and direct community engagement, with attention to women, youth, and marginalized groups. Responses were gathered from Manyara (35%), Dodoma (33%), and Tanga (31%).[13] The findings show serious gaps in consultation and compensation. Only 23% of respondents said they were consulted during project planning or implementation, while 30% said they were excluded. Many described consultations as poorly inclusive, and just 4% believed their views had influenced decisions. Around 43% reported negative livelihood impacts, mainly loss of grazing land and displacement. Compensation has been inconsistent, with only 23% confirming they had received any payment, and very few considering it adequate. Communities also reported unfulfilled promises under the Social Investment Programme, limited local employment, poor working conditions, and cultural harm, including the exhumation of graves.
Despite these concerns, recent developments indicate that the project is moving forward. On 7 February 2026, Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni visited Tanzania and met with President Samia Suluhu Hassan, announcing that oil exports through the pipeline are expected to begin in July 2026. During the same meeting, President Samia stated that, after completion of EACOP, there were plans to construct an additional pipeline along the same route to transport refined oil.[14] These announcements suggest a continued expansion of the project, even as affected communities continue to raise concerns about rights, compensation, and long-term impacts.
Hadzabe hunter-gatherers: the impact of tourism and artificial intelligence
Tourism in Mang’ola has made the Hadzabe highly visible, as many visitors travelling to the Ngorongoro area seek to experience their culture. The system is, however, largely controlled by outsiders rather than the community itself. Decisions about visitor access, photography, payments, and performances are often made without proper consultation or FPIC. Financial benefits are uneven and limited, with most income managed by camp supervisors while performers receive very small payments. Women selling handmade crafts are especially vulnerable to underpayment and intimidation. Tourism has also contributed to dependency, food insecurity, alcohol abuse, and cultural harm, including misuse of images and staged or inappropriate content that misrepresents the Hadzabe identity. While the community does not reject tourism, there is a strong call for a community-led model that ensures transparency, dignity, and fair benefit-sharing.[15]
Artificial Intelligence and digital media have intensified these risks. Images and videos of Hadzabe individuals are edited, manipulated, or fabricated using digital tools and shared online without consent. Some content includes sexualized or false portrayals that are deeply offensive to cultural norms and cause emotional distress, reputational harm, and internal community conflict. Those featured often cannot trace the source of the material or request its removal. The gap between online visibility and real living conditions has created confusion and social tension within communities. These harms are already affecting cultural dignity and cohesion, highlighting the urgent need for safeguards, accountability, and strict respect for collective consent.[16]
General election in October 2025
Tanzania’s General Election in October 2025 was followed by strong reactions from international and regional bodies expressing concern over reports of unrest, arrests, and restrictions on civic space. Civil society organizations documented allegations of intimidation, limitations on freedom of assembly, and pressure on human rights defenders. On 12 November 2025, staff from the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) one of the organizations that also works with Indigenous Peoples, were holding a meeting at the White Sands Hotel when security personnel reportedly surrounded the compound.[17] According to LHRC, staff members were questioned, their laptops, mobile phones, and identification documents were confiscated, and they were instructed to report to the Zonal Crimes Office the following day. Although the devices were later returned, the incident raised concerns about data privacy, surveillance, and the operating environment for non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
In the aftermath of the election, President Samia Suluhu Hassan publicly accused certain local and international NGOs of financing protesters and contributing to unrest during the electoral period.[18] She stated that investigations would be conducted into organizations alleged to have supported demonstrations. These statements increased tensions between the government and sections of civil society, with rights groups calling for transparent investigations and protection of constitutional freedoms. The situation has continued to spark debate about political space, accountability, and the role of civil society in Tanzania’s democratic process.
Edward Porokwa is an Expert member of the United Nation Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and a member of the Steering Committee of the International Indigenous People´s Forum on World Heritage (IIPFWH). He is a lawyer and Advocate of the High Court of Tanzania. He is currently the Executive Director of Pastoralists Indigenous NGOs Forum (PINGOs Forum), an umbrella organization for pastoralists and hunter-gatherers in Tanzania. He holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Law (LLB Hon) from the University of Dar es Salaam and a Master’s Degree in Business Administration (MBA) from ESAMI/Maastricht School of Management. He has 25 years’ experience of working with Indigenous Peoples’ organizations in the areas of human rights advocacy, policy analysis, constitutional issues and climate change.
