The Indigenous World 2025: Ecuador
According to the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC), the current population of Ecuador stands at 17,966,573.[1] There are 14 Indigenous nationalities in the country, accounting for some 1,301,887 people. They are grouped into different local, regional and national organizations and represent 7.7% of the total population. Indigenous nationalities and peoples live mainly in the Highlands (68.2%), followed by the Amazon (24.06%), and, to a lesser extent, along the coast, where only 7.56% live.
The following Indigenous nationalities were included in the 2022 census: Tsáchila, Chachi, Epera, Awa, Kichwa, Shuar, Achuar, Shiwiar, Cofán, Siona, Secoya, Zápara, Andoa and Waorani. The Kichwa nationality accounts for the highest percentage of members (85.87%) and includes some 800,000 individuals nationwide. Despite the low percentages of most of the nationalities, however, all enjoy the same importance within the framework of a Plurinational State. In the highland provinces, such as Tungurahua and Pichincha, and in the Amazonian provinces of Napo and Morona Santiago, there is also a significant percentage of Indigenous people living in rural areas, ranging from 50,000 to 80,000 inhabitants. However, 17 years after the Constitution came into force, and more than two decades after ILO Convention 169 was ratified in the country, there are still no clear, specific public policies to prevent and neutralize the risk of the disappearance of these ancestral peoples.
This article is part of the 39th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. The photo above is of an Indigenous activist Funa-ay Claver, a Bontok Igorot, standing alongside Indigenous youth activists and others. They are protesting against the repressive laws and human rights violations suffered through the actions and projects of the Government of the Philippines and other actors against Indigenous Peoples at President Marcos Jr’s national address on 22 July 2024 in Quezon City, Philippines. The photo was taken by Katribu Kalipunan ng Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas and is the cover of The Indigenous World 2025 where this article is featured. Find The Indigenous World 2025 in full here
The situation of Ecuador’s Indigenous Peoples and nationalities has been directly affected by the country’s negative political, economic and social situation. 2024 was a good year for the powerful economic and political elite – to which President Daniel Noboa belongs – but one of enormous social and economic decline for the vast majority of the popular sectors.[2] This was the result of the continuing and radical neoliberal economic and political model established since the administration of Lenín Moreno in 2017.[3]
Alongside an economic recession, this has meant that the economic and social rights of Indigenous Peoples have been severely affected. Although there have been some positive macroeconomic factors, such as record migrant remittances (close to USD 5 billion),[4] loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and rising oil prices, these resources have never been channelled into development or economic growth. Alongside this, external debt has increased considerably to USD 85 billion.[5]
According to Marco Flores, former Minister of the Economy, treasury revenues have been almost exclusively devoted to meeting the demands of foreign debt bondholders and the International Reserves, as part of the IMF requirements.[6] This has led to a paralysis in public investment and a lack of health, education and security infrastructure.[7]
This situation is compounded by the central government's debts to local governments and basic providers, for example in the health sector. Maintenance of the basic energy, hospital, school and road infrastructure has been neglected. The result is plain to see: not only did the economy not grow in 2024, it contracted. Current indicators are not only the worst since the pandemic but the most negative since the banking crisis of the late 1990s.[8]
It is against this backdrop that a circle of power with no social vision has been consolidated, one that favours business with the State and promotes the privatization of public goods and services under the tutelage of the IMF.
In the social sector, this disinvestment has resulted in a crisis in health and education. There are no medicines or basic supplies in hospitals and health centres, and more than 200,000 children have had to drop out of school. Another 100,000 young people have likewise been unable to access university.
In sum, this panorama reflects a total collapse in the State's capacity to provide basic services.[9] And this has been felt more severely in the rural sectors and among the Indigenous communities of the Highlands and the Amazon region, who depend greatly on such provision.
