The Indigenous World 2025: Myanmar
There is no accurate information on the number of Indigenous Peoples in Myanmar, partly due to a lack of understanding in the country of the internationally-recognized concept. The government claims that all citizens of Myanmar are “Indigenous” (taing-yin-tha) and, on that basis, dismisses the applicability of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) to Myanmar. Indigenous Peoples’ rights activists use the Burmese language term hta-nay-tain-yin-tha to describe Indigenous Peoples, based on international principles that use the criteria of non-dominance in the national context, historical continuity, ancestral territories and self-identification.[1]
According to the 1982 Citizenship Law, ethnic groups who have been present in the current geographical area of Myanmar since before 1823 (the start of the first British annexation) are considered taung-yin-tha[2] (national races). Eight ethnic groups are recognized as national races: Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Chin, Mon, Burman, Arakan and Shan. In the government’s classification, smaller groups are lumped in with bigger groups and sub-groupings. However, there are a number of ethnic groups that are considered or see themselves as Indigenous Peoples, such as the Naga, who would not identify with any of those groups.
In accordance with the 2008 Constitution,[3] Myanmar/Burma is divided into seven states, seven regions, and one union territory. The seven states are named after seven large ethnic groups namely, Kachin, Kayah (Karenni), Kayin (Karen), Chin, Mon, Rakhine and Shan States. The Bamar (Burmese) do not have a specifically named state but they are the dominant ethnic group in those seven regions (Sagaing, Magway, Mandalay, Yangon, Ayerywaddy, Thanyntharyi and Bago) and the Union Territory of Nay Pyi Taw. There are also five self-administered zones and one self-administered division that form part of regions or states, each named after the ethnic group that forms the majority in the area (Naga, Danu, Pa-O, Palaung, Kokang and the Wa).
On 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) attempted a coup d’etat by deposing Aung San Su Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), forming the State Administration Council (SAC) as a “de facto” government. In reaction to this, ousted members of parliament formed the National Unity Government (NUG) in April 2021, which continues in its attempts to act as the legitimate government in exile. In the post-coup era, the overall trajectory of the conflict in Myanmar has been one of expanding control by revolutionary forces, including the newly-formed People’s Defence Force (PDF) acting under the NUG, independent local defence forces, and well-established Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) who have been fighting for the self-determination of the ethnic groups they represent for decades. As such, Myanmar is presently a patchwork of mixed-controlled areas, where receding SAC control fluctuates, and resistance actors attempt to solidify governance mechanisms.
Myanmar voted in favour of the UNDRIP, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2007 but has not signed the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), nor has it ratified ILO Convention No. 169. It is party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Myanmar has not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
This article is part of the 39th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. The photo above is of an Indigenous activist Funa-ay Claver, a Bontok Igorot, standing alongside Indigenous youth activists and others. They are protesting against the repressive laws and human rights violations suffered through the actions and projects of the Government of the Philippines and other actors against Indigenous Peoples at President Marcos Jr’s national address on 22 July 2024 in Quezon City, Philippines. The photo was taken by Katribu Kalipunan ng Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas and is the cover of The Indigenous World 2025 where this article is featured. Find The Indigenous World 2025 in full here
SAC forced conscription puts Indigenous youth in peril
Perhaps signifying a desperate response to unprecedented territorial and military losses that were being incurred toward the end of 2023 and into 2024 across vast swathes of the country, the State Administration Council (SAC) announced it would be enforcing the “People’s Military Service Law” on 10 February 2024.[4] The law, commonly known as the “conscription law”, requires male citizens aged 18 to 35 and female citizens aged 18 to 27 to perform mandatory military service.
