The Indigenous World 2025: Libya

Written on 25 April 2025. Posted in Libya

The Amazigh form the Indigenous population of Libya and are estimated to number some one million people, or more than 16% of the country's total population.

They live in various areas of Libya in the north, east and south of the country albeit without any geographical continuity. To the west of Tripoli, on the Mediterranean coast, they live in the town of At Wilul (Zwara) and in the Adrar Infussen (Nefoussa) mountains, on the border with Tunisia; in the south-east, on the border with Egypt, they live in the oases of Awjla, Jalu and Jakhra; in the south, the Fezzan region is traditionally Kel-Tamasheq (Tuareg) territory, including the areas of Murzuq, Sebha, Ubari, Ghat and Ghadamès. Libya’s Kel-Tamasheq are naturally linked to other Kel-Tamasheq communities living across the borders with Niger and Algeria. Tripoli is also home to a significant Amazigh community.

In addition to Arab and Amazigh communities, there is an ethnic minority in Libya known as the “Toubou”, comprising some 50,000 individuals, who are originally from the Tibesti plateau in Chad and live along the Libya/Chad border. They live a nomadic way of life and practise pastoralism across an area that extends from northern Niger to the Sudan.

During the time of Gaddafi (1969-2011), Libya was declared an exclusively “Arab and Muslim” country. The 1969 Constitutional Proclamation states in its first article that “Libya is an Arab republic (…), the Libyan people are a part of the Arab nation and its aim is total Arab unity. The country’s name is the Arab Republic of Libya”. Article Two adds that “Islam is the state religion and Arabic its official language”. Government policy since then has always relentlessly persecuted anyone who does not recognize Libya's “Arab-Islamic identity”.

Following the 2011 “revolution”, a “Provisional Constitutional Council” submitted a draft new Constitution in 2017^[1] that in no way changed the country's identitary foundations. Article Two still provides that “Libya forms part of the Arab nation” and that “Arabic is the state language”. Article Six notes that “Islam is the state religion and Sharia the source of its law”. Other discriminatory articles then follow prohibiting a non-Muslim Libyan from standing for election to the Chamber of Representatives (Article 69) or as President of the Republic (Article 101) and stating that justice shall be passed down “in the name of Allah” (Article 189). These articles are clearly aimed at imposing an Islamic republic, to the detriment of the diversity of cultures and beliefs in Libya. Due to Amazigh and Toubou opposition, however, and also because of the war, this draft constitution has not yet been adopted.

Libya voted in favour of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).

This article is part of the 39^th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. The photo above is of an Indigenous activist Funa-ay Claver, a Bontok Igorot, standing alongside Indigenous youth activists and others. They are protesting against the repressive laws and human rights violations suffered through the actions and projects of the Government of the Philippines and other actors against Indigenous Peoples at President Marcos Jr’s national address on 22 July 2024 in Quezon City, Philippines. The photo was taken by Katribu Kalipunan ng Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas and is the cover of The Indigenous World 2025 where this article is featured. Find The Indigenous World 2025 in full here

A context of political and institutional instability

Libya remains in a political stalemate, with two governments: the UN-recognized “Government of National Unity” (GNU) based in Tripoli and led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, backed by armed militias, and the Benghazi-based “Government of National Stability” (GNS), led by Prime Minister Osama Hammad, backed by the Libyan National Army (LNA) under the command of General Khalifa Haftar. Political confusion has reigned since the indefinite postponement of national elections scheduled for December 2021.

On 13 April 2024, Abdoulaye Bathily, the UN's Special Representative for Libya, resigned from his post, stating in justification that the main Libyan stakeholders had rejected any solution, presented “unreasonable” demands and shown their “indifference to the interests of the Libyan people”.^[2]

The GNS controls around two-thirds of Libya (east and south) while the GNU covers the remaining one-third in the west. The institutional, political and security situation is chaotic and constitutes a serious obstacle to the normal operation of public services such as health, education, justice, etc. In addition, the population is still faced with insecurity and difficulties in getting around. Armed clashes between rival militias occur regularly, as on 14 December 2024, around the Zawiya oil refinery 40 km west of Tripoli. The struggle for control of the territory and oil revenues is fuelling tensions.

