The Indigenous World 2026: Bolivia
According to the 2012 National Census, 41% of the Bolivian population over the age of 15 is of Indigenous origin, although 2017 projections by the National Institute of Statistics (INE) indicate that this percentage is likely to have increased to 48%. Of the 36 recognized peoples in the country, the majority of those living in the Andes are Quechua (49.5%) and Aymara (40.6%), who self-identify as 16 nationalities. In the lowlands, these peoples are largely the Chiquitano (3.6%), Guaraní (2.5%) and Moxeño (1.4%) and, together with the remaining 2.4%, they make up the 36 recognized Indigenous Peoples.
To date, Indigenous Peoples have consolidated their collective ownership of 25 million hectares in the form of Tierras Comunitarias de Origen (Community Lands of Origin / TCO), and these account for 23% of the country's total area. With the approval of Decree No. 727/10, the TCOs acquired the constitutional title of Original Indigenous Peasant Territory (Territorio Indígena Originario Campesino - TIOC). Bolivia has ratified the main international human rights conventions and has been a signatory to ILO Convention No. 169 since 1991. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) has been in full force since the approval of Law No. 3,760 on 7 November 2007. With the new State Political Constitution in 2009, Bolivia adopted the name of Plurinational State.
This article is part of the 40th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. Find The Indigenous World 2026 in full here
General elections: Rodrigo Paz, President of Bolivia
General elections were held on 17 August for president and vice-president, as well as for the total renewal of both legislative chambers. Against all the odds, the election was won by the centrist candidates, Rodrigo Paz and Edman Lara, despite a strong electoral campaign from former president Jorge Quiroga[i] and businessman Samuel Doria Medina,[ii] and polls which gave them very little hope. Under the banner of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the Paz-Lara duo won with 32.06% as opposed to 26.7% for Quiroga (Libre) and 19.69% for Doria Medina (Unidad).[iii] Further behind were then senator and supposedly Evo Morales' protégé, Andrónico Rodríguez, with 8.71%; the current mayor of Cochabamba, Manfred Reyes Villa, with 6.75%; and the candidate who ran for the MAS government party, the former government minister Eduardo del Castillo, with 3.17%, a percentage with which he managed to save this political grouping from extinction.
These results meant it had to go to a second round or ballotage between candidates Paz and Quiroga since neither of them reached 51% of the votes or a difference of 10% in their favour. This process only took place on 19 October, when Rodrigo Paz obtained 54.6% as opposed to 45.4% for former president Quiroga.[iv]
Evo Morales had substantial influence over the whole electoral process, both in the first and second round. Since October 2024, he has been confined in his Chapare stronghold, a coca-growing area in the Tropic of Cochabamba, resisting an arrest warrant against him for rape, human trafficking and other crimes against his partner.[v] The former president was prevented from participating in the elections due to the interpretation of his two previous mandates;[vi] however, he managed to influence the final results of both processes. Indeed, in the first round, and frustrated in his efforts to be recognized as the candidate for his party, MAS, and later the political grouping “Evo Pueblo”,[vii] he called for a spoilt or blank vote in the August elections. In that instance, 19.87% followed this course of action, which ranked third in popularity, ahead of Samuel Doria Medina. In this scenario, facing the second round, the profile of Rodrigo Paz and, above all, that of his vice-president, former police officer Edman Lara, who were very much in tune with the popular sectors of the countryside and the city, tipped a good part of the null votes towards the PDC option, which won by almost 10%.
Political reconfiguration and new Indigenous caucus in the Legislative Assembly
The composition of the legislative chambers has thus changed drastically, with almost no presence of the social sectors. The PDC won 70 deputies and 16 senators, giving it a majority in both chambers. The MAS of Evo Morales and outgoing president Luis Arce, who previously had total control of these chambers, has been reduced to two deputies. In theory, the ruling party would need the votes of the other two “opposition” groups to achieve the necessary two-thirds should they intend to put forward important reforms, including reforms of the Constitution, as they had announced.[viii]
The formal representation of seven seats elected in special Indigenous constituencies has been maintained although they are currently poorly linked to their organizations and agendas, given the demands that are being articulated in the territories and autonomous governments.
