The Indigenous World 2025: China

Written on 25 April 2025. Posted in China

The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) officially proclaims itself to be a unified country with a diverse ethnic make-up and all nationalities equal in the Constitution. Besides the Han Chinese majority, the government recognizes 55 minority nationalities within its borders. According to the latest national census in 2020,^[1] the combined minority nationalities’ population stands at 125,332,335 or 8.89% of the country's total population. The “unidentified ethnic groups” in China are included in the “minority nationalities” population, numbering 836,488 persons. Minority nationalities are culturally distinctive and socially marginalized in the Chinese context.

The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy is a basic law on the governance of minority nationalities in China. It includes establishing autonomous areas for nationalities, setting up their own local governance and giving them the right to practice their own language and culture. These regional national autonomous areas make up approximately 64% of China’s total territory and include, among others, the vast territories of Tibet Autonomous Region, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

The Chinese government does not recognize the existence of Indigenous Peoples in the PRC despite voting in favor of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).

This article is part of the 39^th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. The photo above is of an Indigenous activist Funa-ay Claver, a Bontok Igorot, standing alongside Indigenous youth activists and others. They are protesting against the repressive laws and human rights violations suffered through the actions and projects of the Government of the Philippines and other actors against Indigenous Peoples at President Marcos Jr’s national address on 22 July 2024 in Quezon City, Philippines. The photo was taken by Katribu Kalipunan ng Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas and is the cover of The Indigenous World 2025 where this article is featured. Find The Indigenous World 2025 in full here

Legislation and policies affecting Indigenous Peoples

1. Legislation and policies to consolidate the consciousness of the Chinese-nation community

The Chinese leadership and government agencies worked continuously throughout 2024 to promote and impose the concept of the Chinese-nation community. This reflects the ongoing process of nation-building in China, which constrains the identity and autonomy rights of minority nationalities articulated in the Chinese Constitution in terms of maintaining or reforming their customary way of life and their language use and development.

In February 2024, Qiushi Journal, a key ideological platform for the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, published a speech by the CPC’s General Secretary Xi Jingping outlining the leadership’s vision for the foundations of the Chinese-nation community, as well as setting priorities for the CPC’s “ethnic work”. Among others, this includes developing theoretical foundations for the concept of the Chinese-nation community and promoting “extensive exchanges and integration among all ethnic groups, and […] Chinese-style modernization with the great unity of the Chinese nation”.^[2] The February issue of the magazine also included an article by the Party Group of State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC) elaborating on the priorities of the party’s “ethnic work”.^[3]

With the idea of promoting the leader’s vision of the Chinese-nation community, in February the SEAC published a textbook entitled “Introduction to the Chinese-nation Community”. The purpose of the book is to instill in students a “correct view of the history of the Chinese-nation and to embed the concept of the Chinese-nation community”.^[4]

In July 2024, the CPC’s Central Committee adopted a decision on Further Deepening Reform Comprehensively to Advance Chinese Modernization, which proposes to formulate a law to promote national unity and progress, improve institutional mechanisms for consolidating the consciousness, and enhance the cohesion of the Chinese nation.^[5] In his speech to the National Conference on Education in September 2024, Xi Jinping again emphasized the importance of promoting “the national common spoken and written language and promoting consolidation of the consciousness of the Chinese-nation community”. Meanwhile, at the subnational level, the authorities have been implementing various measures in the spirit of consolidating the Chinese-nation community.

In January 2024, The Regulations on Promoting Interaction, Exchange, and Integration among Ethnic Groups entered into force in the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture in Northern Xinjiang, whose population of about three million consists of various ethnic groups, including Kazakh, Han, Uyghur, Hui, Mongolian, and Xibe.^[6] The regulations specify the responsibilities of the government at all levels in the prefecture and aim to “gradually realize the all-round integration of all ethnic groups into culture, economy, society, psychology, and other social spaces, and guide all ethnic groups to firmly establish the consciousness of a community with shared weal and woe, honor and disgrace, life and death, and destiny.” (Article 3)

The regulations promote the education of youth by incorporating the idea of “consolidating the consciousness of the Chinese-nation community” into the national education system (Article 11) and promoting integration among students of all ethnic groups throughout the entire educational process (Article 14).^[7] Referring to the proposed “foundation-building project” for consolidating the consciousness of the Chinese-nation community among young people through the Children’s Development Plan in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (2021-2025), these new regulations provide a legal basis for implementing the regional policy of Xinjiang at the prefecture level.

