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
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Editorial

This issue of the IWGIA Newsletter deals only with indigenous people in Africa.

Looking through IWGIA Newsletters published over the last 25 years, Africa has only been dealt with sporadically, but nevertheless to an increasing extent over the last years. In our opinion, this reflects the reality that the world has changed, that the indigenous issue has become of world-wide concern, and that the peoples of Africa themselves have entered the international scene of political decision-making.

The concept of indigenous people, as applied to the African setting, is a complicated and much debated one. This is mostly so from the perspective of the political decision-makers and those dealing with international human rights issues, but less so when seen by those who claim themselves as being indigenous.

When Europeans conquered Africa a large number of self-governing cultures were turned into dependent tribes, and when they were forced to leave the continent the artificial colonial boundaries became borders of post-colonial states. The world is changing, so are the political entities and so are the meanings of these and the role given to each of them by those living there.

The indigenous »movement« in Africa grows from the policy adopted by independent post-colonial African states. The favouring of settled agriculture compared to hunting, gathering and nomadic cattle herding has been instrumental in turning some people into indigenous groups; so was the establishment of national parks and forced relocation of the inhabitants. The cultural domination of the new states by Bantu-speaking or Arabic-speaking groups marginalised others. Outright discrimination and violence in some states has made its

impact. The overall result was that some people – few compared to the total number of ethnic groups in Africa – became leftovers. They did not receive the advantages following from independence, nor from development aid flowing into Africa from the industrialised countries since the 1960s. Indigenous peoples in general are not involved in conflict over control of state-power or state institutions like the Hutu or the Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi or the clans of Somalia. This implies that there are groups in Africa which are in, or have been in, a more precarious situation than many indigenous peoples. The Herero of Namibia, so heavily warred against by the Germans, are just one example.

It might be worth recalling the ILO-Convention 169 adopted in 1989 and the definition of indigenous peoples adopted: »Peoples ... are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions«. And furthermore: »Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of the Convention apply«.

We consider a structural approach, as it is adopted in the ILO definition, as absolutely necessary in order to deal with the rights of indigenous people.

The indigenous peoples of Africa are not always the original inhabitants of the regions in which they reside today. The Bushmen of Botswana are, but the nomadic Maasai of Tanzania have always been on the move.

However, the discussion on indigenous people in Africa can never be left to butterfly collectors. The discus-

sion should not be about categories, but must reflect life as this is experienced by those people being marginalised in post-colonial Africa. The debate starts when the Bushmen in Namibia and Botswana become aware of common problems, dreams and aspirations. When challenged by a major development project, the pastoral Barabaig of Tanzania realised that it was the survival of their culture which was at stake and not only their rights as individual Tanzanians. The women were raped and mistreated simply because they were Barabaig, as documented in this Newsletter. This is the point from which to discuss the human rights of the Barabaigs.

The countries of Africa and Asia have challenged the universal concept of human rights because it is being used by the Western countries to force their cultural notion upon the rest of the world. The opposite of this human rights imperialism is to start with cultural divergencies and accept that even 'universal' human rights have their cultural origins. This is, however, no excuse for authoritarian regimes and ruling élites to use the argument of the integrity of the state to subjugate the collective rights of indigenous peoples.

The new argument used by donor-countries to link aid to countries in the Third World with the observance of human rights has, until now, been confined to the individual human rights. The collective rights, including the collective rights of indigenous peoples, have not played any major role in this discussion. It is our hope that the debate on democracy will go further than the western tradition of multiparty systems and into the sphere of cultural democracy including the right of self-determination. The fragile peace agreement between the state of Mali and the Tuaregs, as analysed by Gunnvor Berge in this Newsletter, is an indication of the pivotal role of self-determination in a peaceful future of multicultural African states.

Several articles in this Newsletter deal with indigenous peoples' right to territory and land. No other question seems to be more important to indigenous people in Africa than this. The Bushmen of Southern Africa have lost virtually all their land, the majority now enduring a miserable life as unpaid or extremely low-paid labourers at cattle-farms in Namibia and Botswana. For years, those few thousand Bushmen remaining in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve, Botswana, have been under continuous pressure to resettle and to leave the game reserve for the animals, tourists and trophy hunters. It is quite ironic that the only Bushmen who have retained at least some control of their land, are those living in East Bushmanland, Namibia, who were subject to the apartheid-instigated homeland policy.

Violations of the most fundamental human rights are now a severe problem in Sudan. We appeal to the international community to put severe pressure on the Sudanese regime to stop its brutal genocide against the Nuba! We also appeal for pressure to be put on the South African Government to release the more than 3,000 former soldiers in the South African Defence Force who are withheld in South Africa.