Initially, the SAC outlined plans to recruit 5,000 people per month beginning in April;[5] figures released by the opposition National Unity Government’s data repository suggest, at the turn of the year, that there were over 22,000 people who had been conscripted. [6] This notification spurred various responses from youth looking to avoid the draft. Large numbers of Indigenous youth living in areas still controlled or partially controlled by the SAC migrated toward areas controlled by Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs), as well as to neighbouring Thailand, Malaysia, and India.[7]
According to a report by the NGO, Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM), the imposition of the draft in Mon and Karen States and the Tanintharyi Region has led to a range of destabilization factors for Indigenous communities. Socio-economic foundations are reported to have weakened where crucial sectors, such as agriculture, have been impacted by the loss of labour, further exacerbating food shortages and economic hardships. In addition, traditional social and political structures are said to have been undermined as young people either flee or are taken away, the authority of community leaders has weakened, and communities’ ability to govern themselves has been diminished.[8]
The practice of forced conscription is not unique to the SAC and is also practised by EAOs. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic Kokang EAO, is reportedly forcibly recruiting men from IDP camps and demanding manpower quotas from local – many of them Indigenous - communities.[9] Another EAO, the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), has reportedly threatened to confiscate the property of families whose members evade conscription into its ranks.[10] Meanwhile, in Paletwa township, forcible recruitment by the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) led to further Indigenous Chin youth migration away from the township.[11]
Indigenous populations on the brink
As Myanmar’s civil war approaches four years, Indigenous communities continue to face a severe humanitarian toll. By the end of 2024, the number of internally displaced persons (IDP) was reported to be over 3.5 million.[12] A large proportion of this figure correlates to where fighting is particularly intense, such as the Northeast, Northwest, Southeast and Western extremities of Myanmar – ethnic states with high proportions of Indigenous communities – where high access restraints persist.[13] Exemplifying this situation, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has predicted that Rakhine State in western Myanmar faces the imminent threat of acute famine and has warned over 2 million people will be at risk of starvation in 2025.[14]
Furthermore, according to the digital rights group, Access Now, at least 80 townships and 13 out of the 14 states and regions of Myanmar were continuing to face ongoing internet shutdowns and phone line disconnections as of March 2024.[15] The initiation of communication blackouts is one aspect of the SAC’s military tactics to cut off and isolate communities in active conflict areas and they are imposed concurrently with travel and trade blockades. Indigenous people living in isolated areas are impeded from accessing information regarding troop movements, escalations of fighting, incoming airstrikes and how to mitigate the risks of displacement in conflict zones. Furthermore, online means of education remained severely hampered and humanitarian actors, journalists and researchers struggled with the task of humanitarian response, monitoring human rights violations, and reporting on the situation in Myanmar.
Territorial gains, losses, and jostling for position
In early 2024 – as Operation 1027 persisted (see The Indigenous World 2023) – EAOs continued to gain and, in large part, consolidate vast swathes of SAC-held territory as outposts and regional commands fell in many ethnic states. According to a report by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, the SAC had lost “stable control” over townships covering 86%of the country’s territory and 67% of the population.[16] While this signified the continued shrinking of the SAC as a military force and its ability to administer large areas of Myanmar, overlapping territorial claims between some EAOs, in some regions, are becoming more apparent in the vacuum.
The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) made significant gains in Northern Myanmar, securing control over rare earth mining areas in Kachin State Special Region 1 close to the Chinese border.[17] The KIA emphasized the opportunity for unity among the Kachin Indigenous communities, pledging a focus on regional development and humanitarian principles while ensuring economic and social well-being.[18] However, tensions have risen in northern Shan State, as the KIA and Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) began competing to offer public services in liberated areas. For example, in Kutkai Township, a mixed Kachin and Ta’ang area, residents from both ethnic groups raised concerns that the two armed groups were replicating forms of Burmese chauvinism in the education sector where a focus on either Kachin or Ta’ang history and language was being taught at the expense of students from the other group.[19]
In western Myanmar, Chin community members have raised similar concerns about the incoming United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) administration in Paletwa Township. In January, the ULA/AA, which fights for the “national liberation and restoration of Arakan sovereignty to the people of Arakan”[20] declared it would maintain administrative control over Chin State’s Paletwa Township, having ousted the SAC from all its military infrastructure in the township.[21] The majority ethnic group in the township, the Khumi people, who are a Chin sub-group, have raised concerns related to a range of ethnocentric approaches to ULA/AA governance, including the imposition of Arakan language instruction within schools,[22] and other forms of discrimination, such as being targeted for forced labour and conscription.