The de facto campaign against Indigenous and minority language learning has continued in the Tibetan area. A recent example is the closure of the Ragya Gangjong Sherig Norbuling School in Golog Machen County, Qinghai Province, in July. Established in 1994 as the first privately-operated school in Qinghai, it was a specialist vocational school offering classes in the Tibetan language, English, computer science, engineering, medicine, videography, and physical education. Since its inception, more than 2,300 students have graduated. According to the Tibet Times, of the 16 known privately owned schools in the Golog region, eight have been shut down since 2021, with most of the remaining schools at risk of closure.

Responding to these apparent assimilationist measures, the Tibet Times, a Tibetan media agency based in India, gathered 100 signatures from mainly Tibetan academics and presented a petition to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on 29 July. The petition calls for an end to the forced closures of private and monastic schools and the boarding school system in Tibet. It requests that the High Commissioner publicly address the human rights situation in Tibet and urges the Chinese government to adhere responsibly to international human rights standards.

Meanwhile, on 24 January 2025, the Chinese government replied to the letter jointly presented by the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues, the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights and the Special Rapporteur on the right to education (ref. AL CHN 13/2023). The letter concerns the growing number of boarding institutions for children in Xinjiang and assimilation policies in these institutions, including restrictions on the use of the Uyghur language.^[8] China replied that the reported allegations were fabricated and at odds with reality.^[9] The reply stated that the development of residential education does not target a particular ethnic group or region but conforms with state laws and improves the popularization of compulsory schooling, allows more children to access a better quality of education, and contributes to a balanced development. The reply claims that boarding schools alleviate the burden on the pupils’ parents, who generally welcome the friendly coexistence of students of all ethnicities.

2. Legislative reviews and consultation on the National Park Law

On 10 September 2024, the draft National Park Law was submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for deliberation.^[10] This is the first proposed bill on national parks at the national level. The second review of the bill was held in December, and the reviewed bill was publicly solicited for comments.^[11]

Referring to Indigenous Peoples as “original residents” (yuanyoujumin, 原有居民 in Chinese) the bill contains five articles that are especially relevant to them. Article 13 proscribes impact assessments on the production and life of original residents of a park area based on extensive consultation and in-depth discussion. Article 27 prohibits human activities in the core protection area of a park, except for the “necessary production and living activities of the ‘original residents.’” Article 29 prohibits an increase in the production and living activities of the original residents, and instructs local governments to resettle original residents should the protection and management needs so demand. Article 56 mandates the authorities to correct the production and living activities in the national park area in cases where they exceed the original scale, including through fines. Finally, Article 40 encourages original residents to participate in the bidding process when selecting providers for commercial services within the park.

Establishing national parks substantially impacts Indigenous Peoples' land use and ways of life in China. There are 49 candidate national park areas in China, including many places inhabited by Indigenous Peoples and minorities. Although the bill was improved at the second review by taking into account the special status of “original residents”, it lacks formal recognition of Indigenous Peoples as right-holders and contributors to the forthcoming governance of the national parks.

Controversial hydropower projects impact Indigenous Peoples

The ongoing expansion of hydropower infrastructure in China continues to create conflicts between Indigenous communities and developers.