Tanzania and Botswana are recognised as belonging to the most democratic regimes of Africa. But even in these countries indigenous peoples are being discriminated against and their human rights violated simply due to their ethnic affiliation. From Tanzania we reprint two letters which we received from a pastoral Barabaig; the letters are reprinted as they were written.

The Berbers of North Africa are not very often considered as indigenous peoples, although they represent one of the most obvious cases. The article by Kusyel Tissas focuses on the suppression of the Berber language by the Arab populations. Discrimination against the native languages is often endured by indigenous people, and in the case of the Berber language, dis-

crimination is even the official policy of North African countries.

Cultural equality and self-determination are basic pre-requisites of any collectivity as to how its members live and control their lives. To restore equality, indigenous peoples of Africa must organise themselves. Few or none of them organise in order to completely defy their respective states, but instead in order to challenge the nature of the kind of state-structure which has left them as marginalised indigenous peoples.

The pastoralist nomads want to be treated as equals and appeal to the international community, to the United Nations and to donor countries, for support. Until the states realise that all people have the right of self-determination, indigenous people use this strategy, simply because they have to.

Many African countries rely on foreign aid. In order to comply with the inalienable rights of indigenous people to self-determination, and in order to accept indigenous people's right to development, the rich donor countries should take these fundamental rights into consideration before linking aid with the compliance of human rights.

All these issues will hopefully be dealt with during a workshop dedicated to the indigenous people in Africa. The meeting will take place in Denmark in early June this year with participation of indigenous representatives, researchers and government delegates. The workshop is organised by IWGIA and the Centre for Development Research, Copenhagen. The proceedings from the workshop will be published afterwards. IWGIA has, furthermore, a document on the San (Bushmen) to be published soon.

Jens Dahl
Espen Wæhle

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Pastoralism and the State in African Arid Lands: An Overview

By M.A. Mohamed Salih

Introduction

Pastoralism is a system of production as well as a socio-cultural system consisting of an interaction between herders, animals and a given mode of resource management. The relationship between the factors of pastoral production is mediated by socio-political and cultural considerations which negate any reductionist approach which perceives of these as a mode of production governed by market relations. However, there is also no reason to believe that pastoralists obtain their livelihood entirely from animals. The evidence available suggests that pastoralists derive a considerable portion of their subsistence from activities other than raising animals (eg. crop production, arduous jobs, migration to towns and centres of employment etc). Moreover, in some climatic conditions, which do not encourage the integration of grain and animal production, pastoralists tend to depend on imports of grain as well as other goods and services from other societies. Likewise, agro-pastoral societies are increasingly obtaining some of their non-agricultural requirements from external sources. What makes pastoralism a unique system of production is that, as a way of life, pastoralists are in continuous movement from one ecological niche to another. Kinship and political relations are expressed in relation to the herd whose reproduction is essential for social and economic reproduction.

The expansion of the market economy and the emergence of new consumption patterns among pastoralists reveals that pastoral societies are more and more interlocked into regional and national trade chains. Moreover, the emergence of the

»new pastoralist« according to the literature (Swift, 1979; Konzaki, 1980; Hjort, 1982; 1989; Little, 1983; Dahl, 1982; Mohamed Salih, 1985; Baxter, 1985; 1986; 1990) indicates that pastoral communities are interlocked into regional economic structures responsive to exchange rates of non-pastoral goods and services as well as national policies. Hence, pastoralists are an inseparable part of the wider society and have more than ever been subjected to upheavals and disasters imposed upon them by misconceptions and ill-planned policies perpetuated by the central state apparatus. Consequently, it becomes more urgent to understand pastoral systems of production, not as remote and isolated uncaptured sectors of the post-colonial state, but as producers of primary products for regional markets as well as for export. The role of the state as a mediator between national and international capital is evident since pastoral development policies, with few exceptions, are operated with the prospect of surplus appropriation and revenue collection in mind. Many pastoral development projects are increasingly financed by aid agencies and international capital. The effect of economic intervention on the politico-social organization of pastoral communities is inevitable since states are interactive political entities. Hence, the relationship between states and pastoral production systems is determined by the role of the state as a provider and an »engine of development«.

However, pastoralists have not featured prominently in the debate about the relationship between state and society in Africa. I argue elsewhere, (Mohamed Salih, 1990a) that this could be attributed to the fact that African states, colonial, neo-colo-

nial or independent, have offered less attention to pastoralists and much attention to the political processes taking place among peasants and urban dwellers who represent the majority of the population and are the main contributors to revenue and foreign exchange. The marginalization of pastoralists and their poor representation in the centres of power could as well be attributed to the very nature of pastoral production, which requires continuous movement from one ecological niche to another in response to seasonal variations in rainfall and pasture. Pastoralists are often not confined to rigid administrative local or national boundaries, and their mode of subsistence connects them loosely with national politics especially those who live in frontier regions.