As a direct effect of this new political context, the annulment of the criminal proceedings against former president Jeanine Añez, who had been serving a 10-year prison sentence since 2021, is significant.[ix] The acting governor of the department of Santa Cruz, Luis Fernando Camacho, has also been released. He had been accused of several crimes, and unlawfully detained for almost three years,[x] along with the former president of the Civic Committee of Potosí, Marco Antonio Pumari, for similar crimes associated with the protests that led to the resignation of President Evo Morales at the end of 2019.
Economic crisis and economic stabilization programme: fuel price hike and threats to the territories (D.S. 5,503)
2025, the “bicentenary”, passed almost unnoticed in the midst of an economic crisis that was in an almost terminal state. The 200th anniversary of the signing of the Act of Independence –generated under the influence of the victorious armies at the battles of Junín and Ayacucho in 1824, commanded by Simón Bolívar and Antonio José de Sucre, which ended the process of emancipation from Spain in South America that had begun in 1810 in Buenos Aires– did not take on the same significance as in other countries. The exhaustion of the economic model, sustained mainly by the flow of international reserves that had maintained a completely untouchable policy of fuel subsidies and social bonds, completely eroded the huge international reserves accumulated during the natural gas export boom. This was compounded by the shortage of dollars, inflation, and trade imbalance, among other issues. The economic downturn was exacerbated by the internal political crisis within the ruling party itself, which saw Evo Morales and President Luis Arce at loggerheads, with the latter trying everything in his power to secure his candidacy for the general election.
There were road blockades once again in June on the part of peasants in the western regions of the country. The most serious were in the mining town of Llallagua (Potosí) and in the Tropic of Cochabamba, which claimed the lives of six people –four of them police officers who died from bullet and explosives impacts–, as well as more than 200 wounded civilians and a similar number of arrests.[xi] Although the protest was ostensibly about the government’s economic mismanagement, the shortage of fuel and U.S. dollars, the underlying issue was the authorization of the candidacy of former President Morales. After several days of blockades, instead of being seen as a legitimate measure by the population, these actions generated widespread rejection, especially from the opposition and ruling political leadership, as well as from the general public, and were lifted almost two weeks later without having achieved any tangible objectives.
The crisis of what was called the Process of Change, and its political and historical exhaustion, also dragged down the Indigenous organizations, especially those that had been key players in the Constitutional Assembly. The Assembly and its final output, the new Constitution, condensed a long process of struggle and vindication of rights, social inclusion and state transformation that was truncated in its practical implementation phase. One of the most evident liabilities has been the weakening of the national and regional Indigenous organizations, which have lost all legitimacy in the eyes of their grassroots members, and other more territorial processes, whose updated and concrete agendas have taken precedence over the leaders co-opted by the government. Currently, this deficit means that the Indigenous movement has no space to collectively develop proposals for all the peoples or to establish a unified voice that can legitimately challenge the government or the de facto regional powers, such as cattle ranchers, agribusiness or mining companies.
Although the structural advances and achievements, as well as the changes in Bolivia's social and political culture achieved during this process are undeniable, as in any political situation, they tend to be short-lived and could regress if not supported by effective implementation. Proof of this could be seen not only in the regressive regulations of Evo Morales’ second government, with decrees that relaxed Free, Prior and Informed Consultation for oil operations in Indigenous territories[xii] and exploitation of these in protected areas,[xiii] but also those recently approved by President Rodrigo Paz Pereira, in particular Supreme Decree 5,503, dated 17 December. This law includes a chapter which, in order to promote foreign private investment in the energy sector and the exploitation of natural resources, virtually repeals the entire section of the Constitution that refers to the environment, natural resources and land and territory (articles. 342-403 CPE).
The decree contained, as its main measure, a drastic reduction in subsidies for liquid fuels combined with social measures to mitigate the effects on the supposedly most vulnerable population.[xiv] The immediate effect was the almost total disappearance of long queues in front of petrol stations and a sharp drop in the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar on the unofficial market, reassuring the population, especially those with greater purchasing power.
However, once the details of the regulation became known, the Bolivian Workers Union (Central Obrera Boliviana / COB) and broad sectors of society, including the bulk of those who voted for the presidential ticket, emphatically rejected Supreme Decree 5,503, which throws out several social achievements established in the Constitution, as mentioned above. Particularly sensitive for Indigenous Peoples is the wording of the articles that give binding legal effect, even over and above sectoral laws, to contracts signed by the state without legislative approval, as established in the CPE, referring to investments considered “strategic”, such as mining, hydrocarbon, agribusiness and infrastructure operations (art. 10). Also those that provide for expedited approval of strategic investment projects, known as the “fast track” procedure, and protection from any administrative measure or procedure considered a “roadblock” to investments related to such activities.[xv] In this context, the rights of Indigenous Peoples to Free, Prior and Informed Consultation, as well as other environmental rights, are exercised through administrative processes and protocols; under these provisions, they would be considered “roadblocks” to development and would therefore be removed.
