The Indigenous World 2023: China

Written on 29 March 2023. Posted in China

The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) officially proclaims itself to be a unified country with a diverse ethnic make-up and all nationalities equal in the Constitution. Besides the Han Chinese majority, the government recognizes 55 minority nationalities within its borders. According to the latest national census in 2020,^[1] the combined minority nationalities’ population stands at 125,332,335 or 8.89 % of the country's total population. The “unidentified ethnic groups” in China are included in the “minority nationalities” population, numbering 836,488 persons. Minority nationalities are culturally distinctive and socially marginalized in the Chinese context.

The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy is a basic law for the governance of minority nationalities in China. It includes establishing autonomous areas for nationalities, setting up their own local governance and giving them the right to practice their own language and culture. These regional national autonomous areas make up approximately 64 % of China’s total territory and include, among others, vast territories of Tibet Autonomous Region, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

The Chinese government does not recognize the existence of Indigenous Peoples in the PRC despite voting in favor of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).

This article is part of the 37^th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. The photo above is of an Indigenous person in Tanzania. This photo was taken by Geneviève Rose, and is the cover of the Indigenous World 2023 where this article is featured. Find the Indigenous World 2023 in full here.

Legislation affecting Indigenous Peoples

China actively carried out legislative and policy measures on wetlands protection in 2022.

The Wetlands Protection Law entered into force on 1 June^[2] and, in October, China published the National Wetlands Protection Plan (2022–2030). These laws and policies set out the overall legal framework, specific requirements and goals to be achieved by 2030 in the domestic implementation of the International Convention on Wetlands (known as the Ramsar Convention). In addition, the Yellow River Protection Law was adopted on 30 October.

Furthermore, China chaired the 14^th Meeting of the Conference of the Contracting Parties (COP 14) of the Ramsar Convention in Wuhan and initiated the Wuhan Declaration in November.

China is home to some of East Asia’s most important wetlands and the Tibetan Plateau is “the water tower” of most rivers in the country and in Asia, such as the Yangtze, the Yellow River, the Mekong River, etc. China is among the few countries to have adopted domestic law specifically for the protection of wetlands. Since the International Convention on Wetlands (known as the Ramsar Convention) entered into force in China on 31 July 1992, China has designated 64 sites as Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar Sites), which together cover over 7.3 million hectares (73,000 km²).^[3]

Many of these Ramsar sites are situated in the regional national autonomous areas and are thus homelands to what Chinese legislation describes as “minority nationalities”.

On 30 October 2022, the National People’s Congress (NPC) passed the Yellow River Protection Law^[4] – a second piece of legislation on a specific river basin following the Yangtze River Protection Law, which came into effect in 2021. The Yellow River Valley is normally referred to as the birthplace of Chinese civilization, and is often called the “Mother River of China”. However, the Yellow River, which is 5,464 kilometers long, can be divided into three segments: the upper reaches (3,472 km), middle reaches (1,206 km), and lower reaches (786 km). Both the upper and middle reaches cover vast traditional herding areas inhabited by Tibetan and Mongolian herders. There are also other native ethnonational groups with distinctive cultures such as Sala, Tu, and Hui in the region. The Wetlands Protection Law, the Yellow River Protection Law, and the National Wetlands Protection Plan (2022–2030) reveal normative and implementation gaps between these domestic legislations/policies and the Ramsar Convention in relation to Indigenous Peoples.

The Ramsar Convention encourages Contracting Parties to promote, recognize and strengthen the active participation of Indigenous Peoples and local communities as key stakeholders for conservation and integrated wetland management. The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2016-2024 incorporates a target (Target 10) on the traditional knowledge, innovations, and practices of Indigenous Peoples and local communities.^[5] When comparing the standards and aspirations described in the Convention, the existing Chinese legal framework and practice make no reference to the relevance of traditional knowledge, recognition of customary use of wetlands resources, or full and effective participation of Indigenous and local communities at all relevant levels.

During the 14^th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Wetlands (COP14) on 6 November 2022 in Wuhan, China, ministers and ambassadors of Contracting Parties adopted the Wuhan Declaration – a statement of political will reaffirming the principles of the Convention to conserve, restore and ensure wise use of wetlands.^[6] The Declaration stresses the importance of Indigenous Peoples’ full and effective participation with Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC), as the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People sets out. In addition, it emphasizes the importance of the role of Indigenous knowledge and practices in improving the conservation, restoration, and wise use of wetlands. It also encourages states to enshrine Indigenous Peoples as rights holders of and contributors to wetlands protection through administrative and legislative measures. China will serve as chair of the Ramsar Convention Standing Committee in the coming three years and provide overall leadership to the secretariat and various subcommittees. It now faces opportunities and challenges in the process of guiding the global protection of wetlands, while at the same time improving the effectiveness of its work domestically in relation to Indigenous Peoples.

