The Indigenous World 2026: Morocco

Written on 22 April 2026. Posted in Morocco

The Amazigh (Berber) peoples are the Indigenous Peoples of North Africa. The last census in Morocco (2024) estimated the number of Tamazight speakers at 24.8% of the population. However, Amazigh associations strongly contest this and instead claim a rate of 85%. This means that the Amazigh-speaking population could well number around 29.6 million out of a total population of 37 million in Morocco in 2023.^[1]

The administrative and legal system of Morocco has been strongly Arabized, and the Amazigh culture and way of life are under constant pressure to assimilate. Morocco has, for many years, been a unitary state with a centralized authority, single religion, single language and systematic marginalization of all aspects of the Amazigh identity. This has had a negative effect, including the falsification of Amazigh history and the people's total Arabization, especially in the cities. This cultural genocide has prompted the Amazigh elite to organize themselves into new structures such as associations and confederations. All these entities, working to protect and promote the rights of the Amazigh people in Morocco, form part of an Indigenous movement referred to as the “Amazigh Movement” (MA) or “Amazigh Cultural Movement” (MCA). In the 1980s, this movement began criticizing the State's assimilationist policies through a cultural charter published in 1981^[2] by the Association Nouvelle pour la Culture et les Arts Populaires (ANCAP), later known as the Organization Tamaynut. Then, in 1991, it began to make the demands set out in the Agadir Charter,^[3] which became a common platform for the different players in this movement. This historic reference document was aimed at getting the Royal Cabinet and political forces in Morocco to react favourably to Amazigh rights. Decision-makers have nonetheless ignored the voices of Indigenous Peoples, leading the MA to address the UN and to participate in the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights. This participation helped them to discover the similarities and connections between the Amazigh and the world's other Indigenous Peoples. The MA's accession to the international Indigenous movement was an historic turning point, leading to the creation of the Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe (IRCAM) in 2001. Today there are more than 900 Amazigh associations established throughout Morocco.

The 2011 Constitution officially recognizes the Amazigh identity and language. This could be a very positive and encouraging step for the Amazigh people of Morocco. Parliament finally adopted an organic law for the implementation of Article 5 of the Constitution in 2019, after several years of waiting. Twelve years on from the Constitution and four years after the organic law was passed in Parliament, however, nothing has really changed: Tamazight language teaching is still at the same stage and will have to wait until 2030 to be extended to all primary schools; and linguistic discrimination is still the order of the day, since the Tifinagh script is absent from national identity cards, passports and the new Moroccan banknotes that went into circulation on 24 November 2023.^[4]

Morocco has not ratified ILO Convention 169 and has not adopted UNDRIP.

This article is part of the 40^th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. Find The Indigenous World 2026 in full here

Peace and security

The issue of peace and security for Morocco's Indigenous Amazigh people raises complex challenges at the intersection of human rights, social justice, territorial security, cultural recognition and political freedom. Despite constitutional recognition and some institutional advances, the Amazigh people continue to face major structural barriers affecting their human security, social cohesion, territorial sovereignty and political participation.

This article analyses four key dimensions:

• The marginalization of the Amazigh dimension of the Moroccan Sahara, despite its fundamental role in national identity.
• The plundering of land and natural resources, without respect for the principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC).
• Structural barriers to the formation of Indigenous political parties, notably the case of the Amazigh Democratic Party (PDAM).
• The delays in implementing Organic Law 26-16 on officially institutionalizing the Amazigh language.

Marginalization and neglect of the Amazigh dimension of the Sahara in southern Morocco

The question of the Western Sahara to the south of Morocco is often discussed, at a diplomatic and geopolitical level, in terms of the issue of territorial sovereignty. Morocco has taken a very important step towards a final resolution of this dispute, reflected in of the UN Security Council.^[5] This resolution sets out a regulatory framework for the process of implementing a plan for the area’s autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.^[6] Nevertheless, the socio-cultural level of the issue, particularly the Indigenous aspect, is poorly known and sometimes misunderstood. This region is inhabited by the Amazigh, the Indigenous people and oldest known inhabitants,^[7] and an Amazigh identity has always been present in its toponymy, language and different forms of culture, even among tribes that have undergone a process of Arabization.^[8] This identity remains marginalized, however, and this dimension is often absent from concrete State policies, including peace and security strategies and negotiations on the region's future.^[9]

The lack of programmes and strategies to promote the Amazigh identity, particularly in Morocco's Sahara region, has several consequences:

• The creation of a formalized identity vacuum whereby peacebuilding is based on unilateral national narratives rather than inclusive recognition of the Amazigh identity within a framework of plurality.
• The perception of national security as cultural homogenization rather than the protection of diverse heritages and collective rights.
• The lack of a peace agreement that fully recognizes Amazigh rights to language, culture, land and local governance.

