The Indigenous World 2026: Ecuador
According to the National Institute of Statistics and Census, the current population of Ecuador is 17,867,244. There are 14 Indigenous nationalities in the country, totalling 1,301,887 people, who are grouped into a set of local, regional and national organizations representing 7.7% of the total population. The Indigenous Peoples and Nationalities live mainly in the highlands (68.20%), followed by the Amazon (24.06%) while only 7.56% are found on the coast. The following Indigenous nationalities were included in the 2022 Census for self-identification purposes: Tsáchila, Chachi, Epera, Awa, Kichwa, Shuar, Achuar, Shiwiar, Cofán, Siona, Secoya, Zápara, Andoa and Waorani. The Kichwa nationality makes up the highest percentage (85.87%) and includes nearly 800,000 people nationwide.
Despite the low percentages of most of the other nationalities, all have equal importance within the context of a Plurinational State.[i] In the highland provinces, –such as Tungurahua, Chimborazo, Cotopaxi or Pichincha–, and in the Amazonian provinces of Napo, Pastaza and Morona Santiago, there is also a significant percentage of Indigenous people living in rural areas, ranging from 50,000 to 80,000 inhabitants. To date, and despite more than 17 years of the Constitution being in force and almost three decades since ILO Convention 169 was ratified by the country, there are still no specific or clear public policies to prevent and neutralize the risk of disappearance of these ancestral peoples.
This article is part of the 40th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. Find The Indigenous World 2026 in full here
Ecuador’s situation in 2025 was marked by the consolidation of a model of political domination based on militarization and the use of a “state of war” as government strategy. The “internal war”, formally justified as a response to criminal violence, actually functioned more as an ideological device for concentrating power than as an effective security policy: the fabrication of an “internal enemy” and the administration of “wartime” politics simply normalized violence and restricted freedoms.[1]
On the socioeconomic front, the country suffered a 2.3% contraction in GDP in 2024 alongside a poverty rate of 31.9%, job insecurity and a persistent energy crisis.[2] The State’s response was to prioritize external debt and welfare policies while deepening the country’s dependence on the extractive industry. The attempt to grant the Campo Sacha concession to foreign companies without a tender process –ultimately halted by public outrage– highlighted the neoliberal orientation of Daniel Noboa's government.[3]
On the political front, Noboa's re-election in April 2025 consolidated a leadership based on an “iron fist” narrative and the construction of a punitive State. Militarization was reinforced after the 2024 constitutional referendum, which enabled the Armed Forces to participate in police tasks without the need for a state of emergency. This shift was accompanied by reports of forced disappearances and youth murders, such as the case of the four children from Malvinas de Guayaquil, thus exposing a civilian-military pact for impunity.[4]
Alongside this, Indigenous and environmental movements denounced the State’s intimidation, the freezing of accounts and an expansion of surveillance in the context of the consultation to reframe the ecological nature of the 2008 Constitution, interpreted as an attempt to legitimize extractivism under the guise of democracy. Although the referendum was rejected in November, institutional polarization persisted, reflecting a structural contradiction between eco-constitutional discourse and extractive practice, as pointed out by the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) and Pachakutik.[5]
In summary, 2025 consolidated a governance model that combines corporate neoliberalism, militarization and extractivism against a backdrop of socioeconomic crisis and violence. As Jacobin warns, Ecuador stands as a “symptom of a continent”: a laboratory of civil-military authoritarianism that serves to anticipate regional trends and mirror the growing influence of the authoritarian model in force in the United States.
Protection of the Tagaeri and Taromenane peoples and condemnation by the IACHR
In the heart of Yasuní, the Tagaeri and Taromenane Indigenous Peoples represent one of the most radical expressions of the right to self-determination: a collective decision to live in voluntary isolation, outside national society and its extractive economies. Their survival has, however, been marked by an historically tense relationship, often openly violated by the Ecuadorian State.