Economic and social crisis and violations of economic and social rights
In such a scenario, the country's social outlook is discouraging: Low wages and labour market flexibility plus unemployment and underemployment affecting 70% of the population (the highest rate in the last 17 years), with 5.2 million people outside of the labour market. Although the Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 2024 by ECLAC states that there are social improvements in Latin America, the Ecuadorian reality contradicts this assessment.[10]
According to official figures from INEC, as of December 2024, income poverty had reached 28%, representing an increase of two percentage points over the previous year, and marking the highest level since the pandemic. Extreme poverty had also grown, from 9.8% in December 2023 to 12.7% just a year later.[11]
Currently, more than seven million Ecuadorians are living in poverty and, of these, 2.3 million are in extreme poverty, surviving on less than 70 cents a day. With the increase in VAT, these families have no margin for manoeuvre and are forced to reduce their consumption of food and essential goods. In the medium term, this situation could lead to a rise in child malnutrition and greater insecurity.[12]
In the case of Indigenous communities, extreme poverty affects between 80% and 90% of families in the highland Kichwa communities of Bolivar and Cotopaxi provinces, as well as several Shuar centres of population in Morona-Santiago in the Amazon.[13]
Security crisis, criminalization and racism
Violence in Ecuador has reached a critical level. Two mayors of areas where mining activities are taking place have been murdered and the country has experienced 15 states of exception since 2021. In less than eight years, Ecuador has gone from being the second safest country in Latin America to one of the most violent in the world.[14]
In January 2024, the government declared the existence of an “internal armed conflict”, its justification being the need to combat 22 Organized Crime Groups (OCGs). Alongside this, it continued to declare states of exception, which it describes as part of a “Phoenix Plan” the existence of which several human rights organizations have questioned. Despite the militarization, homicide numbers are not declining, and the truce seems more like a criminal withdrawal than a victory.
2024 marked Ecuador’s second consecutive year of high rates of violence, with a homicide rate of 38.8 per 100,000 inhabitants. As for robberies, 61,504 cases were reported between January and November 2024 alone .[15] January 2025 became the most violent month in the country's history, however, with more than 700 murders.[16]
According to reports from the Alliance of Organizations for Human Rights, the government has used states of exception to repress and criminalize specific groups under the pretext of security. One example of this are the Indigenous communities, historically marginalized, who are more vulnerable to an abuse of power. Such was the case of the arbitrary detention of Indigenous guards from the Kichwa community of San José de Wisuya, in Putumayo, Sucumbíos Province, in northern Amazonia. On 24 January 2024, these community members were arrested, without evidence or legal justification, and denied access to legal representation. The constitutional principle of the presumption of innocence and their Indigenous status, granted to them by the Constitution, were violated.[17]
Between 8 January and 20 February 2024, the Attorney General's Office (FGE) reported more than 10,000 arrests; however, only 5% (494 people) resulted in a legal process which, according to Human Rights Watch, suggests that the militarization of the country is prioritizing number of arrests over guaranteeing justice to justify the use of force and the purchase of repressive equipment.[18]
One emblematic case was that of Raúl X, an 18-year-old unjustly imprisoned in the Litoral Penitentiary. Accused without evidence, his story reveals how poverty and structural racism facilitate the criminalization of racialized youth, perpetuating State violence and mass incarceration.[19]
The most shocking case, however, was the disappearance, torture and death of Josué Arroyo, 14 years of age; Ismael Arroyo and Saúl Arboleda, 15 years of age; and Steven Medina, just 11 years of age. These Afro-Ecuadorian children and adolescents, who lived in the poor neighbourhood of Las Malvinas, in southern Guayaquil, were arbitrarily detained by 16 soldiers as they were returning home from playing football. They were subsequently taken to the military barracks where they were tortured and killed.[20]
On the very last day of 2024, an anthropological and DNA examination identified the charred bodies of the four boys detained by the military patrol the previous 8 December. After torturing and killing them, they had been doused in petrol and set on fire, their bodies subsequently thrown in the Taura River, 16 kilometres from their place of arrest in Guayaquil.[21] The news shocked the whole country because, only that very day, a judge had ordered the preventive detention of the 16 soldiers in the patrol, accused of forced disappearance. Now the crime for which they will be prosecuted is that of extrajudicial execution.