The Gangtuo project in Tibet is one of 13 cascade hydropower stations planned on the upper reaches of the Jinsha river. This dam would displace residents from two villages and six monasteries, which would end up under water. Local Tibetans’ protests against the forced resettlement and disrespect of sacred sites began in February but were suppressed.^[12] In July, 13 UN Special Rapporteurs expressed their concerns at the hydropower development and its impact on Indigenous Peoples. Letters, including questions on 14 different items, were sent to the Chinese government and the company developing the project.^{[13], [14]} The government’s half-page reply stated that “the relocation of the villages in question was carried out only after full consultation of the opinions of the local residents” but did not address the specific issues noted in the Special Rapporteurs’ letter.^[15] The Company did not respond to the letter.

Meanwhile, the Tiger Leaping Gorge dam on the Naxi homelands in Yunnan province was initially shelved in what was regarded as a victory for the anti-dam campaign during 2003–2006. However, in September 2024, the provincial government decided to proceed with the project once more.^[16] Today, the potential size of the population to be relocated, including the Naxi, Bai, and Tibetans, is expected to be significantly higher than the originally estimated 100,000 persons.

In December 2024, Chinese Xinhua News Agency reported that the central government had approved construction of a hydropower project in the lower reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo River.^[17] This project will build the world's largest hydropower dam, stoking concerns about the displacement of communities in Tibet and environmental and social impacts downstream in India and Bangladesh, including in areas populated by Indigenous Peoples. The authorities have stressed that the project will not have a significant environmental impact. However, no information is available on the process or results of the project's environmental and social impact assessment, including how many people it will displace.

Important inputs and outcomes from the United Nations

1. The 4^th cycle of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) at the UN Human Rights Council

China’s 4^th cycle of UPR was held on 23 January 2024. Throughout the state-to-state review process at the United Nations Human Rights Council, China received 428 conclusions and recommendations.^[18] The recommendations concerning Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Mongolians were mainly focused on the following aspects: (1) implementation of the recommendations set out by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and UN Treaty Bodies; (2) addressing the issues of arbitrary detention, family separation, restrictions on movement, and rights to enjoy their own culture and language; (3) allowing unhindered access to United Nations special rapporteurs and independent experts to evaluate reports of violations of human rights in Xinjiang and Tibet; and (4) allowing freedom of religion or belief and cultural expression and ending the criminalization of religious and peaceful civil expression by ethnic and ethno-religious groups.^[19]

China emphasized that the issues relating to Xinjiang and Tibet were about safeguarding China's national sovereignty, security, and unity, and urged people to stop politicizing and weaponizing them.^[20] It rejected all calls to implement the recommendations of the landmark 2022 UN report on Xinjiang,^[21] dismissing the report as “illegal and void”.^[22]

2. Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

In response to questions about the OHCHR’s work on China, on 27 August the High Commissioner and the Office stated that there had been detailed exchanges with the Government of China on a range of critical issues, such as counter-terrorism laws and policies, criminal justice, and other policies of concern that affect the human rights of ethnic and religious minorities, including in Xinjiang and Tibet. Nevertheless, the Office acknowledged that “many problematic laws and policies remain in place” in Xinjiang. It called on the Chinese authorities to undertake a full review, from a human rights perspective, of the legal framework governing national security and counter-terrorism and to thoroughly investigate allegations of human rights violations.^[23] In October, the High Commissioner stated, in light of the outcome of the UPR, that China needs to respect the rights to freedom of religion or belief, opinion and expression, peaceful assembly, and culture, including for Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other minorities.^[24]

Inputs and outcomes from the European Union (EU)

1. The EU-China Human Rights Dialogue

The EU and China held the 39^th session of the Human Rights Dialogue in Chongqing on 16 June, preceded by a visit to Tibet. In the session, the EU reiterated its further concerns about the grave human rights situation in China, particularly in the Xinjiang and Tibetan areas.^[25]

Following the visit to Tibet, the EU put forward several recommendations addressing the issue of the abduction of Tibetan children and Chinese boarding schools in Tibet.^[26] It raised human rights concerns in cases related to Uyghur and Tibetan scholars, activists, writers, and religious leaders, and also stressed that religious leaders should be selected without government interference and by religious norms, including in the case of the succession of the Dalai Lama. In business and human rights, the EU updated its Chinese counterparts on incoming European legislation introducing human rights due diligence requirements for companies, which may have an impact on the situation of Indigenous Peoples in China.