At the time of writing, a social protest involving road blockades was being organized by the COB and several peasant federations, particularly those in the departments of La Paz, Oruro, Cochabamba and Potosí, to demand the repeal of Supreme Decree 5,503.
FONDIOC case and arrest of former president Luis Arce
The Development Fund for Indigenous Peoples and Peasant Communities (FDPPIOYCC) was created by Supreme Decree 28571 of 22 December 2005, approved by President Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé, Evo Morales' predecessor at the time. This was the regulatory enactment of the Hydrocarbons Law No. 3058 of 2005, article 57 of which established the allocation of 5% of the Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (IDH) to the creation of a fund to promote the autonomous development of Indigenous Peoples.[xvi] It was one of the greatest social achievements, along with the recovery of state ownership of hydrocarbons and the state's leading role in the management of this strategic resource, which had been usurped by the privatization policies of the 1990s.
The FDPPIOYCC had a mixed structure, composed of the national government and the main leaders of the rural organizations, which at that time were the main agents of political and institutional transformation, mainly of rural origin.[xvii] Forming part of the state bodies, which ultimately had the final decision-making power, were the heads of the Ministries of Rural Development, Popular Participation and Economy and Finance.
By 2025, the Fund had managed more than 3,100 projects amounting to nearly USD 100 million (approx. EUR 84 million). In that year, the Comptroller General's Office pinpointed more than 30 “ghost” projects in the accounts, worth close to USD 25 million (approx. EUR 21 million).[xviii]
When the scandal broke, one of the main defendants was the then Minister of Rural Development and Lands, Nemesia Achacollo, a long-standing women’s peasant leader who was involved in several cases of land sales, including this Fund in particular. The government decided to radically modify the fund, creating FONDIOC, and removing the Indigenous and peasant organizations from the board, blaming them for mismanagement, while linking it directly to municipal policies. Minister Achacollo was excluded from the case in court, and under pressure from the government, the investigation was directed towards Indigenous leaders and contracted technicians, unleashing a judicial persecution that disregarded all rights to due process and fundamental human rights.[xix]
Former president Luis Arce was involved in this case, as Minister of Finance and member of the FDPPIOYCC Board of Directors, and who was responsible, albeit collectively, along with the other ministers of state who participated in this body. However, as a direct result of the electoral victory of the new president, Rodrigo Paz, Arce was remanded in custody in the San Pedro de La Paz prison. According to his supporters, this is a case of political revenge by former political and judicial persecutors who are now in power, although the current president has not taken any position on the matter.
Victories for environmental justice in Indigenous territories
In 2025, advocacy efforts and, above all, agri-environmental justice decisions in Bolivia became very evident and forceful in favour of preserving the rights of citizens and Indigenous Peoples to territory and the environment. Between January and September, the Environmental Court of Camiri, in the Chaco region of Santa Cruz, and the national Agro-Environmental Court, issued a landmark ruling regarding the Guaraní territory and conservation area of Ñembi Guasu (Great Refuge).[xx] In January, the Agro-Environmental Court of Camiri issued ruling 01/2025 consolidating the Ecological Pause as a precautionary measure. This measure consisted of revoking permits for forest clearing and burning, reviewing and–where appropriate–revoking human settlement resolutions, as well as restricting access to and use of natural resources in the area, putting a definitive stop to attempts to appropriate this area.[xxi]
For several years now, the most important activity in the Bolivian Amazon has been undergoing a traumatic transition from an extractive economy based on the fruits of the forest and river to gold mining, very similar to what is happening in Peru, on the Madre de Dios River. In July, leaders of the Multiethnic Indigenous Territory II (TIM II) filed a lawsuit denouncing the contamination of the river due to the presence of hundreds of gold mining dredgers.[xxii] TIM II demanded the establishment of measures to prevent environmental damage to the Madre de Dios River, to its ecosystem, and to the territorial, environmental and socio-cultural integrity of the territory in the face of the impacts and threats of illegal alluvial mining activities in the region, which directly threaten the Madre de Dios River that originates in Peru. In its decision to admit the lawsuit, the Agro-Environmental Court considered the Madre de Dios River to be a “subject of collective interest rights”, as in the Ñembi Guasu case setting out precautionary measures such as the suspension of activities and a review of resolutions protecting mining rights, especially those that do not have prior consultation processes.[xxiii]
During 2025, communities in Nor Lípez province, Potosí department, organized in the Central Única Provincial de Comunidades Originarias de Nor Lípez (CUPCONL), initiated legal proceedings against the negotiation and approval of state contracts for the exploitation and industrialization of lithium in the Salar de Uyuni,[xxiv] without Free, Prior and Informed Consultation processes and without sufficient environmental safeguards.