According to the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE):
The case of the four children in Guayaquil is a chilling example of the systematic violence promoted by the State under the government of Daniel Noboa (...). Forced disappearances and extrajudicial executions are direct violations of human rights, barbaric acts perpetrated by a government that acts with indifference, laziness and cowardice, prioritizing electoral calculations and interests over the protection and welfare of the people (...). Daniel Noboa's silence in the face of this tragedy is unacceptable. Security policies have failed; organized crime, mafias and drug traffickers continue to operate with impunity. Meanwhile, the police and armed forces are perpetuating a cycle of violence that disproportionately affects vulnerable communities, victims of an abuse of power, racial discrimination and systematic abuse.[22]
It is, however, important to remember that Noboa's decreed “internal war” is the legitimate result of a strategy to militarize public security, a strategy that was ratified by the people in the 21 April referendum. In that consultation, a majority of the population supported the nine questions regarding repressive responses to criminal violence. In other words, as Franklin Ramírez Gallegos, professor at the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO), points out: “(...) there has been a certain social legitimization of these practices. Society somehow accepted this strategy of a ‘Bukelization’ [a reference to El Salvador’s crackdown on gang warfare by President Bukele] of war, of punitive punishment and an iron fist.”
The failed attempt to set up prisons in Indigenous Amazonian territories
In the context of its “internal armed conflict”, the Noboa government has scaled up the construction of maximum-security prisons, claiming that this will clean up the penitentiary system dominated by drug cartels and organized crime. To this end, the government intended to build a maximum-security prison in the Kichwa territories of Pastaza, first in the San Jacinto Commune and then in the Association of the Kichwa People of Santa Clara.
In both cases, the organization of the Kichwa nationality of Pastaza rejected the government's intentions. In a press release dated 9 January 2024, the Pastaza Kikin Kichwa Runakuna (PAKKIRU) stated:
(...) we reject the construction of the maximum-security prison in the province of Pastaza announced by the Ecuadorian government. We call for the formation of a civic front with social actors, prefect, mayors, parish councils, civil society and the nationalities of the province of Pastaza to jointly promote the defence of our province from the construction of the maximum-security prison.[23]
In the same vein, through a press release dated 11 January 2024, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENIAE) reiterated its rejection of this project, considering that “it will only increase crime and insecurity rates” in the sector. José Esach, president of the organization, argued that this was not the promise made during the electoral campaign of now President Daniel Noboa. “Wasn't he going to build prisons on barges in the middle of the sea? Wasn't that it? I never heard: 'it is going to be built in the Ecuadorian Amazon',” he stated.[24]
The government subsequently attempted to establish the project in the canton of Santa Clara where it was again rejected by the population and local Indigenous organizations.[25] In no case, according to Luis Canelos, president of the Kichwa Nationality of Pastaza PAKKIRU, did the government inform or promote an adequate process of prior consultation regarding the prison project. On the contrary, it was the secrecy and lack of information that resulted in its rejection.
In June 2024, the Executive insisted on its proposal and signed a contract for USD 52 million with the company Puentes y Calzadas Infraestructuras, a subsidiary of the China Road and Bridge Corporation, to build the so-called Encuentro Prison in Santa Elena. With a capacity of 736 inmates, the project was 30% complete by October 2024. The Servicio Nacional de Atención Integral a Personas Adultas Privadas de la Libertad y a Adolescentes Infractores (Prison Service/SNAI) subsequently awarded a contract for the construction of a similar centre in Archidona, also for 52 million and with a term of 300 days. The process was nonetheless handled behind closed doors, generating uncertainty and resulting in rejection by the population.[26]
Since August 2024, the inhabitants of Archidona and the Indigenous organizations have rejected the construction of the prison, denouncing the lack of prior consultation and the impact on local security. On 3 December, led by Mayor Amanda Grefa and the leaders of the Federation of Indigenous Organizations of Napo (FOIN), and with the support of PAKKIRU in Pastaza and CONFENIAE, protests and road blockades began that left the provinces of Napo, Orellana and Sucumbíos cut off for 15 days.
Among their concerns were the proximity of the prison to four schools with 4,000 children, an increase in extortion and violence, and the impact on tourism and commerce.
On 11 December, the National Assembly approved a resolution by 95 votes urging President Daniel Noboa to suspend the work. As we go to press, the government's decision to build the prison in Napo has been suspended indefinitely.
Repression and violence around the La Plata mining project in Palo Quemado
The La Plata mining project, located in the Palo Quemado parish, has resulted in a conflict marked by State repression, the criminalization of protest and the use of paramilitaries to intimidate the population. Despite the constitutional obligation to conduct prior consultations, the mining company and the State have ignored this requirement and have tried to impose a “socialization” of the project without legitimacy.