These peoples, who inhabit the Ecuadorian Amazon and share ancestral territory with the Waorani nationality, face a situation of extreme vulnerability due to oil expansion, internal colonization, illegal logging and the opening of roads in and around the Tagaeri-Taromenane Intangible Zone (ITZT). Various studies have warned that the risk of forced encounters, lethal violence and disease transmission is not accidental but the structural result of an extractive model that is advancing over territories in which isolation is a strategy for collective survival.[6]
This reality was examined by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (I/A Court HR) which, in September 2024, issued –and formally notified in 2025– a landmark ruling in the case of The Tagaeri and Taromenane Indigenous Peoples v. Ecuador.[7] The Court found the State responsible for violating their rights to life, territory, health, cultural identity, self-determination and a healthy environment[8] by failing to guarantee effective protection from extractive activities and the incursion of third-party invaders, despite being aware of the extreme risks faced by these peoples.[9]
The ruling highlights the impact of oil exploitation in blocks 31 and 43, where fiscal financing has taken priority over the principle of territorial integrity. This decision reveals a structural tension between the protection of the Amazon and an extractivist economic model sustained by State and private interests.
The ruling also questions other external initiatives, such as the contact promoted by the evangelical foundation “Come to the Rainforest”, an organization that implements practices prohibited by the Ecuadorian Constitution and international standards as they constitute a risk of ethnocide.[10] In response, the Court ordered the State to expand the protection zones, strengthen monitoring, train public officials and adopt a coherent and strict “no contact” policy.
In the Waorani territory, organizations such as Nacionalidad Waorani del Ecuador (NAWE) have documented the sustained increase in socio-environmental pressures –illegal routes, armed presence and covert extractive activities– affecting the corridors along which isolated peoples move, confirming that the threat is daily and cumulative.[11]
Beyond the legal record, the ruling constitutes a political milestone. It reignites the debate on the real limits of the State in the face of Amazonian extractivism and reinforces a central premise for the Indigenous movement: it is not just a question of environmental impacts but one of the physical and cultural survival of ancestral and culturally-sensitive peoples whose existence depends on the State fulfilling, without delay or shortcuts, its basic obligation to let them live in isolation, in their territory and in peace.
The mining offensive of Noboa's government
Over this period, socio-environmental conflict in Ecuador deepened as a result of a convergence between pro-extractive legal reforms, the expansion of mining and a weakening of Indigenous territorial guarantees. The central government consolidated a discourse of “economic revival” based on large-scale metal mining, projecting exports in excess of USD 4 billion (approx. EUR 3.44 billion), and thus implying an explicit alignment with transnational corporate interests, as stated by the Ministry of Energy and Mines.[12]
In this context, President Daniel Noboa intensified an international agenda aimed at attracting foreign investment, with an emphasis on mining and energy. The President made numerous trips to Canada, South Korea, Europe, Asia and the United Arab Emirates. In Toronto, he met with executives from Lundin Gold and Solaris Resources to promote the expansion of Fruta del Norte and the Warintza project.[13] In Seoul, he signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Korea Mine Rehabilitation and Mineral Resources Corp. for technical cooperation. In addition, Enami signed an agreement with Barrick International Ltd., and the Executive reopened the mining registry after seven years.[14]
In contrast, CONAIE warned that 7.5% of the territory is now under concession, including protected areas.[15] Environmental organizations similarly denounced violent consultations, while INREDH and the National Anti-Mining Front demanded the closure of the registry.[16]
This process can be interpreted as a phase of intensive “reprimarization” of the country's economic model whereby the State acts as a facilitator of extractive capital, reducing environmental controls and relativizing all collective rights. The reopening of the mining registry in July 2025, after seven years of closure, became a turning point by reactivating concessions in Indigenous territories and strategic ecosystems without adequate processes of Free, Prior and Informed Consultation.