Draft law on ecological conservation of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau

In December, the 38^th session of the Standing Committee of the 13^th National People's Congress reviewed the draft law on ecological conservation of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau for the second time.^[7]

The Qinghai-Tibet Plateau is defined as the region including the whole area of the Tibet Autonomous Region, Qinghai Province, and relevant parts of the Sichuan, Gansu, Yunnan provinces, and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. There are various minority nationalities including Tibetans, Mongolians, Luoba, Lisu, Nu, Yi, and others residing in the area. Among the 64 articles of the draft, none addresses the rights of minority nationalities, Indigenous or local communities. Article 46 speaks about “respecting and maintaining local traditional culture and folklore” and reasonably utilizing tourism resources when developing ecological tourism there. From an Indigenous Peoples’ rights perspective, various aspects are lacking in the draft relating to respecting the substantive and procedural rights of native minority nationalities in relation to their effective participation, legitimate representation, and self-determination or FPIC in the process of the legislative activities.^[8]

National Park Spatial Layout Plan and the Law on National Parks (draft)

Together with the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Natural Resources, and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, the National Forestry and Grassland Administration has developed a comprehensive policy on national parks – the National Park Spatial Layout Plan. According to the plan, China has identified 49 sites in 28 provinces where national parks have been or potentially could be built. The total area of the identified sites accounts for about 10 % of the country's land area.

The plan includes forests, grasslands, wetlands, and deserts inhabited by minority nationalities. There are Tibetans, Mongolians, Yi and other native ethnonational groups traditionally living within the territories of national parks, including the Three-River-Source National Park and the Qinghai Lake National Park, the Giant Panda National Park, the Northeast China Tiger and Leopard National Park.

Meanwhile between 19 August and 19 September 2022, the National Forestry and Grassland Administration published the draft Law on National Park for public comments.^[9]

While both the plan and the draft law provide the basis for a new national park system for strengthening environmental conservation, they both fail to recognize the role of Indigenous and local communities as rights holders and contributors in practice or provide for their participation in national parks’ governance.

High Commissioner’s visit to China and Xinjiang Report

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, visited China for six days in May 2022.^[10] It was the first such trip in 17 years. During her mission, Ms Bachelet spoke with a range of government officials, civil society organizations, academics, and community and religious leaders.

In Xinjiang, Ms Bachelet raised questions and concerns about the application of counter-terrorism and de-radicalization measures and their broad application and encouraged the government to undertake a review of all such policies to ensure they fully comply with international human rights standards and are not applied in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.

Ms Bachelet also reiterated the importance of protecting the linguistic, religious, and cultural identity of Tibetans, allowing Tibetans to participate fully and freely in decisions about their religious life. She announced new areas of engagement between her office and the Chinese government in order to dialogue on human rights issues.

On 31 August 2022, the High Commissioner last working day at the OHCHR, a long-awaited report was published.^[11] It concluded that:

The extent of arbitrary and discriminatory detention of members of Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim groups, pursuant to law and policy, in context of restrictions and deprivation more generally of fundamental rights enjoyed individually and collectively, may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.” The assessment also stated that human rights situation in XUAR “requires urgent attention by the Government, the United Nations intergovernmental bodies and human rights system, as well as the international community more broadly.^[12]

China presented its rebuttal in a detailed response to the report, arguing that the assessment was based on disinformation and lies fabricated by anti-China forces and out of a presumption of guilt. It further suggested that the report distorts China’s laws and policies, wantonly smears and slanders China, interferes in China’s internal affairs, and also undermines the credibility of the OHCHR.^[13]

Special Rapporteurs

On 7 September, 45 UN experts released a statement supporting the OHCHR’s assessment of Xinjiang.^[14] The experts described the assessment as comprehensive, principled, and built on the findings and views of multiple Special Procedure mandate holders and Working Groups.

They expressed their profound concerns at systematic human rights violations and their widespread effect on individuals and minorities in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. They repeated a call for the Human Rights Council to convene a special session on China and called on the Chinese government to invite mandate holders, affirming their availability to undertake country visits, as well as to provide technical assistance and government support to the UN experts’ missions to China.

The UN Human Rights Council

Despite the above findings and calls on the part of the OHCHR and the UN experts, the UN Human Rights Council rejected a draft decision entitled Debate on the situation of human rights in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, China by a vote of 17 in favor, 19 against and 11 abstentions on 6 October 2022. The debate would have taken place at the UNHRC’s next regular session in March 2023.^[15] China commented that the US and some other Western countries were propagating falsehoods on Xinjiang at the Human Rights Council and had put together a draft decision on that erroneous basis in an attempt to use UN human rights bodies as a tool to interfere in China’s internal affairs, using the agenda of Xinjiang in order to contain China.^[16]

NGOs

Leading human rights NGO Amnesty International expressed the following observation in terms of the Xinjiang vote failure betraying the core mission of the UN Human Rights Council. The:

vote protects the perpetrators of human rights violations rather than the victims – a dismaying result that puts the UN’s main human rights body in the farcical position of ignoring the findings of the UN’s own human rights office…For Council member states to vote against even discussing a situation where the UN itself says crimes against humanity may have occurred makes a mockery of everything the Human Rights Council is supposed to stand for…(the Council) failed the test to uphold its core mission, which is to protect the victims of human rights violations everywhere, including in places such as Xinjiang.”^[17]