Since 7 March, armed groups linked to the government have been denounced by peasants opposed to the mining. On 11 March, the paramilitary Raúl Bayas Villacrés, together with the Confederación de Juntas de Defensa del Campesinado del Ecaudor, entered the area with his group, assaulted peasants and promoted the legal persecution of 72 community members, accusing them of “terrorism” with the support of the Attorney General's Office.
On 18 March, a platoon of 500 police and military arrived in Palo Quemado to protect the mining facilities and ensure the “socialization” of the project at a meeting in which only 70 people participated, despite the fact that the community is home to 270 families. The militarization generated fear among the villagers, who denounced the presence of repressive forces as a violent provocation.[27]
On 19 March, the repression intensified with the establishment of four military checkpoints restricting the mobility of the community members. According to the Ecumenical Human Rights Commission (CEDHU), at least 15 peasants were injured, seven of them seriously, with burns and wounds caused by rubber bullets, pellets and tear gas.
On 26 March, State violence left one more person seriously injured: Mesías Robayo Masapanta, who was shot in the face with pellets that fractured his jaw and cheek bone.[28]
In the midst of the escalating violence, the Mayor of Sigchos, Oscar Monge, filed a protective action with precautionary measures to try and suspend the project's environmental consultation. Judge Darwin Danilo Paredes admitted the case and ordered the provisional suspension of the consultation, in addition to the withdrawal of the National Police and the Armed Forces from the area.[29] Despite the court order, the government reacted with hostility. General Jaime Patricio Vela Erazo, Chief of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, declared from the Government Palace that the protests in Palo Quemado were “terrorist acts”, justifying the repression against the peasants and ignoring the violations of human rights.[30]
The conflict in Palo Quemado is not an isolated case. In other regions, such as Zamora Chinchipe, Imbabura, Orellana and Pastaza, extractive companies have used similar tactics, including the use of paramilitary groups, to intimidate the population. These events reveal a systematic pattern of State and corporate repression against communities resisting mining and oil expansion.[31]
Despite the suspension of the environmental consultation and the order to withdraw the repressive forces, Daniel Noboa’s government is continuing to promote mining with the support of armed groups, criminalizing protest and violating the rights of the communities.
Leonidas Iza, president of CONAIE, warned:
It is clear that Noboa and his government are not fighting insecurity. With 137 murders during the last Easter holiday, where was the President of the Republic? He is not trying to combat insecurity but rather to combat popular organizations, peasants and Indigenous people. Everything he does is aimed at consolidating the neoliberal project, which is inhumane and impoverishing (...) It would be no surprise if they were building [alleged] links with drug trafficking. They will surely do it. They have a fascist attitude.[32]
It is in this context that Noboa is digging down on his authoritarian tendencies: he intervenes with powers, criminalizes adversaries and erodes the rule of law, all while acting more like a candidate than a president. He responds to an oligarchic tradition with a proclivity to authoritarianism, whereby politics is seen as an instrument of domination rather than of dialogue. He has been able to capitalize on the growing social demand for strong leadership, reflected in polls that indicate a preference for authoritarian government models. However, in a framework of Manichean manipulation between Correism and anti-Correism (supporters and opponents of former President Correa), there seems to be no way out of the economic, social, energy, political and security crises. Ecuador's immediate future poses complex challenges with a high likelihood of new cycles of social protest. The outcome of these will depend on the continuity or not of the neoliberal and authoritarian policies.