The plundering of Amazigh lands and resources

Territorial security is an essential condition for lasting peace. The Amazigh people's deep attachment to their land, not only as an economic resource but also as a founding element of their cultural identity, is well documented, as are the persistent challenges arising from this.

The history of land law in Morocco reveals a radical transformation of traditional Amazigh systems following the French protectorate: a series of colonial laws gradually abolished collective ownership of land, substituting foreign legal regimes for Amazigh customary law^[10] (Azerf).^[11]

Even after independence, land tenure systems inherited from the colonial period persisted, contributing to the marginalization of Amazigh communities in their own territories, notably through:

• The cancellation of customary rights,
• The placing of collective lands under public (Ministry of the Interior) or private control (cession to large investors),
• The exploitation of natural resources without Indigenous consent.^[12]

Laws passed in 2019 removed the inalienability of collective lands traditionally held by Amazigh communities, opening the door to their privatization or “Mélkisation”. ^[13] This poses a serious risk to land security in the sense that collective lands represent a significant proportion of Amazigh territories, and their conversion to private ownership will fragment community structures; this will lead to a loss of control over natural resources (water, forests, minerals etc.) that are essential to economic and cultural survival.^[14]

Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) is a pillar of international law for Indigenous Peoples: it requires that, before any decision is taken affecting their lands –whether for resource exploitation or development projects– Indigenous communities are fully consulted and give their consent without coercion.

And yet several State interventions, in particular demarcations and projects to exploit Amazigh lands, have been initiated without explicit respect for this principle,^[15] (such as natural park projects in Morocco, for example Resolution 3267.23 published in the Official Gazette of 14 March 2024, aimed at demarcating more than 111,000 hectares of collective lands to create a natural park in the Anti-Atlas of the Souss-Masst region).^[16]

The plundering and non-consensual exploitation of land has direct consequences for human security:

• Impoverishment of rural populations;
• Exodus to cities or abroad;
• Local conflicts over access to water and grazing land;
• Gradual destruction of traditional production systems, which were historically factors of community resilience.^[17]

Ban on organizing Indigenous political parties

Political freedom, including the right to form a political party, is a fundamental element of democratic participation and conflict prevention. The experience of the Amazigh Democratic Party (PDAM) and other recent projects illustrates the legal and institutional limits imposed on Indigenous political aspirations in Morocco.

The Parti Démocratique Amazigh Marocain (PDAM) was founded in 2005 to defend Amazigh identity, culture and political recognition. However, the Ministry of the Interior declared the party illegal in November 2007 for “non-compliance with the laws governing political parties, which prohibit formations based on ethnic, linguistic or regional criteria”. The Administrative Court ordered its dissolution in April 2008, confirming the implicit ban on political parties explicitly based on an Indigenous or ethno-cultural identity.^[18]

This institutional ban has important implications. Firstly, it limits political pluralism by preventing the organizational emergence of movements directly linked to Amazigh identity. In contrast, it reinforces a political framework that tends to homogenize demands in parties with general platforms, or others known for their negative track record towards Amazigh and pluralism in general, rather than allowing for political representation specific to the needs of Indigenous communities. The absence of legal political spaces for the expression of Indigenous demands then triggers significant security issues that can exacerbate social tensions, as voices turn to non-institutional or protest channels.

Outside the framework of political parties, restrictions have been reported on freedom of expression, association and peaceful demonstration for Amazigh activists. Excessive restrictions on certain organizations or bans on demonstrations may be interpreted as restrictions on civil and political rights^[19] (e.g. the case of sections of Amazigh organizations such as “Tamaynut” that have not yet received their receipts/registration documents as of 2025).

