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IWGIA

INTERNATIONAL
WORK GROUP FOR
INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

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IWGIA NEWSLETTER



IWGIA

INTERNATIONAL
WORK GROUP FOR
INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Newsletter

No. 57

May 1989



IWGIA

No. 57

International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) is an independent, international organisation which supports indigenous peoples in their struggle against oppression. IWGIA publishes the IWGIA Documentation Series in English and Spanish. The IWGIA Newsletter in English and the IWGIA Boletín in Spanish are published in four numbers annually. The Documentation and Research Department welcomes suggestions and contributions to the Newsletters, Boletines and Documentation Series.

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Cover photo: Khant children from Northwest Siberia (photo: Peter Jessen)

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Introduction

For the first time in the history of IWGIA, we have begun to receive detailed information on the situation of the indigenous peoples of the Soviet Union. The opening up of information from the Soviet Union is extremely welcome and to mark this IWGIA is publishing two articles about the peoples of the north.

The first, by A. Pika and B. Prokhorov, provides a historical and regional introduction to the problems which have been facing the northern peoples of the Soviet Union. The second article, by a Khant author, tells of the problems which oil exploration is causing for his people. It is interesting to note how similarly indigenous peoples in the Soviet Union express their assertion of culture and rights to territory to those in other parts of the world.

The indigenous movement is spreading further than ever. In Africa there is also an increasing interest in indigenous issues. The article on Botswana looks at the Tyua people to the north of the country. A major problem in the country is over the rights to land of those people who have been hunters and gatherers and who face dispossession by commercial interests.

Another new area for indigenous affairs is Pakistan. The broad-ranging article in this issue looks at the history and the present conditions of the Baluch people. They are a semi-nomadic people who live Pakistan and Iran. Their political and cultural organisation stretches back to the 17th century and they are still demanding recognition of their rights.

This Newsletter contains four articles on the Amazon and forest areas of South America. The Co-ordinadora of the Amazon Basin held a historic meeting in Bolivia in 1988, where more representatives than ever attended from all over the region. The report presents an account of the meeting and the main issues which concern the indigenous peoples of the Amazon.

An article from the Environmental Defense Fund looks at the role of the World Bank in the Amazon, focussing on the Grand Carajas mining programme and the US\$500 million loan for Brazil's power sector. The article on Brazil looks at this loan in more detail, concentrating on the Altamira dam programme which the Brazilian government plans to use to create one of the largest reser-

voirs in the world. The programme will affect 408,000 hectares of Indian land. After the large gathering at Altamira in February, which has put international pressure on the Brazilian government, we are still waiting to hear whether the dams will be built.

Deforestation is taking place in Paraguay, where in August, 1988, the armed forces entered an indigenous Pai Tavytera community, cut down trees and stole the wood. The story of the indigenous villagers' brave resistance is told in the article.

Joint action by communities is an important part of indigenous peoples' resistance to oppression while at the same time asserting their identity. This is the basis of self-determination. In an extensive interview with Peter Yu, an Australian Aborigine from the Kimberleys in Western Australia, we hear of the history of his family and the strategies which he and his people have been using to promote community development.

An important form of mobilisation of indigenous communities which are separated by long distances is radio. In his article from Argentina, Jorge Fava looks at the negative acculturating aspects of the radio as a medium for indigenous peoples and discusses how it can be used positively to promote indigenous cultural identity.

The attempts by the indigenous peoples of Alaska to obtain a revision of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act has succeeded. The contrasting articles here look at the revision in detail and points out that while some indigenous peoples have welcomed the change of the act on certain issues, others regret that there are still loop-holes in the law which does not address fundamental questions of indigenous control over resources.

Militarisation and violence continue in several parts of the world. In the Philippines, bombing of indigenous communities has been going on for several years. The article in this Newsletter gives a particularly vivid account of the effects of the attacks and the increasing number of refugees fleeing from their devastated villages.

The article from Nicaragua, on the other hand, shows promising signs of peace and reconciliation. In his statement, the indigenous leader of YATAMA, Brooklyn Rivera explains his plans to return to his country after eight years in exile.

At a Conference of Support Groups on East Timor which IWGIA hosted in February at Copenhagen, we were told that, contrary to recent reports, human rights violations in East Timor continue as strongly as ever. At the East Timor meeting an informative presentation of the application of international law to the invasion was presented. This is reproduced here, along with the resolutions of the meeting.

Since the last Newsletter, IWGIA has heard with deep regret of the deaths of several indigenous leaders. Each has made significant contributions towards the recognition of the right of self-determination for indigenous peoples.

On May 4th, **Jean-Marie Tjibou**, head of the National Liberation Front for Kanak Socialism, was shot in New Caledonia. He had been instrumental in the 1988 initiative for an agreement with France over the future of the islands and was widely recognised as a skillful and astute indigenous leader.

In February, the death was announced of **Moises da Costa do Amaral**, leader of the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) in Portugal. Moises do Amaral was one of the main architects of the Convergence agreement between FRETILIN and the UDT working for a UN-negotiated settlement in East Timor. This alliance has contributed to the international revival of the East Timorese issue over the last two years.


The third indigenous leader to die this year was **Gerald Wilkinson**, who for many years has inspired the youth of indigenous North America as head of the National Indian Youth Council. His tireless work, both nationally and internationally, for the recognition of indigenous peoples' rights has earned him enormous respect and affection from indigenous and non-indigenous people alike.

Alaska: Native Claims Settlement Act Amended

A compilation by Jens Dahl

In 1971, the US Congress, passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). ANCSA was a land claims settlement which left Native Eskimo, Indian and Aleut with 44 million acres of land, about 11 per cent of the State, a US\$ 1 billion cash compensation. The act also extinguished Native Alaska aboriginal claims to the land.

The land and the money were taken care of by 13 Regional Corporations and more than 200 Village Corporations. Contrasting the original intentions, the last 17 years have made it perfectly clear that ANCSA has not developed into an economic vehicle for Native Alaskans. Furthermore, those issues which were left unresolved by ANCSA seem to have been even more aggravated by the assimilationist tendencies in the act. A major problem has been the end of a 20 years transitional period in 1991. To cope with this, Alaska Natives have been lobbying for changes in ANCSA, and in February 1988, President Reagan



White Mountain High School (photo: Charles Russell/Alaska Native News)

signed the Public Law 100-241, which includes the '1991 Amendments' (for a background to ANCSA see IWGIA Newsletter No. 35 & 36, 1983).

The amendments were supported, or accepted, by the statewide umbrella organisation, the Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN), but vigorously opposed by Alaska Native Coalition which withdrew from AFN in 1987 on the 1991 question.

The first article, written by Monica E. Thomas (published in Polar Record October 1988), is an update of ANCSA, and the second article, by Bob Anderson and Lare Aschenbrenner, was published in Alaska Native Coalition News, May/June 1988.

The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: an update By Monica E. Thomas

New ANCSA amendments

The original settlement act left three major issues unresolved: stock alienation, the afterborn, and land taxation and protection. The Alaska Native Claims settlement Act (ANCSA) also left a fourth, unspoken issue in a state of limbo. The three major issues were addressed within the new ANCSA amendments enacted in February 1988 by the US Congress (US Public Law 100-241 1988). The fourth issue, tribal control and sovereignty, was specifically avoided in the new amendments and the US Congress added a disclaimer to the amendments which states that the amendments are not intended to either validate or invalidate any claims by tribal governments. In May 1988 the Alaska Supreme Court ruled (in a split decision) that Alaska Native groups and communities, except the Annette Island Reserve, do not have tribal sovereignty (Native Village of Stevens 1988). An immediate appeal to the US Supreme Courts is expected.

- Stock Alienation

ANCSA prohibited transfer of shareholder stock, and denied rights to non-Natives who might acquire stock through inheritance, until the end of 1991. At that time, all stock was to be liquidated and new stock issued without voting or sale restriction. Subsequent 1980 amendments permitted Native corporations to amend articles of incorporation until 1991 to deny voting rights to non-Native stockholders and provide corporations with first right of purchase. Despite the 1980 amendments, stock ownership in Native corporations, both regional and village, was very vulnerable to outside take-over beginning in 1992. The new amendments directly address this issue. A defined procedure is established for extending stock restrictions and three specified options are provided for remov-



*Klukwan shareholders longshoring at Long Island
(photo: Alaska Native Magazine)*

ing or altering these restrictions. Unlike earlier versions of ANCSA, the restrictions on stock alienation now remain in effect until or unless specifically removed by the majority of stockholders in each affected corporation.

- The afterborn and other specified groups

To be eligible for ANCSA, a person had to be alive on 18th December 1971, at least one quarter Alaska Native, and an American citizen. All natives born after 1971 were therefore ineligible for inclusion in the settlement. The afterborns now exceed 35,000. The new amendments allow a majority of stockholders in each affected corporation to decide to issue stock to the afterborns, designated 'new Natives'. These afterborns may receive either restricted or unrestricted stock, and may or may not possess voting rights and receive dividends depending on the wishes of the stockholders. The new amendments also allow for the issuance of additional shares of stock to elders if a majority of stockholders in an affected corporation so wishes. Finally, the new amendments permit the issuance of stock to ANCSA eligible Natives who missed the original enrolment deadline, subject to the wishes of a majority of corporation stockholders.

- *Land taxation and protection*

Under ANCSA, with subsequent amendments, Native corporation lands were protected from taxation for a limited period of time - 20 years from time of conveyance. A land bank concept was also created in later legislation to provide a trust into which underdeveloped land could be placed. No protection against land losses due to corporate debt was provided. The new amendments extend protection against taxation indefinitely if the lands remain undeveloped. Additionally, the new amendments prevent takeovers on undeveloped lands caused by corporate debts or bankruptcy, unless those lands are specifically mortgaged. Exceptions include rights of eminent domain, unpaid obligations under the 70/30 split whereby certain resource revenues are shared by all regional corporations, and tax liabilities to the US Internal Revenue Service.

Other recent ANCSA related issues

Two important, very controversial issues today have developed from ANCSA legislation and the establishment of Native corporations. These issues are land exchanges and loss sales.

- *Land exchanges*

Several Native land exchanges occurred during the past decade. These included exchanges of US federal lands in Cape Krusenstern National Monument with NANA Corporation lands to permit construction of a road to the proposed Red Dog Mine north of Kotzebue, and exchanges of Arctic Slope Regional Corporation lands in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge for subsurface rights to other US federal lands on the coastal plain in the refuge close to the village of Kaktovik. An exploratory oil well was drilled on these latter exchanged lands, with results not revealed. While not without critics, these exchanges sustained no serious challenge and easily passed the US Congress.

Recently, the US federal government, in an attempt to secure surface rights to critical wildlife habitat in holdings held by Native corporations in several US federal refuges within the state of Alaska, proposed a major land exchange within the coastal plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, directly east of oil-producing Prudhoe Bay. Approximately 607,000 hectares on the coastal plain are being sought for oil exploration by the Reagan administration, state of Alaska, and major oil companies, while the environmentalists wish to declare the coastal plain a wilderness area. The rest of the 7,710,000 hectares refuge is not of interest for resource development, and 3,327,000 hectares are virtual wilderness.

In return for 361,000 hectares of Native surface inholdings within US federal refuges, two regional corporations and four village corporations selected 67,000 hectares of potentially rich subsurface oil lands right in the middle of the coastal plain. These exchanges are currently pending in the US Congress amid heated controversy, and resolution is uncertain. Three additional Native groups have asked for land exchange consideration within the coastal plain, and a fourth group, involved in the current proposed exchange, has asked to expand its potential coastal plain holdings. No action has been taken on these new requests.

- *Loss sales*

A technical amendment in the 1986 Tax Reform Act (US Public Law 99-154 1986) permits Alaska Native corporations to sell net operating losses to profitable corporations which use the losses to reduce their taxes through write-offs. Up to 80 per cent of the tax savings are then funneled back to the Native corporations. This provision was created to aid financially ailing Native corporations, but critics argue that accounting manipulation has created huge paper losses never anticipated by the writers of the legislation. In the past year, Cook Inlet Region Inc. has sold losses for US\$ 102 million, while Doyon, Ltd. expects to earn more than US\$ 50 million. Both of these corporations have been consistently profitable in recent years. This tax break has provided Alaska Native corporations with more than US\$ 400 million to date. A bill has been introduced into the US Congress to end the practice, while Alaska Native corporations rush to complete new loss sales.







Concluding thoughts

While the new amendments and other activities have not solved all of the problems facing Alaska native corporations and their stockholders, many of the most fundamental problems and limitations of ANCSA have now been addressed. With the new amendments, proposed new land exchanges and current loss of sales, the majority of regional corporations, and many village corporations as well, have been provided with new assets and potential new assets, as well as better ways to deal with the critical concerns of stock and land control and continued ownership.

Since 99 per cent of the remaining land in Alaska is in public ownership, there will be increasing pressure to develop Native lands and pursue cash-generating activities. This pressure will necessarily conflict with the continued concerns over subsistence and cultural identity, as well as the controversial issue of tribal government and sovereignty. Nonetheless, most observers believe that the prospects for ANCSA, and Native self-determination and growth, are now brighter than at any time since passage of the original act.

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- Thomas, M.E. 1986. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: conflict and controversy. *Polar Record* 23 (142):27-36.
- US Public Law 99-514. *Tax Reform Act* 22 October 1986.
- US Public Law 100-241. *Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendment of 1987*, 3 February 1988.

<h2 style="text-align: center;">Alaska Native Corporations Supporting Sound and Environmentally Safe Economic Development</h2>	
 <p>Chugach Alaska Corporation 3000 A Street, Suite 400 Anchorage, Alaska 99503</p>	 <p>Koniag, Inc. 4300 B Street, Suite 407 Anchorage, Alaska 99503</p>
 <p>Kake Tribal Corporation P.O. Box 263 Kake, Alaska 99830</p>	 <p>Sealaska Corporation One Sealaska Plaza, Suite 400 Juneau, Alaska 99811</p>
 <p>Klukwan, Inc. P.O. Box 2077 Juneau, Alaska 99803</p>	 <p>Olgoonik Corporation Box 29 Wainwright, Alaska 99782</p>

Alaska Native Corporation at the Seventh Annual International Conference on Alaska's Resources (Source: Alaska Native Magazine)

1991 Provides Protection: but opens doors to new dangers

By Bob Anderson and Lare Aschenbrenner, NARF
Attorneys for Alaska and ANC legal representatives

On February 3, 1988, President Reagan signed Public Law 100-241, the 1991 Legislation. The primary goals of the 1991 amendments to ANCSA were: (1) to insure continued Native ownership of the corporations and their land; (2) to offer a way out of the corporate system; and (3) to authorize issuance of stock to elders and Natives born after 1971. The amendments that were finally passed provide only limited protections for Native ownership. There is still no way out of the corporate system, but the law does authorize issuance of stock to new Natives and elders. At the same time, however, it opens the door to outside takeovers or concentration of control in the hands of a few - through provisions authorizing new stock issues to non-Natives. A brief summary of the legislation's major provisions is set forth below.

Matters affecting Native Corporation stock

- Extending or removing restrictions on the sale of stock

As originally enacted, ANCSA provided that stock issued to Natives in 1971 would become freely alienable (the stock could be sold) on December 18, 1991. The great fear within the Native community was that non-Native individuals or corporations would purchase the stock after 1991 and thus gain control of the corporations. If outsiders controlled the corporations they would also control land and could manage the land in ways inconsistent with Native values. The solution generally proposed was to extend the restrictions on the sale of ANCSA stock so the corporations would not be subject to takeover. Instead of simply extending the restrictions, however, the legislation establishes a variety of methods which on a superficial level seem to favour continuation of the restrictions. Closer review reveals a dangerous bias in favour of removal of restrictions which increases the likelihood of outside takeovers and corresponding loss of control of the land.

Section 8 of the legislation establishes a general rule extending the restrictions on alienation for an indefinite period of time. This means they will remain in place until terminated in accordance with the procedure established by that section. The restrictions may not be lifted prior to December 18, 1991. A proposal to terminate restrictions by amending the articles of incorporation may be put forward by one of two methods. A proposed amendment could be ap-

proved by the corporation's board of directors and then placed before the shareholders for a vote. An amendment to terminate restrictions could also be put before the shareholders for approval if it were proposed in a petition supported by twenty-five per cent of the voting shares of the corporation. In either case, the amendment becomes effective if approved by more than fifty per cent of the shares eligible to vote.

The requirement of approval by a simple majority vote for removal of restrictions is quite low. Corporations and shareholders should be careful to make sure unfair practices are not undertaken to induce removal of the restrictions. Some relief is provided by another section of the legislation which allows the voting standards for removal of restrictions to be raised to as high as two-thirds of eligible voting shares. This can be accomplished by amending the corporation's articles of incorporation. Such a move is strongly recommended for Native corporations wishing to provide additional protection from outside takeover.

Section 8 (c) of the legislation allows Native corporations to amend their articles of incorporation to provide a "recapitalization plan" if the plan is proposed and approved prior to December 18, 1991. This complicated provision authorises the extension of restrictions on sale of stock for a certain time, an indefinite period of time, or until a particular event occurs. A "recapitalization plan" could also provide for the issuance of voting stock to non-Natives. Such stock could carry greater voting power than stock issued in 1971 and such stock could also be freely alienable. This section could result in non-Native control of a corporation even though Native shareholders continued to hold restricted stock. Shareholders could also be faced with a plan that extends restrictions on alienation, but which at the same time authorises the issuance of alienable voting stock to non-Natives or Natives who could afford to buy. This provision opens the door to outside takeover and/or the concentration of control in the hands of a few wealthy Natives.

Section 8 (d) allows all Regional corporations and village, urban and group corporations in the Bristol Bay and Aleut regions to select an alternate procedure for determining whether to extend restrictions on sale of stock. For the "opt-in" procedure to be utilised, the board of directors of a corporation must elect to do so before February 4, 1989. Under this provision, the restrictions would terminate in 1991 *unless the shareholders vote to extend them*. As such, it establishes a bias in favour of removal of restrictions by placing the burden on the shareholders who wish to extend restrictions. Those who wish to continue restrictions should oppose any Board attempts to use this process. Moreover, even if restrictions are extended, dissenting shareholders must be paid off or given alienable stock.

In sum, the amendments provide mechanisms for removal of restrictions-

that could easily be manipulated and result in a loss of Native control of the corporation. Shareholders should be wary of "recapitalization plans" which extend restrictions but raise funds by issuing stock to non-Natives. Any short-term monetary gain could be offset by a long-term loss of control.

New Stock Issuance

Section 4 of the amendments authorises issuance of stock to Natives born after 1971, Natives over the age of 65 and Natives who could have, but did not, receive stock in 1971. These groups of shareholders will be in roughly the same position as existing shareholders, although their stock could be limited by being canceled upon the death of the shareholder. There would be little problem if the legislation stopped here.

A separate subsection alluded to above, however, allows corporations to issue new voting stock to non-Natives and/or to Natives. This stock may have greater voting power than existing shares of Native owned stock and thus opens an additional door to outside takeover of the corporation. The present shareholders would have to authorise an amendment to the articles of incorporation to approve the issue of new stock. Certain disclosure requirements are placed on the corporation should the issuance result in present shareholders losing voting control of the corporation. This, however, may be a hollow protection. In most cases effective control of a corporation can be maintained by far fewer than fifty per cent of the voting shares. Section 4 could be manipulated to concentrate control in the hands of a few wealthy shareholders, or slowly erode effective Native control despite the existence of majority Native ownership. As noted above, the issuance of new stock could also be part of a "recapitalization plan" which might otherwise appear attractive due to a provision extending restrictions on the sale of present stock. All in all, this section provides ample opportunity for loss of native control of the affected corporation. Shareholders should give any proposed plan to issue new stock the strictest of scrutiny before giving their approval.

Land Protection

Section 11 of the legislation provides automatic "land bank" protections to land conveyed to a Native corporation so long as the land is not developed, leased, or sold to third parties. While these protections from taxation, squatters rights, bankruptcy or involuntary dissolution are essential there are significant gaps in the protections. In contrast to land held by a tribal government, Native corporations could lose their land if it were pledged as collateral for a loan. Likewise, it could simply be sold or lost by the corporation through unwise business decisions.

Most important is the fact that the protections are not provided to developed lands. Thus, the core areas of villages where people live will be exposed to loss through taxation, bankruptcy and other forms of judicial foreclosure. This large gap in protection allows non-Native interests a window through which critical inroads into the Native land base may be achieved. The "land bank" is a decent stop-gap measure, but still offers considerable opportunity for erosion of the Native land base.

– *Ways out of the Corporate Systems*

It is undisputed that the corporate system is unworkable and undesirable for many Alaska Native villages. For that reason, a tribal option was considered an essential part of the 1991 legislative package. The tribal option took shape in the "Qualified Transferee Entity" sections of the House and Senate bills. Such an option was necessary due to the difficulty and complexity of undertaking such transfers under existing state law. The QTE section in both bills originally authorised Native corporations to transfer land to tribal governments without having to pay dissenting shareholders. Such transfers would have been permitted if approved by a simple majority of the outstanding shares. Senators Stevens and Murkowski, however, insisted upon a disclaimer and other provisions which had the effect of taking away critical elements of tribal sovereignty in exchange for authorising transfers of corporate land to tribes.

The QTE section was simply dropped from the legislation. Thus, the legislation provides no way out of the corporate system. Section 10 of the Act provides a "Settlement Trust Option" whereby corporations may convey assets to a "settlement trust" which is an entity organised under state law. This has been touted by some as providing a way out of the corporate system. In reality, the section provides few, if any, long-term land protections that are not available to land in the hands of a Native corporation. It falls far short of affording the safeguards which a transfer of assets to a tribal government would provide.

The 1991 amendments provide some protections for the corporations. These protections could, however, be easily manipulated by those who favour non-Native ownership, or who would prefer to see ownership concentrated in the hands of the wealthy and powerful. The land banks protections are good, but still allow the Native land base to be chipped away. Alaska Natives have a long way to go before the land base gained in 1971 will be secure for future generations.

Amazon: The Coordinadora of the Amazon Basin Celebrates its III Congress

By Teresa Aparicio

Introduction

After several years of close collaboration between Amazon indigenous organisations, COICA, the Coordinadora for the Amazon Basin (Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indigenas de la Cuenca Amazonica), was formally established in March 1984, during a seminar on the rights of indigenous peoples of the Amazon Basin. The seminar was held in Lima, Peru, under the auspices of the Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest (AIDSESEP). The other indigenous organisations which participated at that meeting were: UNI/Brazil (Union of the Indigenous Nations); CONFENIAE/Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon); ONIC/Colombia (National Indigenous Organisation of Colombia); and CIDOB/Bolivia (Centre of Indigenous Peoples of Eastern Bolivia).

The aim of the seminar was to discuss common problems which affect the indigenous nations of the Amazon region. The aggressive and colonialist policies of the signatory governments of the Treaty of Co-operation for the Amazon Region were denounced in general terms. These policies are plundering wide areas of the tropical forest from the indigenous nations of the Amazon in order to hand them over to agro-industrial, timber, petroleum and mining corporations.

Each of the delegates submitted a report about the specific problems of the area, and shared the same view regarding the plundering and the lack of legal recognition of their areas by their respective governments. At the end of the seminar the Coordinadora for the Amazon Basin was officially established; the Presidency was held by AIDSESEP (Peru) and the Secretariat by CONFENIAE (Ecuador).

Overcoming great economic difficulties, COICA held its first Congress in Lima in month July, 1985, and during August took part in the UN Working Group Meetings on Indigenous Peoples held in Geneva, Switzerland. The presence of the Coordinadora in the Working Group represented the first and the most important co-ordinated effort of the indigenous organisations of the Amazon before the United Nations. The significance of their participation at this international forum concerning the human rights of indigenous peoples, stems from that year when the presence of the South American governments at the annual sessions of the Working Group increased considerably.



Map of the Amazon (map: Jorgen Ulrich)

During 1986 the Coordinadora attended two meetings with the ILO at the headquarters of AIDSESEP and CIDOB respectively. Likewise, it organised several seminars regarding the situation of the indigenous peoples of the Amazon region. In the course of the same year a delegation from COICA met with the President of the World Bank, Mr. Barber Conable, in Washington to discuss the effects of the development programmes financed by the World Bank in the indigenous territories of the Amazon.

Without any doubt, the event of greatest international impact in 1986 was when Evaristo Nugkuag from AIDSESEP was awarded the Alternative Peace Prize by the Right Livelihood Foundation of Sweden. He received the Alternative Prize on behalf of his people, the Aguaruna, other indigenous nations of the Peruvian jungle which constitute AIDSESEP, and also on behalf of all the indigenous nations that are members of the Coordinadora of the Amazon Basin. In his speech upon receiving the award, Evaristo Nugkuag spoke about the nearly five hundred years of racist oppression that the European colonists and their descendants have imposed upon the indigenous peoples in all of the Amazon area. This oppression continues today and, during the last decades, has been accompanied by some development models which, in Evaristo Nugkuag's words, "cause massive ecological destruction or 'ecological suicide' without precedent in the history of the Amazon Basin".

The Coordinadora returned to participate again in the UN Working Group's Meetings during 1987 and immediately afterwards at a Conference on the Amazon, held in Vienna, Austria. From Vienna, the representatives of COICA travelled to Copenhagen in order to participate in a seminar that had been arranged by IWGIA concerning the ecological destruction of the Amazon Basin and the consequences for the Indigenous Nations in that area. (The reports made by representatives of the Coordinadora have been published - in English - in the IWGIA Yearbook 1987.)

Finally, at the invitation of the Nordic Saami Council, members of the Coordinadora visited the land of the Saami which consists of the northern parts of Sweden, Norway and Finland.

During 1986 and 1987, the Coordinadora reached an important international level and has become established as the largest and most coherent group from a tropical jungle area with regard to international fora such as the UN and the ILO. At the same time, the Coordinadora has formed relationships with fraternal indigenous organisations, not only in South America but also with organisations from other continents. Both the Coordinadora's increasing range of action and the rapid process of consolidation were vividly reflected during the III Congress.

The III Congress

The Coordinadora of the Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin held its III Congress from the 17th to the 20th of May 1988 in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, under the auspices of the Indigenous Confederation of Eastern Bolivia (CIDOB). Each member organisation of the Coordinadora participated with a delegation of from six to ten representatives with the exception of Brazil.



The directors of the III Congress of COICA (photo: Teresa Aparicio)

Of the six representatives of the UNI delegation from Brazil only two were able to participate; the others were not able to travel because they did not have passports, or more precisely, because they lacked the necessary documentation needed to obtain a passport.

All of the delegations to the Congress were composed of experienced and well-known leaders as well as indigenous youth from the local regional organisations which provided a great dynamism to the whole Assembly. Following a resolution taken at the last Congress to increase the number of member organisations of the Coordinadora, two completely new indigenous Amazon organisations were invited to participate in this Congress; the Civil Association of the Indigenous People of Yukpa (ACIPY) from Venezuela, and the TUNASARAPA organisation (which can be translated as Arrows and Water) from Surinam. The later has a representation in Amsterdam, Netherlands.

