The Indigenous World 2026: Libya

Written on 22 April 2026. Posted in Libya

The Amazighs form the Indigenous population of Libya. They are estimated to number some one million people, or more than 16% of the country’s total population.

They live in various areas of Libya in the north, east and south of the country albeit without any geographical continuity. To the west of Tripoli, on the Mediterranean coast, they live in the town of At-Wilul (Zwara) and in the Adrar Infussen (Nefoussa) mountains, on the border with Tunisia; in the south-east, on the border with Egypt, they live in the oases of Awjla, Jalu and Jakhra; in the south, the Fezzan region is traditionally Kel-Tamasheq (Tuareg) territory, including the areas of Murzuq, Sebha, Ubari, Ghat and Ghadamès. Libya’s Kel-Tamasheq are naturally linked to other Kel-Tamasheq communities living across the borders with Niger and Algeria. Tripoli is also home to a significant Amazigh community.

In addition to Arab and Amazigh communities, there is an ethnic minority in Libya known as the “Toubou”, comprising some 50,000 individuals. They are originally from the Tibesti plateau in Chad and they live along the Libya/Chad border. They live a nomadic way of life and practise pastoralism across an area that extends from northern Niger to the Sudan.

During the time of Gaddafi (1969-2011), Libya was declared an exclusively “Arab and Muslim” country. The 1969 Constitutional Proclamation states in its first article that “Libya is an Arab republic (…), the Libyan people are a part of the Arab nation and its aim is total Arab unity. The country’s name is the Arab Republic of Libya.” Article Two adds that “Islam is the state religion and Arabic its official language.” Government policy since then has always relentlessly persecuted anyone who does not recognize Libya’s “Arab-Islamic identity”.

Following the 2011 “revolution”, a “Provisional Constitutional Council” submitted a draft new Constitution in 2017^[1] that in no way changed the country’s identitary foundations. Article Two still provides that “Libya forms part of the Arab nation” and that “Arabic is the state language”. Article Six notes that “Islam is the state religion and Sharia the source of its law”. Other discriminatory articles then follow prohibiting a non-Muslim Libyan from standing for election to the Chamber of Representatives (Article 69) or as President of the Republic (Article 101) and stating that justice shall be passed down “in the name of Allah” (Article 189). These articles are clearly aimed at imposing an Islamic republic, to the detriment of the diversity of cultures and beliefs in Libya. Due to Amazigh and Toubou opposition, however, and also because of the war, this draft constitution has not yet been adopted.

Libya voted in favour of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).

This article is part of the 40^th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. Find The Indigenous World 2026 in full here

Latent instability and insecurity persist

Libya is still divided and has two governments, one called the “national unity government”, headed by Prime Minister Abdel-Hamid Dbeiba and based in Tripoli, controlling the Tripolitania region, and another called the “national stability government” headed by Osama Hammad, based in Benghazi and controlling the eastern and southern regions of the country. The struggle between the two rival factions is not just about political power but is also about control of Libya's oil and gas resources.

Insecurity is further fuelled by the fact that Libya is also ruled by numerous armed militia who control many territories as well as some smuggled oil exports. These militia often engage in bloody battles with each other, such as the one that took place in Tripoli in May 2025, involving the SSA militia and Brigade 44.[2]

The UN is continuing its efforts to reunify the country and restore stability. Following Abdoulaye Bathily's resignation in April 2024 as head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the UN Secretary-General appointed Hannah Tetteh as his Special Representative for Libya on 24 January 2025. She was quick to point out that “at the heart of the political deadlock lies a power struggle fuelled by fragmented institutions and competition for economic resources”.[3] On 21 August 2025, she presented a new roadmap to the UN Security Council, calling for general elections, the unification of national institutions, the establishment of a unified government, a new electoral framework and a broad dialogue involving all Libyan stakeholders. But this new plan was met with reservations and even rejection by the Benghazi government, whose Prime Minister, Osama Hamad, sent a formal complaint to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, and members of the Security Council, accusing her and the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) more generally of “serious violations of national sovereignty” and “interference in the internal affairs of the country”.[4]

In other words, the peace plan proposed by Hannah Tetteh has no chance of success. The UN believes that “deep-rooted divisions, economic mismanagement, persistent human rights violations and competing internal and external interests continue to erode the country's unity and stability, and put it increasingly at risk of renewed conflict”.

The daily challenges facing Amazighs

In a context marked by instability and insecurity, the Amazigh of Libya are trying to preserve their territories, particularly in the Adrar Infussen and At-Wilul (Zwara) regions. Although not part of the conflict between the two governments, Libya's Amazighs are nevertheless under the influence of the Tripoli government, especially as Tripoli has long been home to a strong Amazigh community.

Structured around their municipalities and their High Council of Amazighs of Libya (HCAL), they are trying to influence decisions on matters that concern them, despite insecurity and poor governance. As a result, they are attempting to negotiate with the government in Tripoli to obtain more resources, recognition and participation in the decision-making and political life of their country.