Delays in implementing the provisions of Organic Law 26-16

Organic Law No. 26-16^[20] aims to officially institutionalize the Amazigh language, following its constitutional recognition in 2011.^[21]

This law was intended to lay the legislative foundations for the institutionalization of the Amazigh language, which is the majority language despite the disputed figures from the latest 2024 census,^[22] so that it is used in teaching, appears in public services, and is incorporated into administrative documents and the institutional apparatus.

The legislative assembly did set deadlines for the gradual application of these measures but it is important to stress that implementation has been very slow, often missing the deadlines set; key sectors such as schools, public media and administration have not significantly integrated the Amazigh language; and certain provisions concerning compulsory bilingual signage or the use of Tamazight in the justice system have not yet been applied consistently, sometimes in contrast to the provisions of the Constitution and Organic Law 26.16, such as article 14 of law 38.15 on judicial organization.^[23]

The delays in implementing this law contribute to a continued lack of visibility of the Amazigh language in the public sphere, reducing citizens' effective access to their cultural rights, and increasing the Arabization of the population. It also creates a feeling of institutional inequality that is likely to produce social frustration among the Amazigh. All this has an impact on national cohesion, as the failure to effectively implement an organic law symbolizing cultural recognition could be perceived as a lack of political will.

Conclusion: challenges for peace and security

Analysis of the four dimensions shows that, despite constitutional recognition of the Amazigh people's historic role and symbolic legislative advances, several structural barriers continue to affect their human, cultural, territorial and political security.

Hicham El-Mastouri (Afulay) was born in Tiznit, Morocco. He holds a Master's degree in Management and is a finance executive and a human and peoples' rights activist. He is a former scholarship holder on the Indigenous Fellowship Programme (OHCHR Geneva), class of 2017, and is responsible for external relations and international action within the Organization Tamaynut (founded in 1978). He is also a member of the executive board of the Indigenous Peoples of Africa Co-ordinating Committee (IPACC) and co-founder of the Tilelli Network, which monitors the recommendations made to Morocco by UN mechanisms. Contact: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

This article is part of the 40^th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. Find The Indigenous World 2026 in full here

Notes and references

^[1] M. Lhoucine Aït Bahcine, “La terre marocaine parle amazighe du point de vue toponymie”. Albayane Press. 17 October 2010. https://albayane.press.ma/m-lhoucine-ait-bahcine-lla-terre-marocaine-parle-amazighe-du-point-de-vue-toponymiern.html; Le360. “Video. À la rencontre de l’un de nos ancêtres, découvert à Tafoghalt.” 17 November 2019. https://fr.le360.ma/societe/video-a-la-rencontre-de-lun-de-nos-ancetres-decouvert-a-tafoghalt-202626/; SudEstMaroc. “Le patrimoine rupestre du Sud Est Maroc”.

https://sudestmaroc.com/le-patrimoine-rupestre-du-sud-est-maroc/; Culture Cherifienne. “Célébration de Yennayer, le nouvel an Amazigh au Maroc.” 11 January 2023.

https://www.culturecherifienne.com/celebration-de-yennayer-le-nouvel-an-amazigh-au-maroc/ and My Heritage. “Maroc - principales origines ethniques”. https://www.myheritage.fr/ethnicities/morocco/country-ethnicity-distribution

^[2] La Charte Culturelle, reference document, Association Nouvelle pour la Culture et les Arts Populaires (ANCAP), Rabat, Morocco, 1981

^[3] Agadir Charter on Linguistic and Cultural Rights (1991). https://www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca/afrique/maroc-charte_agadir-1991.htm

^[4] Ahdani, Jassim. “Polémique au Maroc: l’alphabet amazigh absent des nouveaux billets de banque.” Jeune Afrique, 5 December 2023. https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1510802/politique/polemique-au-maroc-lalphabet-amazigh-absent-des-nouveaux-billets-de-banque/

^[5] United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2797, S/RES/2797 (2025), 31 October 2025. https://docs.un.org/fr/S/RES/2797(2025)

^[6] Youssef, Amine. “La résolution 2797 du Conseil de sécurité: La solution d’autonomie plébiscitée.” Policy Center for the New South, 4 November 2025. https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/la-resolution-2797-du-conseil-de-securite-la-solution-dautonomie-plebiscitee