The relationship between states and pastoral societies is a pervasive one and it entails more than a discussion of government policies and development programmes. Although the overlap between state and government obscures their responsibility to society, it seems obvious that the state is the most governmentally oriented form of political organization. At least it is obvious that there are no states without governments, a fact which suggests that states are governed by representation. However, the borderline between state and governmentally inspired policies is difficult to draw although state ideology is to be observed by state »servants« represented by the bureaucratic structure which runs the government. I am, however, doubtful whether this classic notion of the state is applicable to colonial or post colonial Africa. Centralized states usually excessively confuse governmental practice with state ideology. The situation is even

much more grave in semi-absolutist states for which the demarcating line between the sphere of state practice and that of government does not exist.

I, by no means intend to deal wholly with pastoral development programmes and their failures, although this cannot be avoided. However, I intend to delineate the factors which influence pastoral development policies and the social forces behind them. I believe that although dealing with development programmes may explain technical and administrative failures, it often obscures the importance of the political society which gives impetus to the programmes in the first place. Such an understanding could be reached by answering the question of what is the nature of the African state and how it relates to society in general and to pastoralists in particular.

Since I argue that pastoral societies have some features in common with peasant societies such as being producers of marketable commodities (meat, milk, cheese, ghee, hide and wool), some elements of state/peasant relationship may offer a useful source of theoretical insight. Three postulates are relevant to this discussion: first, according to Alavi (1972), »the role of the colonial state was to create a state apparatus through which it can exercise dominance over the people of the colonies. The colonial state, was therefore equipped with a powerful bureaucratic-military apparatus and mechanisms of government which enabled them through routine operations to subordinate African societies. The post-colonial state has inherited an overdeveloped apparatus of state and has used it to institutionalize practices through which the role of government is regulated«. It is, however, important to emphasize that the relationship between the colonial state and pastoralists was not less confrontational than that with the national states. Resistance to the advent of colonialism and the state intervention were fierce among pastoralists and several historical studies have already documented such incidents.

Second, Saul (1983) argues that »the African states directly appropriate a very large economic surplus from society and deploy it in bureaucratically directed economic activity in the name of promoting social and economic development«. Hence, I argue that this has notably been the case among pastoralists from whom poll, sales and export taxes are directly or indi-



rectly levied. The state is not only parasitic, as in the case of peasants, by tapping the agrarian sector for economic growth, it is also tapping the pastoral sector much more for agricultural transformation than for pastoral development per se.

Third, in common with Poulantzas (1973), »the state is not a class construct, but rather the state of a society divided into classes«, a notion which questions the Marxist notion that »the state is an ideological expression of the ruling class«. To my mind, this is not to preclude that in Africa, the hegemonic position of the state is created within territorial boundaries which quite often appear as artificial enti-

ties. Nevertheless I assert that a contradiction between the state and civil society is not necessarily an expression of contradictory class interests. In Africa, the class nature of the state is mediated by ethnic loyalties which cut across class interests.

Although these postulates are of some relevance to the debate about pastoralists and the state, it is erroneous to jump to the conclusion that a pastoral mode of production resembles a peasant mode of production and that as producers of primary products they both fall under the category of a pre-capitalist mode of production. This kind of analysis is naive, and is bound to forsake the fact that the African state has

continuously been taking land from the poor pastoralists and giving it to the poor peasants. It does not suggest that the state is biased in favour of peasants, but that the neo-colonial state has a constant obligation towards international capital through the production of cash crops. It is, however, a bias in terms of hierarchy of interests and not as an overall policy priority. Hence, to lump pastoralists and peasants together under the same category of a pre-capitalist mode of production is not different from the official policies and development plans which subsume the pastoralists under the agricultural sector, only to neglect them.

Even when pastoralists rise to positions of prominence within the African state, they tend to identify with the dominant interest groups within the state and not with the pastoralists. It also provides that a bias to certain sectors of the economy and society is also an expression of the dominant interest groups within the state. The main objective of this chapter, therefore, is to discuss the foregoing issues with respect to pastoral societies and production in order to elucidate how they relate to the state in Africa today.

Pastoralism and the State of Nations

Some African pastoral societies comprise nations with a shared culture, language and what they perceive as equal rights of citizenship and access to a common territory. Such pastoralists, like the Beja, some of whose sections such as the Beni Amir and the Amar'ar extend their territory into Northern Ethiopia and Egypt, respectively. The Somali-speaking peoples are found in Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya while the Fulani roam the West African Sahel from Senegal to the Sudan. There are the Maasai of Kenya and Tanzania and the Baggara who originated in Chad and extended their presence as far as the western banks of the Blue Nile in the Sudan. There is, of course, an impressive array of pastoral societies living in frontier regions or in more than one country.