Representatives of the fraternal local organisations were invited as observers, as were representatives from international support organisations such as IWGIA, OXFAM/America and WIP from Holland. Professor Howard Berman of Harvard Law School, USA, was also invited by the Coordinadora to speak about the ILO Convention 107 at present in the process of revision.

The III Congress was officially opened by the Board of Directors of the Coordinadora, and the Vice-Rector of the University of Santa Cruz welcomed all the participants. Then, the Assembly officials were elected, resulting in the re-election of Cristobal Naikiai, of CONFENIAE, as Chairman.

The working Agenda that had been prepared by the Organising Committee, and which contained nine principal subjects, was submitted for approval by a general vote and approved; it was agreed to constitute various working commissions to deal with the different subjects. Once the working agenda was approved, the President of the Coordinadora, Evaristo Nugkuag, recounted its activities which aroused a great deal of interest and stimulated a number of interventions from Delegates. In the course of his presentation, Evaristo Nugkuag mentioned the fine work of IWGIA, praising the extensive diffusion of information carried out through the Bulletin. The remainder of the first session consisted of reports from each of the delegates about the history of their respective organisations and the present situation of their peoples within their social-political framework. The main problem presented by all the member organisations of COICA, was the question of territorial rights and the illegal invasions of indigenous lands by groups with large economic interests in the extraction of natural resources.

Working Commissions


In the course of the following sessions each of the Working Commissions debated various subjects, such as, territorial rights, the consequences of ILO Convention 107 for indigenous peoples, human rights, the fifth centennial (of the Spanish conquest), and finally, the structure and future activities of the Coordinadora. The results of each of the Commissions were presented to the Assembly in the course of the final sessions and submitted to a general vote.



Delegates at the III Congress during one of the working sessions (photo: Teresa Aparicio)

Indigenous Organisation

It was agreed to support the formation of national indigenous organisations in all of the countries of the Amazon basin for the purpose of reinforcing the existing local and regional organisations. (For example, in Bolivia and in Surinam there are still no nationwide organisations.)



There was also active female participation (photo: Teresa Aparicio)

The Fifth Centennial (of the Spanish Conquest)

The Coordinadora rejected unanimously the celebration of the fifth centennial, either by the Spanish government or by the governments of Central and South America. It was decided to plan an alternative programme to the celebration which would demonstrate the situation and the claims of the indigenous peoples of the Amazon. Finally, the day of the 11th of October was proclaimed as "The Day of Solidarity with the Indian Peoples".

The Platform for the International Struggle


The participation of COICA in international events as a platform for a joint struggle was considered important. In this connection, it was agreed to send a delegate to the 1989 meeting of the ILO in Geneva, where the Convention 107 will be discussed. It was also recommended to increase the size of the COICA delegation at the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations in Geneva, where work on a Declaration of Indigenous Rights has been conducted during the last five years. Finally, it was decided that COICA should solicit consultative status before the ILO and before the United Nations.

Ethno-development

The subject of development projects in indigenous communities was very much debated in the plenary session. Some of the organisations present pointed out the danger for indigenous organisations of the economic dependence which some development projects bring with them, above all in cases of financing. The consequences, almost always negative, of Western development models upon the ecology and environment were also noted. This last point was seen as connected to the different types of technology utilised by indigenous and non-indigenous groups respectively.

One of the points which gained general approval in the plenary session was that ethno-development projects, in whatever shape, should be under the absolute control of the beneficiary communities and/or indigenous organisations. This control should be both directional and administrative. It was also indicated that the commercialisation of agricultural products should be administered by the producers themselves. One of the resolutions which was adopted in this connection was that indigenous development models and techniques should be used as alternatives to development programmes of the Western type.

It was recommended that COICA closely follows the activities of international financial institutions which support development projects in Amazon countries, such as the World Bank, the Interamerican Development Bank, the Bank of Asia, etc.



One of the delegates at the III Congress (photo: Teresa Aparicio)

Self-Determination and Territorial Rights

The right of indigenous nations to control the natural resources existing within their territories was considered one of the basic points of self-determination. The territorial rights, upon which the control of the natural resources depend, are defined as inalienable, non-negotiable, and non-attachable. The principle resolutions which were adopted within this subject area were:

- Not to support any type of agrarian reform, any rural development or colonisation project, until the indigenous territories are demarcated.
- To assist the indigenous groups of the Amazon to demarcate their territories.
- To demand indemnity from the extractive companies which operate in indigenous territories in the Amazon, and to form an economic fund for the reforestation of indigenous territories.
- To reject the militarisation of indigenous lands, both in frontier areas and in the interior.

The structure of COICA

The discussion about the structure and future functioning of COICA was concerned principally with the question of a traditional organisational base versus

a co-ordinating net of a more mobile type with the possibilities of developing activities *ad hoc*. For example, the possibility of creating a Centre for Documentation and Information on the Indigenous Nations of the Amazon in Manaus, Brazil, was discussed, as well as the question of having a fixed headquarters for COICA.

This discussion produced diverse opinions, including the question of which member organisation should serve as the future headquarters for the Coordinadora. Nevertheless, when this question was put to the vote the great majority voted to continue with a popular mass structure with rotating headquarters. Likewise, it was considered premature to establish a Documentation Centre in Manaus.

There was absolute unanimity about maintaining the General Assembly as the maximum authority of COICA. The election of the new officers, conducted by a secret vote and a simple majority, resulted in the following:

President: Evaristo Nugkuag (re-elected) AIDSESP, Peru.

Vice-President: Cristobal Naikiai, CONFENIAE, Ecuador.

Secretary: Jose Urriñahui, CIDOB, Bolivia.

Treasurer: George Pierre, TUNASARAPA, Surinam.

Spokesperson: Javier Armato, ACIPY, Venezuela.

The end of the Congress was celebrated in the headquarters of CIDOB where the new direction of COICA gave their final speeches which were included in a video made about the III Congress.

Conclusion

The Third Assembly of COICA put into relief the importance of the organisation, as much at the inter-regional Amazon level as at the level of the whole of South America. Furthermore, it clearly showed the international profile which the organisation is acquiring. An example of this is the decision of the Coordinadora to solicit NGO status at the UN. The widening of the Coordinadora with the two new member organisations from Venezuela and Surinam has firmly established it as the largest representative organisation of indigenous peoples living in jungle regions.

One of the important points made at the III Assembly was the reconfirmation of the organisational character of COICA as a network spread horizontally, while at the same time maintaining certain vertical organisational characteristics

(for example, a directive group with a President and Vice-President, etc.). The symbiosis of the two distinct types of organisation, which are generally kept apart, produce different organisational structures which can generate a new type of dynamism and flexibility. This, together with a firm organisational base, can produce extremely positive results. At the same time, this structure permits, at least theoretically, other indigenous organisations, be they local or regional, which are not part of any of the existing Amazon organisations, to co-ordinate specific actions with COICA. And, in this respect, the Coordinadora could become the only organisation of this type in the whole of the American Continent, both with regard to representativeness and organisation.

Argentina: Radio as a Tool of Culture – the impact of communication media on indigenous peoples

By Jorge H. Fava

Since 1492, different ethnic groups, and later, peasant (campesino) sectors, have put up a cultural resistance, with more or less success, to the penetration of western culture. This resistance has delayed the fateful final destruction of these peoples.

In the opinion of Adolfo Colombres: "It can be held that, in general, ethnic groups do not give in to ethnocide without first, in anguish, attempting the hopeless recuperation of their mythical universe. They come broken in spirit, caught between two cultures, between their sad reality and the memory of a happy age..." (1)

Nevertheless, Roger Bastide warns: "... The observations of ethnologists demonstrate that men, even though they resist change, also accept potentially beneficial initiatives such as techniques, institutions and practices originating from other cultures..." (2). This is always the case provided that the modifications do not affect, either substantially or directly, the core of their tribal ideology, or when the modifications arise out of a project of applied anthropology based upon the peoples' own desire for change.

Since the 1970s, indigenous resistance has strengthened in the political sphere as can be seen in the creation of numerous organisations which struggle for the recognition of Indian rights. These organisations have established their bases in the most important urban centres of the country, principally in the federal capital. This is because, as the saying goes, "God is everywhere, but he abides in Buenos Aires". From these centres indigenous organisations carry out an effective struggle for Indian demands and raising consciousness.

But while the political front is strengthening in the urban centres, indigenous culture is weakening in the rural areas.

In a few years, it will be five centuries since the Spanish arrived in the Americas with their subsequent conquest, colonisation and evangelisation of aboriginal territories. Today several native cultures face what we can consider as their "critical point" consisting of a European cultural attack projected through the national society. This is exacerbating conflict between indigenous and non-indigenous people.

We cannot try to bring together here the ample and varied forms of acculturation or the process of inter-ethnic contacts which have emerged from colonial and neo-colonial domination of ethnic groups throughout the history of the Americas. These range from small factors to serious threats for indigenous peoples such as loss of ancestral territories, imposed education and religion, detrimental economic contacts, etc.

Here, we will discuss only the mass communication media (specifically the radio) and its impact upon small peasant communities. However we should not forget that the effect of the media is more intense on the working classes through the so-called "popular culture". We have had to treat this matter only peripherally so as not to distract from the particular focus required by the indigenous question. Nevertheless we recognise analogous effects and consequences of the process of marginalisation in many sectors of society.

Indian cultures have managed to survive, traumatised, until the present because of their geographic isolation. This has in many cases been self-imposed because of the mechanisms of resistance peculiar to the socio-cultural system of each cultural group. Nevertheless, the gradual loss of ethnic identity and the readaptation by indigenous peoples to new conditions has prevailed for many years.

The installation of long-range radio stations and the proliferation of regional radio transmitters has accelerated the effects of deculturation on the indigenous peoples and this will continue to increase in the future. Furthermore, the pace of the transmissions and the shift between different elaborated messages have developed disproportionately. "One of the reasons", says Alvin Toffler, "why our interior images of reality change with increasing rapidity could be the increased velocity with which messages charged with images reach our senses. Little has been done to investigate this scientifically, but there exists proof that we are increasing the exposure of the individual to image-carrying stimulæ". (3)

The ubiquitous broadcasting wave, a product of the increase in radio transmitters and the extension of their range to isolated zones as well as the relatively easy access to radio receivers, makes the radio, of all the mass media, the major factor in the process of deculturation and acculturation among native ethnic groups.

Thus the radio has also become an indirect factor in the instigation of internal migration towards urban centres by indigenous peoples. Motivated by their understanding of broadcast information, they formulate in their minds a distorted image of the realities of life in the cities, which through glamorous and sophisticated imagery they suppose is better, easier and of more immediate access. The indigenous recipients of these messages then look out for the possibility of economic progress and social mobility and become convinced by the negative

view of their ethnic origins, a view which is the product of "systems of ideological coercion." Indigenous peoples then take on this view point - an "...adoption of the conscience of 'the others'" (4); they seek voluntary attachment to the dominant group, even though they will definitely never be accepted as integrated members. Indigenous peoples thus become converted into pathetic examples of our contemporary social alienation.

We can read in a work edited by R. König: "It is very probable that in the mass media there is a certain relationship with the role of vertical mobility, given that the media use set images of what constitutes a standard of the "average" life, which is very important for the construction of the image of a desirable group of reference..." (5)





Figure 1

The radio, as a communicative phenomenon, operates (with varying success) upon culture and society, which, in turn, interpenetrate each other. In the cultural sphere, the loss of traditional ethnic values (DECULTURATION) produces the effect of an internalisation of the ideology of the dominant group (ACCULTURATION) and a degraded vision of the indigenous peoples' own cultural universe, forming as a consequence a NEGATIVE IDENTITY in respect to their ethnic origin.

In the social sphere, the destruction of the tribal ethos results in the disintegration of the socially organised group (DETRIBALISATION). This consists of a centrifugal force of indigenous peoples to urban centres, their subsequent concentration on the periphery of large cities in a process of SUBURBANISATION and the formation of poor "villas miserias", in which new socio-cultural codes emerge, created by the MARGINALISATION and extreme poverty.

We should also mention the social-economic factors which give rise to the process of depopulating people from the interior of the country. The main factors are the lack of expectations of progress and the absence of employment in the rural areas, which principally affects the young.

Eduardo Galeano comments on this situation in Latin America: "There is a massive invasion of workers coming from the poorest zones of each country; the cities excite and defraud the expectations of work for whole families which are attracted by the hope of improving their level of living and obtaining a place in the great magic circus of urban civilization. The revelation of paradise attracts many, but glitter cannot be eaten; the city makes the poor even poorer because it cruelly exhibits a mirage of riches to those who will never have access to them: cars, mansions, machines as strong as God or like the devil, and in return it denies secure employment, a decent roof under which to shelter and full dishes on the table each evening. An organisation of the United Nations claims that at least a quarter of the population of Latin American cities inhabit "settlements which do not fulfill the norms of modern urban construction" - a widespread euphemism of their technicians to describe the shanty towns known as *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro, *callampas* in Santiago de Chile, *jacales* in Mexico, *barrios* in Caracas, *barriadas* in Lima, *villas miserias* in Buenos Aires and *cantegriles* in Montevideo..." (6)



Map indicating the zones denominated "suburbanisation" (marked in black) on the periphery of the metropolitan area (city of Buenos Aires and greater Buenos Aires); this is a consequence of the internal migration of the population toward the urban centres (according to architect Raúl Alvarez Vicente, 1987).

We have defined the "critical point" as the historical moment at which, because of the effects of the communication media - in this case the radio - ethnic groups' cultural diversity is seriously threatened. Indigenous peoples have to submit to a constant bombardment of information foreign to their development needs and which become imposed upon their particular cultural foundations.

"For our part", says Roger Bastide, "we believe that only the preservation of their own cultural identities will permit ethnic groups to establish fraternal ties between them, because, in this way, each group can acquire a sense of its own dignity, which contributes uniquely to the growth of the common (cultural) wealth - a contribution which no other people can make - to the great adventure of the human species on the earth." (7)

In the programmes of the redirection of the process of social-cultural marginalisation, the radio should transform itself into a useful tool for the defence of indigenous cultures. In this sense, a pilot experiment carried out in Bolivia gives us the necessary frame of reference for the structuring of these redirection programmes.

The Centre for the Promotion of Women "Gregoria Apaza" which works with Aymaran migrant women, has started a number of productive, service, training and communication projects, using as its medium the San Gabriel radio station in the city of La Paz, Bolivia. The objectives established in the programme are presented to us by Carmen Beatriz Ruiz: "We try and make each programme, whatever its theme, achieve the following reactions among listeners: capture people's interest, provoke self-identification and reflection, guide their collective and individual actions." (8)

Access to, and the participation of, indigenous peoples in the programmes is decisive for their success, enriching the final results with their own life experience and vision of reality. In addition, the programmes maintain the frame of thinking within the terms of the strict interests and needs of the people themselves in dealing with the problem of socio-cultural marginalisation.

The projects should develop fundamentally through regional transmissions, limited to a specific area of influence. In addition, geographical proximity will facilitate contact and exchange for participation and for the content of the programme in a more direct manner, providing access to the indigenous communities.

"There are two elements which we consider fundamental bases for the experiment", continues Carmen B. Ruiz, "systematic and constant participation of the groups in the programme, and the technical training of the groups so that they can take over the programme when the moment arrives.

"We understand participation not only as the possibility of using the radio to express opinions or experiences, but as the global fact of expressing themselves, in the terms in which they live out their reality, and the terms in which

they understand and recognize it. We are involved in a kind of technical training in a way which the groups might be able to use this tool which is being forged.

“By bringing both things together we believe that we can obtain the basic objective that the groups can come to express themselves, recognise themselves as important broadcasting subjects and, furthermore, do it using the rules of the game, in such a way that the broadcasting and impact of the contents of the individual programmes being broadcast are assured.” (9)

As regards the contents of the programmes, these should be elaborated according to the cultural reality of those who work with them, emerging from their basic personality, necessities and concerns, which in each case are brought forward by the targeted groups themselves, always placing value upon the respective indigenous languages as a vehicle of communication.

The struggle for the defence of native cultures incorporated in the mass media as part of a larger plan of struggle, would help in the formation of a new activities of socio-cultural affirmation, based upon the values of indigenous peoples themselves. Because, as Rodolfo Kusch says: “It is necessary to recover a depth in America which goes further than shallow opinion and which can be converted into the foundation of our life, an America which ceases to be a stage setting, but which can be converted into the land where our life springs forth. We need such an America in order to re-assume our humanity and our solidarity, as well as to begin anew”. (10)

Notes:

1. Colombres, Adolfo, 1976: *La Colonización Cultural de la América Indígena*. Quito p.67.
2. Bastide, Roger, 1977: *Antropología Aplicada*. Buenos Aires, p.21.
3. Toffler, Alvin, 1981: *El “Shock” del Futuro*. Barcelona, p.204. (Future Shock. New York. 1971).
4. Ribeiro, Darcy, 1985: *Las Américas y la Civilización*. Buenos Aires, p.73.
5. Konig, René, 1984: *Sociología*. Buenos Aires, p.68, 69.
6. Galeano, Eduardo, 1984: *Las Venas Abiertas de América Latina*. Buenos Aires, p.413/414. (The Open Veins of Latin America. New York. 1973).
7. Cited in Magrassi, Guillermo et. al., 1982: *Cultura Civilización Desde Sudamerica*. Buenos Aires, p.121.
8. Ruiz, Carmen Beatriz, 1986: “Las Mil y Una Voces.” *IWGIA Boletín* (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs), Vol.6 nr.1&2 June 1986. Copenhagen. p.13. (The Thousand and One Voices. IWGIA Newsletter nr. 48. December 1986.)
9. *ibid* p.12.
10. Cited in the supplement to the magazine *Huiaco Lazo Americano*., 1988 SS de Jujuy, Argentina, p.4.

Australia: Interview with Peter Yu – An Aboriginal Spokesperson from the Kimberleys

This interview was made by Teresa Aparicio, in August, 1988, at the United Nations in Geneva, where Peter Yu was participating at the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations.

Peter Yu is closely associated with the Kimberley Land Council and is a Community Aboriginal Consultant. During the 1970s he was elected onto the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee and was a member of the Aboriginal Arts Board in the early 1980s. He became a member of the Aboriginal Development Commission appointed by the government to control a \$130 million budget. In his capacity as an activist for social and political change to allow aboriginal self-determination, Peter Yu has participated in international fora such as the UN Working Group for Indigenous Populations.



*Peter Yu (right) at the UN Working Group, Geneva 1985
(photo: Teresa Aparicio)*

T.A.: Where do you come from in Australia and what is your country like?

P.Y.: I'm from the Kimberley area which is in Western Australia to the far northwest. The nearest capital city is Perth, which is about 2,000 kilometres south. In my area there are about 15,000 Aboriginal people (indigenous people), and some 22 different language groups.


My people live on the coast in West Kimberley. We are what we call the Gurabulu – the seaside culture. Our stories, legends and dreamings relate to the sea; it is important to us not only for food but because it provides an identification of who we are and where we come from. About 200 kilometres inland, live the riverland people, the Gorges. They live near the Fitzroy river which is one of the fastest flowing rivers in the world – when it is running but it is dry for

most of the year. Two hundred kilometres further inland you come to the fringe of the desert. In about five hours you cross three different zones. Some of my family come from the riverland. But we count the three regions as a whole area and it is in this area that I work.

There are some great differences between the cultural groups, and also differences within the seaside culture itself. From my particular area, the coastal region of approximately 800 sq.km., we have Vadri people, Jawa, Njulnjul, Jaberjaber, Jaru, Djugun, Wayeri, Nimabor – probably about eight groups. Sometimes we have what are called high and low languages because we have dialects in some of these groups which are very very complex.

T.A.: What is the history of your people?

P.Y.: My grandmother was a Bunuba woman, and a hundred years ago we numbered about two and a half thousand people. Today we only number about two hundred. The rest were all shot and murdered in ninety years, all because one of our ancestors led an armed resistance against the police between 1894 and 1907. He was employed as a police tracker, tracking down other Aboriginal



Map showing the Kimberleys (map: Trine Thjellesen)

people who were killing the sheep and the cattle when there was a non-Aboriginal settlement in our area. He was the best tracker and he could shoot and ride a horse better than anyone. And my people were some of the fiercest. They occupied an ancient coral reef and limestone ranges, that had many crevasses, caves and gullies. The Aborigines could come down and attack the settlers and then retreat into the hills. The hills were like a fortress and the British said they couldn't penetrate it. My ancestor was the only one who knew the country and he came into conflict with his own people because he was used (as a tool) by the British to divide and rule. You know they used Aborigines from one group against other tribes.

Because our side of the range was the best river country, the settlers wanted it for cattle grazing; they wanted to break through the ranges and set up their cattle stations. But they were held up for ten years before my ancestor arrived, because he was the only one they could use to try to infiltrate his own people.

But that was a mistake because then he came into conflict with his kinship responsibilities and, being a very perceptive man, he reacted. For one of the first times in Australian history we organised a resistance. There was a battle where a lot of people were killed and he got wounded. But he also became a legend in his own time. On three occasions he was shot, but he recovered - his wife and his mother looked after him and nursed him. So we believe he was what we call a *Maman man*, a spiritual man. The police and the pastoralists, who were afraid of him, launched campaigns. They wanted to introduce into the area what they called "the Queensland system", which gave the local white station owner or manager the right to be a prosecutor, judge and jury.


Basically it was a way of justifying the hanging and the killing of Aboriginal people. It was used in Queensland and they wanted to use it in Western Australia, but there was quite a lot of pressure from the Anti-Slavery lobby in England which had just come into being. There was a lot of focus on our state because it was new and had just been given powers separate from the Colonial Office in London. The Colonial Office, because of what was happening there and the world attention on the situation, retained the protection powers for the Aborigines. The state government had to set aside one per cent of the state's gross national product for the benefit of the Aboriginal people. But that was never done. The new premier, the new head of state, did not want to have his record tarnished but his brother was a white explorer, a bad man, and he was a representative for our area, the Kimberleys. So what they did was not to grant land but to outlaw Aborigines because they were not considered human beings they were considered animals – and that is still the way it is today.

They sent special police troops that rode down the river and murdered and massacred many thousands of innocent women and children and we still know

where those places are today. We can still see charred ground were this happened. This is the sort of history that Australia has today. People know this, the whites don't want to believe it, but it is true. They have to come to terms with it. We have every reason to feel angry but we use our anger in a positive manner because that is our nature – we Aborigines are not violent people. There has been violence perpetrated against us for two hundred years but it has changed to more subtle means now. Australia is a very frustrating place to live in because it is very racist – in a very subtle way.

T.A.: What does it mean to be an indigenous person in a racist society?

P.Y.: Australians are basically culturally insecure and ignorant about the issues of indigenous people. They are stupid too because they do not want to learn. Australia still thinks it is part of Europe but it is part of Asia in a cultural sense. It is questionable whether a white culture, a national culture, has devolved in white Australia. Therefore white Australians do not have any understanding and appreciation of our culture; they do not have any culture because they are the descendants of convicts.



Fringedwellers, Broome (photo: Robert Bropho)

There are, also, many other different migrant ethnic groups who have maintained their culture and it is very much a multicultural society. These people also have to recognise that we are the indigenous people of Australia, however, they do not because many of those who come from other countries, in their eagerness to be accepted by white Australia, are quite willing to take on the ignorance of the white Australians.

There are some positive initiatives which have happened quite recently. But two or three committed individuals in a government is not enough to change the situation. The government can change the perception of the white people. The majority of the white people live on the south coast because it is cooler there. If they spent a lot of money promoting and educating the vast majority of ignorant white people, the climate in Australia could change very rapidly. The conflict is mainly through ignorance and ignorance breeds racism. There are some very hard-nosed racists but the majority of people, I would say, are ignorant and could easily become racist if they are not educated.

We say the same as the African National Congress: we do not want white people to feel guilty for what has happened but only to feel guilty if they want to perpetuate what has happened. That is equally relevant to our situation in Australia. Taking up arms is an impracticality for us. There are not the resources in a country such as ours – there's nowhere to hide any longer! Nor is it our mentality. We are not a violent people and that is why we have been slaughtered. According to our culture, we put our hand out in friendship and generosity believing that it is a reciprocal process – according to our rules it is. You can go anywhere and take something as long as you give back. That is our policy and that is why there has been no fighting.

The racism is institutionalised. I experience it every day in the police system. When I was out of work I could not get jobs because I was black. You come to my area and I will show you. We still have black and white bars: the blacks drink hot beer on one side and the whites drink cold beer on the other. The blacks are charged twice the price. What I am trying to do is buy the pub; it is up for sale! That's the only way to beat them and they will dislike it even more working for me, but if you want a job that's the only way to do it. Ninety per cent of the economy is Aboriginal money. Ninety per cent of the money goes outside the town into white pockets. We have to change the economic imbalance. I wanted to buy the pub ten years ago and I am still intending to. I get frustrated in the short term but in the long term I can wait. Perhaps I will be able to buy it within the next six months.

T.A.: Could you explain the situation of your people today, and the governmental policy towards Aboriginal affairs?

P.Y.: The problems really started when the white man landed in Australia.

But they came to a head in the 1960s. Before then most people lived close to their traditional lands on cattle stations or cattle properties. They lived in bondage and worked as slave labour where they were only paid in tobacco, some flour and maybe some clothes. But in 1964 wage work came in and the white ranchers had to pay proper wages to Aboriginal people. It was no longer profitable for them so they kicked the Aboriginal people off the stations and they moved into towns – to the fringes of towns which became quite depressed areas with a lot of social problems because they were living away from their traditional countries. They came into contact with alcohol and it is the same story that happens all over the world with indigenous people. They came in contact with the missionaries - the social discipline structure was breaking down. There were different groups living on other peoples' traditional country. There were all kinds of internal conflicts. All these problems carry on today and are still evident – the problems still exist and the main reason is because people do not have their land.

The elders in my community were very concerned about this and decided that the only way to solve this question was to get back their traditional land, reassert their authority and try to get more discipline from the young people and to educate them in our way – in our tradition – to enable them to have strength, to be able to deal with outside influences and technology. My work has mainly been to try to act as a liaison between my people and the government – to lobby the government for whatever resources we can get. Of course it is very difficult because the administration centres are a very long way away from where we are. The government bureaucracy is very ignorant, but also very racist and obstructionist and they do not understand our situation. They are not prepared to sit down and listen and talk to us so we have to develop our strategies. We believe that the only way we can truly seek self-determination is by not receiving government money but instead to maintain our autonomy and independence and make our own decisions – and that is obviously very difficult when you are under-resourced.

But the problem in Australia has been that policies have been developed by the bureaucracy with little or no understanding of Aboriginal peoples' lifestyle. We have been trying to influence the policy-makers, to try to change their way of thinking, to get them to acknowledge that we are the masters of our own destiny and we know what is best for us – not some white bureaucrat who sits in an office in the city some 2,000 miles away. So that has been basically the direction of our endeavours – to establish Aboriginal systems of administration structures and programmes so that we are in charge, not to receive money and be dictated to by government policies and programmes.