^[7] Skounti, Ahmed. “Les Berbères du Maroc: Qui sont-ils, que sont-ils?” In Les Berbères du Maroc: Qui sont-ils, que sont-ils?, 81–96. Rabat: Royaume du Maroc, Ministère de la Culture, n.d. https://ahmedskounti.weebly.com/uploads/7/4/0/8/7408619/les_berbres_du_maroc_qui_sont-ils_que_sont-ils.pdf

^[8] Bouhaddouz, Rachid. “Le Sahara marocain et l’identité amazighe.” Zaiocity, 27 October 2024. https://zaiocity.com/le-sahara-marocain-et-lidentite-amazighe/

^[9] Congrès mondial amazigh. “Le CMA s’adresse aux organes de l’ONU.” Congrès mondial amazigh, 18 November 2023. https://www.congres-mondial-amazigh.org/2023/11/18/le-cma-s-adresse-aux-organes-de-l-onu/

^[10] Elferouah, Said. “صادم.. نتائج إحصاء 2014 تجعل الأمازيغ أقلية بنسبة 27 بالمائة فقط !” العالم الأمازيغي (Alam Amazigh), 19 November 2015. https://amadalamazigh.press.ma/2014-04-23-15-02-52/

^[11] For Amazigh customary law, see a study by Professor Mustapha El Qadéry, entitled: “Azerf et le mythe de la ‘justice coutumière berbère’. Réflexions sur le droit au Maroc” http://www.mondeberbere.com/azerf-mythe.html  

^[12] Comité des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels. “Info des organisations de la société civile (pour la session), Maroc, INT/CESCR/CSS/MAR/21326,” n.d. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2FCESCR%2FCSS%2FMAR%2F21326&Lang=fr

^[13] Mélkisation: comes from the word “Melk”, which is a word used in Arabic as “Milkone” but which was adapted into the Amazigh language “Lmelek” meaning “Property”. Mélkisation is a Moroccan land policy aimed at transforming tribal and other collective lands into private “Melk” lands.

^[14] International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). “The Indigenous World 2025: Morocco.” In The Indigenous World 2025, edited by Dwayne Mamo. Copenhagen: IWGIA, 2025. https://iwgia.org/en/morocco/5632-iw-2025-morocco.html

^[15] Ibid.

^[16] Le Desk. “Dans le Souss, le projet d’un parc naturel inquiète les populations locales.” 22 mai 2024. https://ledesk.ma/2024/05/22/dans-le-souss-le-projet-dun-parc-naturel-inquiete-les-populations-locales/

^[17] Congrès mondial amazigh. “Contribution du CMA au rapport de la Rapporteuse spéciale sur les droits de l’homme et les personnes déplacées.” 29 mars 2024. https://www.congres-mondial-amazigh.org/2024/03/29/contribution-du-cma-au-rapport-de-la-rs-sur-les-droits-de-l-homme-et-les-personnes-d%C3%A9plac%C3%A9es

^[18] Afrik.com. “Dissolution du Parti démocrate amazigh marocain: la communauté berbère condamne.” 2008. https://www.afrik.com/dissolution-du-parti-democrate-amazigh-marocain-la-communaute-berbere-condamne

^[19] Amazigh24. “Racisme au Maroc – Déclaration de la Rapporteuse spéciale des Nations Unies.” 19 février 2019. https://amazigh24.com/racisme-maroc-declaration-de-rapporteuse-speciale-nations-unies

^[20] Royaume du Maroc. Loi organique n° 26-16 fixant les étapes de la mise en œuvre du caractère officiel de la langue amazighe et les modalités de son intégration dans l’enseignement et dans les domaines prioritaires de la vie publique. 2019. PDF, 32 p. https://amadalamazigh.press.ma/fr/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/AMAZIGHE-Loin%C2%B026-16.pdf

^[21] Maroc. Constitution du Royaume du Maroc de 2011. Promulguée par le dahir n° 1-11-91 du 29 juillet 2011. https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/ma2011.htm

^[22] IWGIA, op. cit 14

^[23] IWGIA, op. cit 14

Tags: Global governance