Not only are some pastoral societies shared by more than one state, but some constitute whole nations within their states. The Dinka represent 10 % of the total population of the Sudan and think of themselves as a nation and so do the Beja who represent a strong regional political force in the Sudan. The Shilluk, the

Ankole, the Bunyoro and the Buganda states thrived well before the colonial legacy, and their exhibition of nationhood tendencies cannot be ignored. The same applies to the Affar, the Oromo and the Beni Amir who exhibit strong nationalist sentiments.

The imposition of modern administrative structures both during and after the colonial period has created contradictions between the state apparatus and elders and chiefs in pastoral societies. Societies, which according to Walter (1969), »lacking officers and specialized political roles, integrated by segmentary lineages, clans, age grades, religious associations or other corporate solidarities« were to accept the rule of centralized authorities. The focus of authority elders and chiefs was mobilized by the colonial regime as well as by the national states to organize labour for public tasks, tax collecting and conflict-resolution. Although these may resemble features of the state's responsibility, states are distinguished from chieftainship by centralization, role specialization of certain services and the nature and means of coercion authorized and exercised by the political community. The merging of new and old political systems and their social values was not accepted without resistance. Coercion more than persuasion, education, Christianity or Islam was in used to integrate pastoralists and other rebellious groups into the realm of the African state. Many features of traditional chiefdoms withered away and new administrative systems partially or totally replaced them which agitated traditional authorities attempting to find new roles or reinforcing the old ones. Resilience is sometimes difficult to persist and at times the winds of change are so swift that few traditional patterns and values continued. The new structures of government within the independent African states, created their own problems emanating from the high expectations placed on them.

Contradictions between state, society and nation emerged as the state began to intervene in every aspect of social and political life. The process of political modernization, the creation of parties, trade unions and co-operatives have hardly transcended the values inherent in local politics. In some cases it produced a blend of modern and traditional political values existing side by side. Hence, it created a

serious confrontation between the values inherent in the state structure and the values of political expression available to society. The state's role as an ultimate arbiter of political and social institutions is at times challenged for at least two reasons: first, the state is perceived by society as a provider of social services and goods which it in reality cannot satisfy for reasons emanating from underdevelopment and second, a contradiction between nation and state developed since the present national boundaries of most African states were artificial creations of colonialism. The fact that all wars in the African arid lands involve pastoralists (Dinka, Shilluk, Nuer, Beni Amir, Baggara, Somali, Affar, Berber) highlights the calamity of the situation and the intensity of the contradiction between the values of statehood and those of 'nationhood'. This always creates a crisis of identity especially in cases where pastoralists oscillate between adherence to local politics mediated by ethnicist ideology, on the one hand, and national politics of a narrowly perceived notion of a nation-state, on the other.


One explanation for the wars going on in the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Chad and the Spanish Sahara could be attributed to the state's intolerance towards the periphery and its insistence on integrating it into the mainstream political society at any expense. The centre versus region syndrome as I argue elsewhere (1985:48-9), is due to the fact that »since regions are open systems, a fact which is normally denied by central level politicians, much greater attention must be given to the economic factors influencing regional political activity for there are much closer links between economic inequality, public policy and anticontral attitudes«.

Issues of economic, social and cultural inequality are high on the agenda of all pastoralists fighting for liberation or political autonomy from the threshold of the African states. The centrality of the state therefore creates animosity and jeopardizes the process of national integration. Since this paper is not intended to offer detailed cases of contradictions between states and all resistant pastoralists, I use the case of the Sudan to illustrate some of the points which have been raised. The Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) and its political wing the Sudan Peoples Movement (SPLM) launched a war in 1983

against the central government of the Sudan. The reasons behind the war have their historical roots in the slave trade, colonial policies of 'divide and rule' and an unequal development maintained by successive national governments. Unlike the first war between the South and the North (1955-1972) which was for separation, this war is for the creation of a new Sudan. According to the SPLA/SPLM the concept of a New Sudan »strives to establish a new cultural order in the country. It takes as its point of departure the notion that human beings, in any given society, have equal rights and obligations regardless of colour,... etc. The establishment of the new cultural order demands of necessity a radical restructuring of state power to establish genuine democracy and follow a path of development that will lead to far-reaching social changes«. Furthermore, the majority of the SPLA/SPLM army consists of Dinka