In August 2024, the Ras Ajdir border post between Libya and Tunisia, located near the Amazigh town of At-Willul (Zwara), was closed for several weeks due to armed clashes between rival groups over its control. This area is the scene of ongoing tensions that have a negative impact on the lives of the inhabitants of At-Willul and the surrounding region.^{[3], [4]}

As a result, the country’s social, economic and cultural life is severely hampered. What’s more, the few civil society organizations that remain have great difficulty in carrying out their activities due to a lack of resources and threats to freedom of opinion, expression and assembly.

In this hostile and often dangerous context, the Amazigh territories of Libya, such as the regions of Nafusa and At Wilul (Zwara) in the west of the country and Tiniri-Imohagh (Touareg) to the south, are trying to organize around their municipalities in order to meet the essential needs of the local populations.

Because of their specific features and vulnerability, the Amazigh people of Libya continue to face threats to their language, culture, socio-economic situation and survival as a distinct people.^[5]

Human and civil rights challenges

Following the 2011 revolution that ousted Gaddafi's dictatorial regime, the Amazigh experienced a sense of freedom that enabled them to publicly express their demands for recognition and respect of their rights as an Indigenous people distinct from the rest of Libyan society. The Amazigh clearly asserted their identity and demanded legal protection for their language and its teaching in Libya's public education system. Subsequently, Amazigh demands expanded to include issues of governance, land rights and the right to self-determination.

The Libyan government's response was to treat the Amazigh as “enemies of the revolution”, “dangers to national unity”, and to threaten them. This clearly indicates that the change of political regime in Libya has not been accompanied by recognition or respect for the Amazigh people of this country.^[6]

Libya's Amazigh organizations want a constitution that guarantees respect for the rights of all its citizens, encompassing all component of society. The new constitution must comply with the relevant international laws and be supported by the international community.

In order to attract Amazigh support, the Tripoli-based GNU has made various statements in favour of Amazigh rights and the need to recognize them in the country's future constitution. In practice, however, nothing has come of these promises, and many pan-Arab political parties regard the Amazigh as a minority, rejecting any possibility of legally recognizing Amazigh rights.

In June 2024, the Tripoli government's General Authority of Waqfs (Awqaf)^[7] and Islamic Affairs issued a statement stigmatizing the Amazigh that follow the “Ibadi" branch of Islam, calling Amazigh “people of caprice and heresy”. This statement indicates that acts of “testimony” by an Ibadi Amazigh can thus be of no value. Back in 2017, the Supreme Fatwa Committee under the Benghazi government called the Ibadi Amazigh “misguided infidels without dignity”. For the Libyan authorities, only Sunni Islam is authorized.^{[8], [9]}

These racist anti-Amazigh positions angered Amazigh communities, who reacted by closing government offices in their territories and deciding to set up their own Religious Affairs Authority.

In November 2024, the Interior Minister of the Tripoli-based GNU announced his intention to take steps to make the wearing of the Islamic veil compulsory for all women. This announcement has caused concern among Amazigh communities as such measures are not in line with Amazigh culture and the Amazigh vision of a free and pluralist society.^[10]

Political challenges

Despite making up a substantial proportion of the Libyan population (around 20% in all), the Amazigh community has remained under-represented in state institutions. They are not represented in the Libyan governments, nor in the Presidential Council, nor among the heads of major administrations. This exclusion of Amazigh from the nexus of political power deprives them of the possibility of making their voices heard and exploiting opportunities that could benefit their territories.

In 2024, the commission in charge of drafting the electoral laws failed to take into account Amazigh suggestions for proportional representation and electoral district boundaries that take the specific socio-cultural features of the territories into account. As a result, the Amazigh rejected the electoral laws proposed by the commission.

