The Indigenous World 2026: Myanmar

Written on 22 April 2026. Posted in Myanmar

There is no accurate information on the number of Indigenous Peoples in Myanmar, partly due to a lack of understanding in the country of the internationally recognized concept of Indigenous Peoples. The government claims that all citizens of Myanmar are “Indigenous” (taing-yin-tha) and, on that basis, dismisses the applicability of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) to Myanmar. Indigenous Peoples’ rights activists use the Burmese language term hta-nay-tain-yin-tha to describe Indigenous Peoples, based on international principles that use the criteria of non-dominance in the national context, historical continuity, ancestral territories and self-identification.^[1]

According to the 1982 Citizenship Law, ethnic groups that have been present in the current geographical area of Myanmar since before 1823 (the start of the first British annexation) are considered taung-yin-tha^[2] (national races). Eight ethnic groups are recognized as national races: Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Chin, Mon, Burman, Arakan and Shan. In the government’s classification, smaller groups are lumped into larger groups and subgroups. However, there are some ethnic groups that are considered or see themselves as Indigenous Peoples, such as the Naga, who would not identify with any of those groups.

In accordance with the 2008 Constitution,^[3] Myanmar is divided into seven states, seven regions, and one union territory. The seven states are named after seven large ethnic groups: Kachin, Kayah (Karenni), Kayin (Karen), Chin, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan. The Bamar (Burmese) do not have a specifically named state. They are nonetheless the dominant ethnic group in those seven regions (Sagaing, Magway, Mandalay, Yangon, Ayeyarwaddy, Thanintharyi, and Bago) and the Union Territory of Nay Pyi Taw. There are also five self-administered zones and one self-administered division that form part of regions or states, each named after the ethnic group that forms the majority in the area (Naga, Danu, Pa-O, Palaung, Kokang and the Wa).

On 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) attempted a coup d’état by deposing Aung San Su Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) and forming the State Administration Council (SAC) as a “de facto” government. In response, in April 2021, ousted members of parliament formed the National Unity Government (NUG), which continues to seek to act as the legitimate government in exile. In the post-coup era, the overall trajectory of the conflict in Myanmar has been one of expanding control by revolutionary forces, including newly-formed People’s Defence Forces (PDF) acting under the NUG, independent local defence forces, and well-established Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) that have been fighting for the self-determination of the ethnic groups they represent for decades. As such, Myanmar is presently a patchwork of mixed control areas, where receding SAC control fluctuates, and resistance actors attempt to solidify governance mechanisms.

Myanmar voted in favour of the UNDRIP, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2007, but has not signed the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) nor ratified ILO Convention No. 169. It is party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Myanmar has not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

This article is part of the 40^th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. Find The Indigenous World 2026 in full here

In 2025, the peace and security landscape for Indigenous populations in Myanmar continued to deteriorate. The junta’s push to stage elections was marred by yet further escalations of violence in attempts to solidify governance of Indigenous areas, compounding the situation for 3.4 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and creating fresh displacement of Indigenous communities living in the border regions.^[4]

Election law weaponized by junta

In July 2025, the junta enacted the Law on the Protection of Multiparty Democratic General Elections, which criminalized speaking out or “expression in writing” deemed “disruptive”.^[5] Jail sentences under the law ranged from three years to a maximum of life imprisonment or even the death penalty. The election monitoring group, the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), reported that, “Rather than ensuring peaceful, competitive elections, the Election Protection Law is being deployed to silence dissent, deter protests, and block independent scrutiny – turning any form of election monitoring into a criminal risk.”^[6]

By December 2025, at least 229 people had been charged under the law for “attempting to sabotage election processes”, according to a junta-controlled media outlet.^[7] While the majority of arrests took place in urban areas in central Myanmar, where the junta has firmer administrative control, people speaking out against the elections in ethnic states also fell foul of the law. In Karen State, 20 people were reportedly arrested; in Chin State, 18; and further arrests were reported in Shan, Kachin, Mon, Karenni states and Thanintharyi region.^[8] In September, a man from Shan State was sentenced to seven years' hard labour for criticizing the election. [9]

Sham election

As the fifth anniversary of the 2021 military coup approached, the junta staged what was overwhelmingly condemned as a “sham” nationwide election and a calculated bid to present a veneer of legitimacy.^[10] The first of several election phases was announced for 28 December 2025, to be continued in stages into early 2026.^[11]

On 1 August 2025, the junta dissolved the State Administration Council (SAC) and, in its place, created the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC), an “interim government” – led by the same junta leaders as within the SAC – tasked with overseeing the planned elections.^[12] The SSPC was to run parallel to the cabinet, led by Prime Minister Nyo Saw, which managed day-to-day government administration.^[13]