Pablo Ortiz-T. is a sociologist and university professor. He is Coordinator of the State and Development Research Group at the Salesian Polytechnic University of Quito (GIEDE-UPS). Contact: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
This article is part of the 39th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. The photo above is of an Indigenous activist Funa-ay Claver, a Bontok Igorot, standing alongside Indigenous youth activists and others. They are protesting against the repressive laws and human rights violations suffered through the actions and projects of the Government of the Philippines and other actors against Indigenous Peoples at President Marcos Jr’s national address on 22 July 2024 in Quezon City, Philippines. The photo was taken by Katribu Kalipunan ng Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas and is the cover of The Indigenous World 2025 where this article is featured. Find The Indigenous World 2025 in full here
Notes and references
[1] INEC. (2024). Visualizador de Proyecciones Poblacionales.
https://proyeccionespoblacionales.ecudatanalytics.com/
[2] Ospina, P. (2024) Daniel Noboa’s Ecuador: “Iron Fist” as Electoral Strategy. NACLA. https://nacla.org/daniel-noboa-ecuador-iron-fist-electoral-strategy
[3] Ortiz, S. (2024). Protests and Citizens’ Revolution in Ecuador under Post-Neoliberalism. Popular Politics and Protest Event Analysis in Latin America, 238.
[4] Central Bank of Ecuador. (2024) Informe de Resultados. Flujo de Remesas. https://contenido.bce.fin.ec/documentos/Estadisticas/SectorExterno/BalanzaPagos/Remesas/ere2024II.pdf
[5] Ministry of Economy and Finance of Ecuador. (2024). Estadísticas Deuda Pública. https://www.finanzas.gob.ec/https-wwwdeuda-publica-nueva-metodologia/
[6] Avila, D. (2024). “Marco Flores: Incremento del IVA sí impactó en los siete millones de pobres del Ecuador”. 29 January 25, Radio Pichincha. https://www.radiopichincha.com/marco-flores-incremento-del-iva-si-impacto-en-los-siete-millones-de-pobres-del-ecuador/
[7] Collaguazo, K. (2024). El ajuste recesivo del FMI: epicentro de la crisis económica en Ecuador. Observatorio de la Dolarización. https://dolarizacion.org/2024/12/13/el-ajuste-recesivo-del-fmi-epicentro-de-la-crisis-economica-en-ecuador/
[8] OECD. (09 December 2024). Latin American Economic Outlook 2024. Ecuador. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/latin-american-economic-outlook-2024_c437947f-en/full-report/ecuador_624094b0.html
[9] ECLAC. (2024). Informe Nacional Ecuador 2024. https://www.cepal.org/sites/default/files/static/files/ecuador_-_informe_nacional_3.pdf
[10] ECLAC. (2024). Panorama Social de América Latina y el Caribe, 2024: desafíos de la protección social no contributiva para avanzar hacia el desarrollo social inclusivo. https://www.cepal.org/es/publicaciones/80858-panorama-social-america-latina-caribe-2024-desafios-la-proteccion-social
[11] INEC. (2024). Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Desempleo y Subempleo ENEMDU. https://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/estadisticas-laborales-enemdu/
[12] Baez, J. (2024). “Enclave Política 29/04/24: Acuerdos entre el Gobierno de Daniel Noboa y el FMI”. Telesur. https://www.youtube.com/live/KcmJCsFGy_I?si=nQaA-WnuxLSGrU9p
[13] INEC. (2024). Boletín Técnico No. 12-2024-ENEMDU. https://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/documentos/web-inec/POBREZA/2024/Junio/202406_Boletin_pobreza_ENEMDU.pdf
[14] Córdova Alarcón, L. (2024). “¿Cómo Ecuador descendió al infierno homicida?” NUSO. https://nuso.org/articulo/como-ecuador-descendio-al-infierno-homicida /
[15] OECO. (2024). Boletín semestral de homicidios intencionales en Ecuador: 2024. Ecuadorian Observatory of Organized Crime.https://oeco.padf.org/boletin-semestral-de-homicidios-intencionales-en-ecuador-enero-junio-2024 /
[16] “Enero de 2025 termina en Ecuador con más de 700 homicidios”. Prensa Latina, 31 January 2025. https://www.prensa-latina.cu/2025/01/31/enero-de-2025-termina-en-ecuador-con-mas-de-700-homicidios/