pastoralists fighting, »to transform the Southern movement from a reactionary movement led by reactionaries to a progressive movement led by revolutionaries and dedicated to the socialist transformation of the whole country«. Apart from this ideological rhetoric, which is not within the grasp of the majority of non-educated Dinka and other Southern groups which support the SPLA/SPLM, there must be some concrete objectives as to what the struggle is all about. I argue elsewhere (Mohamed Salih, 1985: 48) that the reasons which militated the taking up of arms by the SPLA/SPLM are part of »a regional demand for an equal distribution of the limited resources of the country, autonomy to develop their own human and natural resources, recognition of cultural diversity, fair representation in the central government, and a clear solution to the problems of citizenship«. These political concerns are certain-

ly not much different from those held by the Eritreans, the Tigreans, or Oromos in their wars against the central state in Ethiopia. In the general situation of the pastoralists of the Horn of Africa, Markakis (1987; 1989) has clearly demonstrated that the African states are launching a crusade to integrate the parts of Africa which the colonialists were not able to incorporate into the mainstream national politics. Hence it could be inferred that given the class structure of the state mediated by its ethnicist tendencies pastoralists are more than Marx's notion of the peasants being »potatoes in a potato sack«. However, social differentiation among pastoral societies is a function of opposing interests between state and the civil society (Doornbos, 1989) and the ethnic cleavages which society deploys in the struggle over values and material resources are important to local level political culture and its accom-



Pastoralists in the market: Even though they receive meagre to nothing in terms of social services pastoralists contribute reasonable revenue to the running of the state. Photo: M.A. Mohamed Salih.

panying values of politico-social expression.

The state of nations in Africa is by and large a state of defiance and resistance against the authority of the central state. Hence, the contradiction between state and nation is compounded by another contradiction between societal interests and state policies. The lack of a system of two-way communication between the two levels of political participation has hindered the state's attempt to reach out to the populace in any meaningful sense. Attempts at political modernization have not resulted in the break-down of old suspicions, either, between ethnic groups or the hegemony of the states and the pastoralists quest for political autonomy.

Pastoralists and Democracy

Two messages in Baxter's (1985) »From Telling People to Listening to Them« deserve more attention in exploring the democratic venues available to pastoralists in the African context. Baxter (ibid. 2-3) has pointed out that, »first, African pastoralists represent a poorly organized minority of about 3% of the half billion, or so, Africans. Second, pastoralists are generally unpopular and are interfered with by governments and officials for a number of mixed and sometimes contradictory reasons«. One of such reasons is how the traditional political institution of pastoralists have either been exploited by the state apparatus to justify political intrusions or brutally manipulated to rebuke political opponents. As the planners were not listening to pastoralists by pretentiously holding themselves responsible for telling them how to conduct their lives, politicians were in the habit of mobilizing pastoralists for political goals inspired by party politics or an authoritarian one-party state. None of these two forms of political abuse can be accepted by pastoralists if democracy ruled over the use of state power to ensue undesirable policies. Moreover, the relationship between those who placed themselves in the position of telling people without listening to them is a relationship between unequals in which those who are compelled to listen are in a disadvantageous position.

Again in the particular case of the Sudan, I argue (1990a) in a chapter on »Pastoralists, Socialism and Democracy«, that,

»neither during the colonial period nor during independence have governmental policies been introduced among pastoralists in any democratic manner«. For example, the introduction of a native administration system was more for security and economic considerations than for extending a new vision of democratic rule among pastoralists. Cunnison (1966), argues that among the Baggara of the Sudan the creation of power positions was a challenge to traditional concepts of an egalitarian ideology in which leadership was exercised independently of territorial considerations. In Cunnison's (ibid. 147) words, »these power positions are more than leadership because the leadership in the past was independent of local considerations, the leader controlled not a stretch of land with people in it, but a lineage or an alliance of people wherever they might be«. This policy also resulted in the creation of a class of tribal chiefs favoured by the colonial state and which supported its endeavour to maintain peace and order, to collect taxes and to mediate in conflict-resolution. Among the Kakabish of Northern Kordofan, Asad, (1970:238) asserts that, »the maintenance of the monopoly of power has rested largely on the de facto control of the basic means of political administration over the tribe as a whole in which physical coercion or direct persuasion have played little role«. After independence in 1956, the leaders of the pastoral societies were incorporated into the emerging political parties, and the two largest political parties were supported by different pastoral communities. The Umma (National) Party gained support among the Baggara pastoralists of Western Sudan. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) was supported by the Beja and the Shukriya pastoralists. The national elections since independence revealed an intimate relationship between voters, behaviour, tribal origin and party affiliation. The pastoralists often voted for candidates from their own tribe, mainly for tribal sentiments or religious faith as in the case of the Umma party, the political arm of the Ansar sect or the DUP, the political expression of the Khatmiya religious sect. Liberal democracy created a form of civil dictatorship which ignored the aspirations of the local communities. Some tribal leaders were reported to have created enclaves of power outside the state, with corruption, nepotism and vulgar abuse of political

power. The pastoralists almost received diktats from their leadership and voted for the chiefly families. The question arises in Asad's (1970) questioning of whether the leaders of the pastoralists ruled by consent or coercion. Although Asad has not completely excluded the use of coercion, his analysis is useful in explaining the failure of the Sudanese political parties to ensure political modernization and transcend ethnic politics.