On 14 March 2025, a delegation of Amazigh mayors, elders and community leaders thus met Mohamed El-Menfi, President of the Libyan Presidential Council, in Tripoli. The aim of the meeting was to discuss “constitutional recognition of Libya's Amazigh community, recognition and protection of its socio-cultural, linguistic and religious identity, and an end to discriminatory administrative practices against Amazighs”.[5]

On 12 June 2025, representatives of Amazigh municipalities and Amazigh communities met with Hannah Tetteh, Head of UNSMIL[6] in Nalut, in the Amazigh territory of Adrar Infussen. During the meeting, the Amazigh representatives presented their recommendations concerning, in particular, the draft political roadmap of the UN representative in Libya, recalling the constitutional guarantees necessary for Amazigh rights and the equitable participation of Amazighs in the national dialogue. This meeting was important for the Amazighs of Libya because it demonstrated an international commitment to the Amazigh communities and recognition of their role as key players in the country's political future.

Continuing their consultations with government authorities, representatives of the Amazighs of Libya, including the High Council of Amazighs of Libya, were received by Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeiba on 17 December 2025, at the seat of government in Tripoli, in the presence of other members of the government. They had already met in May 2025. The meeting focused on collaboration between the two parties, security issues and the needs of the Amazigh territories if they were to ensure their development in all areas.[7]

Despite ongoing dialogue with the government authorities in Tripoli, Amazighs are still discriminated against and often subjected to acts of racial hatred. Such was the case on 17 February 2025, in the Hay Al-Andalus district of Tripoli, when a vehicle belonging to the Libyan police was filmed deliberately driving over the Amazigh flag. Amazigh communities perceived this act as a serious provocation and immediately reacted by organizing mass street demonstrations. The High Council of Amazighs of Libya, the Municipal Councils of Amazigh territories and Amazigh civil society organizations also reacted strongly, issuing press releases condemning the racist act and calling for the resignation of the Minister of the Interior, Imad Trabelsi.[8]

The Amazigh therefore continue to face various forms of racism, discrimination, intimidation and violations of their rights. In the south of the country, the Kel-Tamasheq (Touareg) community faces several major challenges: poverty, despite the presence of oil deposits on its territory, and the fact that 15 to 20,000 families, i.e. some 80 to 100,000 Kel-Tamasheq people, remain deprived of Libyan nationality and identity documents. As a result, they are barred from taking part in elections, and from accessing public services such as education and training, health care and legal employment.

Insecurity and its impact on Amazigh life

The various oil and gas fields that provide Libya with almost all its financial resources are all under the control of armed groups affiliated to one or other of the two Libyan governments. Amazigh communities do not benefit from the exploitation of these mineral resources, even when they are located on their traditional territories. On the contrary, the presence of natural resources attracts all kinds of competing predatory groups, fostering conflict and violence. Poverty is compounded by insecurity and danger, which complicates the daily lives of local people.[9]

The Kel-Tamasheq community, whose territory in south-west Libya (Fezzan) straddles the Algerian-Libyan border, is faced with the challenge of Algeria's closure of this border on security grounds. The closure of this border has put an end to the traditional trade between the towns of Ghat and Djanet, seriously disrupting the lives of the local population.

Belkacem Lounes is a Doctor of Economics, university teacher (Grenoble University), former expert member of the Working Group on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (2016-2021), former member of the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2018-2020), and author of numerous reports and articles on Amazigh and Indigenous rights.

Nasser Abouzakhar is a Doctor and Professor of Computer Science, Director of Itran Society.

This article is part of the 40^th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. Find The Indigenous World 2026 in full here

Notes and references

^[1] Libyan Constitutional Declaration, 2012. https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/lib128759.pdf

^[2] Courrier International. “En Libye, le gouvernement Dbeibah fragilisé après des affrontements entre milices.” 20 May 2025. https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/politique-en-libye-le-gouvernement-dbeibah-fragilise-apres-des-affrontements-entre-milices_231065

^[3] UN News. “Libye: “la fragile stabilité menacée par l’impasse politique et les rivalités économiques.” 17 April 2025. https://news.un.org/fr/story/2025/04/1154836

^[4] Nova News. “Libya: Benghazi PM files UN complaint against UN Special Representative Tetteh.” 22 October 2025. https://www.agenzianova.com/en/news/libia-il-premier-di-bengasi-presenta-un-reclamo-allonu-contro-la-rappresentante-speciale-tetteh/

^[5] Assad, Abdul Kader. “Libyan Amazigh present their demands on rights and identity to the Presidential Council.” The Libya Observer, 15 March 2025. https://libyaobserver.ly/news/libyan-amazigh-present-their-demands-rights-and-identity-presidential-council

^[6] Amazighs in Libya, annual report 2025, Itran Society.

^[7] Libyan News Agency. “Dbaiba receives an Amazigh delegation.” 25 May 2025. https://lana.gov.ly/post.php?lang=en&id=333398

^[8] Libya Review. “Amazigh Flag Desecration Sparks Outrage in Libya.” 22 February 2025. https://libyareview.com/53327/amazigh-flag-desecration-sparks-outrage-in-libya/

^[9] Renou, Alexandre. “Libye 2025: entre tensions géostratégiques et espoirs démocratiques.” Classe Internationale, 15 June 2025. https://classe-internationale.com/2025/06/15/al-jazeera-2021-21-decembre-libya-electoral-commission-dissolves-poll-committees/

Tags: Global governance