In November 2024, the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Acting Head in the UN Support Mission in Libya, Stephanie Koury, met with Amazigh representatives to discuss their concerns about fair representation and meaningful participation in the political process. Although this meeting was perceived as positive by the Amazigh, there is no indication that their demands will be heard by the Libyan authorities.

The human rights concerns of Amazigh populations include cultural discrimination, restrictions on freedom of expression, challenges to self-determination and repression. Amazigh rights activists have been arrested and ill-treated by the Tripoli government's internal security services, and these activists often report persistent barriers to the implementation of cultural activities and to their freedom of expression and participation in the country's political life.^{[11], [12]}

Economic challenges

The Tripoli government's apparent efforts to modernize local services and institutions have not been effectively implemented in the Amazigh regions, perpetuating economic disparities. State development plans and projects have historically neglected these areas. In 2024, the Amazigh continued to face significant economic challenges resulting from a lack of appropriate development initiatives, such as sanitary infrastructure or water supply.

National development projects have been deliberately targeted at non-Amazigh regions and towns affiliated to large militias and armed groups, where government attention is focused on upgrading their facilities. Major infrastructure projects, such as road building and utility improvements, have largely been awarded to areas aligned with the government authorities, leaving Amazigh territories with dilapidated facilities.

Despite the proximity of Amazigh territories to oil-rich areas, Amazigh communities in the Nafusa, At Wilul (Zwara) and Tiniri-Fezzan (Touareg) regions have received only minimal oil revenues.

The Kabaw region, in the Amazigh territory of Nafusa, once known for its figs, olives and almonds, has experienced significant agricultural decline due to droughts induced by global warming. Fields that were once green and prosperous until the early 2000s are now barren. The lack of government support for adaptation to climate change and sustainable farming practices has left farmers in dire straits.^[13]

Despite having contributed to the construction of Libya’s "Great Manmade River" via a tax on their salaries for many years, the inhabitants of the Amazigh regions are not connected to this project's network of water pipes. In the Nafusa region, the absence of effective water management policies and infrastructure has resulted in severe water shortages, forcing many inhabitants to abandon their homes and farms and migrate to urban areas. In this mountainous region, environmental degradation and a lack of government support have led to a decline in local food production, exacerbating food insecurity.

This lack of economic opportunities has contributed to rising unemployment and the migration of many professionals to the capital and coastal areas. In early 2024, several local offices were closed in the Nafusa region due to a lack of resources and insecurity, forcing residents to travel long distances to access certain public services. In Yefren, bank branches and the Faculty of Education closed in 2024.^[14]

Regular closures of the Ras Ajdir border crossing with Tunisia, near the town of At-Willul (Zwara), are seriously disrupting economic activities in the region, affecting the livelihoods of Amazigh communities who depend on these cross-border activities.^[15]

The challenges facing Indigenous youth in Libya

Libya's Indigenous youth, and particularly young women, are particularly hard hit by the security chaos. This situation is hindering their work or studies and causing an obstruction to their future. In the words of Dihya, a young Amazigh from Nalut, “The most significant thing for me is the absence of hope. I dream of a peaceful country where I'll be free but Libya is dominated by violence and discrimination against women, and I don't see how things can improve.” In Zwara, young Izem says he is “concerned by the reign of the law of guns and by injustice”. He adds that he “has no confidence in government institutions because they propagate a discourse of hatred and exclusion and refuse to recognize and respect the rights of Amazigh communities”.^[16]

Another challenge is that facing the several thousand young Imohagh (Tuareg) from southern Libya who are still deprived of identity documents, preventing them from benefiting from public services such as education or health. This problem, which has persisted for over 40 years, has not yet been resolved despite being brought to the attention of the government authorities.