However, the main political changes which affected pastoral communities in the Sudan came with Numei's socialist reforms during the period between 1969 and 1976. The socialist programme aimed at modernizing the political practice and creating a new leadership capable of mobilizing the masses. A colonial heritage represented by the native administration system of 1922 was nominally abolished and a new system of peoples local government was enacted in 1971. The Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU) was established in the same year and was to replace the multi-party system and the corrupt practices of the sectarian political parties. However, when the traditional leadership recognized the threat posed to it by the new system they joined the opposition and rallied behind the sectarian parties. The tribal leaders who held the positions of *nazir* and *omda* which constituted the backbone of the native administration system were banned from political activities. Elections for the new political and administrative positions were held but without success in eliminating the ethnic character of the voting behaviour. According to Zaki (1987:214), »no two or more candidates from the same tribe competed for seats of their constituency in order to avoid the disintegration of the tribe and the division of the votes for that would increase the chances of success for candidates from other tribes«. In other words, the pastoralists had succeeded in transforming the objectives of the socialist programme which advocates »popular participation« into a function of tribal politics. Pastoralists have since then rendered themselves captives of a new breed of educated elites who cared less about their immediate problems and needs. The new leaders were not accepted by the pastoralists as serious contradictions between their value systems began to emerge. The new elites stood behind policies handed over to them by the state, and were

expected to tackle local issues of which they contrived to know little or nothing and propagated a political ideology alien to the pastoralists. It is a clear case of competing systems of political expression; one close to the heart of pastoralists and the other representing the dominant ideology which supports the conveyance of power to modern educated elites. It is only natural that the state was still dependent on the traditional leadership in conflict resolution and the repair of the social damage caused by its policies. It is important to recognize that the strength of the traditional leadership is derived from its appeal to local needs, shared sentiments, sectarian politico-religious ideology and the dominance of tribal political values which perceive the traditional leaders as legitimate and have the right to rule.

However, when the populace began to show some signs of political awareness, the peasants and pastoralists opted for more independence from the state. Members of the newly emerging political elite were infuriated when they felt rejected by the pastoralists and began to use the state machinery to curtail popular aspirations. The political elites effectively blocked the quest for any meaningful popular participation. Appeals for internal reforms were neglected and those who pleaded for democratic venues for democratic expression of political views were detained. The pattern emerging here is not different from the attitudes of the state development policies in which pastoralists were compelled to listen to those who promised development but furthered »underdevelopment« and promised participation but offered political repression instead. Both in political penetration and development implementation the quest, as Baxter (1986) put it, is for listening to people and responding to the means of political expression available to them.

The case of the Sudan has some wider implications for other pastoral societies. In his widely read »A Pastoral Democracy« Lewis (1961:3) argues that, »Somali pastoral democracy lies in kinship. The second basic principle is complementary to kinship as a form of social contract«. Furthermore, he argues that, »I do not claim that Somali political contract (*heer*) corresponds in all respects to any one of the many doctrines of the social contract and the political philosophers. But I do hold



The price of the above tank which was used in the assault against pastoral nomads by the state, can save thousands of lives in the drought and famine prone Sahel.

Photo: M.A. Mohamed Salih.

that it includes essentially contractual elements having closest affinities with these political theories which saw the origins of political union in an egalitarian society«. However, in the case of the Somali as well as among the Baggara (Cunnison, op cit) and the Kababish (Asad, op cit), such traditional contractual relations gave way to political abuses by tribal leaders. The continuity of certain tribal political institutions such as *dia* (blood compensation) paying groups, the elders role in the maintenance of peace and order during the liberal as well as the socialist one-party system indicates that matters of peace and order are important to any human society regardless of its level of political and economic development. In common with the Sudanese Socialist Union, the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party failed to implement its programme for the mobilization of the pastoralists who represent about 45-70% of the total population of Somalia. The state in Somalia began to use more coercive measures to favour one Somali clan over

the other. Social democracy which was inspired by assumed social and political injustices committed against pastoralists by the traditional leadership under the multi-party systems proved to be less acceptable and completely failed to realize either full participation or wider acceptance by pastoralists. The Somali promise to return to civilian rule is a clear indication of the state's appeal to the pastoralist nature of the Somali society.