On 12 May 2025, CUPCONL filed a Class Action denouncing the violation and threat to the rights to territory, to self-determination and autonomy, to Free, Prior and Informed Consultation, as well as the rights of Mother Earth to life, to ecological balance, to the regeneration of her cycles and to water, with an emphasis on the water systems of the Salar.
At the first hearing, held on 27 May, the judicial authority granted precautionary measures, ordering the suspension of the legislative processing of the contracts, in line with the preventive nature of the Class Action and the obligation to prevent acts that could result in structural violations of collective rights. However, at the second hearing, on 5 June, the Court of Colcha K refused to rule on the merits of the case, arguing that a Class Action was not an appropriate way to challenge contracts or demand prior consultation, thereby regressively restricting the scope of this constitutional mechanism.
Faced with this decision, with the support of the Ombudsman's Office, the communities appealed to the agro-environmental court. On 20 August 2025, the Agro-Environmental Court of La Paz issued a favourable resolution and ordered precautionary measures. Among its main resolutions, it ordered the preparation of technical-scientific reports on the actual availability of natural resources, particularly fossil waters, in the areas of influence of the projects; it established that, prior to any legislative approval, a continuous, effective and culturally appropriate process of Free, Prior and Informed Consultation had to be guaranteed, aimed at obtaining the consent of the Indigenous and Peasant territories of Nor Lípez and south-western Potosí; and it decided that the Plurinational Legislative Assembly should request strategic environmental impact assessments and convene collegiate bodies to consider reports on the exploitation of strategic natural resources.[xxv]
Ninth Indigenous government: Ch'alla, Cochabamba
The Soras Nation, Cochabamba department, has taken the most complex step in the long road to fulfilling the legal requirements for accessing the creation of its autonomous government, as established in the Constitution. On 7 November, Law No. 1,689 was enacted, creating the “Territorio Indígena Originario Campesino Challa”. The autonomous territory of Challa is located in the Tapacarí and Arque provinces.
The Indigenous authorities of Challa began the process to become an Indigenous autonomy in 2018 with the request for the first requirements for access: the certificate of Ancestral Territory Status and the Certificate of Governmental Viability, but these were only granted in January 2020 by the Vice-Ministry of Autonomies.[xxvi]
Within the framework of their highest collective decision-making body, they appointed a group of 45 assembly members tasked with collaboratively drafting the Statute of Autonomy, which was to be approved by the entire territory three years later.
The endless steps to obtaining autonomy meant that this document had to be submitted to the Constitutional Court for prior regulatory review, a requirement before it could enter into force. One of the biggest stumbling blocks, however, as is always the case with Indigenous autonomies seeking to consolidate their jurisdiction over their territories titled as collective lands, was the technical work of delimiting the new territorial unit with the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA). The particular case of Challa involves three ayllus with ancestral ownership rights that have been regularized in 12 collective territories titled by the state. These territories are located, moreover, at the convergence of conflicting departmental and municipal boundaries, which were fortunately resolved in a timely manner.[xxvii] Challa is the ninth territory to gain Indigenous autonomy, complying with the requirements established in the 2010 Framework Law on Autonomy. More than 20 others are still waiting, caught in the tangle of bureaucratic requirements imposed by the state to delay the exercise of their constitutional rights.
International seminar on cultural mapping
On 15 and 16 September 2025, the “International Seminar on Indigenous Mapping Practices” was held in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, organized by IWGIA in collaboration with ORÉ as local organization. This was a highly significant event for the country's Indigenous organizations, attended by leaders and experts in mapping, researchers and support institutions from Latin America, Africa, Asia and international networks that use mapping as a communication and advocacy tool.