The government has created a situation where the Aboriginal people have become dependent on the welfare system. We have to begin by acknowledging this because by being dependent on the welfare system you cannot operate without

government interference. We have to put ourselves in a position where we can make decisions without interference from the government.


T.A.: You have mentioned that Aboriginal people become dependent on the welfare system, can you say more about how this dependency works?

P.Y.: In the history of Australia there have been three different phases, beginning about 100 years ago with the idea that Aboriginal people were dying out. The government, at that time, had a policy called the “smooth dying pillow” and that basically meant doing nothing and just allowing the people to die. The second phase was when they realised that we were not dying and they tried to assimilate us by making indigenous people white in their brain, denying us our language, culture, and kinship structure.

In 1967 there was a referendum which gave the Commonwealth government the authority to make laws for the benefit of Aboriginal people and recognise Aboriginal people as citizens. We were not Australian citizens until 1967 and if you wanted to become a citizen you had to apply and fill in a form. You were then given what we call a “dog ticket” and you had to be sponsored by a white person. That gave you the right to drink alcohol. My father was Chinese and was arrested in 1950 for living with my mother, for co-habiting with a native, and was fined 30 pounds. This is the only time he has been in jail. And there was a curfew. Aboriginal people had to be out of town after 6pm. in the 1950s. We were not considered human beings until 1967. So when we talk of Aboriginal development we are only talking about 21 years, a relatively short time.

The integrationist policy was ambiguous. What happened was that during the years of this policy, they took Aboriginal people and put them on settlements, government ration camps, missions and because it is a very harsh country they provided flour, some meat and tobacco. They were beginning to try to assimilate us and the desperate dependency started. It was easier to stay in the settlement and be fed than to hunt traditionally. If you didn't go to church, you didn't get your rations, etc. These kinds of things happened all over the world, I suppose.

I am not sure when unemployment benefits came in, but they were available for everyone. Development only really started in Aboriginal communities in 1972 when the Aboriginal Affairs Department was established and there started to be some affirmative action and positive discrimination for Aboriginal people. The Labor government was in and it initiated some quite radical programmes providing a lot of money but it was too soon and too quick because people were not used to it. But if it had not happened we would still be ten years behind today, worse off. That is the irony: too much too soon and too quickly. The Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, was a very progressive thinker. The way that the dependency manifested itself is that there was a high unemployment rate in Aboriginal communities though there was no unemployment at that time. So people would still go and hunt



Sandhills fringedweller camp, Broome (photo: Robert Bropho)

to subsidise their diet with traditional foods. But with the arrival of the dole, people called this “sit down money” – sit down and get money for nothing.

T.A.: What kind of economic strategies have you developed in order to break the dependency bonds with the government?

P.Y.: We receive government money for projects – not for programmes or recurrent administration. This is a new strategy to manipulate the bureaucracy itself, to play the same games, to use the same language, and try to turn it to our advantage. If we are to survive, and if we are to maintain the status quo, we have to develop new modern strategies and be able to manipulate new technology to our own advantage. It does not matter if we wear western clothes or eat western foods, but we think indigenous people have to start making decisions until a stage is reached where we are totally independent and can have an income from our own enterprises, from our own projects. Then we will not be dependent on government money. Those are our ideals. When we look at projects, they must not compromise our own integrity as indigenous peoples. The projects are just the vehicles for us to establish our autonomy and maintain our independence from the government.

T.A.: Are the projects ways to make Aboriginal communities self-reliant? How do they work in practice?

P.Y.: I've been involved with community development for about fourteen years since I left school, working in my communities in the Kimberley area. I am chairman of the Momobulungin Resource Centre which was set up together with several other community groups. We were able to get money from the government to build our own office complex, so we have a big office in the town and we added enough rooms so that we are able to rent out rooms to other Aboriginal organisations and make money that way. So we have there the Aboriginal Legal Service and the Aboriginal Law and Culture Centre, people who support many of the traditional communities in their ceremonies and activities, and we have the Aboriginal musicians' association with contemporary music. Black music is very strong in my town – rock band concerts are becoming very popular. We also have a big conference room which we hire out to government agencies and to anybody who wants to use it, and with that we provide a catering service so we make a little bit of money. We also have established a building company using rammed earth, because where we are we have very good soil for that – it is a rich soil and you mix it up with some cement, put it in a mould and use compressors to ram it together. It is a local material, very cheap and very suitable because it is cool in the hot summer – sometimes temperatures get up to about 42 degrees – and it is also very warm in the winter. To us it is logical because housing is a very big problem and the government is trying to force people to live in conventional houses which is wrong.

Our belief is that if you sit down on the ground with the communities and consult and discuss the concept of a house with them, the development should be flexible enough to provide several models. They make the decisions. So when we are building it, they may want to make some changes and they are also involved in the process. It gives them some pride to be able to work on their own dwelling and be part of it. I think that is very important instead of just providing the house and saying: “This is your house – you live here”. We take a more broad, holistic approach. You cannot isolate someone's problems by saying they drink too much alcohol, or they argue too much, or they are not very agreeable persons. You cannot do that because small problems are symptomatic of greater ones. Therefore you have to take a bigger view – that, I think, is the most essential part of community development.

Another thing is, of course, that you cannot dictate to people. Basically they know what they want, they only need the resources and sometimes, if they are not familiar with the system, they need options, so all you have to do is to provide those options and work slowly. These are the ideals on which we work.

All the communities are members of Momobulungin. The communities elect their own representatives and we meet every month. Our main task is to provide administration and accounting services to small communities and look after their

financial records. We have just computerised our system. We will be employing an accountant and when he comes he will help people to manage their money problems. This will help the people understand that there has to be some accountability and also understand that the way you use your money becomes important in the long term. At the moment we look after about a million dollars worth of community project money. We write the cheques out and record everything and every month provide a report to our members and they pay us 200 dollars a month. In that way we provide an alternative service to the government. The quality is better, too, and we are above community politics and personal politics. We do not interfere – our charter is not to dictate or to be involved in community politics.

T.A.: Can you give some examples of how community development projects are being planned and carried out?


P.Y.: We have just bought an indoor cricket centre, which is a sports centre, and it is the only one in town. It is the first time that we, as Aboriginal people, have become involved in the local economy of the town so that we can have a power base – to determine what happens in local government. We have three people now in local government and we have worked hard to get them there. That way we have direct access and they are fighting for us. The indoor cricket centre makes a profit for us and as it is the only one in town everyone has to use it. When we first bought it, there was a lot of criticism from the white racists who said they were not going to use it anymore because we owned it, but we just ignored that and promised good management. Also we don't worry about it – we just go ahead and do it, so that people can see by example that we are equally competitive and that we can hold our heads high. That is a big achievement for us.

Another thing is that we have just established our own Aboriginal publishing house and we have so far published four books. Aboriginal people have their oral history, oral tradition, so what we do is to get people to take tape-recorders and go and sit down, listen and get stories which we prepare and publish. We have an editor, a co-ordinator and a steno-secretary and they prepare the book and we get it printed in Perth or Hong Kong or somewhere, and then we distribute it. We have come to an arrangement with other big, independent distributors and we have had quite a success. We have two children's books and our first book was about bush fruits written by an Aboriginal woman in an Aboriginal language and in English. We also publish autobiographies of Aboriginal people, about what has happened in history and what has happened in their lives. We are aiming for other Aboriginal people to read them so that they can be proud. We have to educate our own people, not only the white people, so it serves a dual purpose. Our last book was a success, we made 5,000 copies which sold straight away and we are doing a reprint already.

The book is about an Aboriginal woman's experiences as a young girl in a

mission when she worked as a house-slave in the southwest of Western Australia. Not many white people know about these things. She is also a very talented writer and the way she writes is very unique. She does not write like the white people expect us to, but like the way people talk.

The next book that's coming out is about the cattle industry from the Aboriginal point of view. The Aboriginal people were running the cattle industry in Australia, they were doing everything, but this was never recognised. They were the bosses, the white man just sat in his house and did nothing. The Aboriginal people know more about the cattle business than white people. So we have these old people, traditional people, who worked on the cattle stations and they talk and we write down what they tell. It will be very strong, very powerful politically, so people will have to come to terms with it. They cannot deny that the Aboriginal people were responsible for the development of that industry and that they contributed to the development of the country. This is going towards providing the facts of history because Australian history is very deliberate in its ignorance of Aboriginal peoples' role and that continues to be an excuse for white people to suppress us further; so we have to break down that myth by providing the factual evidence. That is what we are doing.



Botswana: Ranches, Resettlement and Land Rights among the Tyua of Northern Botswana

By Robert Hitchcock

The Basarwa (Bushman, San) of Botswana include a large number of groups which range from mobile foragers to completely settled agro-pastoral and wage-earning populations. There are differences of opinion concerning the number of contemporary Basarwa, with estimates ranging from 24,500, according to anthropologist Richard Lee of the University of Toronto, to 31,000, as suggested by Phillip Tobias in 1956. Data gathered over the past decade by anthropologists and remote area development workers in Botswana have indicated that there are a larger number of Basarwa than most researchers believed. Table 1 presents data on the numbers of Basarwa that have been determined on the basis of surveys and ethnographic interview. It can be seen that the overall number is somewhat higher than believed previously.

The number of Basarwa who can be classified as "hunter-gatherers" is relatively small when compared to the total population. In 1976, Lorna Marshall pointed out that only a minority of Basarwa lived as independent hunter-gatherers even in the 1950s. In George Silberbauer's *Bushmen Survey Report*, published in 1965, it was estimated that 6,000 (25%) of a total of 24,652 Basarwa still pursued a hunting and gathering lifeway.

Some of the Kalahari Basarwa are, or were until relatively recently, mobile foragers. Social units are small and are made up of aggregates of families along with individuals who may be friends or have other kinds of ties to people in the co-residential unit. The bands are often made up of cores of siblings who are related closely to one another through kinship or marriage. Group sizes tend to be small, averaging between 25 and 30 persons, depending on the season, and they are flexible in composition. Division of labour is along the lines of age and sex. Sharing of food and goods both within and between groups is crucial to Basarwa adaptive success.

The foraging lifeway in the Kalahari is characterised not only by small group size but also by low levels of population density and by land use patterns which incorporate extensive areas. The ranges of foraging groups in the Kalahari are structured in such a way as to incorporate all the basic resources that the groups need to sustain themselves. Since resources and water points are not distributed evenly over the landscape, there are variations in the size, shape and productivity



Map of Botswana

of various ranges. A common characteristic of Basarwa groups is that they have reciprocal access to resources in different areas. Social, economic and other kinds of ties among groups living long distances from one another serve to facilitate movement from one area to another in the Kalahari.

The Tyua of the northeastern Kalahari Desert are somewhat different from the classic desert San foragers of the central and northwestern parts of Botswana such as the !Kung and the G/wi. In general they tend to be tall and dark-skinned. Sero-genetic data suggest that they are more closely related to black populations than they are to San. Nevertheless, they do speak a Khoisan language, refer to themselves as Basarwa, and have a history of hunting and gathering.

The Tyua and other groups like them such as the Danisan, Ganade and Shuakhwe, have been classified as "River Basarwa" since they occupy the better-watered portions of northern Botswana, western Zimbabwe, southern Zambia and southeastern Angola. Many of these people are dependent in part upon fishing and agriculture for their subsistence. Mobility patterns are somewhat different from other Basarwa; in general, the Tyua move only a few times each year, shifting their residences from the Nata River, where permanent water is available, to the pans north of the river during the rainy season and back again.

Tyua mobility was reduced in part because of competition with livestock-owning populations which moved into the area. In the 19th century, the chiefly family of the Bamangwato tribe kept cattle in the area. Later, the Matabele Zulu had cattle posts in the vicinity of the Nata River. In the mid-20th century the Bechuanaland Protectorate Administration allowed the Colonial (now Commonwealth) Development Corporation (CDC) to establish a large-scale ranching operation just to the west of the river. While opportunities for Basarwa herders expanded briefly, eventually, the project failed and the Basarwa had to resort to alternative means of generating income and subsistence. This was not easy because many of the areas which formerly supported foraging populations were now overgrazed.

In the 1940s and 1950s, the Protectorate Administration forcibly removed some of the Basarwa from the areas north of the river and resettled them in villages south of the river. Part of the reason for this decision was that the Administration wished to have better control over the activities of the Basarwa, some of whom were suspected of engaging in illegal activities such as poaching. The hunting issue became even more important when the Wankie National Park was declared in the area north of the Nata in what is now Zimbabwe.

But it was the land reform programme of the Botswana Government in the mid-1970s that was to have the greatest impact on the Tyua of the Nata River Region. After a series of surveys by district officials in 1975-1976, certain portions of the Kalahari were declared as commercial ranches. In these areas, in

Table 1.
Population Size and Distribution of Major Basarwa groups in Botswana

Group Name(s)	Location	Population Size
!Kung (Zū/wasi)	NW Kalahari	2,950
//Au//ei (Auen)	W & NW Kalahari	1,950
Nharo and other Ghanzi groups	W. Kalahari	7,600
G/wi, G//ana	Central Kalahari	3,600
!Xō	SW Kalahari	3,200
S. Kúa, Tshasi, E. ≠Húa	SE Kalahari	2,700
N. Kúa	E Kalahari	3,350
Tyua (/Taise, Ganade, Danisan)	NE Kalahari	6,200
Hiechware, Tati, Tuli Block, and Motloutse groups	E Botswana	3,350
River Basarwa (Bugakwe, Tannekwe, Deti, etc.)	Okavango Delta, Botletle River	2,650
Kwengo	N Botswana	950
Balala (Ngwaketse groups)	S Kalahari	1,550
Balala (Kgalagadi District groups)	SW Kalahari	650
Urban groups (e.g. Gaborone, Mochudi Maun, Molepolole, Serowe)	SE Botswana	1,150
TOTAL		41,750

Table 2.
Resident Populations of Commercial Ranching Areas in Botswana

District & Size	Area Name & Size	No. of Ranches	Population Size
Central 147,730	Lepasha (FDA) 768	12	600
	Western Sandveld (SDA) 14,022	8	5,500
	Nata Ranches 1,682	8	450
Ghanzi 117,910	Makunda (FDA) 640	10	100
	Nojane Ranches 1,699	25	1,800
Kgalagadi 106,940	Tshane/Lehututu	10	125
	Makopong	13	175
	Werda	10	140
	Middle Pits 4,564 (total)	10	130
	Bokspits (LDP I)	11	550
Kgatleng 7,960	North West	-	1,350
Kweneng 35,890	Western (FDA)	63	1,900
	North East (SDA) 6,800 (total)	59	1,350
Ngwaketse 28,470	Samane (FDA)	15	425
	2nd Allocation Area (FDA)	22	650
	CDC Group Ranches 14,400 (total)	6	350
North West 109,130	Hainaveld (FDA)	72	1,500
	SW Ngami (SDA) 5,640 (total)	-	3,800
TOTAL			20,895

Note: FDA stands for First Development Area, SDA for Second Development Area, LDP I for First Livestock Development Project area. The numbers given are in square kilometers.

dividuals and small groups could gain exclusive leasehold rights. In 1979 a set of ranches were established in the same area where the CDC operations had existed between 1949 and 1955. Additional ranches were set up in the Nata region in the early 1980s. Pressure is building to allow individuals along the Nata River itself to gain exclusive rights to blocks of land, as well. The danger is that resident populations in these areas may face dispossession.

Currently, a major problem facing the Tyua and other Basarwa is that the Botswana Government has raised a question as to whether these people have rights to land which can be recognised under either customary or common law. Whereas anthropologists have long held that the Basarwa have territories which they recognise explicitly and to which they inherit rights from preceding generations, some administrators continue to hold that Basarwa "lack a concept of land tenure". As such, they reject the idea that the Basarwa have land rights. The Litigation Consultant to the Attorney General's Chamber made a ruling in January, 1978, which suggested that "true nomad Basarwa can have no rights of any kind except rights to hunting".

If it is the case that Tyua and other Basarwa lack land rights and have to face resettlement out of commercial ranching areas, then it is likely that a number of people in rural Botswana will be affected. Table 2 presents data on the number of people living in commercial ranching areas in Botswana. Survey data indicate that most of these people are Basarwa. Thus, there is a substantial number of people who face the prospect of dispossession if it is decided not to allow people rights of access to land under commercial leasehold tenure.

Fortunately, the Botswana Government is well aware of these problems and is attempting to ensure that people from commercial ranch areas have continued access to land. Areas of land have been set aside as Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) where people will be allowed to continue to hunt and gather. Some land has also been declared as "communal service centers", places where social services will be made available and land allocated for the purpose of agricultural and pastoral production.

The question remains, however, as to what form of compensation people will receive for the loss of their traditional areas. Most people in the commercial ranch areas do not feel that cash payments are adequate. It is apparent that policy decisions still need to be made to ensure that people removed from commercial ranches in Botswana will have the means of maintaining their livelihoods.

Brazil: The Future of Amazon Indians Dammed

The indigenous peoples who live in the Xingu River Basin fear that the Altamira Hydro-electric Complex, the biggest project planned in Brazil, will devastate their lands with reservoirs which will occupy about 408,000 hectares. The tendency is to treat these indigenous regions as unoccupied space, full of resources and awaiting exploitation of its mineral wealth, which requires huge amounts of energy.

The fact is that the 2,000 km. long Xingu River, one of the main tributaries of the Amazon, is a vital source of subsistence for many rural families and indigenous people. But they have no titles to their lands and have no organisation to present their claims to the authorities. The US\$ 10.6 billion project is in the phase of viability studies and is scheduled to begin in 1990. The situation is remediable. Now is the time to make concrete interventions and the Pro-Indian Commission of Sao Paulo, a non-profit-making organisation, has started a campaign to save the lands of the indigenous peoples.

The Xingu River in Brazil is one of the main tributaries of the Amazon River. Flowing over 2,000 km. northwards, it joins the Amazon River near the mouth at Porto Moz in the state of Para. Drainage of the Xingu River Basin covers an area of 510,000 sq.km. In 1975 the Consortium of Engineers (CNEC) conducted a hydro-electric survey on behalf of the Eletronorte company (Centrais Electricas do Norte do Brazil) for the Xingu River Basin and it was completed in 1979. CNEC located 47 potential dam sites, including 23 on the Xingu River, 14 on the Iri River, 5 on the Bacaja River. The "Great Bend" of the Xingu - filled with rapids between the cities of Altamira and Belo Monte, approximately 170 km. long and with a 90 metre fall, has exceptional hydro-electric potential, perhaps unique in the world. About 75 per cent of the river's potential is concentrated in this stretch.


The Altamira Hydro-electric Complex (AHC) is being planned for that area as the first stage of the Xingu Basin project. About 60,000 indigenous people in the region fear they will be displaced when the project is scheduled to begin in 1990. The Pro-Indian Commission of Sao Paulo, which is supporting the indigenous peoples in their struggle for survival, knows full well what will happen to the people.

They cite the case of the Tukurui Dam, also in the state of Para, the construction of which brought immense and irreparable losses to the Parakana and Gaviao Indians whose lands were flooded or occupied by the construction site.

They were moved to a new area and ill-equipped to adapt themselves to a totally different environment.

In 1986, the Altamira project, the largest undertaking of its kind in Brazil, was estimated to cost US\$ 10.6 billion or 10 per cent of the Brazilian foreign debt, but some engineers whom the Pro-Indian Commission consulted considered the cost was underestimated. About 408,000 hectares of indigenous lands will be flooded by the reservoirs to be formed. The indigenous areas affected are Kararao (156,000 hectares), Paquicamba (600 hectares), Arara (106,000 hectares), Koatinemo (75,575 hectares) and Arawate (68,950 hectares).

The Altamira Hydro-electric Complex on the Great Bend of the Xingu River will comprise two hydro-electric power plants at Kararao (11,000 mw.) and Babaquara (6,000 mw.) with a capacity to generate 17,000 mw., nearly 30 per cent more energy than Itaipu, which has a capacity of 12,600 mw. Babaquara will inundate 4,120 sq.km. by the expected year of operation in 2001. That would flood not only tribal lands but part of the city of Altamira and a stretch of the Trans-Amazon Highway. The reservoir will be one of the largest in the world. The largest, Sobradinho, which is also in Brazil, has the largest artificial lake - 4,214 sq.km.



Map showing location of hydroelectric dam projects
(map: Judith Rew/NACLA)

The Pro-Indian Commission of Sao Paulo is concerned that discussion of such projects are restricted to determined sectors and exclude the larger part of Brazilian society. Despite being democratised, government projects are decided in secret and the public is informed only when the projects are already in the phase of implantation. That is the case with the controversial Calha Norte Project, a military undertaking which calls for the building of roads, hydro-electrics, implantation of economic projects and redefinition of Indian policy in the 6,500 km. frontier area between Tabatinga and Oiapoque.

The Pro-Indian Commission is of the opinion that the tendency of the government Altamira Hydro-electric Complex and other such projects is to treat the Xingu River as an enormous energy reserve; to the indigenous people it is a source of subsistence and they have a right to be consulted about any matter relating to their land including any decision to construct a hydro-electric complex.

The negative environmental consequences for the region affect Indians as much as non-Indians. Only when these issues are discussed can the Altamira Hydro-electric Complex be fully understood in the wider context of the government's energy policy.

The Altamira project is of especial interest because it is in the phase of viability studies which means it is not too late to do something. The situation is remediable and now is the time to make concrete interventions.

Banks should not be financing the project unless the indigenous people and the rest of the affected population are fully consulted and adequately looked after in the viability studies being prepared by the CNEC. Even with indemnification, according to the Pro-Indian Commission, the indigenous people will suffer irreparable losses - which shows clearly which interests the undertaking will in fact serve.

The Eletronorte company, in order to comply with the law to produce viable studies of the environmental impact and the regional population, requested universities, research centres and museums to contribute to the publication of data on the project. That however has only limited influence. What is understood is that Eletronorte undertook such studies exclusively for legal reasons and because the World Bank, from whom Brazil hopes to receive funding for the complex, requires them. The studies are not really taken into account when decisions are made.

For a meaningful discussion on the studies, citizens must have access to project proposals, but in Brazil it is extremely difficult to get this kind of material. After several months and various attempts, the Pro-Indian Commission failed to obtain these studies. The only communication they received was a vague telex from the company's president who stated that the studies were in a

preliminary stage and no decision had been made – conveying a climate of uncertainty about the project. However, engineers who have collaborated with the Pro-Indian Commission have assured the organisation that the preparation of the studies are in an advanced stage and that the studies began after a decision was made for the execution of the project.

Eletronorte claims that the energy produced would be channeled to the north-east and south of the country. Reports in the press of threats of energy rationing have lent support to those claims. Furthermore, Eletronorte declares that there is progressive exhaustion of hydro-electric resources in those two regions and that southeast would need 12 million kw. of energy and the northwest 4.9 million kw. from other regions, until 1995. An Eletronorte pamphlet states that the Altamira Complex will meet the needs of the mineral development of Amazonia.

The objectives are that the provision of infrastructure for the exploitation of minerals on an industrial scale could lead to a wider development of minerals on an industrial scale, which in turn could have detrimental effects on the indigenous peoples living in those areas.

Despite the fact that part of Altamira city will be flooded by the project, the mayor, councilors of Altamira and the local council chamber consider the project



Protest against the construction of the hydroelectric dams in indigenous territories (photo: Egon Heck/Porantim)

of enormous benefit to the city and the region. They completely ignore the regional population living along the Xingu, Iriri and Curua Rivers who have a subsistence economy and who have no titles to their land. They have not been informed about the hydro-electric project.

The direct and indirect effects of building large dams in the tropics lead to inevitable and unavoidable destruction, socially and environmentally, for the indigenous peoples. This was fully recognised at the conference on "Global Development and Environmental Crisis - Has Humankind a Future?" organised by Sahabat Alam Malaysia (Friends of the Earth, Malaysia) and the Asia-Pacific People's Environment Network (APPEN), at Penang, Malaysia, in April 1987.

The Conference passed a resolution recommending that the construction of all large-scale water projects be ended forthwith, even if these projects are as yet incomplete. To that end, the Conference called for an international campaign to halt the funding of large-scale water projects and to finance instead small-scale community based schemes, designed in full collaboration with, and under the control of, local committees.


The Pro-Indian Commission of Sao Paulo states that the present campaign will be a crucial test to evaluate the real possibility for intervention by a civil society in government policy. The Altamira Hydro-electric Complex is still in the phase of viability studies and the government still does not have the resources available to finance the undertaking. The Commission will pressure the World Bank not to finance the undertaking and will rely on the support of international environmental agencies, like the International Rivers Network, APPEN, and in particular the Environmental Defense Fund.

Source: APPEN

This article is based on a report prepared by Lucia Andrade and Leinad Ayer Oliveira Santos who are the co-ordinators of the Pro-Indian Commission of Sao Paulo in Brazil.



General map of the Indonesian Archipelago (map: Jorgen Ulrich)



Map of the Island of Timor (map: Jorgen Ulrich)

East Timor – “No Improvement in Human Rights” says Copenhagen Conference

The main conclusion of an international gathering of solidarity groups on East Timor in Copenhagen on February 11th and 12th was that, in spite of assertions to the contrary, there has been no improvement in human rights abuses on East Timor. Fifteen non-governmental organisations from Europe and Asia met at the conference which was hosted by IWGIA.

More than 200,000 Timorese have died as a result of Indonesia’s illegal invasion of East Timor in 1975 and human rights abuses continue. East Timor, once a Portuguese colony, lies about 400 kilometres north of Australia. The meeting was told that in 1988 an estimated 2000 Timorese were killed, and in November, 1988 alone, 3000 Timorese were arbitrarily arrested in Dili, the capital of East Timor. Many of these prisoners were tortured. There has been international condemnation of the continuing human rights violations in East Timor, including a strong statement by East Timor’s Bishop Belo.



Delegates at the international gathering of solidarity groups on East Timor in Copenhagen, February, 1989 (photo: Carmel Budiardjo)

Present at the conference was Abilio Araujo from the National Convergence – a broad-based, Timorese coalition working for East Timorese independence. He drew attention to the European Parliament resolution on East Timor of September, 1988, which totally “condemns the occupation of East Timor by Indonesia”.

The conference also appealed to Denmark to take a more active role in supporting the human rights of the people of East Timor.

The Conference concluded with a resolution, the main part of which is published here:

We, the solidarity groups at the above meeting agree on the following points:

We note with great satisfaction the continuing struggle of the people of East Timor for their fundamental rights and freedoms as related to us by the representative of the National Convergence of East Timor and receive with gratitude the gifts sent to us by the women of the East Timorese resistance.

Self-determination and Human Rights

1. We strongly disagree with recent suggestions that the human rights situation in East Timor has improved for the following reasons:
 - a) An estimated 2000 Timorese people were killed in East Timor during 1988.
 - b) 3000 Timorese were arrested arbitrarily in Dili during the first week of November, 1988, before the visit of Suharto to East Timor. Many of these prisoners were tortured.
 - c) East Timorese people continue to live in resettlement areas to which they were forcibly relocated.
 - d) Timorese who wish to visit relatives outside of the country have to leave members of their families hostage in East Timor.