U.N. and government stakeholders widely condemned the election process, suggesting the elections would “perpetuate repression, division and conflict”^[14] and were “unfolding in a climate of violence and repression”.^[15] The European Union also raised concerns about the climate in which the elections were taking place, emphasizing that “addressing the underlying discrimination and human rights violations faced by persons belonging to all ethnic minorities must be a part of a political solution to the crisis in Myanmar.”^[16]

ANFREL, which served as an accredited international observer during the 2015 and 2020 Myanmar elections, suggested the ballot would not align with international standards and could not be considered credible or legitimate.^[17]

Participation in ethnic states and regions

A total of 57 parties that were registered with the junta-controlled Union Election Commission (UEC) participated, and the ballot was held in 102 of Myanmar’s 330 townships. With 25% of seats constitutionally reserved for military MPs, the USDP junta proxy party needed only to win 26% of seats nationwide to prevail. As the year closed, despite a reported low voter turnout, it was widely anticipated that this would be the outcome.^[18]

In ethnic states and regions, largely populated by Indigenous communities, the ballot was held in 49 townships deemed secure enough. In the vast northern Sagaing Region – home to Naga, Chin and Kachin populations – and in Shan State, the ballot was held across 24 townships. The other 25 townships were made up of a selection from Kachin State (six townships), Karenni State (two townships), Karen State (three townships), Mon State (five townships), Chin State (two townships), Thantintharyi (four townships), and finally Arakan State (three townships).

Some state-level (ethnic-based) parties registered for the ballot; however, because the UEC oversaw the registration process, newly-formed parties were considered junta-affiliated, such as the Kayah State People’s Party (KySPP) in Karenni State.^[19] In other cases, Indigenous-affiliated party representation had historical and ongoing links to the junta, or, at times, direct affiliation. For example, in Shan State, the Pa-O National Organization’s (PNO) vice-chairman Khun San Lwin sits on the junta’s governing body, and Dwe Bu, who leads the Kachin State People’s Party, is also a junta member.^[20]

In Chin State, preliminary results underscored the farcical nature of the process. In Hakha Township, the junta-aligned USDP seemingly claimed a sweeping victory across all three legislative tiers – the Lower House, the Upper House, and the Chin State Hluttaw (Assembly) – despite only 2,820 (10.32%) out of 27,324 eligible voters casting their ballots. This figure lay bare the absence of public participation and consent, compared to 72% voter turnout in 2020, when over 19,000 people voted. Furthermore, over 600 “advance votes” received were from the junta’s civil service and through members of the public casting votes under duress.^[21]

Bombs to ballot

The junta chief, Ming Aung Hlaing, framed the proposed elections as a “pathway to peace”; however, in the lead-up to the process, violence committed by the junta increased significantly. The surge in violence related to the junta's push to re-establish a semblance of governance in contested areas, or areas considered “liberated”, both of which are largely populated by Indigenous communities.^[22]

Within a month of the election day announcement, the junta had conducted 27 airstrikes on 20 townships, killing more than 100 civilians.^[23] The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported in September that the attacks seemed “intentioned to regain key contested areas where elections have been announced to take place.”^[24]

Airstrikes and ground assaults escalated dramatically in the months before the elections. From September onwards, the junta escalated military operations across Chin State aimed at suppressing resistance and intimidating the civilian population ahead of the planned elections. Between September and December, at least 30 airstrikes were reported across Chin State. These attacks killed 12 civilians, including six children, and injured at least 91 others, striking civilian infrastructure. Over 20,000 Indigenous Chin people were newly displaced as junta convoys made their way into Chin State.^[25]

On 10 December, the junta conducted an airstrike on the Mrauk-U Hospital in Rakhine State, killing 33 civilians, including a baby, and injuring 80 more people.^[26] This continued the pattern of attacking hospitals, schools, and other civilian infrastructure that had persisted in other ethnic states and regions throughout 2025.

The author and publisher of this article are well aware of the existing Myanmar name dispute; however, Myanmar is used consistently here to avoid confusion.

This article was produced by the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO). CHRO works to protect and promote human rights through monitoring, research, documentation, and education and advocacy on behalf of the Indigenous Chin people and other ethnic/Indigenous communities in Myanmar.

This article is part of the 40^th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. Find The Indigenous World 2026 in full here

Notes and references

^[1] “Coalition of Indigenous Peoples in Myanmar/Burma.” Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review, March 2015. https://www.chinhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Coalition-of-IPs-in-Myanmar_UPR.pdf

^[2] Burma Citizenship Law 1982, Pyithu Hluttaw Law No 4 of 1982. Section 3

^[3] “Myanmar´s Constitution of 2008 with Amendments through 2015.” Comparative Constitute Project, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Myanmar_2015.pdf?lang=en

^[4] United Nations Refugee Agency, “Myanmar: UNHCR Displacement Overview 08 Dec 2025,” 11 December 2025. https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/120075

^[5] Mitv, “SAC Law No. 48/2025: Protection of Multiparty Democratic General Elections,” 30 July 2025. https://www.myanmaritv.com/news/sac-law-no-482025-protection-multiparty-democratic-general-elections