Faced with this scenario, CONAIE denounced the unconstitutionality of the draft Law to Strengthen the Mining and Energy Sectors, pointing out that this reform weakens environmental protection, makes licences more flexible and violates collective rights recognized in the 2008 Constitution.[17] Far from being technical, these reforms operate as political devices of dispossession, reordering the legal framework in favour of extractive accumulation.
In this context, the conflict surrounding the Loma Larga mining project and the Quimsacocha páramo became one of the epicentres of socio-environmental resistance in 2025. In September, tens of thousands of people marched in the southern city of Cuenca under the banner “Don’t Touch Quimsacocha”, bringing together peasant communities, Indigenous Peoples, urban student organizations, professionals, labour unions and environmental groups in defence of water as a common asset.[18]
These mobilizations expressed not only their rejection of a specific project but also an ontological dispute over the territory: while the State and companies see it as a space for exploitation, the communities understand it as a source of life, identity and social reproduction. The narrative of the "fifth river of Cuenca"[19] synthesizes this vision by emphasizing the centrality of the páramo in the regional water cycle.[20]
At the same time, CONAIE promoted the Allpamanta process, aimed at the titling, monitoring and community control of ancestral lands, strengthening local capacities in the face of extractive encroachment. In the Amazon, particularly in Napo, the Federation of Indigenous Organizations of Napo (FOIN) demanded the declaration of environmental emergencies due to mining pollution of rivers, highlighting the cumulative impacts of illegal and legal extractivism.[21]
The escalation of socio-environmental conflicts was accompanied by an increase in the criminalization and persecution of water and nature defenders. Human rights reports document the freezing of accounts, arbitrary judicial processes and threats against community leaders, especially in subtropical territories such as Las Naves in the Central Highlands.[22]
This pattern reveals structural violence whereby the State combines legal reforms, coercive force and omission in the face of armed actors, creating territories with resources but without effective guarantees of rights. The defence of territory thus becomes a high-risk practice, despite being protected by the constitutional framework and international instruments. In short, the socio-environmental conflict associated with mining in the country in 2025 showed a new cycle of confrontation between an extractive model reinforced by the State and an increasingly coordinated Indigenous and community resistance. Far from being isolated conflicts, these processes express a profound dispute over the meaning of development, democracy and the relationship between society and nature.
Return of oil companies and threats to Amazonian Indigenous territories
The so-called Ronda Sur-Oriente (RSO) is one of the main initiatives of Daniel Noboa's government aimed at deepening the extractivist model and the reprimarization of the country's dependent economy through the promotion of concessions for oil exploration and exploitation in the south-central Ecuadorian Amazon, particularly in the provinces of Pastaza and Morona Santiago. Promoted by the Ministry of Energy and Mines, the initiative seeks to grant concessions for new hydrocarbon blocks (over an area of approximately 2,000,000 hectares) in which seven Indigenous nationalities live.[23] The aim of attracting private investment would be to increase oil production and strengthen tax revenues in a context of economic crisis and decline in traditional oil revenues.
From the State’s perspective, the RSO would be developed under “environmental responsibility” standards, incorporating prior consultation processes, social compensation and “lower impact” technologies (Ministry of Energy and Mines, 2025).[24]
These claims have, however, been widely questioned by Indigenous and environmental organizations. Indigenous organizations in Pastaza, coordinated through spaces such as PAKKIRU, together with NAWE, Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENIAE) and CONAIE, have expressed their categorical rejection.[25] They denounce the violation of the right to Free, Prior and Informed Consultation, the disregard for Constitutional Court rulings –especially in the Waorani case– and the direct threat to highly biodiverse territories and peoples in voluntary isolation, such as the Tagaeri and Taromenane.[26]
In May 2025, more than 120 Waorani delegates travelled to Quito to demand the suspension of the process from the Constitutional Court, pointing to a new extractive imposition without legitimate consent.[27] At the same time, organizations such as Amazon Watch and Amazon Frontlines are warning that the RSO threatens millions of hectares of primary forest, compromises the cultural integrity of at least six Indigenous nationalities, and contradicts the Ecuadorian State's climate commitments.[28]
Indigenous uprising in Imbabura and October national strike
Ecuador’s national strike of September and October 2025 became the most decisive event of the year, both in terms of its scale and duration and the toll it left in deaths, injuries and arrests. Called by the National Federation of Peasant, Indigenous and Black Organizations (FENOCIN), CONAIE and other social sectors, the uprising lasted 31 days and crystallized a crisis of representation that had been brewing for some time. The immediate trigger was the elimination of the diesel subsidy, a measure that abruptly increased the cost of transport, agricultural production and the cost of living for the working classes.