We note the statement by Bishop Belo of East Timor on December 5th, 1988: “We oppose this barbaric system and condemn the lying propaganda, according to which human rights violations do not exist in East Timor.”

2. We emphasise that the bureaucratic changes which have been undertaken by Indonesia with respect to East Timor (“Equalisation of East Timor with other Indonesian Provinces”) does not warrant the use of the concept of “opening” in any way whatsoever. The concept of “open” is meaningless and irrelevant to the status of East Timor as an occupied colonial territory of Indonesia.

3. Considering that Indonesia has no legal right to be in East Timor, any visit to the country should be able to proceed without interference from the Indonesian authorities; considering, also, that even though Indonesia says that East Timor is “opening up” the government will not allow anyone to enter who opposes the principle of occupation; we therefore have immediate reservations about any visits which do not fulfill the following minimal conditions:

- a) Free movement throughout the whole of East Timor.
- b) Unsupervised free access to all Timorese.
- c) Visitors should be able to choose their own independent interpreters and advisors.
- d) Visitors should be able to stay in East Timor for as long as they need.
- e) No limit on the number of persons in the group.
- f) Recognition that East Timorese are under strong pressure not to speak out for fear of retaliation by the Indonesian authorities.

International Meetings

4. We consider that the occasion of the Non-Aligned Movement meetings, to be held in the Hague, Netherlands, in June 1989, will be a major opportunity to promote the cause of East Timor.
5. We will also lobby our governments on the occasion of the IGGI meeting in June.
6. We agree to continue our support and participation work at the UN Decolonisation Committee in New York, during August.

National and International Activities

7. We support the initiative of establishing the Parliamentarians for East Timor organisation and call on solidarity groups internationally to encourage recruitment of Parliamentarians.
8. We consider that the European Parliament resolution Doc. 82-143/88 (adopted September 1988) is the strongest statement in favour of East Timor in recent years and constitutes a resounding defeat for the Indonesian diplomatic offensive of 1988. Follow-up activities should include:
 - a) Supporting point 18 of the Resolution which requests the European Commission to give a progress report on the situation in East Timor within six months;
 - b) Arranging a hearing at Strasbourg on East Timor after the European elections in June 1989.

9. We welcome the principled diplomatic initiative being taken by the Portuguese authorities for the resolution of the conflict in East Timor according to Article 297 of the Portuguese Constitution which binds Portugal to 'promoting and guaranteeing the right to the independence of East Timor'. We are looking forward to the realisation of the plan for an International Conference of Parliamentarians on East Timor and hope that it will take place in Lisbon during 1989.
10. We are very impressed by the rapid rise and consolidation of the Free East Timor Japan Coalition. We commit ourselves to supporting internationally its crucial work of trying to influence Japanese government opinion on East Timor.

These resolutions were approved on February 13th in Copenhagen.

Death of Moisés do Amaral

IWGIA learnt with sadness of the sudden death, on February 22, of Moisés da Costa do Amaral, aged fifty.

Moisés do Amaral, a prominent leader of the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), and a man well known to all those concerned with East Timor, died shortly before a scheduled meeting with Portuguese Foreign Minister João de Deus Pinheiro.

Very well known in the Timorese community, his funeral was attended by hundreds of Timorese refugees. UDT Vice President Paulo Pires, delivering the oration, declared that he had "died fighting as surely as our compatriots in Timor".

Moisés do Amaral was an architect of the recently-formed United Front, or 'Convergence', between Fretilin and the right of centre UDT. In 1986, the two parties agreed to enter an alliance to pave the way for a UN-negotiated settlement on East Timor.

Moisés do Amaral's family suffered deeply following the Indonesian invasion. Of his eight brothers and sisters, five died following the invasion, as did both his father and mother. Moisés do Amaral, who was abroad in December 1975, calculated that only a few dozen survived from among his clan, which had numbered about 600. With his death, his family and East Timor have suffered another loss.

Source: CIIR, Timor Link.

The Application of International Law to East Timor

Address given to the European and Asian East Timor Support Group Meeting, Copenhagen February 1989

By Pedro Pinto Leite

When I accepted to say a few words in this meeting about the juridical aspects of the invasion and annexation of East Timor by Indonesia, I was aware of two problems: first, that most of you know the facts and their political implications much better than I, and second, that most of you don't believe in juridical arguments because you know that international disputes are almost always solved by force and not by justice.

With respect to the first problem, I shall limit this intervention to the application of international law and make only short references to the facts of the East Timor situation.

With respect to the second problem, I have to confess that I am also very sceptical about juridical solutions. But we must recognise that some developments in the last twenty years have been positive: international law is no longer the prerogative of a few strong countries (the rule on the prohibition of the use of force is an example of this). In addition, the decisions of international courts coincide less and less with the interests of developed countries (the recent condemnation of the United States in the Nicaragua case is an example of this).

Even though it is also true that international institutions are not strong enough to oblige a state to comply with the law or with a court decision, nevertheless the fact that people can argue that the law or a court decision is on their side is a very important weapon for the actual recognition of their rights. The 'Western Sahara' advisory opinion was of paramount importance for the political and material support of Polisario although it was rejected by Morocco; the condemnation of the United States was responsible for a much less aggressive American policy against Nicaragua, and perhaps for avoiding a new Grenada.

That is why I shall try to remind you that behind the political, military and human aspects of which you are aware, several juridical arguments can be used to defend the people of East Timor against Indonesia and against those who treat the annexation of East Timor as a *fait accompli*.

East Timor and the Maubere people have international law on their side. That is a well-known fact. But this consideration is not enough. Even among the jurists who fight for the rights of the Maubere people there are doubts and contradictions on very important matters. In this paper, I shall try to show you some of these.

One of the first arguments raised against an independent East Timor was that of economic non-viability. It is a false argument. Economic non-viability has never been accepted as an impediment to the implementation of the right of self-



Every December 5th, East Timorese gather outside Indonesian Embassies and Consulates to protest against the forceful annexation of their country (photo: Pacific News Bulletin)

determination. You can read that very clearly in paragraph 3 of the 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples': "Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence". International practice leads us to the same conclusion. From a study made in 1976 by Elmer Plischke on microstates, one can conclude that of the 156 states that the world then counted, 28 (more than 1/6) had a smaller population than East Timor. (Nowadays the same can be said for one in five members of the United Nations.) Of those 156 states, 25 (almost 1/6) had a smaller territory than East Timor.

Besides, East Timor has potentially rich agriculture. Metzner mentions an imbalance between man and territory in East Timor causing low production. This is due, especially, to the existence of malaria in fertile regions, the colonial administrative inefficiency and the lack of adequate agricultural technology. East Timor's coffee, for instance, is of a recognised good quality. Furthermore, everybody knows that in the Timor Sea there are thought to be large oil reserves, as OPEC (of which Indonesia is an important member) recognised in its bulletin of May 1986.

Although East Timor has not been recognised by many countries, I believe that under modern international law it was an independent state when Indonesia invaded it. The constitutivist theory of recognition is no longer accepted; what counts nowadays is the effectiveness of territorial control by the government which issues the declaration of independence. Bernard Dewit, in the paper he submitted to the Permanent People's Tribunal in 1981, reached another conclusion, although starting from the same theory of effectiveness: according to him the time between the declaration of independence, or even between September 1975 and the invasion, was too short to consider Fretilin's control of the territory as an effective control. I cannot agree. The Democratic Republic of East Timor contained all essential elements of a state, namely a permanent population, a defined territory and a government. The government's control of all the territory from September until the invasion was recognised by many independent observers, even if it only lasted three months. That was enough to create statehood. And more, the illegal Indonesian occupation that followed could not terminate it. Under international law the occupant does not displace the territorial sovereignty though the statehood itself is affected.

It was therefore a state that Indonesia invaded, occupied and annexed. With these and other deeds, many crimes were committed against the East Timor people, crimes for which the government and military leaders of Indonesia are responsible. Some of these crimes were extensively treated in many speeches in the United Nations and in works on East Timor. I shall list them very briefly: – An international crime against peace; a premeditated act of aggression against

a state and its territorial integrity; when Indonesia carried out the planned invasions of East Timor, when it occupied a part of its territory by force (and here it also committed an act of disobedience to the Security Council because this organ called upon Indonesia to withdraw without delay all their forces from the territory) and when Indonesia annexed East Timor as a province.

- An international crime against the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence, through the triple act of aggression against its territory (and, at the same time, another international wrong because of the non-compliance of obligations arising from treaties through which Indonesia seceded from the Netherlands, from the principle of respect of colonial boundaries and from unilateral declarations of Indonesia itself).
- A crime against Humanity, through the practice of physical genocide of the Maubere people (of which the destruction of its culture is, at the same time, an evidence and a complement), accompanied by systematic violation of almost all human rights.
- War crimes, through the violation in East Timor of the norms of humanitarian law.

None of the justifications given by the Indonesian authorities for their crimes is valid:

- As Professor Roger Clark has shown, the Indonesian aggression cannot be justified by 'self-defence', nor by any 'right to intervention' (be it based in 'invitation', 'security or 'humanitarian considerations').
- The crime against the right of the Maubere people to self-determination cannot be camouflaged by the 'integrasi' in which the grotesque succession of 'acts of self-determination' culminated.
- The crime of genocide cannot be denied through the manipulation of the number of deaths, nor can the deaths be attributed to other causes but the Indonesian Military violence and the resulting hunger.
- The violation of humanitarian law and of human rights, are themselves unjustifiable, and therefore only denied by Indonesia, are objects of irrefutable evidence, even if the territory was all this time closed for impartial observers.

Nevertheless Professor Clark doesn't consider the act of genocide of the Maubere people by the Indonesian army as included in the definition of criminal genocide given by the Genocide Convention. Because intention is expressly required, according to him it would be difficult to prove the intention of the

Indonesian generals to destroy the East Timorese people. Negligence or even recklessness could be proved; knowledge and a *fortiori* intention could not. I disagree. Article II of the Convention reads:

In the present convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such:

- a) Killing members of the group;
- b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

One of these acts is enough to characterise genocide. Indonesia committed them all. More than one third of the population was murdered. If we connect these facts with other acts aimed to destroy the cultural identity of the Maubere people (so-called cultural genocide) it is not so difficult to prove the intentional element.

Many of the norms that Indonesia violated are norms of *jus cogens*, rules of international law from which no derogation is permitted. It is the case of the outlawing of acts of aggression and the norms over self-determination that makes the validation of the annexation through recognition impossible. On the contrary, it implies a duty of non-recognition or through the lapse of time. It is also the case of the norms which prohibit genocide and protect some of the human rights (like the prohibition of torture). This gives rise to an obligation to all countries, and consequently to all international organisations, to support actively the people of East Timor in its struggle against the foreign occupation in order to reassume the exercise of its right to self-determination. This obligation includes:

- A clear condemnation of Indonesia for its committed crimes in East Timor;
- Moral and material support to the people of East Timor and its freedom fighters;
- The imposition of sanctions on Indonesia until its troops withdraw from East Timor (and, needless to say, an abstention of military or economic aid to Indonesia as long as the illegal occupation goes on).

All this sounds very lyrical, perhaps. But it is nothing more than the result of the application of the rules of modern international law to the facts. Intensive political fight in the international arena, accompanying the internal armed resistance, can eliminate this wrong. The same happened in Zimbabwe, the same is happening with Namibia. Curiously, until now, the biggest colonial territory waiting for the exercise of its right to self-determination is Namibia. Once independent, that honour will belong to East Timor.....

International: The World Bank in the Amazon

The role of the Multilateral Development Banks and the Campaign Aimed at Reform of Their Lending Policies

By Stephan Schwartzman and Korinna Horta

The Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are the most influential development institutions in the world. Various studies have examined the environmental and social effects of their projects. Our aim here is, through examining several concrete cases in the Brazilian Amazon, to show some of the ways these institutions exercise their influence: through financing basic infrastructure that attracts further investment and acting as an international guarantor of the credit-worthiness of developing countries. Finally, we will describe the campaign to reform MDB policies launched jointly by environmental and indigenous-rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the developed world and in developing countries. Given the United States' preponderant role in determining World Bank policies, special attention will be given to the campaign as it is taking place in the United States.

What are MDBs and how do they operate?

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, also known as the World Bank, and its three sister organisations, the regional development banks, wield more influence over the fate of the natural resource base and the environment in developing countries than do any other institutions on earth. As the largest public development lenders worldwide, the World Bank and the much smaller Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank and Inter-American Development Bank have the stated goal of arranging for the transfer of resources from the developed to the developing countries. A president and internationally recruited staff manage each bank, though final decision-making power lies in the hands of a board of governors, which is composed of finance ministers or heads of central banks of individual member countries. Because these governors have to spend most of their time on the economic policies of their home countries, their power at the banks is delegated to a board of executive directors, made up of individual representatives of major donor countries (i.e.

the large industrialised countries) and representatives of country groups (less powerful members).

Unlike the equal voting rights for member countries of other UN affiliated organisations, voting rights at the MDBs reflect each country's financial contribution to the banks. For that reason major donor countries not only appoint their own executive director, they also wield most of the real power within these multilateral institutions. At the World Bank, for example, the United States has by far the largest share of the vote – almost 20%. The other most influential members are the United Kingdom, France, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany. The combined voting shares of the world's most industrialised countries guarantee that their approval or veto of a loan determines the ultimate outcome of development schemes in much of Asia, Africa and Latin America. However, in many – if not most – cases, lending decisions taken by the World Bank reflect either the perceived needs of developed countries or those of the huge bureaucratic structure of the World Bank, rather than the development needs of the vast majority of impoverished people living in the Third World.

At present, the main concern of the governments of the developed countries is to negotiate debt management strategies for the most heavily indebted developing nations. This means that loans for the export sectors of developing



*The Carajás-São Luis railroad, Brazil, built to export minerals
(photo: Aguirre/Switkes/Amazonia/NACLA)*

countries have become a top priority. Their goal is to enable a country to earn sufficient foreign exchange to service its debt to the commercial banks in the developed nations, while largely ignoring the long-term costs of resource depletion and environmental destruction in the debtor countries. Recently the World Bank has put more emphasis on so-called “structural adjustment lending” and sector loans, both of which make lending to developing countries contingent upon economic policy reforms there. These reforms are aimed at the privatisation of the public sector and the liberalisation of trade and foreign investment opportunities. A firmer integration of developing nations into the world economy and a smoother international flow of resources are the final objectives of these policies. Over the past few years, however, the result has been to facilitate a net capital outflow from the impoverished debtor countries to the wealthy creditor nations.

As for the internal structure of the World Bank, its administrative apparatus is geared toward the handling of large-scale, capital-intensive projects. This is good news for the large corporations which supply the capital goods, it is bad news for the huge numbers of unemployed people in the labour-abundant and capital-scarce developing countries. In addition, the job of a Bank official is to move money and to do it quickly. Delays caused by considerations of environmental protection or the rights of indigenous people living in project areas will not be rewarded and may only obstruct the career path of officials. In theory, the executive directors determine whether or not a project merits financing. In practice, however, the executive directors receive appraisal reports only two weeks before the board meets to vote. Needless to say, this brief period of time does not allow careful examination of the potentially harmful and even disastrous aspects of a project. The result has been that almost never does the board disapprove a project.


In 1987 the World Bank has committed loans for over US\$ 17 billion, out of a total of more than US\$ 23 billion committed by all the MDBs. A planned capital increase for the World Bank is scheduled to increase the Bank's lending capacity to more than US\$ 20 billion in the early 1990s. Aside from paying for “economic reform”, these funds will be used for projects in environmentally sensitive areas, such as energy, transportation and rural development. However, the nominal value of these huge amounts of money hardly draws a clear picture of the Bank's real influence over the future of natural resources in developing countries. The reason is that loans granted by the World Bank generate a multiplier effect in several ways. First, project loans require borrower government contributions on the order of two to three times the amount of the loan. Second, World Bank financing sends a signal to commercial banks, private investors and bilateral aid agencies, who see World Bank participation as a seal of approval and an informal guarantee that investments will pay off. Consequently, they channel

their own investments into the same projects or project areas. Last, but not least, World Bank investments in infrastructure permit other investments made possible by the prior existence of MDB-financed infrastructure.

Two examples in Brazil

In the 1980s the World Bank has begun to fund large-scale development projects in the Brazilian Amazon Forest. A brief analysis of the Carajas Project and of the World Bank's Second Power Sector Loan (which is currently being negotiated with the Brazilian government) illustrates how these mechanisms operate.

Among today's most alarming examples of how World Bank financed infrastructures contribute to tropical deforestation and the death of indigenous societies is the **Carajas Iron Ore Project**. The infrastructure created by this project represents the core of the Brazilian Government's Grand Carajas programme. The area of Grande Carajas, in the heart of the Brazilian Amazon, stretches out for about 900,000 square kilometers; this corresponds roughly to the combined size of France and Great Britain. In what has been described as the most gigantic project in the history of mankind, the Brazilian government and its financial



*Making charcoal in igloo-like ovens to fire a pig iron plant
(photo: Stephen Ferry/NACLA)*

supporters abroad plan to use the vast hydraulic energy resources of the Amazon to exploit effectively the mineral riches of this region, mainly iron ore and bauxite, plus smaller quantities of copper ore, manganese, cassiterite, nickel and gold.

In 1982, the World Bank approved a loan of US\$ 304.5 million for an iron ore mine, a railroad and a deep-water port, which constitute the core of the vast industrialisation of the region. The loan agreement included provisions to protect the environment in the heavily forested project area, as well as a Special Project to assist the forty Indian communities with a total population of thirteen thousand – who live near the iron ore mine and along the railroad.

So far more than US\$ 4 billion have been invested in Carajas. Most of these funds were obtained through World Bank sponsored negotiations with other international and national agencies and private banks. The loan agreement between the World Bank and Brazilian Government specifies where some of the co-financing was coming from:

Nippon Carajas iron Ore Ltd.....	US\$ 250,000,000.-
Export-Import Bank of Japan	US\$ 50,000,000.-
Group of Japanese commercial banks.....	US\$ 150,000,000.-
European Coal and Steel Community	US\$ 600,000,000.-
Private bank loans	US\$ 200,000,000.-
Suppliers credits	US\$ 129,000,000.-
Loan from the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico Social	US\$ 697,000,000.-
Loan from the Agencia Especial de Financiamiento Industrial	US\$ 321,400,000.-
Loan from the Banco da Amazonia	US\$ 60,000,000.-
Cruziero-denominated subordinated convertible debentures	US\$ 250,000,000.-
Japanese bond issues	Yen 10,000,000,000.-
Loan from the West German Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau	DM 300,000,000.-

The World Bank-financed infrastructure has become the staging ground – the necessary condition – for a much larger development scheme.

Attractive fiscal and other incentives provided by the Government's Greater Carajas Project encourage massive investment in the area. An income tax holiday for a period of ten years, exemptions from import tariffs and export taxes, subsidised energy and Government guarantees of foreign and domestic credit operations are a few examples of the multiple efforts to attract industry to the



Settlers watch the forest burn (photo: Stephen Ferry/NACLA)

region. Industries producing pig iron, iron alloys and cement are being built along the Carajas railway. Two of them are already in operation and are powered exclusively by charcoal, which is produced directly from timber cut in the adjacent forests. Nine other plants have already been approved and a minimum of 13 others will be considered. It has been estimated that 15,000 square kilometers of forest will have to be cut down annually to satisfy the needs of the aluminium and other heavily-polluting plants that are supposedly bringing development to a backward region. Pressure to cut trees for cash, both on poor colonists and Indians, is likely to devastate Indian areas.

At present, a highly-centralised Interministerial Council, which oversees the whole Carajas programme, has ruled out participation in the project decision-making process by other federal institutions or by representatives of legislative or judiciary authorities or the labour sector. This is not to mention that this Council is in no way accountable to the public at large, which for generations to come will have to bear the tremendous financial cost of these decisions. Given the crisis of the world's steel sector, it is debatable that the investments made in Carajas will ever pay off or carry any benefits whatsoever for the vast majority of poor Brazilians. Meanwhile, the hidden cost of irreversible environmental des-

truction will make it all the harder to achieve a more equitable development process in Brazil. While the World Bank claims that it cannot be blamed for resource mismanagement in the Carajas region, it cannot be denied that the whole development scheme rests on the infrastructure built by the Bank.

The World Bank's Special Project to protect the Indian communities in the project area has not lived up to its promise. Less than half of the indigenous areas have been granted the legal protection necessary to guarantee the Indian communities ownership of their ancestral lands. Railways, roads and power transmission lines cross several Indian territories. The fact that Indian lands are covered by dense forest is making them the prime source of wood for charcoal to fire the area's pig iron smelters. Deforestation and pollution of the rivers will have a devastating impact on the indigenous population.

Another example of the linkages between World Bank loans and other development financing are sectoral and structural adjustment loans. The Bank approved a US\$ 500 million loan to the Brazilian power sector in June 1986. At present, the Brazilian government and the World Bank are negotiating a second US\$ 500 million loan for the Brazilian power sector and a final decision is expected to be reached this fall.

These loans in fact constitute balance of payments support - money with which the government can pay interest on its foreign debt - in a form that permits the Bank to exercise influence over whole sectors of the economy. The money is not tied to any specific project, and is paid out very quickly. These loans are directly tied to debt renegotiation. Bank approval of the second power sector loan, for example, is a condition for the release of part of a US\$ 2 billion new private bank money agreement reached this year between Brazil and its US commercial bank creditors. The first payment of US\$ 600 million in new US private bank loans, was conditioned on Brazil reaching an agreement with the IMF, which has occurred. The second payment, also of US\$ 600 million, is conditioned on approval of the US\$ 500 million power sector II loan.

There are several problems with such loans. First, the Bank is in effect temporarily bailing out private commercial banks, without directly addressing the debt crisis, or discussing long-term mechanisms for debt relief. The Bank may be able to negotiate policy changes for such loans, as it did in negotiating energy price increases and requiring the preparation of an "Environmental Master Plan" to address environmental issues in the sector. But sector loans disburse so quickly that the Bank has little leverage to ensure compliance with these conditions once the loan is paid out. More troubling still, in failing to address long-term debt relief while providing short-term bailouts, the Bank fails to deal with the most pressing economic, social and environmental problems of the decade. Insofar as the present Brazilian debt situation continues, so will massive eco-

conomic pressure to generate short-term export earnings, regardless of the social or environmental costs. The government will also lack crucial resources for social expenditures, or indeed for any investments that do not result in generating hard currency. The World Bank is uniquely positioned, as its role as the guarantor of the new bank package shows, to facilitate debt negotiation, and should use its leverage to reach real solutions, rather than bailing out commercial banks.

In addition, in approving the power sector loans to Brazil the Bank lends its seal of approval to an investment plan that includes dozens of large-scale hydroelectric dams, which inundate vast areas of tropical forest and affect thousands of Indians. While an "Environmental Master Plan" was part of the first power sector loan package, the Bank has had serious problems in seeing that its conditions are actually observed, and at the same time since the loan is tied to private bank money for interest payments on the debt, the Bank is itself under pressure to approve the second power sector loan, in order to allow the government/private bank agreement to proceed.

The Bank would be in a position to improve the environmental and indigenous peoples' situation in a long list of projects, if it would make these areas a sufficient priority and if it actually would refuse to approve loans until the problems are dealt with.

The impact of ongoing and planned power projects can hardly be overstated. The present investment plan foresees the flooding of 25 million hectares of tropical forest and will affect the lives of thousands of Indians, among them isolated groups at risk of extermination through the spreading of diseases which are newly introduced into the area. The Master Plan of the World Bank's first power sector loan put the Brazilian government's National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) in charge of defending indigenous populations in a number of specific projects. However, FUNAI's record in carrying out this task in previous and present projects can only be called scandalous. Not only has FUNAI failed to ensure adequate demarcation of Indian lands and to provide basic health services for the communities at risk of extinction from disease, FUNAI has also actively prevented the presence of qualified researchers in several Indian areas whose studies might have helped to prevent some of the tragic events befalling the Indian communities. FUNAI has become better known for its involvement in illegal logging activities on Indian lands than for any serious attempt to execute its legal mandate or its obligations under Bank loans.

The investment programme is questionable on economic as well as environmental grounds. Improvements in energy conservation and energy-efficient end-use might be able to supply much of the electricity that is now being produced at a tremendous financial as well as human and environmental cost.

The serious questions raised by the US Executive Director need urgently

to be supported by the Executive Directors of other major donor countries during the present negotiations of the Second Power Sector loan. The issue is certainly not one of undermining development efforts, but one of achieving rational development strategies which will allow a majority of people in Third World countries to improve their standard of living without sacrificing the very natural resource base on which the livelihood of future generations will depend. In the concrete case of World Bank loans to the power sector in Brazil, the issue is not one of simply cancelling these loans. What is necessary is that an effective conditionality accompanies the disbursement of funds. A thorough demarcation of Indian lands and the implementation of effective indigenous protection measures – that will have to be closely monitored – must be a pre-condition for any further international funding. Also, watershed management and afforestation in the areas surrounding new dams are essential, not only as environmental protection measures, but also to prevent siltation and sedimentation of the reservoirs, which would seriously shorten the time period during which the dams are economically viable. Long-term economic viability and ecological soundness are closely intertwined.

The campaign to reform MDB lending policies

Two extremely disturbing aspects of MDB-allocation of billions of US dollars for investments in developing nations have aroused NGOs working on environmental and social development questions in both developed and developing countries. Both aspects relate to the secrecy that shrouds decision-making at the MDBs. Neither the taxpayers who finance their country's contribution to the MDBs, nor the population for whose benefit development projects are ostensibly designed, have access to, or the right to participate in, the development planning and implementation process. While taxpayers don't know how their money is being spent, the population in project areas of developing countries has no say in determining its own future. Often the local population is seen as "obstructing development". A stark example are the hundreds of thousands of "development refugees" who had been displaced by World Bank financed dams, in India, Indonesia and Brazil. Although the Bank has elaborate guidelines for the compensation and economic rehabilitation of people displaced by Bank-funded projects, in practice these people have seen their basis for subsistence taken from them, without anything to replace it. NGOs in Third World countries with thorough knowledge of local social and ecological conditions are largely ignored by government and Bank officials.

In the first half of the 1980s, a network of environmental groups in the United States, Western Europe and Third World countries started to develop. On the

basis of information gathered at project sites, case studies on various major MDB-funded projects are being prepared and publicised in the media. The information is also used to call the attention of members of Congress in the United States and parliamentarians in Western Europe to the disastrous consequences of many internationally funded projects. The co-operation of concerned people in donor and borrower countries has made it possible to formulate demands for key reforms at the MDBs. These demands include that more environmentally trained staff be hired at the banks, increased participation of conservation and indigenous peoples' NGOs in the planning and implementation process, involvement of environmental and health ministries in loan negotiations and support for smaller scale, appropriate technology projects.