^[6] ANFREL, Date Drive Issue No. 25, “Myanmar: A Junta-Staged Election in the Midst of a War,” December 2025. https://anfrel.org/myanmar-a-junta-staged-election-in-the-midst-of-a-war-data-dive-issue-no-25/

^[7] Reuters, “Myanmar arrests hundreds under new election law ahead of December vote,” 19 December 2025.

 https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/myanmar-arrests-hundreds-under-new-election-law-ahead-december-vote-2025-12-19/

^[8] Myanmar Prison Witness, “Charges and Arrests by the Myanmar Military Junta under Election Protection Law,” 26 December 2025. https://eng.mizzima.com/2025/12/27/29610

^[9] The Straits Times, “Myanmar arrests three artists for ‘undermining upcoming election,” 30 October 2025. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/myanmar-arrests-three-artists-for-disrupting-election

^[10] Forum Asia, Progressive Voice, and 87 Myanmar based CSOs, “MYANMAR: International community should reject junta’s sham election,” 23 December 2025. https://forum-asia.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Joint-Statement-MYANMAR-International-community-should-reject-juntas-sham-election.pdf

^[11] Global New Light of Myanmar, “National Defence and Security Council convenes Meeting 3/2025,” 1 August 2025. https://www.gnlm.com.mm/national-defence-and-security-council-convenes-meeting-3-2025/

^[12] Global New Light of Myanmar, “Formation of State Security and Peace Commission,” 1 August 2025. https://www.gnlm.com.mm/formation-of-state-security-and-peace-commission/

^[13] See generally, The Stimson Centre, “Myanmar’s December Election: Engineering Continuity Through Institutional Redesign,” 20 August 2025. https://www.stimson.org/2025/myanmars-december-election-engineering-continuity-through-institutional-redesign/

^[14] UN News, “UN warns Myanmar’s planned elections will deepen repression and instability,” 28 November 2025. https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166472

^[15] UN News, “Myanmar elections marked by fear as UN warns civilians are coerced from all sides,” 23 December 2025. https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/12/1166662

^[16] Council of the EU, “Myanmar: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the upcoming elections,” 9 December 2025. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/12/09/myanmar-statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-upcoming-elections/?utm_source=brevo&utm_campaign=AUTOMATED%20-%20Alert%20-%20Newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_id=3318

^[17] Asian Network for Free Elections, “Myanmar Junta’s Planned Elections: Falling Short of Democratic Legitimacy,” 30 September 2025. https://anfrel.org/myanmar-juntas-planned-elections-falling-short-of-democratic-legitimacy/

^[18] Reuters, “Myanmar junta says voter turnout at 52% in first phase of election,” 30 December 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-junta-says-voter-turnout-52-first-phase-election-2025-12-31/

^[19] BNI, “Views of various Karenni resistance forces on KySPP established under the military council,” 1 January 2025. https://mmpeacemonitor.org/en/en-interviews/views-of-various-karenni-resistance-forces-on-kyspp-established-under-the-military-council/

^[20] For background, see The Irrawaddy, “33 Myanmar Political Parties, Mostly with Military Links, Register with Junta,” March 2023. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/33-myanmar-political-parties-mostly-with-military-links-register-with-junta.html

^[21] Zalen Media (Burmese language), “War refugees in Hakha urged to vote early,” 6 December 2025. https://www.facebook.com/zalen.info/posts/pfbid0GDE8J7D6V2YhsEQmK3F6bdnKGG3NTqJs61PTcX88M3VWh2m7BARzPvitzYXTiHWEl?rdid=lY7e35iUUadiDpZf#

^[22] The Irrawaddy, “Myanmar Junta’s Pre-Poll Military Push Projects Strength at Heavy Civilian Cost,” 1 September 2025. https://www.irrawaddy.com/factiva/myanmar-juntas-pre-poll-military-push-projects-strength-at-heavy-civilian-cost.html

^[23] The Irrawaddy, “Junta Airstrikes Kill Over 100 Civilians Since Election Date Announcement,” 25 September 2025. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/junta-airstrikes-kill-over-100-civilians-since-election-date-announcement.html

^[24] Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Elections Briefing Paper,” December 2025. https://bangkok.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/2025-12/20251208_OHCHR-Elections-Briefing-Paper-Myanmar-military-elections.pdf

^[25] Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO), “Urgent Appeal to the International Community as Junta Troops Mobilise in Northwestern Myanmar,” 25 October 2025. https://mailchi.mp/chro.ca/press-release-urgent-appeal-to-the-international-community-as-junta-troops-mobilise-in-northwest-myanmar?e=f45de161d3

^[26] Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) “Deadly airstrike on a hospital in Mrauk-U, Myanmar,” 11 December 2025. https://www.msf.org/deadly-airstrike-hospital-mrauk-u

Tags: Global governance