It is, by now, obvious that neither liberal democracy nor social democracy appealed to pastoralists, and both have their misgivings by rendering them captives to the political desires of the educated political elites and their strive for power and resources. A situation of lack of representation is certainly a case for telling people rather than listening to them. This has thus far been the conventional wisdom which has led to pastoralists' lack of participation in the political arena as well as their absence from decision-making institutions in pastoral development ventures.

Pastoral Development and the State

Pastoral development like other areas of development is loosely defined and refers to different things and practices in different sociopolitical contexts. There is also the confusion of livestock development policies for pastoral development policies. Although the two have different connotations, they overlap, albeit with varying perceptions and target group or groups. Pastoral development is largely a social development activity aiming at the improvement of the standards of living of pastoralists through the provision of health, education, veterinary, water and other services together with institution-building for better systems of range management. Livestock development, on the other hand, is an economic activity based on cost recovery with the aim of achieving some or all of the following objectives: a) technical change and the introduction of new inputs such as medicine, vaccines, fodder farming and the use of engine power for watering, b) specialization and diversification through the adoption of modern production and management techniques and the specialization in livestock products such as dairy, milk, wool, hide etc., c) increasing ability to evade seasonality by transforming milk and meat into storable forms usually through technical advancement and specialization, d) developing, integrated market outlets responsive to national and international demands. By examining the state structure we can depict the forces behind such policies which are more interested in livestock than livestock raisers. The prime objective is to produce cheap livestock products for the urban dwellers whose alienation may trigger off protest and political unrests. The policy itself is appealing to international finance institutions because it fits into their perception of development. A second economic force behind livestock development policies is the newly emerging private owners of dairy farms and slaughter houses. In a sense, livestock development policies are designed to cater for the needs of the already wealthy and privileged.

The preoccupation of the African state with development means that its intervention in the economic sphere is imperative regardless of ideological orientation. An underdeveloped national private sector and a state operating under severe interna-

tional financial constraints refute any desire for commitment to a coherent ideology. Policy performance has, at best, favoured those who can help themselves without the state's help, and at worst has neglected both the deprived and the potential investor. The contradiction between the state policies and the rural population – peasants and pastoralists alike – can also be explained with respect to the centrality of the state. For example, in his »Pastoral Man in the Garden of Eden«, Århem (1985: 27) argues that in socialist Tanzania, »the development of state controlled beef ranches and dairy farms has steadily and increasingly channelled resources away from the pastoral producers... The history of the pastoral Maasai is a history of land loss and marginalization. The grazing land has been taken over by individual farmers, private companies and the state, usually in that order... The gap between rich and poor herders has widened«. Although Århem was concerned with an inclusive notion of conservation based on multiple land use, and sustainable eco-development, his chapter »the Tanzanian State and the Maasai« offers a useful insight into the three contradictions between state ideology, policy and local perception of resource management and maintenance. It, therefore, becomes evident that the state's control over the economy is also an explicit indication of the state's control over society. Moreover, the function of the state as a manager places it as a link between politics and economics. The state is not only a source of power, it also uses this power to enlarge the bureaucracy's economic base. This very nature determines a top-down approach which negates the pastoralists ability to organize themselves or perceive common goals with the state apparatus and its set of priorities.

A more revealing and complex case is that of the Shukriya agropastoralists whose predicament is analysed by Sørbo (1985) in his illuminating study of »Tenants and Nomads in Eastern Sudan«. The tenants in this case are the Nubian immigrants from Northern Sudan following the establishment of the Aswan Dam in 1965. The nomads are the Shukriya of the Butana who inhabit the territory between the Atbara River, the Blue Nile and the Nile proper. According to Sørbo (ibid. 101), »the evolution of the political structure



A pastoralists settlement destroyed by air bombardment during the Eritrean-Ethiopian war. Photo: M.A. Mohamed Salih.

seems to have been the outcome of a) internal processes of differentiation related to important features of the production system and b) the political support given to the Shukriya elite families by the state. Whereas powerful external state agencies have controlled the means of coercion, they have also to a large extent handed over control over non-pastoral means of

production to the Shukriya elite«. However, the immigrant Nubians were provided with modern housing, educational, health services and tenancies dependent on an input delivery system financed on credit by the state. The Nubians have had better access to education since the colonial times and being on the borders with Egypt, they have a long history of migra-

tion to urban centres and cities. They occupy not less than 20 % of the top hierarchy of the state apparatus and, as such, they are within easy reach of policy and decision-making institutions within the state. Following the same line of argument, Hale (1988: 280-81) asserts that, »Nubians, then, played a major role in creating, through at least one apparatus – the edu-