However, the demands quickly expanded to include a rejection of militarization, the demand for respect for social protest and opposition to extractive projects such as Loma Larga, perceived as direct threats to the communities' territories and water.
In provinces such as Imbabura, the strike took on a particularly intense hue. Indigenous communities, peasant farmers and urban collectives blocked roads, organized mass marches and held permanent assemblies.[29] The protest was sustained by mingas [community work parties] and community kitchens, and had a strong community impact in towns such as Otavalo and Cotacachi, with the participation of women, youth and ancestral authorities.
Mariana Yumbay, lawyer and assembly member of the Pachakutik Movement, said: "This strike is not just about fuel; it is about life, dignity and the right to make decisions about our territories without fear.”[30] Leonidas Iza, former president of CONAIE, denounced the fact that the government had chosen to “govern by decree, guns and states of emergency instead of listening to its people”.[31]
This narrative of the “internal enemy” served to stigmatize Indigenous leaders and protesters, presenting them as enemies of public order, and legitimizing the intensive use of force while depoliticizing the root causes of the conflict.
On the ground, this logic translated into a sustained pattern of repression. There were reports of indiscriminate use of tear gas, including in residential areas and inside homes, as well as the violent dispersal of peaceful gatherings. Families in Otavalo reported being affected by tear gas fired in the early hours of the morning while they were sleeping. Raids without warrants, arbitrary detentions and barriers to the work of medical and observation teams became commonplace.[32] The most tragic event occurred in Cotacachi, where Kichwa community member Efraín Fuérez was killed during a military operation in the context of a community blockade. Witnesses and Indigenous organizations denounced this as an illegitimate use of force. “Efraín was not a criminal, he was a community member defending his right to protest,” said CONAIE, demanding an independent investigation that never came.[33]
These cases were interpreted as a disciplinary and deterrent message to the mobilized communities. This repression also affected freedom of expression and the right to information. Indigenous and community radio stations in Imbabura, such as TVMICC, reported signal cuts, the seizure of equipment and administrative pressure, while journalists and human rights defenders were attacked. For CONAIE, these actions constituted a direct attack on the ability of communities to communicate from their own territories.[34]
The gravity of the situation transcended borders and placed the Ecuadorian State under international scrutiny. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) recalled that social protest is a right protected by Inter-American standards and that militarization of public order increases the risk of serious violations. Reports from the IACHR, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch coincided in documenting a pattern of repression that left a tragic toll: at least three dead, dozens injured, hundreds detained and an unknown number of people prosecuted.
Towards the end of October, in view of the extreme exhaustion of the communities and the absence of structural responses from the government, CONAIE announced a lifting of the strike. The result was a deeply polarized and wounded country. The 2025 national strike exposed an authoritarian and militarized State model that has opted for a highly repressive and arbitrary approach and has failed in its responsibility as the guarantor of fundamental human rights.
Referendum, defeat and crisis of Noboa's government
The 2025 Referendum in Ecuador, held on 17 November, marked a milestone in national politics by revealing deep public discontent with the government of Daniel Noboa. With traces of burned barricades still visible on the roads, along with the echo of shots fired by repressive forces and the outcry of the Kichwa communities of the Northern Highlands in Imbabura, more than 70% of registered Ecuadorians resoundingly rejected the proposed reforms, with disapproval percentages ranging from 60% to 70%, according to the National Electoral Council (CNE).[35] This result reflects a growing rift between the government and an electorate clamouring for solutions to the social and economic crisis.