Airstrikes, artillery and landmines
As the SAC continued to cede territory and accrued heavy losses, airstrikes increased dramatically in 2024. At the turn of the year, there had been a reported 1,769 deaths across the country, a higher figure than the combined total of the previous three.[23] A large proportion of airstrikes carried out by the SAC take place in ethnic states, including in areas populated by Indigenous Peoples. For example, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), Rakhine State had the highest rate of deaths as a result of SAC airstrikes, where, by October, there had been 159 civilian deaths.[24]
Perhaps predictably, a large proportion of airstrikes have hit non-military targets, such as schools, churches and medical facilities. For example, in Chin State alone, 104 airstrikes were documented in 2024, destroying or damaging 20 schools, six churches and four medical facilities, leading to 58 deaths and 91 injuries to civilians, often where no active fighting had been taking place.[25] The consequence of this is that it prevents displaced people from returning to areas now free of the SAC’s control and beginning to rebuild their lives.[26]
The ongoing threat of landmines and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) also continues to impede the ability of Indigenous communities to pursue lives and livelihoods amidst ongoing conflict. According to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) report at the end of 2024, Myanmar has, for the first time, recorded the most casualties in the world from antipersonnel landmines, documenting 1,003 victims during the reporting period.[27] In Chin State, for example, Indigenous communities face the risk of stepping on landmines as they attempt to pursue socio-economic activities such as farming, fishing and gathering forest products, impacting day-to-day life, and, in other circumstances, children have been killed while playing with UXO.
SAC presses ahead with election plans
Despite unprecedented territorial losses and a creaking administration, the SAC persevered with its plans to hold an election in 2025 and embarked on a population census between 1 and 15 October. The provisional results of the census put Myanmar’s population at approximately 51.3 million people, slightly lower than the 51.5 million count taken 10 years ago.[28] These numbers have been put forward despite the October census only being undertaken in less than half of the 330 townships that comprise Myanmar, due to security issues.
The census went ahead after China, for the first time, signified its backing for the SAC, potentially offering a lifeline for its legitimacy, however timid, when China’s foreign minister Wang Yi promised technological assistance for the census-taking process[29] and invited the besieged SAC leader to a meeting in Beijing for the first time while also exerting pressure on EAOs in Shan State to halt fighting.[30] China also began collaborating with the SAC to establish a joint security company to protect Chinese investments and personnel in Myanmar.[31] [32]
Meanwhile, the United Nation’s Special Envoy on Myanmar, Julie Bishop, denounced what she called a “zero-sum mentality” among those involved in the revolution in her first address to the UN General Assembly in October – failing to mention the SAC’s widespread atrocities – having previously met with the SAC leader in Nay Pyi Taw.[33] These comments by the Special Envoy drew criticism that they would lend further false legitimacy to the proposed sham election process and signified a continued trend in UN special envoys emboldening successive Burmese military governments to continue atrocity crimes while undermining the collective efforts of Myanmar’s people towards sustainable peace.[34]
In an open letter, 276 Myanmar and European-based civil society organizations claimed that the election would not be free and fair, nor a representation of the people's will, nor would it contribute to genuine power-sharing among the broad ethnic and religious communities across Myanmar.[35]
Will the impunity bubble burst?
In November, the Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC) formally requested that the court issue an arrest warrant for the SAC leader, Min Aung Hlaing, related to the crime against humanity of deportation of Rohingya.[36] Although prima facie, the ICC has no jurisdiction for prosecuting international crimes in Myanmar – Myanmar is not a signatory to the Rome Statute – but ICC prosecutors decreed that as part of the crime of deportation occurred in Bangladesh, which is a signatory, there were grounds for an investigation. Three ICC judges must now rule on the prosecutor’s request. Unsurprisingly, the SAC quickly rejected the proposed action's legitimacy.[37]
While the ruling relates specifically to the situation of the Rohingya expulsions in 2017, there could be ramifications for other crimes against humanity and war crimes taking place in other areas of the country, should a Security Council ruling expand the court’s mandate. This is, however, unlikely due to veto powers at the council. The Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar reiterated his call for governments to support universal jurisdiction cases concerning Myanmar in competent national courts and for State Parties to the ICC to consider referring the situation in Myanmar to the Prosecutor under Article 14 of the Rome Statute.[38]
The author and publisher of this article are well aware of the existing Myanmar/Burma name dispute; however, Myanmar is used consistently here to avoid confusion.