The result of ensuing pressures on the World Bank was the announcement in 1987 by World Bank President Barber Conable of sweeping environmental reforms. In a Washington Speech, Conable announced the creation of an Environment Department and environmental assessment units which would monitor Bank-financed programmes worldwide. Conable also committed the World Bank to increase its lending for environmentally beneficial projects and to collaborate more with NGOs.

More than a year later, tangible results of Conable's promises are hard to find. Although environmentally trained staff at the World Bank has increased and the Bank has published more laudable policy guidelines on subjects such as involuntary resettlement in development projects, their practical impact on concrete day-to-day project work appears to be negligible.

All this means is that the campaign to reform the World Bank - and other MDB - lending policies is only at the beginning and will have to proceed forcefully.

The Campaign in the USA

Citizens in all MDB-member nations can influence MDB-lending policies, because the Banks are responsible to their Executive Directors, who in turn represent member governments, which are accountable to the people who elect them. As a concrete example, we will describe the campaign in the US in more detail. The campaign is spear-headed by environmental and indigenous peoples' rights organisations which have a vast membership among the general population. These organisations have developed information gathering techniques in co-operation with partner organisations in developing countries, as well as the expertise to thoroughly analyse the environmental and social impact of large-scale development projects. At the same time they dedicate their energy to finding sustainable and economically viable alternatives to expensive and highly des-

tructive development programmes. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), for example, has studied the economic superiority of extraction in the Amazon - that is, the collection of rubber, Brazil nuts and other forest products, activities that do not require the destruction of trees. The results of the EDF-study have been accepted by the state government of Acre in northwestern Brazil which is presently creating the first "Extractive Reserve". The World Bank, too, has endorsed EDF's proposal as an economically sound method of improving local living conditions and contributing to overall economic growth.

EDF and other organisations disseminate the information gathered to their members and also to a wider audience through intensive work with the media. At the same time they have established a working relationship with the US Congress, especially with those committees that control US contributions to the MDBs. Environmental and indigenous peoples' rights groups have testified frequently in the US Congress to make MDB performance in developing countries a part of the public record. These hearings have led the US Congress to enact legislation which requires US Executive Directors at the MDBs to promote environmental reform and to keep Congress informed on the progress being made. While the Treasury Department is in charge of US policy toward the MDBs and appoints the US Executive Directors, the Treasury Department itself is responsible to several Congressional committees, which authorise and oversee US funding for MDBs. The concerted efforts of NGOs, Congressional Committees and the Treasury Department have had some measure of success. For example, in the case of an Inter-American Development Bank financed highway in the Brazilian Amazon state of Acre, the combined pressure, including a threat by the Treasury Department to cancel all US funding for this MDB, led to a cessation of loan disbursements until effective measures to protect the indigenous population and the environment are implemented. Also, the World Bank's stated commitment to environmental and indigenous policy reform is a direct result of NGO actions and co-operation with responsible governmental entities.

However, much remains to be done to translate the World Bank's stated intentions into reality, as the Bank's continued funding for the Carajas programme and the Brazilian power sector clearly shows. Activities carried out in the US and the US vote at the World Bank do not carry sufficient weight to lead to the deep structural changes that are needed. France, as the fifth largest contributor to the World Bank, could play a major role in the movement to reform MDB policies. The Ministries of Environment and Development in Paris could make recommendations to the World Bank and the other MDBs which could make a real difference. So far, however, French entities have been unresponsive to the environmental reform plan and the French Executive Director at the World Bank has made no statement in support of the reforms.

Increased co-operation between NGOs in Western Europe, developing nations and North America is an essential element in influencing the MDBs to live up to their commitments.

New Caledonia: Pro-Independence Leader Killed by Rivals

Jean Marie Tjibou, leader of the pro-independence Kanak Socialist Liberation Front (FLNKS), was assassinated on Thursday, May 4th by members of a minority FLNKS faction. The French Minister of Overseas Departments and Territories, Louis Le Pensec, termed the incident a "savage and cowardly assassination" aimed at "killing off peace and hope."

According to New Caledonia's National Gendarmerie, Tjibou was reportedly shot by members of the Kanak Liberation United Front (FULK), an ultra-leftist action within the FLNKS coalition. Tjibou's Deputy, Yeiwene Yeiwene, who was with the independence leader at the time of the slaying, was also killed. One assailant was reportedly killed by Tjibou's bodyguards.

The FULK turned against Tjibou last June after he signed the "Matignon Accords" with Jacques Lafleur, leader of the European-descended New Caledo-



French riot police face Kanak protesters demonstrating against the massacre of 19 militants on Ouvea island, May 1988 (photo: Pacific News Bulletin)

nians who support the archipelago's remaining part of the French Republic. The Accords – named after the French government palace where they were signed – established an institutional framework for a peace plan for the Pacific Island nation, aimed at putting an end to decades of bloody confrontations between “independentists” and “loyalists”.

The Tjibou assassination came on the eve of the first anniversary of an attack by French army troops on a FLNKS force in which 19 Kanaks (New Caledonia's indigenous people) were killed.

The Matignon Accords, which were sealed with a handshake between Lafleur and Tjibou, were viewed at the time as a major political achievement by French Prime Minister Michel Rocard, who assumed his post in May, 1988, after the Socialists recaptured the government in France's legislative elections.

The massacre on New Caledonia's northeastern island had been described by some commentators as a “last ditch attempt” by the Conservative government of Rocard's predecessor, Jacques Chirac, to create a tense situation in order to gain the support of France's ultra-rightists in the elections.

The FULK never forgave Tjibou for signing the Matignon Accords, which were ratified in a French referendum in November and call for the holding of a plebiscite among New Caledonia's resident population within 10 years to determine the status of the archipelago. The minority faction believes that the only worthy option is full independence from France and that should be secured by any means, including violence.

Source IPS

Nicaragua: Brooklyn Rivera Plans Return

On May 22nd, Brooklyn Rivera, a leader of the Nicaraguan indigenous organisation YATAMA, visited the offices of IWGIA where he explained his trip to Europe and YATAMA's current peace initiative. In the following statement, which has been edited from an interview, he outlines the conditions in Nicaragua surrounding his return from exile.

The Indian leadership of my organisation, YATAMA, has made a new peace initiative consisting of seven aspects:

1. We want the indigenous YATAMA leaders who have been in exile and have lived clandestinely to return to Nicaragua and re-enter the civilian life of the country.
2. We wish to transfer the structure and political activity of YATAMA into the life of Nicaragua.
3. We wish to establish negotiations with the government concerning the fundamental issues of land rights, autonomy and rights over natural resources.
4. We want to work for the repatriation of the 40,000 indigenous refugees who live in Honduras, Costa Rica and several other countries.
5. We want to rebuild our traditional community which has been destroyed by the Sandinist army and, more recently, devastated by hurricane Joan.
6. We want to become self-sufficient, as we were in the past, as a people.
7. We want to organise our people politically in order to implement the autonomy for the Atlantic Coast region and to participate in the political process of the country.

In order to implement these initiatives we need some material and political support from the international community. Political support is necessary for the physical security of the leaders who will be coming back to Nicaragua and for creating a political space within the country where we can re-establish our organisation. We also need political support for the freedom to mobilise, organise and develop our work with the communities in order to take care of the needs of the people – those Indians who will be coming back to Nicaragua from exile.

The material support will be necessary for the repatriation, resettlement and reconstruction of our communities and also for enabling our activities to become self-sufficient once again. For this reason we are trying to get funding from some different people in Europe: governments, international organisations, church groups, peace groups and support groups advocating the peace and reconciliation process in Nicaragua.



Brooklyn Rivera at UN Working Group (photo: Käte Meentzen)

The Situation in Nicaragua

The situation in Nicaragua is still very complex and difficult. Nevertheless the people have been making an effort to improve the conditions on the ground. Regarding the indigenous people of Nicaragua, a year ago we signed a basic accord with the government which contained the Indian demands and other important aspects of the negotiation and peace process in Eastern Nicaragua.

A few months ago there was a joint agreement among the five Central American presidents. We in YATAMA consider, in principle, that the framework of this agreement is interesting as it opens possibilities for other parties to contribute in a positive way to save the country and to advance the peace process. The Indian leadership is trying to take advantage of the new dynamic in Nicaragua such as these two agreements.

Now we are trying to implement this initiative of reconciliation. I think there is some small change taking place in Nicaragua and we must move in line with this. We are going to accept this challenge and feel the situation on the ground. Then we can improve the conditions of the people and try to reach the goals of our struggle – those goals for which we have been fighting and sacrificing ourselves over the past eight years.

The Regional Autonomy

I think that the Sandinist government itself is not convinced that this autonomy is the will of the people and that it represents the aspirations of the indigenous people. But the autonomy is all that the Sandinists can afford for now. They are not willing to recognise the legitimate demands of the people. From my position I think that the Autonomy is unacceptable, but we still have to deal with it. We have to look at it and plan how to put into practice the goals which we have been fighting for, probably based in what is there now.

We will be coming back home and we will be pushing for the implementation of the autonomy for the indigenous people in Eastern Nicaragua. We will be pushing for elections in the Atlantic Coast region. Our main interest is to create the conditions that will allow our people to participate in the regional elections and from there to create the structure and institutions of the autonomous government. There our people will be able to elect their autonomous authorities and undertake the effort to build autonomous communities and autonomous institutions in the region. This is where our reality, our interests and our culture lie.

Also we do not want to isolate ourselves from the parties which we beat in the electoral process. We want to be part of the election for the national assembly for instance, and for the election of the president. We still have to create mechanisms to participate. We do not have much infrastructure to do it but we still have the support of people in the international community and we can overcome our isolation and difficulties. Meanwhile we can create the mechanisms that we need in order to be part of the broader process of peace and democracy in Nicaragua.

The US and Central America

In the past, the policy of the Reagan administration was very counter-productive and harmful to Nicaragua. It has destroyed people, resources and infrastructure. The US has been supporting the Contras as a way to solve the problems of the country and I think they were wrong. We can see from the results that they were wrong.

At present with the new administration, I think they are now trying to change their methods and face the situation in Nicaragua. I think they are putting more emphasis on diplomatic and political approaches rather than military.

What I see now is that the US is supporting the Central American peace process which was forwarded by the five presidents of the region.

At present there is a real chance of a political settlement in the region, but it depends on the will and decision of all the parties involved in the conflict. All the Central American governments are responsible and they should contribute in a positive way to work out some kind of agreement which will lead to lasting peace in the region. At least the US is now trying to respect the will of the leaders of the region in their current peace effort regarding the particular situation of Nicaragua.

I think that the Sandinist government has a tremendous responsibility, not only to make a serious contribution and change its attitude and politics, but also to make further effort to build a consensus and national unity in the country in order to save the people of Nicaragua from the current economic collapse and devastating social crisis that we are facing.

I think there is a small chance now as there has not been much violence and military confrontation for a year. But it is not fair that the government keeps using the war as an excuse for their failures. The problem now in Nicaragua is not the civil war itself but the economic crisis. The government must now assume responsibility. Our concern is that after one year, the situation is getting increasingly worse, the people are in a desperate situation and are leaving by the hundreds because of the economic crisis.

This shows that the problem was not only the war, of course it was a factor, but there were other aspects like the economic system, the political structure, lack of freedom and the internal policy of the government.

You can see the result: thousands of Nicaraguans living outside the country and more people are trying to leave. The people in the countryside are being relocated, especially the peasants, and there is no production taking place. They are living on donations from other countries and looking for more aid. At the same time people outside who are providing aid to Nicaragua are becoming less enthusiastic because they have given lots of support to Nicaragua and don't see many results or benefits in the conditions of the people. That is to say that there is still a tremendous need for change and reform in the economic policies.

The Benefits of Return

The Sandinist government has been unilaterally trying to impose its own solution on the Atlantic Coast, but all their plans have failed because the Indians know who they are, what they want and who their leaders and organisations are.

As leaders we must be part of the people and the communities and our people are very loyal to their leadership and their organisation. The Sandinists on the one side and the Americans and the Contras on the other have been trying all this year to create and impose organisations and leaders on our people. But they failed because our people cannot be deceived.

It is clear that if YATAMA's leadership returns to the East Coast there will be a new political situation in the region and the government must deal with it whether they like it or not. I think that they are aware of this and that with the return of the leaders there will be a chance to make some progress in achieving peace and reconciliation, reconstruction and involvement for the indigenous people in the region.

Nevertheless success does not depend only on our side but we should at least give it a chance. Now we need to encourage and persuade the other side, the government, to take the situation seriously and to provide their own contribution in the effort to build a lasting peace. I would say that our people and leadership will be prepared to contribute positively to the reconciliation process. We will respect that the government will also contribute so that we can make progress and overcome all difficulties. Then we can build a new reality where Indian aspirations for justice and historical rights will be our aim while also respecting the legitimate aspiration of the national government.

Future Development

In the past we indigenous people were self-sufficient, that is to say we produced our own food and had our own means of subsistence. We never had to depend on anyone - whether the government or society. But because of the eight years of conflict and the hurricane destruction throughout the region, the situation has deteriorated. At present we depend on outside aid for food, medicine, clothing and so on, because we are not in a condition to produce our own food and meet our basic needs.

What we are proposing to do now is to try to re-establish all those indigenous people who have been displaced internally and externally, bring them back to our area and rebuild our traditional communities. At the same time we plan to re-establish our means of subsistence, to begin our agricultural activities again, to cultivate the land and plant our fruit trees. We need to start our fishing and hunting activities again in order to get food. Then we can have the food that we need for our own subsistence.

That is the first step. Then we need to plan to increase our activities in order to develop the communities according to our needs and way of life. We plan to exchange our products between communities and zones and probably, then, we will have to make a plan for a greater development. We will have to develop the people, communities, resources and the land.

We understand different ways of development, not western types of development where the land, resources and people are exploited. We have to develop in a way so that we can preserve the land and resources because they are part of our life and our unity as a people. Development should be based on harmony, on the land and the needs of the people. We are interested in how to survive as a people and also how to live as a people based on our own life, self-sufficiency and our own priorities for development.

Pakistan: An Introduction to the Baluch Question

By Maria Levent

Headlines


In the flood of news coverage about the Middle East and South Asia, Baluchistan is seldom, if ever, mentioned. Even the long war waged in the 1970s between the Pakistan government of Z.A. Bhutto and the nationalists did not attract much attention. Baluchistan has remained essentially a question mark on the map, only mentioned from time to time when it becomes strategically important. The work of Baluch leaders outside their country has remained low-key due to the essentially defensive nature of their struggle. Furthermore, as we shall see here, the diversity within Baluch territory makes a simple socio-political overview of the situation impossible.

The Baluch people inhabit a very large area comprising parts of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. (1) They number less than 6 million of which approximately sixty per cent (3 million) live in the province of Baluchistan in Pakistan and the remainder are divided between Iranian Baluchistan and the few hundred thousand nomads living in the Seistan region of Afghanistan. A few thousand Baluch are also to be found in the Merv area of USSR but the extent to which they identify as Baluch is open to question.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Baluch nationalists advocated the idea of a "Great Baluchistan" covering an area equivalent to present-day Pakistan. (2) But no leader of any major movement since the Second World War has seriously considered this. Social development, inter-ethnic exchange, submission to different historical situations, Persian domination in Iran, and Punjabi rule in Pakistan have created very different sets of conditions. Though Baluch nationalist movements have existed in Iran under Reza Shah Pahlavi as well as under the Islamic Republic and with some backing from Baghdad, the centre for the development of Baluch political and cultural identity has been situated mainly in what is now known as Pakistani Baluchistan. This article will concentrate on this last region.

Changing trends of the last decade.

With the help of several constitutional changes and martial laws, the ruling elite of Pakistan, focused around the Punjabi military and bureaucracy, has been able to maintain a strong grip on the minority groups which inhabit three quarters



Map showing the distribution of the Baluch people

of Pakistan's territory. Such a distortion in the distribution of power has led to various crises of legitimacy, culminating in 1971 with the secession of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh.

The quest for a stable institutional framework has thus been the constant, unachieved goal of Pakistan's governments. The description of Pakistan by the Lahore Resolution in March 1940 as federal, took into consideration a complex heritage of populations with diverse histories, socio-cultures, languages, economies (not to mention the awkward geographical distribution of potential constitutive parts of a future muslim state). The *de facto* outcome, however, was that the Punjabis had 90 per cent control of the armed forces and civil administration and control over an assembly with a Bengali majority. Successive military dictatorships replaced civilian regimes that had become entangled in political intrigues and feuds and which were incapable of handling the fundamental regional distortions in the "land of the pure". Yet, neither the political system enforced by General Ayub Khan to integrate all provinces into "one unit" (3) together with the so-called "basic democracy", nor the 1973 constitution that nominally restored a federal state and Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto's banner of Islamic Socialism, fulfilled the demands of the Pakhtuns, the Baluchs or the Sin-

dis for provincial autonomy or their due share of representation within the country's institutions.

It is not surprising that the ten year martial law of the shrewd General Zia Ul Haq, who reasserted Islam and Nizam I Mustafa (the ideal Islamic order of the pious Califat) as the only legitimate faith of Pakistan, has put aside the question of the federalist framework. He chose to deal with each province, combining a remarkable pragmatism with rough treatment, for example in Sind during the 1983 MRD movement (4). The formal "restoration" of the 1973 constitution in the iron mould of Islamic policy cannot be called a "resurrection" because so many amendments have been passed under martial law.

Recent rumours in Pakistan about a so-called "decentralisation plan", aimed at reorganising the four provinces into eight administrative units are viewed with suspicion by the minorities. Such a project would split Baluchistan into three units: Coastal, Kachi and Arid Zones. This plan was denounced as a ruse aimed at strengthening Punjabi representation. The authorities have denied the existence of such a plan. But the rumours are symptomatic of unease in a country with a hollow constitution. After the imposition of a non-party political system and elections in 1985, for the first time in the history of Pakistan, widespread and bloody inter-ethnic rioting erupted in a pattern similar to the Indian communal riots (5). Looking at recent developments, one can easily surmise that the implementation of rights for the minorities will be an essential topic of Pakistan politics in the years ahead. Just how this will be done remains an open question.



The Baluch (photo: M. Levent)

The province of Baluchistan is 134,000 miles square and constitutes a little over 40 per cent of the total area of Pakistan. The 3 million Baluch living there are scattered in small fertile niches between wide areas of barren land, where river inundation permits the growth of millet, barley and wheat. The Baluch keep donkeys, cattle and camels but goats and sheep are the main source of wealth. A semi-nomadic lifestyle is necessary in order to find sufficient grazing lands. In Makran, tribes concentrate around oases where they exchange milk, butter and grain for dates. Until the end of the 1970s over 70 per cent of the Baluch in the Province were nomadic. Less than five per cent of the land was cultivated and the cultivable land was situated in areas occupied mostly by non-Baluch settlers.

Among the seventeen major tribal groups in Baluchistan are the Marris, Dombkis, Mengals, Bugtis Mohammad Hosnis, Zehris, Bizenjos and Raisanis. Each tribe has a chief called a Sardar (6) whose power and responsibility varies as does the internal organisation of each tribe. In certain areas the tribes have long been in a process of disintegration. There are about 15 urban centres including pre-British centres such as Kalat and Sibi. Only Quetta, a colonial British garrison town and capital of the province, has a population over 300,000 which is divided almost equally between Baluch, Pakhtuns and Punjabis. Census counts indicate a literacy rate of five to eight per cent (possibly overestimated) compared to the national rate of 16 per cent. The per capita income in 1976 was the lowest in Pakistan with 54 US\$ per inhabitant per year. Life expectancy is close to 42 years compared with the national average of 60 years.

After partition, rural Baluchistan remained on the whole extremely deprived. Pakhtuns took control of most of the commercial life previously held by Sindi Hindus. Then the Punjabis moved in and bought some of the best arable land, for example, in the Pat area near Kalat where land was acquired by military and civil bureaucrats under Ayub Khan. Provincial administration has been predominantly Punjabi and few of the higher civil servants are Baluch. Similarly, the majority of the entrepreneurial class is non-Baluch, except for a few sectors like marble quarrying and ship-breaking. Preliminary surveys have shown that underground water as well as mineral resources are available in large quantities. But the underdeveloped infrastructure of the province makes them difficult to exploit (see below on gas, coal etc.). Uranium is also to be found in the area of Dera Ghazi Khan disputed with Punjab.

Sui gas (situated in the Bugti area), today controlled by the central government, produces 80 per cent of Pakistani gas. It is consumed outside Baluchistan, in Karachi or Punjab, and the royalties the provinces receive from it are very

low. The coal mining industry is completely controlled by non-Baluch and most of the coal is used outside Baluchistan.

The Zia decade has to a certain extent modified this overall picture. In Iran, events occurred which caused the Shah's dream for reviving the Persian empire to collapse. This deeply and irrevocably altered the situation of the Baluch. In brief there are four factors to take into account when considering the development of the Baluch struggle for recognition and rights:

1. The decisive evolution of minority politics during the ten years of martial law;
2. Government strategy, the economic development programme and social change introduced in the province;
3. Massive dislocation of the Baluchistan population; and
4. The general geo-strategic context.

Four decisive factors

1. *Minority Politics*

While the Bengalis were the front runners for national rights during the first period of the life of "two wings" Pakistan, the Baluch were always the centre of resistance to hegemonist tendencies in the Western Wing. The two long periods of war under Ayub Khan and Bhutto bear testimony to this. Baluchistan was regarded as a symbol of resistance to the Punjab by other minorities. The Baluch leadership, (traditional and tribal as well as revolutionary) miraculously escaped intact after four years of serious conflict which ended with the imposition of martial law in 1977.

There is a strong sense of suspicion of the Baluch leadership vis-à-vis policies followed by other minorities. Pakhtuns who are seen as "brothers" to the Baluch, with the mythical connotation of "aryan" blood links, have traditionally been seen as competitors for grazing land in northern Baluchistan. Today they probably outnumber the Baluch in the provincial capital as a result of the Afghan conflict which led to great numbers of Pakhtun immigrants. This in itself has increased frictions between the two peoples. The Pakhtuns are often portrayed by their uncompromising attitude of keeping their tribal integrity after the British left, and for the historical role played by leaders like Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his son Wali Khan. However, Baluch nationalists have, in contrast, had to face the alliance of a broad part of the Pakhtun elite with the military apparatus of the Pakistan state.

The Sindis are the largest minority and have strong cultural and "tribal" ties with the Baluch. However, the Baluch nationalists reproach them for their silence during the Bhutto years. Bhutto was a Sind scion and successfully manipulated Sind nationalist feelings in his province.



Tribal gathering during the Pariri Movement (photo: M. Levent)

When massive repression took place in Sind in 1983, the Baluch adopted a “wait and see” attitude. The leaders of the other nationalist minorities interpreted this to mean that the Baluch were not willing to transform their own province into a battlefield to defend the minority struggle as a whole in Pakistan. In fact, the Baluch seemed happy enough with the new status quo which gave them time to appraise their situation. Minority political considerations explain the restrained attitude of the Baluch leadership. The whole pattern of the minorities’ struggle is thus set to change, perhaps allowing a more balanced sharing of responsibilities in the future.

2. Government strategy, economic development and social change

This is probably essential for any consideration of the future. Economic deprivation has been one of the major, though indirect, elements in all previous insurgencies. The general amnesty of 1977 and the quick political development were followed by an impressive plan called the Special Development Plan (SPD), a 2 billion US\$ aid package in the aftermath of the war in Afghanistan. The plan was also backed by bilateral aid from Canada, Australia and EEC members as well as Gulf countries with the aim of modernising the province in the shortest time possible. The nature and effects of this modernisation have been highly controversial: the flood of money and abundance of projects have drastically

changed certain aspects of the province. The SPD, conceived by the United Nations and the World Bank administration and presented by Dr. Mabul Ul Haq in 1981, aimed at transforming the poverty-stricken province overnight. Roads, railways, airports, electricity and an irrigation network were designed, as well as several ambitious development projects such as a copper-mining centre in Saindak (in the northwestern Baluchistan) and coal-mining in Chagai near the Afghan border. Omara, Pasni, Gwadar and Jiwani on the coastal Makran were chosen as sites for developing port installations. The effects of implementing this plan are still difficult to evaluate. On the one hand, the population of Quetta doubled in a few years and, like other Pakistan cities, it is experiencing a miniboom. The bazaars are packed with all kinds of goods and industrial products and the streets are filled with Japanese cars. On the other hand, the remote regions seem unable to absorb the money available.

Because of a lack of adequate infrastructure many projects were open to corruption. The first surveys have since been described as over optimistic. Quetta, the more developed North and the coastal infrastructure seem to have absorbed the bulk of the money whereas in the inner areas of traditional Baluchistan marginal changes have had the effect of creating a deeper imbalance in the provincial economy.

3. Dislocation

The third factor is partially linked with the second. Economic imbalance between “urban” and tribal areas in the province has aggravated ethnic dislocation, though Baluchistan never had a homogenous population. Hindu merchants have lived side by side with the Baluch even after partition. The Brahuis, who are believed to belong to an earlier Dravidian stock (although the hypothesis seems rather controversial today), have long been assimilated into Baluch culture though they do retain some distinct characteristics. Sindis, Mohajirs and Punjabi have moved into the province and the majority have settled permanently. Out of a total of about 4 million, more than 1.5 million Pakhtuns are concentrated in the Northern region and in Quetta.


The 1970s war and subsequent deprivation has produced the reverse trend for the Baluch. In the Bhutto’ years, many Baluch migrated in search of work to the gulf states which needed manpower and to Karachi. More than 300,000 Baluch are thought to be living in the Gulf today. There are at least half a million in Karachi, mostly in slum areas, and approximately the same number scattered around inner Sind (those not to be confused with much earlier Baluch settlers who became Sindi speakers). At least 300,000 Baluch live in Punjab particularly around Dera Ghazi Khan, a historical Baluch stronghold.

This accelerated two-way process of massive Baluch migration out of Baluchistan and migration into Baluchistan has created a paradoxical situation. According to estimates the Baluch are probably a minority in their own province. The emigration of so many Baluch all over the country has reinforced the sense of identity and led them to question more sharply the present national institutions.

4. General regional considerations

The fourth factor is the rising importance of Baluchistan. There were two main reasons for the United States wanting to consolidate Pakistan and the weakest part of it, Baluchistan. Firstly the US had lost Iran as a chief ally in the gulf and, secondly, there was a termination of the East/West equilibrium that had prevailed under M. Daoud in the Republic of Afghanistan.