The seminar allowed for a rich exchange of mapping experiences across different countries and territories, highlighting the uses and importance they have acquired in the processes of territorial demands and defence, as well as for the planning and management of the spaces conquered, especially in the Amazon and other strategic ecosystems. The event also analysed the new threats looming over the territories as a result of the effects of climate change and projects to convert them into areas of occupation for the extractive exploitation of their natural resources. In turn, it addressed how cartography used in a political and social context represents a fundamental weapon with which to challenge this new and worrying context.
Leonardo Tamburini is a graduate in Jurisprudence from the Università degli Studi di Macerata (Italy) and holds a Master’s in Indigenous Rights and Development from the Universidad Autónoma Gabriel René Moreno (Santa Cruz, Bolivia). He is currently Executive Director of Oré-Organización de Apoyo Legal y Social.
This article is part of the 40th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. Find The Indigenous World 2026 in full here
Notes and references
[i] Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga was vice-president to General Hugo Bánzer Suárez between 1997 and 2001, and became president upon the death of the first president until October 2002.
[ii] Samuel Doria Medina is a businessman who started in the cement business and today has multiple investments in Bolivia. He has been a candidate for president on several occasions and was a member of the Constitutional Assembly from 2006 to 2007. In the 1990s, he was Minister of Economy under the current president's father, Jaime Paz Zamora.
[iii] Plurinational Electoral Body of the State of Bolivia (OEP). Publicación de resultados. Elecciones Generales 2025. La Paz, OEP, 26 August 2025. https://web.oep.org.bo/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/30-08-2025-Separata-resultados-EG2025.pdf
[iv] Plurinational Electoral Body of the State of Bolivia (OEP). Segunda vuelta electoral para la elección de presidente y vicepresidente del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia – 2025. La Paz, OEP. https://computo.oep.org.bo
[v] Office of the Attorney General of Bolivia. Orden de aprehensión contra Evo Morales sigue activa y también el mandamiento de arraigo. Office of the Attorney General of Bolivia, 06 March 2025. https://www.fiscalia.gob.bo/comunicacion/noticias/orden-de-aprehension-contra-evo-morales-sigue-activa-y-tambien-el-mandamiento-de-arraigo
[vi] Rivera José Antonio. La inviable candidatura de Evo Morales a la presidencia de Bolivia en 2025. Agenda de Estado de Derecho, 6 May 2025. https://agendaestadodederecho.com/la-inviable-candidatura-de-evo-morales-a-la-presidencia-de-bolivia-en-2025/
[vii] EFE. “Morales creará un nuevo partido llamado ‘Evo Pueblo’ y desafía al oficialismo de Bolivia”. EFE, 31 March 2025. https://efe.com/mundo/2025-03-31/bolivia-nuevo-partido-evo-morales/
[viii] Melissa Revollo. “PDC tiene mayoría en Asamblea, pero necesita alianzas para los dos tercios”. Opinión, 20 October 2025. https://www.opinion.com.bo/articulo/pais/pdc-tiene-mayoria-asamblea-necesita-alianzas-dos-tercios/20251020000100982071.html
[ix] Felipe Llambías and Rafael Abuchaibe. “Ponen en libertad a Jeanine Áñez, la expresidenta interina de Bolivia que pasó casi 5 años en la cárcel”. BBC, 6 November 2025.
https://www.bbc.com/mundo/articles/cd9kgzxg19zo
[x] “Bolivia: líder opositor Luis Camacho sale de prisión”. DW, 29 August 2025. https://www.dw.com/es/bolivia-líder-opositor-luis-camacho-sale-de-prisión/a-73816382
[xi] ANF. “14 días de bloqueos dejaron seis muertos, 200 detenidos, pérdidas económicas y la derrota de Evo Morales”. ANF, 15 June 2025. https://www.noticiasfides.com/nacional/politica/14-dias-de-bloqueos-dejaron-6-muertos-200-detenidos-perdidas-economicas-y-la-derrota-de-evo-morales
[xii] Supreme Decree 2,298 of 18 March 2015 amending the Regulation on Consultation and Participation for Hydrocarbon Activities.
[xiii] Supreme Decree 2,366 of 20 May 2015, which aims to “(...) establish measures for the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources throughout the national territory, within the framework of their constitutional, strategic and public interest nature for the development of the country; linked to the reduction of extreme poverty in communities that inhabit protected areas and the comprehensive management of life systems”. (Art. 1) Permitting the exploitation of hydrocarbons in protected areas.