This article was produced by the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO). CHRO works to protect and promote human rights through monitoring, research, documentation, and education and advocacy on behalf of the Indigenous Chin people and other ethnic/Indigenous communities in Myanmar.
This article is part of the 39th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. The photo above is of an Indigenous activist Funa-ay Claver, a Bontok Igorot, standing alongside Indigenous youth activists and others. They are protesting against the repressive laws and human rights violations suffered through the actions and projects of the Government of the Philippines and other actors against Indigenous Peoples at President Marcos Jr’s national address on 22 July 2024 in Quezon City, Philippines. The photo was taken by Katribu Kalipunan ng Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas and is the cover of The Indigenous World 2025 where this article is featured. Find The Indigenous World 2025 in full here
Notes and references
[1] “Coalition of Indigenous Peoples in Myanmar/Burma.” Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review, March 2015. https://www.chinhumanrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Coalition-of-IPs-in-Myanmar_UPR.pdf
[2] Burma Citizenship Law 1982, Pyithu Hluttaw Law No 4 of 1982. Section 3.
[3] “Myanmar´s Constitution of 2008 with Amendments through 2015.” Comparative Constitute Project. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Myanmar_2015.pdf?lang=en
[4] ISP: On Point “PANDEMONIUM: The Conscription Law and Five Negative Potential Consequences,” 16 February 2024. https://ispmyanmar.com/op-20/
[5] UN NEWS, “Myanmar: Mandatory conscription shows junta’s ‘desperation’, rights expert says,” 21 February 2024. https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/02/1146802
[6] National Unity Government, Ministry of Human Rights, “Unlawful Conscription Watch,” accessed 2 January 2024. https://mohr.nugmyanmar.org/unlawful_conscription_watch/?fbclid=IwY2xjawHjL05leHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHaGkhvdhupfPK1fBZU0nnzG2lXtzcNoCUT7NDwXFffFaTNE2s-xp5NW4eQ_aem_ROwnfHgC-wRHPPKxam3q8A
[7] Frontier Myanmar, “Communities Strive to Shield Youth From Conscription,” 22 April 2024. https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/communities-strive-to-shield-youth-from-conscription/
[8] Ibid
[9] The Diplomat, “Myanmar Ethnic Armed Groups Draw Allegations of Forced Recruitment,” 3 January 2024. https://thediplomat.com/2024/01/myanmar-ethnic-armed-groups-draw-allegations-of-forced-recruitment/
[10] DVB, “Chin National Front calls to resist conscription law; Thai PM warns Burma nationals to enter legally,” 21 February 2024. https://english.dvb.no/chin-national-front-calls-to-resist-conscription-law-thai-pm-warns-burma-nationals-to-enter-legally/
[11] Chin Human Rights Organization: Unpublished Data.