The referendum, called by President Noboa as part of a package of constitutional and legal reforms on security, economic and institutional issues, became a plebiscite on his administration. The most rejected proposals were reforms to the judicial system and citizen control over State institutions, reflecting a deep mistrust in the Executive's promises.
Political analyst Javier Rodríguez interpreted the result as “a strategic defeat” that lays bare the disconnect between the government and an electorate demanding more profound changes. For Rodríguez, the consultation was an attempt by Noboa to regain legitimacy but it ended up exacerbating the perception of a weak government that is insensitive to the needs of the people.[36]
From a critical perspective, Jacobin Latinomérica pointed out that this setback is a reflection of the “crisis of the regime” in Ecuador at a time when civil society and the popular sectors are reconfiguring the balance of power and questioning the governance established after the “muerte cruzada” [impeachment process] held during the presidency of conservative Guillermo Lasso in 2023.[37] This analysis highlights how the referendum became a symptom of social pressure on the executive branch, which is facing a clamour for more inclusive and democratic reforms and basic respect for constitutional principles.
Indigenous organizations played a key role in this rejection. The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador and the National Federation of Peasant, Indigenous and Black Organizations expressed their opposition to the reforms, arguing that they violated collective rights and favoured a security-oriented and authoritarian approach, which was reflected in the persecution and prosecution of community leaders.[38]
In conclusion, the 2025 Referendum not only represented a political defeat for Noboa but also revealed a structural crisis that calls for a new social and political pact. According to Pablo Ospina, lecturer at the Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, the lack of popular support opens up an uncertain scenario for the government, which faces the urgent need to rebuild its agenda and alliances to avoid further political destabilization.[39]
Pablo Ortiz-T. is a sociologist, researcher and university lecturer. Contact: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
This article is part of the 40th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. Find The Indigenous World 2026 in full here
Notes and references
[1] Ramírez, F. Chat Show “Los Especialistas”. Facebook, 28 December 2025. https://www.facebook.com/share/v/17udFF3B9h/
[2] INEC. “Pobreza – diciembre 2025”. Ecuador en cifras. https://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/pobreza-por-ingresos/
[3] Echeverri, J.A. “Ecuador, síntoma de un continente”. Jacobin Latinoamérica, 2025. https://jacobinlat.com/2025/06/ecuador-sintoma-de-un-continente/
[4] Amnesty International. “Ecuador: A year without justice for the four children from Las Malvinas.” Amnesty International, 08 December 2025. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/12/ecuador-un-ano-sin-justicia-para-los-cuatro-ninos-de-las-malvinas//
[5] Watts, J. “Indigenous and environmental leaders in Ecuador say they are facing state intimidation”. The Guardian, 16 October 2025 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/16/indigenous-and-environmental-leaders-in-ecuador-say-they-are-facing-state-intimidation
[6] Cordero-Heredia, D., & Koeppen, N. “Oil extraction, Indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation, and genocide: The case of the Tagaeri and Taromenane peoples”. Harvard Human Rights Journal, 2022.