In 1981, Mr. J. Buckley, the then Under-secretary of State of the US, and D. MacPherson, administrator of USAID, declared during a visit to Pakistan that "aid to Baluchistan was essential for the global strength of the country". (7) Baluch nationalists were quick at pointing out the geo-strategical dimension of the SPD. One of their historic leaders, Ataulah Mengal, declared in London that "Baluchistan is already under US command. The US has bases for the use of its fleets and is in a position to determine the Pakistan government's policy in Baluchistan". (8)



A Baluch camp (photo: M. Levent)

The Rapid Deployment Force, which was soon enlarged with the creation of US Central Command, introduced the concept of "prepositioning". The complex of airports and roads designed for southern Baluchistan where civilian use was not always obvious became very suspect. For its part, the Pakistan government denied charges of any formal agreement about concession of land to the US forces' Central Command. For ten years now, there have been rumours of a base being built in Gwadar to replace the gigantic base of Shah Bahar which was lost when the Shah fled Iran. But despite suspicion and the fact that the area is closed to foreigners, no conclusive evidence has been produced. (9) However, there is no doubt about the existence of formal agreements between the Gulf Co-operation Council and the Pakistan government. Two Pakistani army divisions were based in Saudi Arabia and Pakistani pilots trained pilots from the Gulf states. Pakistan maintains a close relationship with Oman, the only country in the region to have accepted American bases. During the 1980s these three-sided relations have been consolidated: the US provides arms and loans, the Saudi and Gulf countries provide petro-dollars and Pakistan provides the technological know-how and military personnel (officers as well as soldiers). (10) Pakistani and American politicians often analyse the Baluch struggle as a cover for "the Soviet move towards warm waters". Nevertheless, a closer look reveals that there is nothing much to substantiate such "theories".

One of the most serious problems encountered by Baluch nationalists has been the continual lack of external support, even during the period of their recent history prior to 1977 when they were fighting with arms. Wars have been waged with Second World War rifles, Chinese or US arms belonging to the Pakistan army, or even nineteenth century guns. Soviet historians long ago recognised the "nationalities" of Baluchistan and Pakhtunistan (11) but their views bear no weight compared with the USSR's recognition of Pakistan as a state following the backing by Moscow of the Muslim League's demands during partition. After the 1977 amnesty, some of the Baluch guerrilla, lead by Mir Hazar Ramkani, decided to stay in Afghanistan where three camps had been installed during the war. This group was backed by their tribal leader, Sardar Khair Bux Marri, a former member of the National Awami Party (NAP) who was dismissed from government and chose to settle in Kabul. However, this "Kabul connection" was not new. Successive Afghan regimes have been obliged to give asylum to Baluch tribal refugees because of the importance of the Pakhtun issue in Afghanistan national politics and the Pakhtuns' direct and popular affiliation with Baluchistan. Despite these theories, Soviet strategists have played down the "Baluch question" and allowed the refugees to maintain a minimum subsistence level. (12)

That does not prevent the Baluch from increasingly risking implication in the struggle for controlling the region. This strategic factor is becoming a daily reality



The Baluch (photo: M. Levent)

that the Baluch people have to take into account. Looking at the different factors affecting this once remote area, the Baluch quest for rights and identity is fraught with difficulties. But these recent developments must now be put into historical perspective.

From tribes to confederacy

Baluchistan has known all the advantages as well as the inconveniences of being a *de facto* "buffer zone". Due to its position in one of the most inhospitable parts of South Asia, it was never directly occupied. However, though a deprived area, it is situated on one of the few east-west routes and the Baluch have borne the consequences of lying in the path of first the Persian and Moghul empires and then the British Raj. In the case of empire rulers, their interest in Baluchistan was essentially limited to raising an army, to ensuring free access to the Bolan pass which leads to the Iranian plateaux, to military expeditions or to commercial exchange. For their part, the numerous autonomous Baluch tribes used the opportunity to extract special revenues from the highways.

It is difficult to trace the early history of Baluch tribes as they moved from the northwest to their present location (maybe from the south of the Caspian sea) (13) a process which lasted centuries. By the fourteenth century the Baluch tribes, moving toward Makran under the pressure of Persian rulers, made an attempt to form a Baluch confederacy. It was a loose confederacy and evolved around sub-regional powers, such as the Brahui Kingdom of Kalat which occupies a central place in Baluch history, or the Makrani coastal area or the Dodai of Derajat. At that time the Baluch were not a homogenous people and there is no evidence that they had a unified social system. In their progressive move toward the southeast, the tribes incorporated different political social sub-systems. That may partially explain the rich variety of social organisations still visible in Baluchistan today. The historical process which produced Baluchistan cannot be explained by looking at only the ethnic or the linguistic identity of the people. The Brahui, who still preserve some aspects of their own language, paradoxically formed the political backbone of the Baluch from the fifteenth-sixteenth century and attempted to bring most of the Baluch tribes together in order to form a confederacy (14).

The rising Brahui confederacy, centered in Kalat in the Jhalawan range, was entangled in continual struggles with the Moghul and Persian empires. Kalat submitted to Emperor Akbar in 1595 and was argued over by the Safavid Persian dynasty (the Moghuls were ousted from Kandahar by the Safavids in 1650). The Brahui chieftom incorporated Makran by the end of the seventeenth century (1680) and finally established the first Baluch Khanate at the beginning of the eighteenth century (1714). Mir Abdullah then ruled a domain extending from the Helmand valley (Seistan) to Bander Abbas and from Dera Ismael Khan to Karachi, an area similar to that of the twentieth century ideal of "Great Baluchistan".

By the middle of the eighteenth century the Kalat Khanate was part of a

three sided relationship between the Persian and the declining Moghul empires and the young Afghan state of Ahmad Shah Abdali. In the first years of his long reign, the Khan of Kalat, Nasir Khan, sent tribute to the Afghan ruler for tactical reasons due to internal dynastic difficulties. However, he soon refused to pay tribute which resulted in the short Afghan-Baluch war. It was concluded by the treaty of Kalat (1758), which gave full sovereignty to the Khanate. During his reign, Nasir Khan helped first Ahmad Shah Abdali against the Persians (1759) and then the Moghuls against the Hindu Marathas and the Sikhs. At the same time he annexed the Dodai Confederacy of Derajat and tried to raid Scistan. After his death in 1794, the Baluch Khanate soon lost its independence.

This period ended the first more enduring attempt to forge independent institutions and political unity throughout almost all Baluchistan. The frail equilibrium which permitted the crystallisation of the Kalat state was jeopardised by internal dynastic and tribal strife and by growing pressure at the turn of the century from the British East India Company. The latter progressively overshadowed the remains of the Moghul empire and the fragments of the Maratha's confederacy.

The East India Company and the British Raj - "The Sandeman System"

Due to the remoteness of Sind and Baluchistan, the East India Company left them alone. However, missions were sent to the Talpur Amirs in the first decade of the nineteenth century. The Talpurs, a dynasty of Baluch ascendancy, had been ruling Sind since 1783 and were virtually independent from Afghan tutelage. At first the British contacts were aimed at preserving British interests in the face of French intrigue.

By the 1830s the East India Company (EIC) had almost lost its commercial purpose and had begun to act as a political agent of the British crown. (The role of the EIC ended formally after the 1857 mutiny.)

Once the British had gained the benevolent neutrality of the Sikh Kingdom of Lahore ruled by Ranjit Singh, they started a complete revision of their strategic positions in Northern India. The turmoil inside Afghanistan after the death of Ahmad Shah Abdali and the split between different Durrani offspring caused the British Governor-General to overestimate the Persian and Russian threat. This led to the pitiful adventure of the first Anglo-Afghan war. A direct consequence of the war was the rough entrance of Sind and Baluchistan into colonial history. Sind was divided between the various Talpur families and could not hold out for long against attack. Under the pretext of the Amir's "malignant neutrality" during the British defeat, Sind was bluntly annexed in 1843 (in violation of a treaty concluded in 1832 between H. Pottinger and the Amirs).

Baluchistan's ruling elite met an even more tragic fate. In order to invade Afghanistan, and supporting a rather obscure pretender - Shah Shuja - the British troops could not use the Khyber Pass without crossing the Sikh's allied Kingdom of Lahore. The Bolan Pass, "the door of Baluchistan", was the only way left for the British. As the Khan tried to oppose the crossing of his territories by British troops, Kalat was stormed and Mehrah Khan killed (1839).

The die were cast: Nasir Khan II (1830-1857), young son of the Khan, was recognised by the British in 1841 and 14 years later Kalat signed its first twenty-year treaty. British political agents were assigned to the Khan and an annual rent was paid in exchange for loyalty. By 1862 the borders between Baluchistan and Sind had been demarcated. The British Empire then started to define its frontier policy more precisely. Baluchistan's history during the nineteenth century was one of progressive integration in the British set-up of the "three-fold frontier". The imprint of the nineteenth century can still be seen in contemporary social structures. The crumbling tribal structure was perceived by the Raj as a potential weakness of its frontier and so Sir Robert Sandeman advocated a system for developing the authority of the tribal chiefs.

To control the dangerous turbulence of tribesmen "left to themselves" (15), the position of the Sardars, the traditional chiefs, was reinforced through a system of subsidies and personal relationships. Institutions like Jirgas (tribal councils) were encouraged to develop. The chiefs were offered a quick way to wealth by working on infrastructural developments, such as canal excavation. In a presence of feudal kinship bonds the Viceroy received the Khan of Kalat and the Sardars with all the trappings of honour in Delhi.

On the whole the Sandeman system seems to have been successful in meeting its aims - of keeping the tribes under control, avoiding polarisation, and bolstering a unifying pro-British front among the tribes. Maybe, rather than being the resurrection of an outdated social system, it resembled more a formal caricature of it and, moreover, did not affect all the tribes to the same extent. Most of all, it lasted for a long period and froze the social structure. A new treaty signed with Kalat in December 1876 (the treaty of Jacobabad) widely extended the 1854 arrangement.

The next year, on the brink of the second Anglo-British war (1878-1880), a Baluchistan agency was formed with headquarters in Quetta, a garrison town securing access to Afghanistan or to India.

The century ended in a precast mould: "The Kalat mission might be the father of the central Asian mission of the future. The agent will reside...chiefly in Quetta...He would have leisure for collecting information for Kandahar, Herat, Kabul, Balkh. English rupees would try conclusions with Russians rubles in the Zenana and the diwan". (16)

By 1900 "assigned districts" like Pishin and Sibi tracts (17) and the Afghan border region of Chagai and West-Sinjrani were incorporated into India as a province of British Baluchistan. Railway tracks were built and the telegraph installed. Most of the northern tribes (Bori, Zhob, Khetran) still nominally linked with Afghanistan were brought under British administration.

Accession to Independence? – the rise of nationalism

The ambiguous status of "Indian protected state" given to the Khanate of Kalat which was surrounded by territories under direct British administration and held for strategic purpose (18) maximised the empire's security. At the same time it minimised the administrative and welfare costs of British Indian territories.

The twentieth century inherited all the territorial and administrative ambiguities as well as the awkward political and social system which were the consequences of the events of nineteenth century in Baluchistan. What had been good enough for securing empire frontiers was inadequate to cope with the needs and aspirations of a people entering the "modern world". With the passing of the first decades of the twentieth century, the peoples' discontent found new forms of expression. Political unrest took various forms and there was an increase of sporadic tribal uprisings. External events, such as the First World War and the 1917 Russian revolution, also had effects on the Province. The Mengal and Marri tribes revolted against attempts by the British government to raise mercenaries in the Province. Rebel chiefs fled to the Soviet Union and formed the delegation to the famous "Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East". Soviet influence in Baluchistan, though not to be overestimated, dates from that time, and Lenin's appeal for the "right of self-determination for all oppressed nations" had already had some influence on rapidly developing nationalist tendencies.

From the end of the First World War, underground activities and propaganda were strengthened mostly around a "classical" nationalist ideology not adverse to the concept of "Great Baluchistan". "Great Baluchistan" would have encompassed the Kalat state, British administered territories and western Baluchistan.

In the 1930s an organisation known as Anjuman I Ittihad Baluchistan, (Organisation for the Unity of Baluchistan) and, a few years later, the Kalat State National Party (KNSP) started to work intermittently in the open, promoting different ideas of reform within Kalat and advocating the need for more representative institutions. The reaction of the Khanate was mixed. Even if a Khan like Mir Ahmad Yar personally sympathised with the nationalists, he had little room in which to manoeuvre. On the one hand, the Khans were dependent upon a consensus being reached on every major issue with the Sardars, on the

other, they were under the tight control of British political agents. They also had to consider the maintenance of their historical legitimacy, drawn from the ancient confederacy, as well as growing demands for the formation of democratic institutions. The leaders of the Anjuman and its offspring, the KSNP, expressed their loyalty and their spirit of continuity with the traditional democratic tribal organisation and thus indirectly threatened the autocratic feature of the Khanate as well as, more directly, the power of the Sardars, the latter having evolved from tribal toward a form of "feudal" system.

By the end of the 1930s, because the Khan needed wider legitimacy and had shown sympathy to the nationalists, he expressed his readiness to consider the formation of a constitutional government. Most of the Sardars were violently opposed to the KSNP and put pressure on the Khan to restrict nationalist activities. Leaders of the KSNP were obliged to move their headquarters into British administered territories and then shortly afterwards, when the Defense of India Act was passed at the outbreak of World War II, to go underground.

Despite the good prospects for self-rule and even complete independence after British withdrawal, the frozen social structure which was the legacy of the Sandeman system, and the factionalism it implied, together with the ambiguity of the juridical and administrative situation at the end of the war, directed Baluchistan along a gloomier path.

Left in almost complete obscurity, post-war Baluchistan is an example of how easily peoples' rights can be violated during nation building processes. Different possibilities for the future of the Kalat State and British leased territories were considered. Despite the poor state of political life in Kalat, formally a sovereign state under the Raj though linked by a treaty (frequent parallels were drawn to Nepal), the Muslim League, as well as the departing British, at first seemed ready to allow independence to Kalat and to return to it of some of the surrounding area under direct British administration.

While the British cabinet mission left the process of accession to a new status of the autonomous princely states unresolved, the memorandum of May 1946 clearly recognised the right of these states to self-determination. Eventually, in the summer of 1947, M.A. Jinnah reaffirmed the rights of the states to choose their own formula, though the case of Baluchistan was not specifically mentioned. But what followed was entirely different.

In mid August 1947 the Khan declared Kalat independent (just after the British withdrawal and the creation of Pakistan). A Kalat assembly was formed, elections were held and the nationalist forces became dominant, even though the KSNP was still officially banned. Suspicions and apprehensions were growing over Pakistan's designs during the two sessions of the Kalat assembly in September and December 1947. The three entities – Sind, North West Frontier Province

(NWFP) and Punjab decided to merge into Pakistan. Most of the assembly's members still retained their preference for full independence although they were conscious of the necessity for special agreements with Pakistan on such issues as security and foreign policy. Pakistan had already refused to return the British administrated areas to Kalat, and soon made it clear that it would only consider unconditional accession. General Akbar Khan, based in Quetta, received the order to move into Kalat and on 1st April 1948 the "juridical vacuum" constituting Baluchistan was occupied by Punjabis. The Khan was obliged to sign an agreement of accession and the nationalist leaders were jailed or exiled from Kalat.

As a form of justification in the face of blatant suppression, Pakistan advocated that a pro-Pakistan Assembly be held in Quetta in June 1947. But it did not mention that the participants had been chosen by the British authorities and that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the area of British Baluchistan. The legitimacy of this move can hardly be equated with that of a Kalat Assembly...

The Kalat Lower Assembly presented a unanimous resolution hostile to the merger with Pakistan, but the failure to change the situation must, at least partly, be attributed to the temporising attitude of the Khan and the hesitation of the majority of the Sardars (anxious and surprised at the rise of the nationalist party). Their unassertive policy gave the Muslim League enough time to consolidate itself. The Khan's last chance to reestablish legitimacy was lost. The unlawful accession and the shameful surrender of the Khan provoked the first rebellion under Pakistani rule.

Prince Abdul Karim, brother of the Khan and governor of Makran (previously annexed by Pakistan), started an armed movement in the Jhalawan area backed by some nationalist leaders and with the secret approval of the Khan. Officially the Khan was obliged to declare the Prince a rebel. Due to bad planning and the lack of expected support from Afghanistan, the Prince and his partisans were forced to surrender. The door was temporarily closed for armed rebellions and also for constitutional struggle within the new state installed by the Muslim League.


Suppression and resistance

During the forty years of the existence of Pakistan, four wars have been waged in Baluchistan. The first conflict was almost a symbolic gesture of resistance. The second started with the imposition of the "one unit" scheme by Ayub Khan and ended twenty two months later in tragedy. The third was sparked off in the main tribal areas of the Province and lasted more than five years, with sporadic

fighting. The last war was the most serious and affected virtually the whole province; from 1973-1977, 100,000 soldiers were pitted against a few thousand guerillas. In a fragile, economically deprived and thinly populated region, a total of more than twelve years of devastating conflict left deep wounds on the Baluch people.

By abolishing the "One Unit" outrage and allowing the first free elections, General Yahya Khan opened the way to a new attempt at a federal solution for Pakistan in December 1970. The aftermath of the traumatic events in Bangladesh obliged the remaining Western Wing of Pakistan to find some viable institutional accommodations if it hoped to survive. The National Awami Party and Jamat Ulema Islamin (NAP and JUI), which had won a majority in the two provinces of Baluchistan and the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) were called by Z.A. Bhutto to sign a tripartite agreement in March 1972. This called for the lifting of martial law, the drafting of a new constitution, consultations between the majority parties and the Provinces to appoint governors, and possibilities for each province to form its own government according to a parliamentary majority.

The NAP formed the largest single group in both the provinces of NWFP and Baluchistan (8 out of 20 seats). But in order to get a majority, NAP was obliged to make an alliance with the JUI representing the interests of orthodox Muslim and notabilities in certain districts of Pakhtunistan.



Baluch refugee camp in Afghanistan, early 1980s (photo: M. Levent)

The federal government appointed the veteran Baluch nationalist leader, G.B. Bizenjo, as governor of Baluchistan, A. Mengal as chief minister and K.B. Marri headed the NAP in the assembly of April 1972. A detailed history of this brief period (11 months) of NAP government has still to be written. The first attempts by the provincial government to "Baluchistanise" regional administration, as well as the pressures exerted by tribals on Punjabi landowners, antagonised the Punjabis. The provincial government began to set up a regional guard and to establish its own press. A programme aimed at upgrading Baluch culture in the province was launched. Leaders of the NAP made different declarations on foreign policy stressing attachment to a nonaligned foreign policy.

Different interpretations have been made of the abrupt decision by Z.A. Bhutto on 12th February 1973 to dismiss the provincial governments. News that Pakistan Intelligence had found Soviet sub-machine guns and ammunition ordered by Baluch leaders in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad was used as a pretext. Proof of this conspiracy was never found, not even after the arrest of NAP leaders and the Hyderabad trial, and not even later under Zia ul Haq. Far from pointing to the Baluch NAP leadership, the few pieces of evidence point in other directions. (19)

Apart from Z.A. Bhutto's hunger for power and the worries of the Pakistan national leadership about reinforcement of a NAP government in both Baluchistan and the NWFP, it seems that once again geo-strategical concerns were overwhelming. In his letter appointing G.B. Bizenjo as governor, Z.A. Bhutto warned that: "movements such as the Azad Baluchistan Movement, however nebulous, should be firmly put down and not permitted to affect our relations with foreign powers, especially friendly neighbouring countries". (20) Apparently the Shah, who was worried by the possible contamination of "his" Iranian Baluch, tried to obtain guarantees from Bizenjo visiting Teheran in 1973. However, the meeting proved inconclusive.

When the first clashes between guerrillas and army troops broke out in April 1973, Z.A. Bhutto flew to Teheran and immediately received US\$ 200 million in military aid. During the whole period of the conflict this assistance was increased step by step; Iran provided Islamabad with 30 Huey Cobra helicopters sometimes with Iranian pilots. The Baluch soon realised that both the Persian and Punjabi elites were quick in joining forces.

While accounts of some major battles, such as in Chamalang in September 1974, had reliable observers, it seems that in addition thousands of Baluch civilians were killed by bombardments and various military actions. At the peak of the war, 8,000 tribesmen (mostly from the Marri tribe) fled to Afghanistan where they were allowed to establish refugees camps. Over 6,000 prisoners were released in 1978. Numerous reports have testified that torture was common prac-

tice. (21) Nevertheless, considering the scarcity of reliable surveys, the magnitude of the devastation caused by the war will only be determined with time.

One of the first measures taken by the military junta, after taking over in July 1977, was to declare a cease-fire, to release the NAP leaders jailed in Hyderabad and to open negotiations. Several meetings were held in Islamabad in 1977-8. Although some Pakhtun leaders, such as Wali Khan, moved by their strong resentment of Bhutto, agreed to discuss with the Junta, the Baluch made it clear that they were not fighting individuals... Some Baluch did not accept the amnesty offered on the grounds that they had fought an illegal government and went to Afghanistan instead. In 1979, K.B. Marri and A. Mengal, pessimistic about a durable settlement with the Martial Law authorities, went into exile. G.B. Bizenjo threw himself in the mainstream of Pakistani politics with some success and founded the PNP. (22) He has tried to spread the idea of autonomy in other provinces as well as within the Pakistani progressive movement.

Prospects

The different wars that the Baluch have supported since independence have been of a defensive character. The conflict never extended to areas outside Baluchistan nor, moreover, to the "urban" milieu of Baluchistan which was almost always kept apart if not politically then at least militarily. The tribes were always the bases of the various insurgencies, particularly certain peoples like the Marris and the Mengals where the tribal structure was stronger. Tribal territories were defended through armed action which mostly took place in the inhospitable and arid "jabals". In the twentieth century revolts and insurgencies took place every time the central authorities tried to penetrate the mountains in order to build roads of strategic importance, or to "modernise" and disarm the "tribals". To a Baluch tribesman, arms are seen as a guarantee of freedom, and therefore attempts by the various governments to take away what they perceived as a "natural" right were interpreted as an assault on their personal dignity or "ryvaj" (traditional code of honour).

Despite the above mentioned dislocation due to economic pressure and the wars, the tribal system remains the core of Baluch society, its backbone as well as its ultimate identity. The essentially unchanged mythical ethos of the tribes explains the ability of the tribal leaders to sustain long periods of fighting without any external assistance. This itself explains the limitations of the conflicts and also questions two of the common explanations given by the Punjabi ruling elite of Pakistan for the problems or conflicts: 1. troubles are just the result of "reactionary Sardars" manipulating emotions to maintain archaic structures;

2. troubles are fermented by “foreign agents”, be they Soviets or Indians, seeking to dismember the country.

Such deceptively simplistic arguments received abundant coverage in the Pakistani press and ironically led the civilian government of Z.A. Bhutto to embark on a war only two years after the end of the Bangladesh tragedy. The “progressive” anti-Sardars aspect of Z.A. Bhutto’s politics could not hold for long. (23) The abolishing of the Sardar institutions, widely publicised in April 1976, concerned the juridical aspect of Sardar privileges. Furthermore, the same measures had already been taken under the NAP government in 1972. The abolition was merely a propaganda move of Z.A. Bhutto to isolate the Baluch movement from other forms of democratic aspirations in Pakistan. It was nevertheless unsuccessful in hiding the fact that, of a hundred Baluch Sardars, most collaborated with different civilian and military central governments and only very few of them – like A. Mengal or K.B. Marri – were consistently on the side of the Baluch movement, in the course of which they had long since abandoned their “formal” Sardari.

The second argument can be repudiated even more easily. Not only did the Baluch fight the war with weapons captured from the army, but no evidence of substantial external aid was found. Refuge granted by Afghanistan, was no more than maintaining traditional Pakhtun-Baluch links of solidarity/rivalry. The suc-



Baluch refugee camp in Afghanistan, early 1980s (photo: M. Levent)

cessive governments in Kabul (except maybe under the short interim of Afizullah Amin who favoured a Pan-Pakhtun policy antagonising Soviet advisors) have shown little desire to back the Baluch movement. The Soviets, for their part, have been even less enthusiastic about playing their “Baluch card” and seemed just as ready to keep the movement at a subsistence level. Far from wanting to “dismember” Pakistan, the Kremlin is aware that pro-Western Pakistan acts as a buffer necessary to maintain Moscow’s leverage on Indian foreign policy.

Today no serious analysts would contest the state of cultural and social deprivation in which the Baluch have been left since their forced integration into Pakistan. But many of them question the effect of recent economic developments of the Province, the progressive breaking down of archaic structures and finally the potential viability of the Baluch Nation as a separate entity. They also underline the division of the Baluch leadership.

Looking at the Baluch today we can say that by trying to mould the Baluch movement in fixed categories, most of the observers have missed essential points. Describing the beloved Sardar of the Marri tribes as a Marxist-Leninist, Sardar Ataullah Mengal as a nationalist hard liner, and G.B. Bizenjo as a skillful politician, provides a distorted view. The same can be said of different Baluch organisations like BSO and BPLF and the recently created SBPLF (24). Such descriptions do not take account of the reality but only of empty schemes. When Baluch politics are denounced as tribal politics (the latter having negative connotations), the Baluch leadership reminds us that Pakistan politics (when allowed to function normally by the military apparatus) are essentially “clientelist” politics, a degraded form of “tribal politics”. In fact, the Baluch leaders have proved their ability to see tribal politics as a function of the struggle for minority rights. These leaders are well aware that ethnocide is common in South Asia and that any offensive move may threaten the very existence of the Baluch people.

In this light, diversification and decentralisation of the Baluch leadership can be seen, not as a sign of weakness, but as an effort to maintain a maximum bargaining position in order to safeguard the development of the movement. In addition to this, it enables the maturation of the process bringing together other minorities and yet preserving an organic unity of the Baluch social formation, essential for the successful continuation of Baluch identity.

The very existence of this movement antagonises not only the Pakistan state, at least in its present form, but the whole strategic context of the region. In such circumstances any unilateral or offensive move on the part of the Baluch would be nothing short of suicidal.

Concerning the viability of a Baluch Nation State, at present such a state is impractical and no more than a scholarly exercise. What is more concrete and at stake, is the development of Baluch culture and people in an hostile environ-

ment. When the Punjabi intelligentsia, conservative or progressive, arrogantly ridicule the Baluch, the leaders remark that nobody questions the viability or historical legitimacy of the neighbouring entities of United Arab Emirates, Bahrain or Qatar.

They argue that Baluchistan, with its vast coastline, mineral wealth and low population, could prove as viable as the isolated and landlocked Pakistani Punjab. An alliance with an urbanised and agriculturally developed Sind would certainly reinforce those possibilities. (25) However abstract and debatable these arguments may look today, the Baluch leaders insist that they cannot be swept away by today's tenant of yesterday's even more abstract concept of Pakistan. (26)

On a more concrete note, the severe constraints and rapid changes imposed upon Baluch society will have a deep effect on the Baluch movement in the near future. With half a million Baluch living in the slums of Karachi side by side with other communities, and with almost half of the population (including the most important manpower) forming a "diaspora", the condition of the Baluch struggle for national rights is certainly bound to change in the coming years.

But history has shown that such a process has little chance of bringing the "dilution" which the Punjabi "modernists" expect. On the contrary, it could accelerate the formation of a more radical and less "society-oriented" form of resistance as observed in other regions of the subcontinent. Similarly, the consequences of the Special Development Plan on Baluch society are not easy to predict. The first result of the Quetta miniboom could well be an accentuated polarisation between non-Baluch settlers and the backward areas left with a decaying subsistence economy. One of the worst possible scenarios would be, in the absence of any realistic alternative to the present set-up, the progressive entry of the Baluch "diaspora" in communal-ethnic politics; such possibilities have been developing in other communities of Pakistan. This cannot be totally excluded for the future. Over the last decades the Baluch have shown their skill at organising the survival of their aspirations. They are going to encounter many more complex tasks.