[12] UN-OCHA, “Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 43 | Reflecting on 2024 and preparing for 2025,” 5 January 2025. https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-43-reflecting-2024-and-preparing-2025
[13] Ibid
[14] UNDP, “Rakhine: A Famine in the Making,” 5 November 2024. https://www.undp.org/asia-pacific/publications/rakhine-a-famine-in-the-making
[15] The Irrawaddy, “Myanmar Junta Cuts Communications in Around 80 Myanmar’s Townships: Report,” 14 March 2024. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-cuts-communications-in-around-80-myanmars-townships-report.html
[16] SAC-M, “Briefing Paper: Effective Control in Myanmar 2024 Update,” 30 May 2024. https://specialadvisorycouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/SAC-M-Effective-Control-in-Myanmar-2024-Update-ENGLISH.pdf
[17] The Irrawaddy, “KIA Seizes Chinese Border Town From Myanmar Junta,” 21 November 2024. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/kia-seizes-chinese-border-town-from-myanmar-junta.html
[18] The Irrawaddy, “KIA Abolishes Kachin State’s Special Region-1 on China-Myanmar Border,” 29 November 2024. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/kia-abolishes-kachin-states-special-region-1-on-china-myanmar-border.html
[19] Frontier Magazine, “Blood brothers? Tensions test an old oath in northern Shan,” 26 June 2024. https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/blood-brothers-tensions-test-an-old-oath-in-northern-shan/
[20] The Irrawaddy, “AA Seizes Rakhine’s Taungup, but Battle Continues,” 29 November 2024. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/aa-seizes-rakhines-taungup-but-battle-continues.html
[21] The Stimson Centre, ‘Understanding the Arakan Army,” 21 April 2023. https://www.stimson.org/2023/understanding-the-arakan-army/
[22] CNI Myanmar, “AA implements Arakan education system in Paletwa,” 2 December 2024. https://cnimyanmar.com/index.php/english-edition/25971-aa-implements-arakan-education-system-in-paletwa
[23] RFA, “Air, artillery strikes set grim benchmark for civilian casualties in Myanmar in 2024,” 31 December 2024. https://www.rfa.org/english/myanmar/2024/12/31/myanmar-year-of-airstrikes/
[24] The Diplomat, “Arakan Army Commander-in-Chief Twan Mrat Naing on the Future of Rakhine State,” 6 September 2024. https://thediplomat.com/2024/09/arakan-army-commander-in-chief-twan-mrat-naing-on-the-future-of-rakhine-state/
[25] Data provided by the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO).
[26] CHRO: Documentary, “Rebuilding Lives,” November 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zdkPfcClpFo&t=4s
[27] International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Landmine Monitor: 2024,” 20 November 2024. https://backend.icblcmc.org/assets/reports/Landmine-Monitors/LMM2024/Downloads/Landmine-Monitor-2024-Final-Embargoed.pdf
[28] Associated Press, “Myanmar’s military government begins a census seen as a way to gather information about opponents,” 2 October 2024. https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-census-civil-war-military-resistance-eafba6e479c59fb926d31a10d4b663ca
[29] Reuters, “Myanmar junta announces census for promised 2025 election,” 2 September 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-junta-announces-census-promised-2025-election-2024-09-02/
[30] IISS Myanmar Conflict Map, “China pressures Myanmar opposition groups to halt latest offensive,” July 2024. https://myanmar.iiss.org/updates/2024-07
[31] VOA, “China’s joint security proposal sparks controversy in Myanmar,” 20 November 2024. https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-joint-security-proposal-sparks-controversy-in-myanmar/7870325.html
[32] Mizzima, Myanmar military forms committee to establish joint security venture with China,” 15 November 2024. https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/11/15/16285
[33] UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, “Briefers Urge Third Committee to Address Unmet Needs of People, Election Concerns in Conflict-Torn Myanmar, Act on Neglected Crisis,” 29 October 2024. https://press.un.org/en/2024/gashc4421.doc.htm
[34] Progressive Voice, “Special Envoy’s Zero Regard for Human Rights,” 9 November 2024. https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2024/11/09/special-envoys-zero-regard-for-human-right/
[35] 276 Myanmar and Europe-Based Civil Society Organizations, “Appeal for European Parliament Action on Myanmar: Denounce the Junta’s Sham Election, Support Democracy, and Pursue Justice for Atrocity Crimes,” 3 December 2024. https://progressivevoicemyanmar.org/2024/12/03/open-letter-by-myanmar-and-europe-based-civil-society-organizations-to-denounce-the-juntas-sham-election-support-democracy-and-pursue-justice-for-atrocities/
[36] BBC News, “ICC prosecutor seeks arrest warrant for Myanmar leader,” 27 November 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2nqg05pz9o
[37] The Nation, “SAC rejects ICC statements, cites Myanmar's non-membership,” 28 November 2024.
https://www.nationthailand.com/news/asean/40043696
[38] UN Special Procedures: Press Release, “Seize momentum for justice created by application for ICC arrest warrant against Myanmar junta leader: UN expert,” 16 December 2024.
https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/12/seize-momentum-justice-created-application-icc-arrest-warrant-against
Tags: Land rights, Youth, Human rights