[7] IACHR. Case of Tagaeri and Taromenane Indigenous Peoples v. Ecuador. Judgement of 04 September 2024. IACHR, 2025. https://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_537_esp.pdf
[8] Alvarado, A. C. “La Corte Interamericana condenó a Ecuador por vulnerar los derechos de los pueblos indígenas en aislamiento voluntario”. Mongabay, 18 March 2025. https://es.mongabay.com/2025/03/corte-interamericana-condeno-ecuador-vulnerar-derechos-pueblos-indigenas-aislamiento-voluntario/
[9] Radwin, M. “Ecuador must improve conditions for uncontacted Indigenous communities, human rights court rules”. Mongabay, 20 March 2025. https://news.mongabay.com/2025/03/ecuador-must-improve-conditions-for-uncontacted-indigenous-communities-human-rights-court-rules/
[10] Alvarado, A. C. “Come to the Rainforest: la fundación de Estados Unidos que busca contactar a pueblos indígenas en aislamiento voluntario en Ecuador”. Mongabay, 03 June 2025. https://es.mongabay.com/2025/06/come-to-the-rainforest-fundacion-estados-unidos-contactar-pueblos-indigenas-aislamiento-ecuador/
[11] NAWE. “Estrategia de monitoreo de presiones socioambientales de la Nacionalidad Waorani del Ecuador.” Fundación EcoCiencia. 2025. https://ecociencia.org/estrategia-de-monitoreo-de-presiones-socioambientales-de-la-nacionalidad-waorani-del-ecuador-nawe/
[12] Ministry of Energy and Mines. “Ecuador espera alcanzar más de USD 4 mil millones en exportaciones mineras”. Ministry of Energy and Mines, 2025. https://www.ambienteyenergia.gob.ec
[13] Teleamazonas. “Gobierno firma memorando de entendimiento con Barrick International”. Teleamazonas, 04 August 2025. https://www.teleamazonas.com/actualidad/noticias/ecuador/gobierno-firma-memorando-entendimiento-minera-barrick-international-100054/
[14] “Ecuador reopens mining concession registry after seven years”. Reuters, 17 June 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/ecuador-reopens-mining-concession-registry-after-seven-years-2025-06-17/
[15] CONAIE. “Memoria, unidad, lucha y autodeterminación (Consejo de Gobierno 2021–2025)”. CONAIE, July 2025. https://conaie.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Version-final-INFORME-MEMORIA-INST-CONSEJO-DE-GOB-2021-2025.pdf
[16] INREDH. ”Territorios con recursos y sin Estado amenazados por las bandas delincuenciales”. INREDH,13 May 2025. https://inredh.org/territorios-con-recursos-y-sin-estado-amenazados-por-las-bandas-delincuenciales/
[17] “Frente Nacional Antiminero exige cierre del catastro minero”. Telesur, 05 December 2025. https://www.telesurtv.net/frente-nacional-antiminero-exige-cierre-catastro-mineria-ecuador/
[18] Primicias. “Marcha por el agua en Cuenca contra el proyecto Loma Larga”. Primicias, 2025. https://www.primicias.ec
[19] For Cuenca, “The Fifth River” is not a geographical riverbed but a collective human action. After the mass mobilizations of 2025, this metaphor came to represent the popular uprising to defend water and páramos from mining. While the Tomebamba, Yanuncay, Tarqui and Machángara rivers find their source in the peaks before giving life to the city, this “fifth river” is born on the streets. It symbolizes organized civil resistance that flows with the same strength and vitality as the natural rivers it protects.