There is little concern for the harmonious development of minorities by Iran, with its war economy, and Pakistan, with its over-inflated military budget and possible entry in a nuclear arms race with India. Religious dogmatism is trying to impose itself upon the Baluch for whom, up until now, cultural values have superseded religious bigotry, even though the majority of Sunni Muslims (27) have little care for the martial kind of Islam promoted in Pakistan.

The ability of the historical leadership and of new generations of Baluch to grapple with these questions will be decisive in the development of rights and

social aspirations of the indigenous people in a part of the world sinking progressively into militarism and increased religious communal feuds.

Notes

1. Estimates of population vary considerably, overestimated by some of the nationalists or underestimated by official figures. If the Iranian, Pakistani, Afghani Baluch and Baluch are counted, five million seems a reasonable figure. Some estimates consider figures of ten or fifteen million. See Sardar Khan, *History of the Baluch Race and Baluchistan*, 1977 Quetta.
2. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan: 310403 sq. miles.
3. Conceived by General Ayub Khan, the "One Unit" scheme which integrated the old provinces of West Pakistan was used to secure domination over the East Wing. Formulated in 1954, the one unit was dissolved and the provinces restored in November 1969.
4. The Sindi nationalist movement was in the forefront of the MRD (Movement for Restoration of Democracy). The repression was extremely brutal with thousands of arrests and hundreds of dead and wounded.
5. 'Ethnic conflict in South Asia' by Asghar Ali Engineer, *Economic and Political Weekly* March 28 1987.
"Samme grund til den blodige vold i Indien, Pakistan og Sri Lanka" by A. Dastarac and M. Levent. *Information* Juni 6 1987.
6. Sardar: term of possible Persian origin meaning "chief" or "commander". It was used in British India army to distinguish the Indian officers.
7. See *Pakistan Times* September 1981. On the SPD see also 'Pakistan - Le verrouillage' by A. Dastarac and M. Levent in *Le Monde Diplomatique* August 1984.
8. See "Baluchistan" cover story: Ataulah Mengal interview *The Herald* Karachi, July 1986.
9. See 'Gwadar: A beautiful place for a military base' by R. Tempest. *Herald Tribune* December 8, 1985.
10. On G.C.C. See 'Le golfe sous surveillance' by A. Dastarac and M. Levent *Le Monde Diplomatique* July 1985.
'Strange war in the Gulf' in *MLRIP* no. 125-126, July-September 1984.
'Washington renforce son dispositif militaire dans le golfe and L' ocean Indien' by Lawrence Lifschultz in *Le Monde Diplomatique* February 1987.
11. *The peoples of Pakistan* by Yuri V. Gankovsky. N.P.H. 1971 Moscow.

12. See *Afghanistan, Pashtunistan/Beluchistan* by Inayatullah Baloch, (Zeitschrift für internationale Fragen) 3rd quartal 1980, Hamburg. See also 'Le Pakistan, fragile Bastion de la strategie occidentale' in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, March 1981.
13. See *Enzyklopaedie das Islam* Leiden-Leipzig, 1913.
14. On language origin, see J.H. Elfenbein, 'Baluchi' *Encyclopedia of Islam* Leiden-Leipzig, 1960.
15. 'Baluchistan 1867-1877: Sind and Punjab British officers differences' by Sahib Khan Chano, *Sind Quarterly* Vol XI 1983 no.4.
16. Salisbury to Lytton, 22/08/1876 in *Cambridge History of India*, Vol VI 1960.
17. In 1887 "assigned districts" were incorporated into British India after the treaty of Gandammak. In 1879 the Crown assumed already direct administration of Sibi and Pishin. In 1890 Bori, Zhob, Khetran (nominally linked to Afghanistan) were integrated into Baluchistan and in 1896 Chagai and West Ainjrani.
18. In 1893, the question of the Afghan frontier had been settled. The Mortimer Durand line was accepted by Abdur Rahman, in return for subsidies. Quetta railways were to be extended to Nuski in order to protect the border.
19. See 'Balouchistan. Vers un nouveau Bengladesh?' by Jean Pierre Viennot, *Le Monde Diplomatique* October 1973; and Selig S. Harrison *In Afghanistan's Shadows* 1981 pp 34-35.
20. See 'White paper on Baluchistan', (Islamabad, *Government of Pakistan*) 1974.
21. Among the few accounts of the war see: 'Pakistan's civil war' *Manchester Guardian* January 24, 1975; 'Balouchistan, la guerre oubliée' by A. Dastarac and R. Dersen in *Le Monde Diplomatique* August 1976.
22. On the Pakistan National Party see: 'What P.N.P. stands for', *View Point*, Lahore, August 19th 1979; 'A National Party is born', *View Point*, June 10th, 1979.
23. On the Sardari System see the response given to Bhutto's reforms by the BPLF in *The war in Baluchistan-strategy for liberation*, Paris 1976.
24. Concerning the SBPLF see: *Manifesto for a confederal solution* issued by the Sindh Baluch Pushton Front, London 1987. The Baluch Student Organisation (BSO) was first formed in 1967 to struggle against the "One Unit". Despite splits between different tendencies it has remained as a whole the major organised nationalist movement in Pakistan. The Baluch People's Liberation Front (BPLF) was formed during the 1973-7 war. The leader was Mir Hazar Ramkhani, a member of the Marri tribe, maintaining strong links with Khair Bux Marri. The movement has some Marxist influence and

original elements such as the emphasis given to positive side of nomadic society.

25. For a discussion on independent Baluchistan viability see *In Afghanistan's Shadows* by Selig S. Harrison pp. 168-175.
26. The concept of Pakistan was formulated by Choudhri Rahmat Ali at Cambridge where he inspired a group of young Muslims. The idea of a separated Muslim entity had been earlier developed by Sir Muhammad Iqbal.
27. The wide majority of Baluch are Sunni-Muslims (Hanafi rite). Nevertheless, members of a heterodox sect called Zikris can be found on the Makran coastland and in Karachi. They are estimated to number up to 500,000.

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Paraguay: Denunciation of Ecocide in the Pai Tavytera Village of Takuaguy-Oygue

The Pai Tavytera, indigenous Guarani, are the autochthonous inhabitants of vast areas of the Departments of Amambay, Canendiyu, and part of Concepción, in Paraguay. They also live in the neighbouring state of Mato Grosso in Brazil.


At the end of the 1950s their territory was approximately 20,000 sq.km. and they numbered 83 communities but today there are only 33. Some people have fled to Brazil while others have been forcibly incorporated into other communities. In 1988, these 33 communities, numbering some 7,000 persons, occupied an area of 36,077 hectares of land. Sixteen communities, in fact, have an average of 11.3 hectares per family, and there is an increase in smallholdings. This means that these Guarani have lost no more than 98 per cent of their land in 20 years.

Since the middle of the 1960s, all the territory of the Guarani has been the object of a systematic deforestation. The only forestry reserves available along the frontier region with Brazil are found in the Guarani communities themselves. All kinds of means are being used to get at the wood, ranging from bribery and corruption to the distribution of alcoholic drinks to indigenous leaders. What is most alarming is the alliance between the traders, the regional authorities and even the government authorities. The participation of the employees of INDI (the Paraguayan government's National Indian Department) in the wood trade, and the efforts directed at corrupting the indigenous people for this end, is common knowledge and makes a mockery of the efforts of the indigenous people and indigenist institutions to put a stop to the deforestation of the communities.

The Community of Takuaguy-Oygue

Takuaguy-oygue is a village (*tekoha*) situated some 35 km. to the north of Pedro Juan Caballero and an area of 666 hectares was measured and mapped in 1985 by the Institute of Rural Welfare. The title papers are in the hands of INDI at present. Until August, 1988, thirty-four indigenous families, some 150 persons, lived in this village. This community had the only forestry reserve in the zone and it constituted one of the few natural forests that remain in Amambay.

On the morning of the 18th of August, 1988, a group of eight armed men under the command of a military person entered the village saying they were going to occupy the area and erected a camp in the forest.



A Pai Tavytera family (photo: DIM)

The indigenous families immediately informed their own authorities about this act and asked for the expulsion of the soldiers. At midday on the 20th of August, the indigenous leaders witnessed the felling of the first six trees.

The families began to express their disgust for the military occupation and the tree felling. They took photos which the military leader confiscated. When the indigenous people asked under whose orders he was acting, he responded authoritatively, "We are the military and we have orders not to let anyone enter".

On the morning of the 22nd of August the indigenous people again informed the regional and national authorities.

A Government Delegation and judicial functionaries went to the area to confirm the facts. Nevertheless, uniformed soldiers, armed with submachine guns and posted on the road leading to the community, forcibly barred their entry. The authorities turned back to Pedro Juan Caballero. The same happened to Sergeant Antonio Rodriguez sent by INDI.

About the 25th of August, the first logging teams entered the community area and five lorries moved trunks of wood twice a day to Pedro Juan Caballero

Lucio Romero, the leader of the Pai Tavytera village, was summoned by the military and warned that no indigenous person could leave the community. The entrances and exits to the village were blocked.

By crossing the River Aquidaban, the Pai Tavytera avoided the guards and made their way to Asunción. There they met Colonel Anibal Carrillo, the private secretary of the president of the Council of INDI. They recounted what had happened and he told them not to worry and that the problem would be solved. Nevertheless, on their return to the village, they testified that the number of lorries had increased.: "Two days after our return a lorry with personnel, about 60 labourers, six motorsaws and some 20 lorries arrived...the military personnel occupied a small wooden house belonging to Señor Duque, a rancher who lived next to the community. They changed uniforms and leader; someone called Villalba assumed charge and they called themselves security police".

In view of these events, 20 indigenous leaders went to Asunción. They were received by the Minister of Defense who said he could do nothing because the indigenous people did not have any land title. The leaders wrote a denunciation to the Chief Commander of the Armed Forces concerning what had happened in the village and presented themselves at the Court on two occasions but were not received. From there they went to the National Parliament and had a meeting the National Member of Parliament, Bonifacio Irala Amarilla, from whom they had the following reply: "My dear children, go home and don't worry, the problem will be sorted out, I cannot say today or even tomorrow but within a maximum of five days". This all took place between the 12th and 14th of September. The representatives returned to Amambay.

On the 20th of September almost all the leaders of the Pai Tavytera met in a village. "We agree at this point that it is either us or the end of the world and we decide this in the face of the indifference of the authorities that we will expel the invaders from our lands."

On the 3rd of October, some 70 indigenous people, armed with bows and arrows entered Takuaguy-oygue. Two soldiers posted on the path leading to the village fled headlong to the wooden house and hid there. The indigenous people surrounded the house. Sergeant Villalba came out, pistol in hand. On seeing himself targeted on all sides by bows and arrows, he sought refuge again in the house and tightly barred it. The workers fled into the forest. A soldier called Lendro Cantero fired four, five, six shots at the indigenous people. "None of them hit because we are protected by Pai Kuara (the primeval hero) and Karavie Guazu (the guardian of the Jasuka, primeval matter). In seeing our immunity they immediately fled." The indigenous people warned those inside the house that if they had not left by the next morning they might burn the house down.

In the night sergeant Villalba and his companions hurriedly abandoned the house and made for Pedro Juan Caballero. They left behind them in the house a war arsenal: two boxes full of bullets, six rifles, four automatic pistols and a bag full of clubs.

On the next day, the 4th of October, employees of the Ministry of Justice and the Governmental Delegation arrived in the village. They fraternised with the indigenous people and took charge of all the booty including the tractors and machinery. The 70 indigenous leaders returned to their respective communities.

Six days later, on the 10th of October, Villalba, accompanied by military personnel, entered the village again. Immediately they took seven indigenous people whom they tied together. After that they went to the house of the village leader, Lucio Romero, and told his wife at gunpoint that if they found him they would kill him. Then the soldiers left the house.

That very day indigenous families began to flee in terror. Some fled to Brazil and others took refuge with the other Pai villages on the Paraguayan side. The village was left empty except for those detained by force.

By the end of October the community was also devoid of trees. It is estimated that at least, three hundred and twenty four million Guaranies worth of wood was looted in two months and that it will take some 500 years for the regeneration of the forest which, until only a few weeks previously, the indigenous families of the village of Takuaguy-oygue possessed and administered.

The military detachment which occupied the Pai Tavytera village is to be found under the command of Colonel Lino Oviedo.

By the Commission for Solidarity with Indigenous Peoples: Line Bareiro and Guillermo Sequera.

For the Centre of Anthropological Studies of the Catholic University (CEADUC): Adriano Irala Burgo (President) and Miguel Chase-Sardi (Coordinator).

Philippines: War Reaches the Mangyan of Mindoro


By Danilo Geiger and Heike Blum

Nearly two and a half years after the take-over by President Corazon Aquino, the main promises she made of profound democratisation of society and the resolution of social and economic problems, remain unfulfilled. In response to the New People's Army (NPA), the Aquino government has carried out massive military actions rather than seeing the steady growth of the guerilla movement as a result of basic structural problems, problems which could be counted by sweeping socio-economic changes such as genuine agrarian reform which are long-awaited by masses of landless farmers. Aquino's election campaign, promising to seek a peaceful solution to the insurgency problem, exhausted itself in an early attempt at a ceasefire with the National Democratic Front (NDF), the umbrella organisation of the underground movement. The nation's first taste of peace came to an abrupt end after the NDF negotiators withdrew, protesting against the massacre of unarmed peasants seeking the implementation of land reform at Mediola, on the 22nd January 1987. Only three days after the formal ending of the ceasefire agreement, the President announced a policy of total war against the insurgency movement which has since been determining the political climate in the country.

A hysterical and aggressive anti-communism campaign has been launched giving the military full power to proceed against every person and organisation trying to assert people's basic rights. The results are increased human rights violations against innocent civilians. It is widely agreed that this policy of "all-out-war" has made the Aquino regime a worse violator of human rights than its predecessor. While the rural peasants have to bear the brunt of the unleashed military terror, indigenous areas are increasingly targeted by the military on the grounds that they are infiltrated by rebel forces.

The Mangyan, indigenous inhabitants of the mountainous interiors of Mindoro, have become victims of military counter-insurgency. This is a tragedy of a special sort. Not only are they known to be among the few societies that have never waged war, but they are fundamentally opposed to violence and aggressive behaviour or attitudes. However, the government's "Dirty War" has now also reached their remote settlements. Facing a fast-growing local insurgency, this once quiet island has now been given some sort of priority by the military of the Southern Tagalog Region. A plan has been designed to crush the insurgency in its initial stages. Two battalions of troops (800 troopers) stationed in Mindoro

in Marcos' times have now been increased to five battalions (2,000 troopers) backed by helicopter gunships and heavy armour.



Nilapso refugee camp (photo: Danilo Geiger)

Late 1987 saw the beginning of a series of comprehensive military operations that have since affected Mangyan communities all over the island. A total of four Mangyan settlements and their immediate surroundings within the so-called ROMANBUL area (Roxas-Mansalay-Bulalacao, three towns in Oriental Mindoro, whose hinterlands are inhabited by the Buhid and Hanunoo Mangyan) were hit by massive bombings during the period of December 30th to March 3rd, 1988. This was mainly in retaliation for a spectacular NPA-raid on Police Head-quarters in Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, in mid-December, and to demonstrate unchallenged military control. However, in all of the incidents, no casualties were reported as the villagers managed to escape before they took place.


Had it not been for the warnings by their influential leaders, the villagers of Kiraring and Kyanaw, Municipality of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, would still have been at home on March the first and second when at least 60 soldiers of the 271st PC Company, backed by four helicopter gunships, attacked these villages. Apart from strafing, twenty five rockets were fired which destroyed homes and crops, and also killed many of the people's animals. After the bombings, ground troops looted and also burned houses which had not been razed by the rocket fire. A total of twenty two houses were destroyed as a result of the operation. The military alleged that these places had served as NPA hideouts or even training camps. The villagers categorically denied such accusations. Concerned persons and organisations that are working with the Mangyan, learned from local military commanders that more operations are to be expected.

In the latest event recorded, the Iriya Mangyan inhabitants of the village of Talipanan, near the well-known tourist resort of Puerto Galera, were caught in crossfire during a military raid on a group of NPA soldiers. Although the villagers somehow all managed to escape unharmed, their houses were subsequently bombed and then looted by troopers.

While the people in places like Talipanan, Kiraring and Kyanaw had to evacuate to save their lives, countless Mangyan families all over the island have left their homes and fields because of intimidation that their settlements would also be bombed. In one area alone, the confirmed number of 350 Alangan Mangyan families, amounting to approximately 2,500 women, men and children, sought refuge near the mission stations. Reports from several refugee camps in other parts of the island lead us to believe that the total number of displaced families is much higher and that the picture is one of mass exodus.

Boldness and violent resistance have never been the Mangyan way. They have found avoidance and withdrawal from conflicts a much more efficient way of dealing with threats from outside. This sets the Mangyan apart from other indigenous Filipino groups with a long history of struggle against outside intrusion, such as the Igorot of the Cordillera, the Lumad of Mindanao or the Muslim cultural communities. Not surprisingly, in these uncertain days, the Mangyan settlements are swarming with terrifying rumours; extreme psychological pressure has built up, sometimes precipitating panic and desperate reactions by communities, such as mass flight to the lowlands.

One of the most serious consequences of the military operations is the continued disruption of the planting cycle. Scared away from their swidden areas during the crucial stages of cutting and burning, the refugees will now only be able to plant, at best, small plots which will not produce enough food to sustain them through the next planting cycle. This means food shortages or even famine in the future. Visits to one of the refugee camps showed the people in




*Photos showing the effects of the bombardment of the
2nd March, 1988 (photo: Danilo Geiger)*

a very miserable condition, suffering from hunger, sickness and in a state of despair.

Ironically, the military are posing as benefactors by doling out relief goods – and in the same breath “illuminating” these victims of militarisation with intensive anti-communist propaganda. On the other hand, no thought and consideration are given to the safety of the Mangyan in the course of the military operations. There were no official warnings about impending bombings.

Besides the all-pervasive attempt to crush the insurgency at present going on all over the Philippines, yet another rationale seems to be operating in Mindoro. It is clear that the military has targeted areas for ground and air operations where strong national or foreign economic interests are competing for Mangyan Ancestral Domain, as in the case of the F.F. Cruz Coal Mining Company in Bulalacao and of Austphil, an Australian Corporation digging for gold in the hinterlands of Baco and San Teodoro.

Serving the interests of big landlords as well as national and foreign corporations and enjoying the overt support of the USA, an unrestrained and self-righteous military is proceeding against all forces in the country that are struggling to change the status quo. The Armed Forces of the Philippines, ruling almost unchecked by civilian authorities, do not have to be afraid of being charged for any of the massive human rights violations committed against innocent civilians – among them an increasing number of indigenous Filipinos.



Map of Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Region

Soviet Union: The Big Problems of Small Ethnic Groups

By A. Pika and B. Prokhorov

Their ancestors came here thousands of years ago, examined these severe lands and made them their home. They pooled all their knowledge of nature, worked out special ways to survive under extreme natural conditions and managed to create lively and original cultures. Their roots, their hopes for the future are linked only with this area and not with any others. These are the peoples of the North and, at the present time, their life is not easy.

For many years and decades, a lot was said in our country about the unprecedented progress of the indigenous peoples of the Soviet North who had perfected a gigantic leap from a primitive communal structure to socialism. But the picture of reality was often distorted and embroidered. Because serious economic, social and demographic researches had not been made for a long time, acute and full-blown problems were either silenced or put out of mind. This has contributed to the fact that today the nature of the north and its closely integrated indigenous inhabitants have almost reached a dangerous boundary beyond which their further existence and development in harmonious and historical continuity can not be guaranteed. Many things could change irreversibly and disappear.

In recent years, disturbing signals from this area - honest and caring scientific reports, whose fate even recently was to end up in the drawers of writing tables and the archives of various establishments - appeared on the pages of newspapers and journals, were openly discussed at conferences and were broadcast on television. Dozens of commissions of high state and party organisations visited the far North to investigate the facts.

So, what is really happening to the small ethnic groups of the North at the present time?


The national populations of the North occupy about half the territory of the USSR - from the Kola Peninsula to the Lower Amur and Sakhalin. In 1925, by a special decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Soviet of Peoples Commissars, the Tsarms, Nenets, Khanty, Mansi, Enets, Nganasans, Selkups, Kets, Evenks, Evens, Dolgans, Yukagirs, Chukchi, Koryaks, Eskimos, Aleuts, Itelmens, Tofalars, Ulchi, Nanaians, Nivkhs, Udege, Negidals, Orochs, Orochs and Chuvans were distinguished as a special group of small ethnic nations of the North. Their total population is now greater than 160,000 people. An important historical stage was reached in 1930 with the creation of national (now auto-

mous) regions of peoples of the North. In the years after the War, industrial development in the area of the indigenous inhabitants of the North was growing quickly. Owing to migration from other regions of the country, the population increased here many times over, whereas the population of the indigenous inhabitants increased insignificantly. Their proportion has sharply decreased and today ranges from 23 per cent in the Koryak region to three per cent in the Khanty-Mansi region. In the economic balance of the region, the production generated by the indigenous northerners, mainly trade and farming, has become almost unnoticeable against the huge industrial capacity.

The autonomous regions where the nationalities of the North are living, can have their interests defended constitutionally. But the figures for the standards of living of the indigenous northerners are significantly worse than those for the newly arrived population. It is possible to state with complete certainty that their social and living conditions are most unfavourable in comparison to all the other nationalities and small ethnic groups of the USSR. The ethnic settlements have a marked deficit of housing: provisions do not exceed, on average, four square metres per person. There is an lack of facilities in the majority of inhabited centres: only three per cent of the houses have gas, 0.4 percent have water and 0.1 percent have central heating. There is no sewage and no water reservoirs to satisfy sanitary and ecological demands. The housing fund is largely run-down; the buildings are from the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s. The social infrastructure of the settlements is not developed. The supply of food products and industrial goods is meagre.

The situation in the Khanty-Mansi autonomous region is quite typical for all the North. The Khanty and Mansi are now living in 72 national settlements. In many of them there is still no electricity and people use kerosene and oil lamps as in the old days. Furthermore, in those places where there are electricity stations, their power is often inadequate and light is only provided for some hours of the day. In many settlements, there are no hospitals, schools, clubs, bakeries, saunas and sometimes not even a single shop. There are also certain settlements which are officially considered "liquidated", non-existent, but people continue to live in them. They completely lack amenities and the inhabitants have only themselves or their neighbours on whom to rely.


Since the end of the 1930s in the North, a state policy of converting the population to a settled way of life has been carried out (although even up to the present day, more than 15,000 people - almost 10 per cent of the indigenous inhabitants - continue to migrate throughout the year and have no permanent home). The policy of conversion to a settled way of life is based on an unpremeditated point of view. It has no basis scientifically and leads to the destruction of the traditional economy and also to the dissolution of the indigenous



population, to their disappearance as a unit of original ethnic formation and to the loss of national and cultural distinctiveness. The latter, precisely because of the conception of the "cultural inferiority" of the nomadic way of life, has for several decades been officially considered as a sort of "temporary existence" which ought to be abolished. Thus the installation of modern living comforts for the nomadic families has not been planned; it was assumed that the reindeer farming population would be using such things in permanent settlements.

The traditional branches of the economy are the basis of the national and cultural individuality of the indigenous peoples of the North. At the present time, less than 43 per cent of the working population of the indigenous northerners are involved in deer farming, fishing and hunting (only three decades ago it was more than 70 per cent). All these occupations are in a state of crisis be-

cause of the unbalanced economy, non-rational methods of trade and deterioration of pastures and natural areas because of the influence of industry. But mainly it is a crisis in the leadership of the economy. This has a social basis.




*Soviet drilling rig, Samotlor
(photo: Northern Perspectives)*

The commercial wealth of the northern rivers, forests and tundra, and also of the domesticated reindeer and almost all means of production, have, for a long time, stopped being the collective property of the indigenous people. These means of production have reached the state where they have actually become the "departmental" property of Gosagroprom, Minribkhoz, Rospotrebyuz, Glavokhota, etc. These organisations are only ruled by considerations of narrow, departmental, immediate interests. They cannot link their activities to the essential requirements of the northern peoples and to the perspectives of their development. The results of their leadership of the economy are very clearly expressed in poetry:

"Economy became saturnine and by the distant northern river Khanty fishermen purchase southern sardines."

One could not put it more correctly: fish are brought thousands of kilometres by aeroplane from the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to be processed at the Surgut and Salekhard fish factories. For feeding the animals on the fur farms in southern Yakutia, meat is being brought from Moscow and fish from the Far East. Almost all commercial agricultural production in the North is expected to make a deficit. In the *sovkhos* "Udarnik" in Chukotka, the cost of one polar fox skin is 150 roubles but it is sold for 65 roubles 13 kopecks. It is not difficult to calculate the loss knowing that the *sovkhos* produces 5,000 fur skins per year. As a result of the uncontrolled activity of the government departments, the number of domesticated reindeer in the country now totals only 1.8 million head - the lowest in the whole history of reindeer farming in this century (in 1965



Oil refinery, Ob Basin area (photo: Northern Perspectives)

there were 2.4 million). The intensity of the development of hunting areas and the production of the “northern” wild furs are also decreasing. The fishing resources in many internal waterways of the North are close to exhaustion and in rich commercial areas as Kamchatka and Sakhalin the indigenous population are being squeezed out from the local fishing by more active newcomers who, in their haste for quick profits, mercilessly undermine the natural potential.

Plans for the industrial development of the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions of the world and also other regions where indigenous peoples are settled have always been greeted with great unease. Social and governmental organisations demand reliable guarantees from companies for the conservation of the interests of the local inhabitants. These demands are fixed in an international “Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention.” The experience of foreign countries shows that there exist real possibilities to combine the interests of the indigenous, ethnic groups with industrial development but for this it is necessary to study the possibilities carefully.

How are the interests of the population of the North of our country being defended? The answer to this question can only be: depressingly badly. Their interests were not taken into consideration when the atomic explosions in the Arctic were carried out in the 1950s; their interests are not considered during the search for deposits in the taiga and tundra, during the extraction of oil and gas and during the construction of gigantic pipelines on their pastures and hunting grounds.

We have been conducting field research in the northern regions for many years. It is painful to see how the few improvements in the lives of northern people, which technology and all the processes of industrial development have brought, are more than cancelled out by the damages from the organisations developing these regions. Over many years, day and night, the gas-burning flames around Nizhnyevartovsk have been lighting everything in a crimson glow, oil has been floating on the tributaries of the Ob, the forest has been cut down on the shores of the Taz and the Iceland moss in the reindeer pastures of Yamal has been perishing under the tracks of cross-country vehicles and through burning. And all this is because of the endless haste, indifference and obvious neglect of the land providing the wealth.