Belkacem Lounes is a doctor of Economics, university teacher (Grenoble Alpes University), former expert member of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities in Africa of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (2016-2021), former member of the United Nations Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2018-2020), author of numerous reports and articles on Amazigh and Indigenous rights.

Nasser Abouzakhar, is an Amazigh from Yefren in Libya, holder of PhD in Science Engineering, University academic, human rights defender and member of the Federal Council of Amazigh World Congress.

This article is part of the 39^th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. The photo above is of an Indigenous activist Funa-ay Claver, a Bontok Igorot, standing alongside Indigenous youth activists and others. They are protesting against the repressive laws and human rights violations suffered through the actions and projects of the Government of the Philippines and other actors against Indigenous Peoples at President Marcos Jr’s national address on 22 July 2024 in Quezon City, Philippines. The photo was taken by Katribu Kalipunan ng Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas and is the cover of The Indigenous World 2025 where this article is featured. Find The Indigenous World 2025 in full here

Notes and references

^[1] Libyan Constitutional Declaration, 2012. https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/lib128759.pdf

^[2] Bamba, Ali. “Libya: Bathily resigns from UN special mission.” Africa News, 13 August 2024. https://fr.africanews.com/2024/04/16/libye-bathily-demissionne-de-la-mission-speciale-de-lonu/

^[3] Assad, Abdulkader. “Libyan Amazigh Council denounce Interior Minister's Ras Ajdair actions.” Libya Obserer, 23 March 2024. https://libyaobserver.ly/news/libyan-amazigh-council-denounce-interior-ministers-ras-ajdair-actions

^[4] Cordall, Simon Speakman. “Smuggler paradise on Tunisia-Libya border hurts as closure strangles trade.” Aljazeera, 19 June 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/19/in-a-smuggler-paradise-on-tunisia-libya-border-closure-wrecks-livelihoods

^[5] Assad, Abdulkader. “Koury listens to demands of Libyan Amazigh .” Libya Observer, 11 June 2024. https://libyaobserver.ly/inbrief/koury-listens-demands-libyan-amazigh

^[6] Amnistia. “Libya: Internal security agency must end abuses in name of ‘guarding virtue’.” 14 February 2024. https://www.amnistia.org/en/news/2024/02/libya-internal-security-agency-must-end-abuses-in-name-of-guarding-virtue/

^[7] Assets donated for religious or charitable purposes.

^[8] Menas Associates. “Libya's religious tensions bubble to the surface again Libya.” 18 July 2024. https://menas.co.uk/blog/libyas-religious-tensions-bubble-to-the-surface-again

^[9] Ghanmi, Lamine. “Fatwa against Ibadi Muslims in Libya risks igniting sectarian strife.” The Arab Weekly, 13 August 2017.  https://thearabweekly.com/fatwa-against-ibadi-muslims-libya-risks-igniting-sectarian-strife

^[10] Courrier International. “Morality police and compulsory veil: a new political weapon in a divided Libya.” 13 November 2024. https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/societe-police-des-m-urs-et-voile-obligatoire-une-nouvelle-arme-politique-dans-une-libya-divided_224490

^[11] Amnesty International 2023/2024 Report. Libya. https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/north-africa/libya/

^[12] Freedom House. Freedom in the world 2024. Libya. https://freedomhouse.org/country/libya/freedom-world/2024

^[13] Asharq Al-Awsat. “Once Fruitful, Libyan Village Suffers Climate Crisis.” 17 June 2024. https://english.aawsat.com/varieties/5031595-once-fruitful-libyan-village-suffers-climate-crisis

^[14] BTI Transformation Index. Libya Country Report 2024. https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/LBY

^[15] Bin Musa, Ali. “Border Crossing Struggle Reflects Chronic Instability in Western Libya.” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, 22 August 2024. https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/border-crossing-struggle-reflects-chronic-instability-in-western-libya/

^[16] Based on interviews conducted by Nasser Abouzakhar.

Tags: Youth, Business and Human Rights , Human rights, Cultural Integrity