This article is part of the 40th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. Find The Indigenous World 2026 in full here
Notes and references
[1] National Bureau of Statistics and Office of Chief Government Statistician. “2012 Population and Housing Census:
Population Distribution by Administrative Areas.” Tanzania, March 2013. https://www.nbs.go.tz/statistics/topic/census-2012
[2] Other sources estimate the Hadzabe at between 1,000 – 1,500 people. See, for instance, Madsen, Andrew. The Hadzabe of Tanzania: Land and Human Rights for a Hunter-Gatherer Community. Copenhagen: IWGIA, 2000. https://iwgia.org/en/resources/publications/305-books/2662-the-hadzabe-of-tanzania-land-and-human-rights-for-a-hunter-gatherer-community.html
[3] Simtowe, Aurea. “Samia forms two special commissions to address Ngorongoro’s land, relocation issues.” The Citizen, 24 December 2024. https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/samia-forms-two-special-commissions-to-address-ngorongoro-s-land-relocation-issues-4868098
[4] Pingos Forum. “Pastoralism Security Three Years After Massive Evictions and Land Annexation.”
https://drive.google.com/file/d/10d5987yMtS354CO5s8r__WH9IFDWAueu/view?usp=sharing
[5] Hyolmo, Sonam Lama. “Forced evictions suppress Maasai spirituality & sacred spaces in Tanzania.” Mongabay, 22 June 2024. https://news.mongabay.com/2024/06/forced-evictions-suppress-maasai-spirituality-sacred-spaces-in-tanzania/
[6] Ibid.
[7] Volkswagen Climate Partner. “Longido Monduli Rangeland Carbon Project, Tanzania.” https://volkswagen-climatepartner.com/project/monduli-longido/
[8] Darwin Initiative. “Protecting Tanzania's Tarangire Ecosystem.” 11 September 2024.
https://www.darwininitiative.org.uk/news/2024/09/11/protecting-tanzanias-tarangire-ecosystem/
[9] Maasai International Solidarity Alliance. “No Carbon Credits.” https://www.misasolidarity.org/no-carbon-credits
[10] Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism Tanzania Wildlife Management Authority. “Invitation to Participate in Electronic Auctioning for Allocating Hunting Blocks in Tanzania.” 2024. https://www.tawa.go.tz/storage/app/media/uploaded-files/TANGAZO%20MNADA%20WA%2010%20NOVEMBA%202024%20ENGLISH.pdf
[11] Simoncelli, M., Lemmi, D., and Said, K. “Tanzania's Maasai people facing government pressure to leave.” Deutsche Welle, 24 September 2025. https://www.dw.com/en/tanzanias-maasai-people-facing-government-pressure-to-leave/a-74067154
[12] Porokwa, Edward. “The Social, Economic and Cultural Impact of EACOP on Indigenous Peoples in Tanzania.” Debates Indígenas, 1 November 2025. https://debatesindigenas.org/en/2025/11/01/the-social-economic-and-cultural-impact-of-eacop-on-indigenous-peoples-in-tanzania/
[13] Ibid.
[14] Maricha, J. “Tanzania, Uganda line up major infrastructure projects as oil exports near.” The Citizen, 7 February 2026. https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/tanzania-uganda-line-up-major-infrastructure-projects-as-oil-exports-near-5351528
[15] PINGOs Forum. “Cultural Tourism or Cultural Exploitation? A Hadzabe Story.” YouTube, 5 February 2026. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QIx_HJqbZIs
[16] PINGOs Forum. “The Impact of Generative AI on the Hadzabe Indigenous Community.” YouTube, 29 January 2026. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ndbEDS0lWo0
[17] International Federation for Human Rights. “Tanzania : Acts of harassment and intimidation against LHRC staffs.” 18 November 2025. https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/human-rights-defenders/tanzania-acts-of-harassment-and-intimidation-against-lhrc-staffs
[18] Kiprono, Brian. “Samia Claims Protesters Were Paid to Burn Tanzania.” Dawan Africa, 20 November 2025. https://www.dawan.africa/news/samia-claims-protesters-were-paid-to-burn-tanzania
Tags: Global governance