[17] INREDH. (2024). Informe sobre los hechos de violencia policial y militar durante la Declaratoria del Decreto 111. Quito. https://inredh.org/archivos/pdf/informe-inredh-vulneraciones-decreto111cani.pdf
[18] HRW. (2024). Ecuador: Abusos luego del anuncio de un “conflicto armado”. At: https://www.hrw.org/es/news/2024/05/22/ecuador-abusos-luego-del-anuncio-de-un-conflicto-armado
[19] INREDH. (2024). Informe sobre hechos de violencia policial y militar durante la Declaratora del Decreto 111. Quito. https://inredh.org/archivos/pdf/informe-inredh-vulneraciones-decreto111cani.pdf
[20] Orlando Perez. “Conmociona a Ecuador muerte de cuatro menores tras detención por soldados”. La Jornada, 1 January 2025. https://www.jornada.com.mx/noticia/2025/01/01/mundo/conmociona-a-ecuador-muerte-de-cuatro-menores-tras-detencion-por-soldados-4767
[21] “Charred bodies found near Ecuador military base are 4 boys who went missing while playing soccer, officials say”. CBS News, 1 January 2025. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ecuador-missing-boys-bodies-found-near-military-base/
[22] CONAIE. "Justicia para nuestros niños". Facebook, 3 January 2025. https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1BKaSzX2ib/
[23] PAKKIRU Enlarged Council. Resoluciones Consejo Ampliado PAKKIRU No. 1-001-2024, 15 January 2024. https://pakkiru.org/2024/01/15/resoluciones-consejo-ampliado-n-01-001-2024/
[24] “Proyecto para construir una cárcel genera rechazo en Pastaza”. Primicias, 11 January 2025. At https://www.primicias.ec/noticias/sociedad/pastaza-carcel-autoridades-indigenas/
[25] El Observador Pueblo. (9 February 2024). Kichwa de Santa Clara se levanta en contra de la cárcel de máxima seguridad. https://elobservador.ec/pueblo-kichwa-de-santa-clara-se-levanta-en-contra-de-la-carcel-de-maxima-seguridad/
[26] INREDH. (2024). Comunidad en resistencia: Oposición a la cárcel de máxima seguridad en Archidona. https://inredh.org/comunidad-en-resistencia-oposicion-a-la-carcel-de-maxima-seguridad-en-archidona/
[27] Karol Jaramillo. "Denuncia Pública: Gobierno de Daniel Noboa criminaliza, militariza y reprime a moradores de Palo Quemado”. Alliance for Human Rights in Ecuador, 20 March 2024. https://alianzaddhh.org/?p=241658
[28] “Ciudadano fue herido por represión policial en Palo Quemado, denuncia la CONAIE”. Radio Pichincha, 27 March 2024. https://www.radiopichincha.com/ciudadano-fue-herido-por-represion-policial-en-palo-quemado-denuncia-la-conaie/
[29] “Palo Quemado: Juez de Sigchos ordena suspensión provisional de consulta ambiental”. Primicias, 26 March 2024. https://www.primicias.ec/noticias/economia/palo-quemado-suspension-provisional-consulta-ambiental/ 26 March 24
[30] Vela, J. Ningún acto violento será tolerado, afirmó el Jefe del Comando Conjunto de las FF. AA, Jaime Vela. General Secretariat of Communication of the Presidency of the Republic. Newsletter No. 166, 26 March 2024. https://www.comunicacion.gob.ec/ningun-acto-violento-sera-tolerado-afirmo-el-jefe-del-comando-conjunto-de-las-ff-aa-jaime-vela/
[31] Cf in this regard: Massa-Sánchez, P., Cisne Arcos, R. D., & Maldonado, D. “Minería a gran escala y conflictos sociales: un análisis para el sur de Ecuador”. Problemas del desarrollo 49, 2018, (194), 119-141; Trujillo, P., & Collaguazo, R. N. “Conflicto minero, derechos humanos y la defensa del territorio Shuar”. Homa Pública - Revista Internacional de Derechos Humanos y Empresas, 5(2), 087-087, 2021; Quiliconi, C., & Vasco, P. R. Chinese mining and indigenous resistance in Ecuador. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2021; Warnaars, X. S., & Bebbington, A. (2016). Negotiable differences? Conflicts over mining and development in South East Ecuador. In Natural Resource Extraction and Indigenous Livelihoods (pp. 109-128). Routledge.
[32] Iza, L. "Hay elementos para un juicio político al Pdte. Debe haber una postura clara del primer poder del Estado”. Ecuador en Directo, 7 May 2024. https://youtu.be/VKtocL-GCB0?si=OPbECAh3-dxTuQTM