2.  EU Legislation

On 23 April 2024, the European Parliament adopted the Forced Labor Regulation. Furthermore, the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CS3D) entered into force on 25 July.^[27] Both documents require large companies to establish due diligence procedures to address the adverse impacts of their actions, including along their global chains of activities. Multinational companies related to China in the EU are therefore facing novel challenges.

3. European Parliament Resolution

The European Parliament adopted the Resolution on the Cases of Unjustly Imprisoned Uyghurs in China, notably Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas, on 10 October.^[28] Tohti was awarded the European Parliament Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought in 2019, and 2024 was the 10^th anniversary of Tohti’s imprisonment. The resolution demands China’s authorities halt their repression and targeting of Uyghurs with abusive policies and calls for their immediate and unconditional release. It regrets China’s lack of commitment to the Human Rights Dialogue and the absence of results. It insists on fully implementing the EU’s Forced Labor Regulation and calls on businesses operating in China, particularly in Xinjiang, to comply with human rights due diligence obligations.

Due to the sensitivity of some of the issues covered in this article, the author prefers to remain anonymous.

This article is part of the 39^th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. The photo above is of an Indigenous activist Funa-ay Claver, a Bontok Igorot, standing alongside Indigenous youth activists and others. They are protesting against the repressive laws and human rights violations suffered through the actions and projects of the Government of the Philippines and other actors against Indigenous Peoples at President Marcos Jr’s national address on 22 July 2024 in Quezon City, Philippines. The photo was taken by Katribu Kalipunan ng Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas and is the cover of The Indigenous World 2025 where this article is featured. Find The Indigenous World 2025 in full here

Notes and references

^[1] “China Statistical Yearbook 2021.” China Statistics Press, 2021, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2021/indexch.htm

^[2] Jinping, Xi. “Strengthen the sense of community of the Chinese nation and promote high-quality development of the Party's ethnic work in the new era.” QS Theory, 31 January 2024. http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2024-01/31/c_1130069364.htm

^[3] Party Group of State Ethnic Affairs Commission (SEAC). “Strengthen and improve the Party's ethnic work with the focus on forging a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation.” QS Theory, 1 February 2024. http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2014/2024-02/01/c_1130069365.htm

^[4] Xinhua News Agency. “The textbook "Introduction to the Chinese National Community" was published and distributed.” 29 February 2024. https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202402/content_6935010.htm

^[5] Xinhua News Agency. “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on further deepening reform in an all-round way and promoting Chinese-style modernization.” 21 July 2024. https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202407/content_6963770.htm

^[6] The legislative authority of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region ratified the regulation in November 2023. The regulation can be found on the weblink: Yili News Network. “Regulations on Promoting Interaction, Exchange and Integration among Ethnic Groups in Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture.” 15 December 2023. https://www.xjyl.gov.cn/xjylz/c112802/202312/57858335f4aa4152b4ce34e4b395232f.shtml

^[7] The wording of these regulations has been summarized by the author. Please refer to the regulations in the above weblink for accurate expressions.

^[8] “Mandates of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues; the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights and the Special Rapporteur on the right to education.” AL CHN 13/2023. 20 September 2023 https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28234

^[9] Official reply of the Chinese Government to the UN Human Rights Council letter dated 20 September 2023, ref. AL CHN 13/2023. https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=38103

^[10] China News Network. “The draft National Park Law was submitted for review for the first time, creating a special law for national parks at the national level.” 10 September 2024. https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2024/09-10/10283326.shtml

^[11] See the draft of law, http://www.npc.gov.cn/flcaw/userIndex.html?lid=ff808181927f12760193fccbd4197d8f