Thus the construction project for the gas pipeline corridor on the Yamal peninsula, which was expected to remove 36,000 hectares of reindeer pastures, was rejected on the advice of Gosplan USSR. In fact, had this project gone ahead, the area of lost pasture could have been three to four times bigger. It is a sad paradox that the Yamal-Nenets and Khanty-Mansi autonomous regions are world fuel suppliers. But the indigenous inhabitants not only received nothing

from the common “energy-fuel pie”, but suffer constantly from the invasion of the oil and gas giants.

Through their unskillful work, the Magadan specialists in land reclamation destroyed the plankton in many rivers of Chukotka – the feeding base for Siberian salmon, hump-backed salmon, chir, white salmon and other delicatessen fish. When the Yermak came to Siberia on the shores of the Sob, the left tributary of the great Ob, the nomadic camp of the Khanty had already existed for a long time and has been gradually turned into the Khanty settlement Katrovozh. The local people fished here, and trapped animals and birds. Many places in the river valley were always considered “sacred” and it was categorically forbidden to catch fish, go hunting, cut the forest or make fires. It was sometimes forbidden to even take water from these places. In such a way, the fish-spawning periods, hibernation quarters and the nests of water fowl were preserved. And what surprise, indignation and confusion there was among the Khanty several years ago when powerful equipment began to excavate the bed of the Sob. The constructors were in need of a sand-gravel mixture; the sig and salmon disappeared from the river and people who had been fishermen all their lives lost the natural basis of their livelihood.

There is no end to the list of crimes against nature and, therefore, against the indigenous population itself. The Evenk author, Alitet Nemtushkin, who was a delegate at the Nineteenth Congress, writes about the project of the Turukhanskaya Hydroelectric Station (GES) which includes plans to build on his homeland:

Whole ethnic groups could find themselves on the edge of extinction when, under the guise of benevolence, they want to flood the best commercial grounds and reindeer pastures, in other words to deprive us of the basis for our life... Any extinction is a catastrophe. But here, unique features of national character, ethnic appearance, language and lifestyle could disappear forever from the culture of mankind and from its genetic fund.

During the development of the regions where indigenous peoples are living, there appear problems, not only of scarred earth, destroyed pastures and poisoned fish but of two cultures colliding over the vast spaces of the taiga and tundra: an ancient culture, unique and, one might even say, fragile; and modern culture, assertive, self-satisfied and technocratic. The people who are developing this severe region are very well known to us through common activities on boreholes, long conversations around the taiga firesides and through meetings concerning the construction of new cities and railways. Some of their characteristics – stamina, devotion to their profession, courage, mutual help and modesty – we admire. Only such people could live and work in the North. But the problem

is that they constantly hear and read about their outstanding character, about themselves as explorers and at this point it seems everything has been said. They are never, or extremely rarely, reminded about the ecology and about the culture and communication with the local population, about the necessity to respect other customs and other lifestyles. The processes which are taking place in the North, especially the negative aspects, are reflected in the young generation of indigenous inhabitants. Young people do not willingly enter the traditional branches of employment because of their backward economies and bad organisation. But when the indigenous northerners transfer to any other sphere of occupation, they generally have to be satisfied with only low-paid, low-prestige jobs. The percentage of the indigenous population occupied in unskilled physical work (as cleaners, porters, auxiliary workers and etc.) in the employment structure is constantly growing and already comprises more than 30 per cent (compared to 13 per cent in 1959). This process of "lumpenisation" of the small ethnic groups is interpreted by some scientists ("optimists") as a "new progressive phenomenon, the growth of the working class", whereas the deep social alienation, passivity and pessimism produced by this situation are judged as "the remnants of a tribal, patriarchal past."

Socio-economic changes in districts inhabited by the small ethnic groups of the North are visibly reflected in the most important social indices: in the state of health of the people and in the demographic situation. They are signalling a great warning. The indigenous people are turning for medical help and are being hospitalised due to circulatory and oncological diseases. Illnesses of the ear, nose and throat are significantly more common among the northern ethnic people than among newcomers living in the same districts but under significantly better living conditions. The number of indigenous deaths from these illnesses are also higher. Infant mortality is high. The mental health of the indigenous northerners is also under threat. The level of their social-psychological adaptation to the quickly changing conditions of life is decreasing. The growth of drunkenness and aggressiveness is an indicator of this process. From 1970-1980, one in two deaths among the indigenous population was caused by injuries in the home, accidents at work or murders and suicides (approximately 70-90 cases per 100,000 people which is 3-4 times higher than the national average).

From the middle of the 1960s, the small ethnic groups of the North entered a period of so-called demographic transition during which high levels of birth and mortality should supposedly have replaced the low ones. But today the birth-rate is still decreasing. All this is caused by a special crisis in the family-marriage relationship and is very closely related to the general process of cultural assimilation. Incomplete families are growing up in the settlements, mainly single mothers and widows with children.

Overall mortality among the peoples of the North has not decreased over several decades, remaining at an extremely high level which is two to three times the prevailing index for the Russian Federation. The life expectancy of the indigenous population of the northern regions is 45 years for men and 55 years for women. This is 18 years less than the average for the whole USSR. The industrially developed countries and many of the developing countries in the world do not have such low indices. Because of this high mortality, the population growth of the small ethnic groups of the North between the censuses of 1970 and 1979 decreased by a factor of five, but in seven out of 26 ethnic groups the numbers of people actually decreased.

Among the problems which are especially alarming for the small ethnic groups of the Soviet North is the absence of work in the national settlements for indigenous people, a poor knowledge of the mother tongue or even a total ignorance of it among the youth, and the alienation of children from their families and from the traditional economic activities as a result of their long residence in boarding schools. Other phenomena are also alarmingly negative, for example, the psychology of "willy-nilly dependence" which has been produced as a result of the defective system of relationships between the organs of local power (which consist primarily of persons of a non-indigenous nationality) and the indigenous northerners. There is a widespread desire among local administrators to solve problems which are far removed from the interests of the indigenous population while maintaining the outward show of caring for the people.

The author, Vladimir Sangi, has told how on Sakhalin they are fulfilling the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR "on measures for further economic and social development of the areas occupied by small ethnic groups of the North" (1980). In the district centre, Nogliki, there are about 700 Nivkhs (this is almost 65 per cent of the total indigenous population of the district) who in their time were forcibly settled here from the small areas. Using the money issued for their economic and cultural development, the local authorities are offering, besides oil pipes, graders and cars which will doubtfully reach the indigenous northerners though they can only partly use them, a thousand pairs of plastic skis with titanium stocks, 200 typewriters, 500 pocket calculators and the same number of "Kompakt" toilet bowls.

The academic, A.P. Okladnikov, wrote:

"The present hunting-fishing ethnic groups of the North, whose creativity goes back thousands of years, contribute to the cultural achievements of the world in the same way as other nations on the planet... For us, the problem is not whether to save the original culture of the northern people but how to save it in the best way under the pressures on one side, from the technological revolution and, on the other, from the tendency to internationalise cultures."

Naturally, in order to save their culture it is necessary at first to preserve the people themselves.

All these problems have common roots, closely linked with the policy (precisely the absence of any end-directed and scientifically based policy) which is in operation with the indigenous population. These problems can only be solved as a whole, and the main role in their solution no doubt belongs to the true northern natives. All attempts to put into practice measures (however valuable) from above, from Moscow or from Tyumen, from Magadan or Krasnoyarsk, are destined to fail. This has already been demonstrated by previous experience. In the capital of our country, in the provincial, regional and district centres, we have first of all to stop the expansion of the ministries to the North and to force them to respect and consider the interests of the indigenous people in practice. So far, regretfully, they cannot do it themselves.

The Nineteenth All-Union Conference of the Communist Party of the USSR confirmed the right of every nation of the USSR to the revival and development of national cultures and the speeding of progress in previously backward regions. In the resolution "about the relationships between nations," it was said:

It is important that, in every national region, economic and social progress be accompanied by spiritual progress with emphasis on the cultural individuality of nations and small ethnic groups. This is entirely appropriate to the situation existing in the regions of the smaller ethnic groups of the North. Built onto the basis of their social-economic and cultural progress in recent decades must be the ideas for preserving their national-cultural individuality and the 'independent character' for their development. Firstly, this implies special socio-economic and cultural forms of state national policy directed towards the northern small ethnic groups with the aim of supplying support, not only for the people living in the far, cold North but for all nations with a desire to ensure their survival and to preserve their ethnic individuality.

This means somewhat more than simply supplying "equal rights" and "equal opportunities" for all the population of the North so that, under equal conditions, the strongest and those who "know the rules of the game" better always win. Unfortunately, so far, the northern people on their native land are not in this position. Secondly, the only possible means and way for their survival is through an independent development, because if the hurdle of social passiveness and alienation cannot be overcome by the indigenous people themselves they will find no support from outside. The compulsory participation of northerners in all regional and local programmes of development at all stages – from ideas and discussion to realisation – must be considered as a most important political principle. It seems to us that the foundations of "new thinking" in the approach to the old problem are held in these two ideas.

At the present time, the conception of economic and cultural development in the areas inhabited by the small ethnic groups of the North is being worked out. The scientists who were invited to give their recommendations and representatives of state power also take part in this work. The co-operation of the government institutions with the research collectives in solving complicated national-cultural and social problems can only be welcomed. This is a step forward but even so, it only reflects the needs of yesterday. Moreover, the concept of "state care" of the indigenous people of the North leaves no room for the political will, the national-cultural aspirations and the wishes of the latter. At the moment, it is not foreseeable that serious discussion of planning measures will include the direct participation of the indigenous peoples themselves. It is possible that all the legal, financial and socio-economic levers of development of their "small motherland" will again be put into the hands of the ministries and departments, i.e. to those who have already demonstrated over decades their disinterest in the affairs of the small ethnic groups of the North.

Decisions about complicated national political questions must certainly not be taken quickly or be resolved simplistically by disinterested people. Furthermore, it would be correct to enlist for this task people who are active and who enjoy the respect and trust of the people from the far northern settlements and nomadic camps: the national creative intelligentsia, doctors, teachers, workers of the Soviet and Party organisations, deputies of local and regional Soviets, and representatives from the northern autonomous regions in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In addition, their participation must be integral and not in the form of an invitation during the final conference to acquaint them with, and get their approval of, the "scientific conception" or draught of the resolution. The time has come to create a real representation for the northern nationalities. They



Family outing
(photo: *Northern Perspectives*)

need a national-cultural and social institution to work permanently on the present problems. The proposal to create such an institution, an association of northern nationalities, was put forward by Vladimir Sangi at the sitting of the secretariat of the Union of Writers of RSFSR. It received approval from scientists.

It will be necessary to gather all the instructions and wishes from the local areas, to discuss them in the press and at village meetings, and then to prepare them as a document reflecting the real interests and future hopes of the peoples of the North. If the indigenous inhabitants are not enlisted in the difficult, and probably lengthy, work to solve their problems, any new resolution will have little effect and will create, as happened earlier, new problems and dead-end situations.

International experience of socio-cultural changes among ethnic groups which were not long ago at pre-industrial stages of development, including the foreign North, shows that, in those cases where they were not consulted about the forthcoming reorganisations, the changes did not bring anything to people except feelings of resentment and helplessness and instead converted them into passive executives of an alien will and consumers of "handed down" goods. It is only necessary to help the indigenous inhabitants to organise themselves and sometimes to help them understand the serious nature of the reorganisations. Let the people themselves decide what is best for them: traditional ways or industrial development, reindeer or oil, state bonuses or economic perspectives.

Awakening the self-awareness of the indigenous population of the North is only possible against a background of social-economic prosperity. Under the present conditions, it is difficult to expect positive changes in the consciousness of people whose interests have been ignored. The governmental departments which exploited the natural treasures of the North and significantly undermined the natural basis of the traditional occupations of the indigenous population must compensate for the damage caused. They must compensate, not simply with money, but by creating modern, comfortable settlements by building schools, hospitals, clubs, industrial workplaces and a transport system. The leadership of the government departments and the indigenous population must clearly understand that this is not a good deed but just, and far from complete, compensation. This side of the question is very important.

Undoubtedly, the most important problem in the organisation of normal life in the North is to bring the economies of the indigenous inhabitants themselves into proper order. It is clear that the main aim of economic activity must not be the transportation of production beyond the geographic limits of the North but primarily for supplying the population through their own labour. The production of consumer goods from outside the region must become secondary.

Production which is unprofitable and unsuited to the North, e.g. dairy products, Arctic pig breeding etc., should be gradually curtailed. It is expedient to stimulate the independent character of northern companies and to propagate and inculcate family contract work, especially in reindeer farming, tenancy agreements and other forms of co-operation.

The indigenous inhabitants must again feel themselves the complete, powerful masters of the taiga and its rivers, the tundra pastures and reindeer herds, and not day-labourers for the "comrade with a briefcase." We must strive so that genuine socialist co-operative ownership of the means of production will take the place of the "departmental" ownership which serves as the feeding ground for a specific northern bureaucracy and for the over-population of the northern settlements by a large number of newly arrived "specialists and administrators." Only economic self-government and the possibility to be independent masters of co-operative property in the northern communities can bring a personal and social sense of purpose back to the local people. This is the most important thing to give them because it will help them in their desire for self-preservation and cultural individuality.

Source: "Communist", number 16.

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A Khanty woman in traditional dress 1969, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area (photo: Z.P. Zokolova/Inuktitut)

Not by oil alone

By Yeremei Aipin

Platform

Should they elect me people's deputy of the USSR, I'll go out of my way to save my nation. From what? From death. I'll call upon everyone who has still a scruple of human conscience and kindness. I'll back the platform of any deputy who aims at preventing the extinction of my ancient Finno-Ugric people – the *Khants*, known in the past as *the Ostyaks*.

Where does my people go?

The land of my ancestors has been ruined. My 76-year old father realised this long ago, one night in January when a truck speeding ahead of him turned suddenly and stopped, barring the way on a lonely winter road. My father's reindeer sledge also stopped. Two men climbed down from the cabin and made their way to the sledge. One held the old man from behind by the shoulders while the other pulled off the old man's fur boots. The two leisurely walked back to the truck and then drove off. My father returned home in his socks. He was perhaps glad that they had not harmed the reindeer and that his home wasn't far away because otherwise his feet could get frost bitten.

This happened when the conquering of oil-bearing wilderness cut a winter road across our own pine forest from Nizhnevartovsk to their base in Novosengsk. Once a month my father used the road to fetch his pension money.

Ever since that incident, a new system of time reference has appeared. Talking to someone, he usually said that this or that event happened "the winter the truck stole my boots from me" or "the autumn the people from the boat broke into the store and carried away all the fur clothes". More than enough such reference points have accumulated in his life over the last two or three decades of the oil boom.

The next winter his sledge, pulled by three dogs, was stolen from him in the logger village.

The timber-felling enterprise cut down all the trees on the tribal cemetery thus ruining the final resting place.

My hunter father can't understand many other things which happened during his 76-year lifetime, during which he not once plucked a fir needle or leaf, not a blade of grass unnecessarily on his land, on the land of his ancestors. He can't understand why they cut down his pine grove if the logs still lie in stacks

needlessly rotting. Why have the oil prospectors left behind upturned soil and mountains of metal scrap? Why do the machines choke up the small streams with pipes and sand bars, making it impossible either for fishermen or fish to go through? Finally, why do they pump oil out of the earth if it is allowed to float two fingers thick along the Agan killing all life along the way? The oil could be scooped out but where can it be stored? Can it be put back into earth?

The land no longer exists. My father has been in a sort of a trap. Further west down the Agan there is the town of Pokachi bossed by the Pokachi oil and gas company. In the north there is the town of Kogalym with the Povkh oil fields closer to my father's place. It is bossed by another oil company. In the east up the Agan there are geologists' settlements at Novoagansk and the town of Raduzhny bossed by the Varyegan oil and gas company. In the south there is Samotlor.

"What do you want old man," I ask my father. "Can I help you?"

"I don't want anything," he says after a long silence. "Only my land. Give me my land back where I can graze my reindeers, hunt game and catch fish. Give me my land where my deers are not attacked by stray dogs, where my hunting trails are not trampled down by poachers or fouled up by vehicles, where the rivers and lakes have no oil slicks. I want land where my home, my sanctuary and graveyard can remain inviolable. I want land where I can not be robbed of my clothes or boots in broad daylight. Give me my own land, not someone else's. Just a tiny patch of my own land."

What can I say in reply?

What can I do if he wants to be the real master of his land? What to do? Maybe we could give him back his own land?

Who's in favour? Who's against?

Those against will surely be in the majority. In words, many seem to be in favour, but when it comes to practical deeds, there will be a thousand arguments in favour of keeping his own land away from him. Will he ever see the day when he again is the master of his land?

The land of our ancestors is no more and this has ended our tribe that used to settle along the entire middle course of the Agan, the right tributary of the Ob, between the oil cities of Surgut and Nizhnevartovsk. Our tribe of the Makha, the tribe of the Beaver, is at an end. Our tribe is at an end. Our tribe is at an end, as I know now, from the feeling of doom.

Nearly all of my first and second cousins died aged 35-40 from alcoholism. They all had their own families and kids. What's happened to the kids? What are they now? They haven't amounted to anything. The families who lost their breadwinners moved into urban areas. There is nobody there to teach the boys how to hunt game, catch fish or graze reindeers. No one's there to teach them

how to make lassos, fishing nets, sledges, boats, how to build homes and stores on props. They have not learned anything their fathers and grandfathers used to learn from early years. They have not become hunters and fishermen, or reindeer herders. Neither have they made the great leap from shabby patriarchal times into socialism as social scientists predicted. They have not made oil workers, geologists or builders. Why? Because many of them haven't completed eight years at school and are now useless both in town and in the country.

The roots between the land and the people have been severed.

But quite recently, up to the 1980s, the countryside had no such problems. There was a collective farm named after S.M. Kirov and its members were hunters and fishermen and they grazed three reindeer herds. In addition there were as many as 30 cows, a dozen horses, there was a black fox and a polar fox farm. They planted spuds and other vegetables. Then, pressed by oil and mismanagement, all that disappeared along with the people who loved their land and took good care of it.

This gave rise to the lost generation of my nephews and nieces who know neither the language nor culture of their nation.

At first I was under the impression that the discovery of oil showered misfortunes only on my father and my tribe. But then I could see that others too were hit in various degrees. The old Khant families of the Pokachevs, Tyrlins, Sardakovs, Kazamkins, Tylchins and the Nenets, families of the Lusia and Aivasedes settled along the Agan, all found themselves in the same boat.

They have sustained the same losses. They have the same anguish.

What about the living standards of the indigenous population? How much do they earn?

In June 1988 I visited the ethnic village of Agan. Indigenous women workers at the Nizhnevartovsk fish factory receive a minimum wage of 13 roubles a month. A month, mind you! They do the manual work like handling, salting and processing fish. There is no mechanical gear in sight, no conveyor belts or cranes. Nothing.

Social, housing and welfare facilities are indescribable. The housing built in ethnic villages under the government decision of 1953, has long since rotted away. But some families still try to cling to them for there is no other shelter.

The question is: can you support a family on 13 roubles? In 1983, amid the breathtaking reports of our "paper" victories and achievements, there cropped up one unexpected figure. The average monthly pay of an indigenous worker in the Nizhnevartovsk District was 26 roubles and some kopeks. Now that the number of unemployed there is declining, some people maintain that the pay is up to 30-40 roubles others say it is up to 50-60 roubles. The difference between 13, 26 or 60 is small. Does it really matter?

And this is happening near the rich oil fields of Samotlor, the flicker of whose flares have been for decades dancing on all this human misery. Under the existing system, local Soviets and other government bodies are obliged to literally go cap in hand to the almighty oil companies to beg for every nail, to make ends meet in the ethnic villages. Now that they switch to cost accounting and self-financing it's useless to beg the "kind sirs" for a nail.

Things are not better at the distant approaches to Samotlor. I went around the place to see and hear much. Khants on the Vakh, Tromagan, Kazym, Yugan, Pim, Lyamin and Nazym, Mansi on the Sosva and Konda rivers, things are the same way as on the Agan, as everywhere my people live. Give or take a little. Some have it better, some have it worse. Everywhere the question is land. Where are the people supposed to graze their reindeer, where are they supposed to hunt the game and catch fish, gather berries and mushrooms? Where do they get land?

The hardest pressed are the Khants who live on the Pim River near Surgut. They are surrounded on all sides by oil fields. They have become uprooted. They are trying to run away from the drilling camps, oil pipelines, winter roads and concrete motor roads. They move about with their families and things. They rough it, winter or summer, in tents full of holes. Stray dogs and poachers have killed nearly all of their reindeer, and game and fish are becoming scarce.

Ruined in our two autonomous areas, including Yamal Nenets area, have been:

- 11 million hectares of reindeers grazing grounds;
- 28 rivers where commercial fishing was done;
- 17,700 hectares of spawning and feeding grounds;
- 50 per cent of casing gas is being burned up in flares; and
- at least 300 accidents a year happen at each oil producing association.

Only 0.5 to 0.7 per cent of all capital investment in the area goes to nature protection while the figure in the other regions of the Russian Federation is more than two per cent.

Consider these statistics:

The number of Khants in 1970 was 21,138. The number of Khants in 1979 was 20,934. A one per cent drop is 204 people in 10 years. What can speak more eloquently and convincingly than the figures? Mind that the figures refer to the years of stagnation.

Now try to imagine that you and your children face the same prospect. Can you imagine? Can you feel it? If you do, you can appreciate what my kinsfolk felt who died before their time; why they would go for any drink that could give them even momentary oblivion and escape from the realities of life.

How to save my tribe?

My voters, indigenous people who live on Yugan River, are lucky in a way; prospecting for oil has just started on their land. But here's what they write:

The conquerors of nature routinely break up our hunting lodges, pilfer things they think are exotic and simply steal things like boats and outboard motors – our essentials of transportation. We're finding it more difficult with every year to preserve our graveyards.

So what shall we do? We protest against the destruction of our land. To destroy its nature is to destroy us. We realise that the country needs oil, but not at the cost of our lives!

We are of the impression that all work here is being done as if we do not exist, as if our ancestors did not live here, as if life is at an end for our people. Where is the principle of Lenin's policy of nationalities?

We earnestly ask the government to save our small nation before it is too late, to leave for us the living space along the Bolshoi, Yugan and Maly Yugan rivers to stop oil production there. No settlements, oil derricks or oil pipelines should be built beyond the village of Ugut up the river. Let there remain at least one distinctive corner on our land. Our settlements should be declared a national preserve. The Khant people hopefully expect that our government will take time from global problems to see our problems and finally decide to preserve our small nations.

The above comes from the appeal to the soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet made by the fishing and hunting community of the Urgut branch of the Surgut hunting and fishing co-operative farm. It was signed by more than 100 persons, but I'm sure all the 20,934 Khants and all the old timers, all the oil workers, geologists and builders who still have in them a shred of conscience would have signed it.

To restore the damage that the oil boom has done in the past three decades to the land and water would take 43,000 roubles. What's more precious, the future of a human or a ton of oil? Or rather the future of a whole nation or a ton of oil produced at whatever cost? Conscience prompts everyone that the future of a nation is more precious.

If someone is without scruples, then another ton of oil is of course more valuable because it means money, bonuses and awards – in a word, glory and honours.

Can this barbarity be stopped today? It can't of course. This very cumbersome machine, which is perhaps totally unwieldy, is creeping over the land and lives of its indigenous people. What has been lost can't be restored in the next few years. Is there a way out?

There is. An attempt should be made now to preserve the still undamaged land. This would involve arranging reserves where the indigenous people of the north could live in an environment free of industrial enterprises and lines of communication. There are some such areas along nearly all the tributaries of the Ob and the Irtysh populated by Khants, Mansi and Nemets. These tributar-

ies are the Agan, Vakh, Tromagan, Yugan, Pim, Nazym, Konda, Kazym and Sosva. The preserves are to be set up upon decrees to be passed by the USSR or the Russian Federation governments. The issue can't be resolved in any other way. The all-powerful ministries and departments never reckoned and perhaps will take a long time to learn to reckon with the rulings of local governments.

Can the government make this move? It can, if it is really concerned with the future of the small nations of my north, so vulnerable and defenceless in the face of scientific and technological advances. This would not harm the country's economy in any way. Indeed, given good management and improved technology for the extraction and transportation of oil, the oil producers would find that they don't have to expand. The present areas they are developing would last for many decades.

One wishes that the government would establish protected areas: sanctuaries, reservations, autonomous territories. It is important that they be set up today, in the next few days, months, years. Decades from now will be too late. There simply will be no people. It is impossible to preserve people in an artificial environment of a town, an industrial settlement cut off from the land, their roads completely severed, their moral foundations dashed to smithereens.

Reservations would help solve many problems. First, they would help preserve the linguistic environment. After all, it's better to take in language with your mother's milk rather than by studying ABCs and textbooks. Secondly, the traditional trades of hunting, fishing and reindeer herding are the basis our peoples' historical culture. Thirdly, reservations would mean the people's health. Their traditional, genetically approved, food is fresh fish, meat, berries and mushrooms. You will agree you can't last long on canned food and macaroni being paid 13 roubles a month.

At the moment, in order to solve any matter of even minuscule importance, we are obliged to turn to high officials, first at the regional level in Tyumen, then in Moscow at different Republican and All Union departments. This multi-stage system is effective only in throwing a wet blanket on any initiative. The area which is formally an autonomous entity wields no real power. The law on the Autonomous Area is being drafted. What would it give us? Would the area officials be their own masters? Or would everything remain as it is now, with one thing said on paper and something quite the opposite happening in reality?

There should be a status for an ethnic area: an ethnic village Soviet (council) and ethnic settlement. The most important thing is that there should be a system whereby these territories are self-governed.

As regards economic and social matters, local Soviets should be all powerful. Had they held real power, the whole villages, settlements and centres populated by indigenous people, including the area's capital Khanty-Mansiysk, would not have been allowed to wither away.

In order that social and cultural advancement gets under way after having stood still, the areas' capital should itself become a cultural centre. It needs a modern printing shop that could produce books in Russian and ethnic languages, there should be an art boarding school for gifted children of ethnic people, a TV centre broadcasting in several languages and a research institute to study the folklore, history, applied arts and many other things.

But the autonomous area cannot solve all these matters because it lacks power. I hate to think that my tribe is going to become extinct, that my own people will become extinct. This is why I have taken my pen and have written these lines.

The land can't be saved, it can't be protected against barbarity, by padlocks, bows and arrows or guns. Individuals or ethnic minorities stand no chance of success with such methods. This land and its peoples can only be saved through the joint efforts of many people, the entire community.

The future of my people, I think, depends on the future of perestroika. If perestroika goes on, my people will survive. Without perestroika my people stand no chance. Quietly and unnoticed we'll quit this land under some new slogans boasting achievements and successes. This applies not only to the Khants but also to many other small nations of the North. The same fate is in store for them.

My elderly father whispers these words as he would a prayer each time he passes by the holy place.

○ Gods deliver my land from oil.

○ Gods put the land back into my hands!

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The author is a member of the Bureau of the Party Committee of the Area, deputy of the Soviet of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area and a Khant author.

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