The UN treaty bodies

Due to the lack of improvement in the human rights situation in Xinjiang, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination adopted a decision under its early warning and urgent action procedure at its 108^th session on 24 November 2022. The Committee called on China to immediately investigate all allegations of human rights violations in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), including those of torture, ill-treatment, sexual violence, forced labor, enforced disappearances, and deaths in custody. The Committee also called on China to immediately release all individuals arbitrarily deprived of their liberty in the XUAR, whether in “Vocational Education and Training Centers” or other detention facilities, and to provide relatives of those detained or disappeared with detailed information about their status and well-being.^[18]

Outlook for the coming year

The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGFB)^[19] was adopted at the Fifteenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), chaired by China. It is important to ensure that establishing a national park system and other biodiversity conservation measures undertaken in China move forward in a way that recognizes the territories and rights of Indigenous Peoples and their contributions to the governance of biodiversity. However, as of today, there are obvious inconsistencies in China playing a leading role in promoting global cooperation governance on the conservation of wetlands and biodiversity while domestically denying the existence and relevance of Indigenous Peoples in the country.

Due to the sensitivity of some of the issues covered in this article, the author prefers to remain anonymous.

This article is part of the 37^th edition of The Indigenous World, a yearly overview produced by IWGIA that serves to document and report on the developments Indigenous Peoples have experienced. The photo above is of an Indigenous person in Tanzania. This photo was taken by Geneviève Rose, and is the cover of the Indigenous World 2023 where this article is featured. Find the Indigenous World 2023 in full here.

Notes and references 

^[1] “China Statistical Yearbook 2021.” China Statistics Press; 2021, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2021/indexch.htm

^[2] Ministry of Ecology and Environment of PRC. The Wetlands Protection Law, https://www.mee.gov.cn/ywgz/fgbz/fl/202112/t20211227_965347.shtml

^[3] The Ramsar Convention. China, https://www.ramsar.org/wetland/china

^[4] NPC. Yellow River Protection Law of China. 2022, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/202210/1af57adb03f54fd7821e7d35efe6ca15.shtml

^[5] The 4^th Strategic Plan 2016-2024, The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat – the “Ramsar Convention”. https://www.ramsar.org/sites/default/files/documents/library/4th_strategic_plan_2016_2024_e.pdf

^[6] Wuhan Declaration. https://www.ramsar.org/sites/default/files/documents/library/wuhan_declaration_final_e.pdf

^[7] Gao Jing, Drafting Law on Ecological Conservation of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau Shall Strengthen Biodiversity Conservation, 28 December 2022, http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/202212/ef61d3070f5c4b358e76a50f8d4a9260.shtml

^[8] The Law on Ecological Conservation of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau (draft). 2022, https://npcobserver.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Qinghai–Tibet-Plateau-Ecological-Conservation-Law-Draft.pdf

^[9] State Forestry and Grassland Administration Government Network. “The National Park Law (Draft): Draft for comments.” 19 August 2022, http://www.forestry.gov.cn/main/153/20220819/150732442216001.html

^[10] “UN rights chief concludes China trip with promise of improved relations.” UN News, 28 May 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/05/1119302

^[11] UN. OHCHR. “OHCHR Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China.” 31 August 2022,

https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assesment.pdf

^[12] Ibid, Para. 148 and 149.

^[13] “China’s rebuttal to the Xinjiang Report.” Permanent Mission of PRC to the UN Office at Geneva and other International Organizations in Switzerland, 31 August 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/ANNEX_A.pdf

^[14] UN OHCHR. “Xinjiang report: China must address grave human rights violations and the world must not turn a blind eye, say UN experts.” UN Media Center, 07 September 2022,

https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/09/xinjiang-report-china-must-address-grave-human-rights-violations-and-world

^[15] UN. OHCHR. “Human Rights Council Adopts 21 Texts and Rejects One Draft Decision, Extends Mandates on Older Persons, Rights to Development, Arbitrary Detention, Mercenaries, Slavery, Indigenous Peoples, Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation.” UN Media Center, 06 October 2022,

 https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/10/human-rights-council-adopts-21-texts-and-rejects-one-draft-decision-extends-mandates

^[16] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC. “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Remarks on the Human Rights Council’s Vote Against a Draft Decision on Xinjiang.” 07 October 2022, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/202210/t20221007_10777575.html

^[17] “China: Xinjiang vote failure betrays core mission of UN Human Rights Council.” Amnesty International, 6 October 2022,

https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/10/china-xinjiang-vote-failure-betrays-core-mission-of-un-human-rights-council/

^[18] UN. “Prevention of Racial Discrimination, Including Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedure. Decision 1 (108).” Committee On The Elimination Of Racial Discrimination, 108^th session, 14 November-2 December 2022, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2FCERD%2FEWU%2FCHN%2F9624&Lang=en

^[19] “The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, agreed at the 15^th meeting of the Conference of Parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity is now available as document CBD/COP/15/L25.” Official CBD Press Release, 22 December 2022, https://www.cbd.int/article/cop15-final-text-kunming-montreal-gbf-221222

Tags: Global governance, Human rights, IWGIA