^[12] Lhamo, Sonam and Pelbar. “Tibetans protest forced resettlement due to Chinese dam project.” Radio Free Asia, 15 February 2024. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/dam-project-02152024172629.html

^[13] “Mandates of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights; the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention; the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change; the Special Rapporteur on the right to development; the Special Rapporteur on the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context; the Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous Peoples; the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons; the Special Rapporteur on minority issues and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief.” AL CHN 8/2024. 8 July 2024. https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=29120

^[14] “Mandates of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights; the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change; the Special Rapporteur on the right to development; the Special Rapporteur on the human right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the right to nondiscrimination in this context; the Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous Peoples; the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons; the Special Rapporteur on minority issues and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief.” AL OTH 107/2024. 8 July 2024. https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=29168

^[15] The Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and other international organizations in Switzerland.” CHN/HR/2024/60. 12 September 2024. https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadFile?gId=38659

^[16] Yunnan Government Letter [2024] No. 110. “Notice of the Yunnan Provincial People's Government on prohibiting the construction of new projects and the relocation of population to the land occupied and submerged areas of the Longpan Hydropower Station project in the middle reaches of the Jinsha River.” 20 September 2024. https://www.yn.gov.cn/zwgk/zcwj/yzh/202409/t20240918_304213.html

^[17] Xinhua News Agency. “China approves construction of hydropower project in lower reaches of Yarlung Zangbo River.”25 December 2024. https://english.news.cn/20241225/3b1298a2f02d4428bd76e65929571cd3/c.html

^[18] United Nations. “Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – China.” Human Rights Council, Fifty-sixth session, 11 March 2024, A/HRC/56/6, para.20, https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g24/034/58/pdf/g2403458.pdf

^[19] UPR of China (4^th Cycle – 45^th Session). “Thematic list of recommendations.” https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ohchr.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fdocuments%2Fhrbodies%2Fupr%2Fsessions%2Fsession45%2Fcn%2FUPR45_China_Thematic_List_of_Recommendations.docx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK

^[20] United Nations. “Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – China.” Human Rights Council, Fifty-sixth session, 11 March 2024, A/HRC/56/6. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g24/034/58/pdf/g2403458.pdf

^[21] Mamo, Dwayne (ed.) “China.” The Indigenous World 2023, IWGIA. p. 185.

^[22] United Nations. “Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – China, Addendum: Views on conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary commitments and replies presented by the State under review.” Human Rights Council, Fifty-sixth session, 31 May 2024, A/HRC/56/6/Add.1.

https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ohchr.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fdocuments%2Fissues%2Fdigitalage%2Fcfis%2Fhrc57-promote-digital-education-young-people%2Fa-hrc-56-6-add-1-av-china-e.docx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK

^[23] United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. “China: Update on the work of UN Human Rights Office.” 27 August 2024. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2024/08/china-update-work-un-human-rights-office

^[24] United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. “Observations in light of the outcome of the fourth cycle of the Universal Periodic Review.” 9 October 2024. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/upr/sessions/session45/upr45-hc-letter-china.pdf

^[25] European Union External Action. “China: 39^th Human Rights Dialogue with the European Union took place in Chongqing.” 17 June 2024. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/china-39th-human-rights-dialogue-european-union-took-place-chongqing_en

^[26] European Parliament. “The abduction of Tibetan children and forced assimilation practices through Chinese boarding schools in Tibet. European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2023 on the abduction of Tibetan

children and forced assimilation practices through Chinese boarding schools in Tibet

(2023/3025(RSP)).” P9_TA(2023)0479. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2023-0479_EN.pdf

^[27] European Parliament “Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859.” Document 32024L1760. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1760/oj

^[28] European Parliament. “European Parliament resolution of 10 October 2024 on the cases of unjustly imprisoned Uyghurs in China, notably Ilham Tohti and Gulshan Abbas (2024/2857(RSP)).” 10 October 2024. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2024-0019_EN.html

Tags: Business and Human Rights , Human rights, International Processes