[20] El Universo. (2025). “’El quinto río de Cuenca se desbordó’”: movilización en contra de la minería en Quimsacocha”. El Universo, 2025. https://www.eluniverso.com
[21] INREDH. “Territorios con recursos y sin Estado”. INREDH, 2025a. https://inredh.org
[22] INREDH. “Seis defensores del agua y la naturaleza de Las Naves rechazan condenas”. INREDH, 2025b. https://inredh.org/seis-defensores-del-agua-y-la-naturaleza-de-las-naves-rechazan-ser-condenados-a-tres-anos-de-prision/
[23] “Fact sheet: Ronda Sur-Oriente 2025”. Amazon Frontlines, 2025. https://amazonfrontlines.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Fact_Sheet_RSO_2025_ES.pdf
[24] “Ecuador between oil decline and the possibilities of the offshore frontier”. BNAmericas. https://www.bnamericas.com/en/analysis/ecuador-between-oil-decline-and-the-possibilities-of-the-offshore-frontier
[25] Statement by Luis Canelos, president of Pastaza Kikin Kichwa Runakuna (PAKKIRU). Facebook, 17 February 2025. https://www.facebook.com/share/v/17a8ttCRuF/
[26] NAWE. “Las demandas de la Nacionalidad Waorani en el Foro Permanente de la ONU”. NAWE, 06 May 2025. https://nawe.org.ec/2025/05/06/las-demandas-de-la-nacionalidad-waorani-resuena-en-el-foro-permanente-para-las-cuestiones-indigenas-de-la-onu/
[27] INREDH. “120 Waorani llegan a Quito para exigir que se detenga la Ronda Sur-Oriente”. INREDH, 13 May 2025. https://inredh.org/120-waorani-llegan-a-quito/
[28] Amazon Watch. “Perforando hacia el desastre”. Amazon Watch, 2025. https://amazonwatch.org/assets/files/2025-perforando-hacia-el-desastre.pdf
[29] Amnesty International. “Ecuador: Alert over repression of protests, judicial independence and enforced disappearances”. Amnesty International, 08 October 2025. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/10/ecuador-alerta-por-represion-a-protestas-independencia-judicial-y-desapariciones-forzadas/
[30] Mariana Yumbay. “Insistir en el paro nacional ’no es terquedad’; vemos una necedad de gobernar sin escuchar al pueblo”. FM Mundo, 29 September 2025. https://fmmundo.com/notimundo/actualidad/mariana-yumbay-insistir-paro-nacional-no-terquedad-vemos-una-necedad-gobernar-escuchar-pueblo-n80863
[31] Iza, L. “El expresidente del movimiento indígena de Ecuador acusa a Noboa de querer dividirlos”. Swissinfo, 08 October 2025. https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/el-expresidente-del-movimiento-ind%C3%ADgena-de-ecuador-acusa-a-noboa-de-querer-dividirlos/90130583
[32] Alliance for Human Rights in Ecuador. “Informe de verificación de derechos humanos durante el Paro Nacional de Ecuador”. Alliance for Human Rights in Ecuador, 2025. https://shorturl.at/masTa
[33] Radio Pichincha. “INREDH denuncia uso desproporcionado de la fuerza y estigmatización en el paro nacional convocado por la CONAIE”. Radio Pichincha, 17 October 2025. https://www.radiopichincha.com/inredh-violencia-estigmatizacion-paro-nacional/
[34] OAS. “IACHR stresses call for dialogue to prevent human rights violations in Ecuador”. OAS, 14 October 2025. https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/preleases/2025/208.asp
[35] CNE. “Resultados Preliminares. Referéndum y Consulta Popular 2025. Consejo Nacional Electoral”. CNE, 2025. https://app01.cne.gob.ec/resultados2025cp
[36] Rodríguez, J. “Así perdió Daniel Noboa la consulta: Análisis Javier Rodríguez”. GK City, 24 November 2025. https://gk.city/2025/11/24/asi-perdio-daniel-noboa-la-consulta-analisis-javier-rodriguez/
[37] “Consulta popular en Ecuador: Crisis del régimen y reconfiguración estatal”. JacobinLat, 2025. https://jacobinlat.com/2025/11/consulta-popular-en-ecuador-crisis-del-regimen-y-reconfiguracion-estatal/
[38] “El primer gran revés de Noboa: Ecuador dice no a todas sus reformas constitucionales”. El País, 17 November 2025. https://elpais.com/america/2025-11-17/el-primer-gran-reves-de-noboa-ecuador-dice-no-a-todas-sus-reformas-constitucionales.html
[39] Ospina Peralta, P. Cuesta abajo en la rodada. Daniel Noboa después de la Consulta Popular. Ecuador Debate, No. 126, 2025. https://caapecuador.org/ecuador-debate-n-126/
Tags: Land rights, Human rights, Indigenous Peoples Human Rights Defenders