[xiv] Specifically, the reduction resulted in an 80% increase in the price of premium petrol and a 160% increase in diesel, while wages rose by 20% in formal employment, which in Bolivia accounts for 10% of the economically active population, with informal and insecure employment in the majority. https://inesad.edu.bo/dslm/2025/12/reduccion-de-subsidios-a-los-combustibles-en-bolivia-que-desafios-enfrenta-el-aumento-del-salario-minimo-subyacente/
[xv] One of the first slogans coined by President Rodrigo Paz was that he was taking office to dismantle the “blocked State”, i.e., the bureaucratic structures that were preventing national and foreign private investment from committing to the country's development.
[xvi] It also involved implementation of ILO Convention 169 on the participation of Indigenous Peoples in decisions about their development, as well as their share in the benefits accruing to the state from the exploitation of natural resources in their territories.
[xvii] The national Indigenous organizations of the highlands (CONAMAQ), of the lowlands (CIDOB) and the peasant women’s organizations (Bartolina Sisa), mixed men’s organizations (CSUTCB) and settlers, later self-identified as “intercultural” (CSCB). It was the expression of the main political and social alliance in power during that first phase of the so-called “Process of Change”.
[xviii] Daniela Romero. “El Fondo Indígena, el ente que originó uno de los mayores casos de corrupción en Bolivia”. Swiss Info, 11 December 2025. https://www.swissinfo.ch/spa/el-fondo-indígena%2C-el-ente-que-originó-uno-de-los-mayores-casos-de-corrupción-en-bolivia/90623999
[xix] The most emblematic case was the death in prison of FONDIOC director, Marco Antonio Aramayo, who was responsible for reporting the embezzlement authorized by the government. In response to his reports, he was held in preventive detention for more than nine years and charged in more than 256 criminal cases brought against him by the government, a strategy to keep him in prison indefinitely in retaliation for speaking out.
[xx] This is a Conservation Area of Ecological Importance covering an area of 1,207,850 hectares located in the cross-border area with Paraguay, which is home to Chaco forests and a large number of fauna species, mainly the jaguar, the flagship feline of the Chaco Boreal area.
[xxi] Roberto Navia. “El bosque vence: la justicia consolida la protección al Ñembi Guasu y pone candado legal a su destrucción”. Nomads Magazine, 21 November 2025. https://revistanomadas.com/el-bosque-vence-la-justicia-consolida-la-proteccion-al-nembi-guasu-y-pone-candado-legal-definitivo-a-su-destruccion/
[xxii] Observatorio de Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas – Bolivia (ODPIB). “Madre de Dios: El Tribunal Agroambiental ordena suspender minería ilegal y paralizar operaciones sin consulta previa”. ODPIB, 4 December 2025.
https://odpib.org/seguimiento/madre-de-dios-el-tribunal-agroambiental-ordena-suspender-mineria-ilegal-y-paralizar-operaciones-sin-consulta-previa/
[xxiii] Agro-environmental Court of Bolivia. Resolution No. 12083. La Paz: Agro-environmental Tribunal, 22 October 2025. https://arbol.tribunalagroambiental.bo/consultas/web/index.php?r=site%2Fvisorresoluciondoshtml&idresolucion=12083
[xxiv] The Salar de Uyuni is a unique natural site located in the departments of Potosí and Oruro at more than 3,500 metres above sea level in the Andes Mountains. It is considered one of the most exotic tourist sites on the planet. It is the largest and highest salt desert in the world, covering an area of 10,582 km2.
[xxv] Monastery, Fatima. Personal interview.
[xxvi] Betzabé Saca Choque. “Political Victory for Challa: Bolivia’s New Autonomous Territorial Entity”. Indigenous Debates, 1 December 2025. https://iwgia.org/en/bolivia/5925-debates-2025-victory-for-challa-bolivia%E2%80%99s-new-autonomous-territorial-entity.html
[xxvii] “The issue was finally addressed with the approval of Law No. 127/2024-2025, the Law on Boundaries/Sections between the Department of Oruro, Municipality of Paria, and the Department of Cochabamba, Municipalities of Tacopaya, Tapacarí, and Bolívar. This provided territorial certainty and allowed the autonomy process to continue.” Betsabé Saca Choque, op. cit. Indigenous Debates, 1 December 2025.
Tags: Land rights, Human rights