cation system – the dominant ideology of the state«. The powerful Shukriya elites, on the other hand, were originally the creation of the colonial regime and the native administration system. This, I argue, has created a leadership which perceives protest against the state policy as a challenge to the rule of law. This is natural since during the colonial period, it was difficult

to distinguish between a protest to improve the lot of the local population and a challenge to overthrow foreign rule, not to mention the colonialist suspicion of any signs of rebellion. During independence, the pastoralists were still not able to coordinate resistance to the state or play one political opponent off against the other. Sørbo (op. cit) and Asad (op. cit) have rightly described the relationship between the pastoralists and their leadership as a patron/client relationship in which there is little if any room for political manoeuvre. The Shukriya elites, therefore, are managers of local politics and they have invaluable knowledge in responding to problems emerging within this arena. They are, however, not in a strong political position to manipulate the state apparatus to realize the demands of their subjects. Unlike the tenants on whose behalf the state borrowed millions of dollars to develop the New Halfa scheme and has an obligation to international capital, the pastoralists operate with little intervention in the form of veterinary services and water points. The case of the New Halfa Scheme demonstrates that the financial intervention of the state in agropastoral development is not a mere attempt to provide technical solution to the constraints of production, but a political activity expressing the nature of the state and of the social groups whose interest it serves. In the final analysis, development involves sectoral biases which imply social and political biases as well.

Although there are many more cases to illustrate the relationship between the nature of the state and pastoral development policies, no analysis would be complete without looking into the so-called most successful state intervention in livestock development in Africa. The case of Botswana is still one which creates nothing less than mixed feelings between commercialization and conservation. In their »commercialization of Livestock and Differentiation of People in Ngamiland«, Hinderink and Sterkenburg (1987) made a distinction between four social groups: a) marginalized households with no access to or have inadequate resources. These form a reserve for local wage labour and migrants to towns and the mining industry, b) poor peasants who diversify their sources of income by owning a very small number of cattle, c) middle peasants who combine or supplement ranching with arable culti-

vation and sell a substantial proportion of their production and d) large cattle ranchers, i.e. those with more than one hundred head of cattle and who usually combine well paid urban positions in government, politics and private business with their pastoral activities. According to the authors (p. 202), »the big cattle and ranch owners are the least numerous and at the same time the most influential group in Ngamiland. Representing about 5 % of the population, they control roughly one third of the district's livestock resources... those who combine stock-ranching with some political office (at the district and national level)« have much easier access to credit and the decision-making apparatus. No wonder that, the establishment of commercial ranches in Ngamiland encountered serious problems and caused painstaking process of political haggling whereby large herd owners used their considerable political influence both on the Tswana Land Board and the national level to pursue their private interests. When evaluated against the interest of the small producers, it is found that »power relations are of utmost importance for the concentration of cattle in the hands of the privileged minority«. Although the commercialization policy has succeeded in increasing production, exports and foreign exchange earnings, its impacts on soil, the environment and social differentiation are staggering.

The case of Botswana evidently has much relevance for Kenya (1968; Raikes, 1981; Hjort, 1982; 1989; Dahl, 1982; Baxter, 1990) and Nigeria (Frantz, 1975; Awogbade, 1983; Waters-Bayer, 1988; Mohamed Salih, 1990b) where land administration, control and use policies have served the interests of the already wealthy and powerful groups within the state apparatus. Baxter (1990) and Hjort (1989) have particularly emphasized that state policies have undermined individual household security and relegated pastoral communities to a situation of mass regional instability militated by ecological stress and food shortages and a looming famine. Again state policies were considered out of touch with the pastoralists' needs, aspirations and perception of production objectives. This also occurred under malformed political structures which are incapable of fulfilling the promise of pastoralists participation in policy formulation.

It appears that a pattern can be established in which the lack of access to the state apparatus is a hindrance to pastoralists' ability to influence decision-making or to mobilize themselves as a pressure group. This may also lead to the questioning of the avenues of political expression available to pastoralists in their resistance to state policies. The contradictions between state, society and the field of interest are compounded by divergent perceptions of subsistence security and local political responsibility vis-a-vis profitability and centrality of decision-making. In such circumstances, society and state may not perceive common goals and objectives.

Conclusion

The relationship of the African state to pastoralists has much in common with its relationship to the wider society. Societal interests have often been sacrificed either for alien technical arrangements to introduce planned change or political interests not congruent with those of the pastoralists. Doornbos (1989: 17) summarizes the relationship of the African state to society by asserting that, »with respect to the uncertain search for state identity that drew so much attention in the early days after independence, one wonders in retrospect whether the stress on nation-building and national unity at the time reflected a genuine desire to create a new 'national' society, or whether it constituted the beginning of an ideological defence of the colonial heritage which had become the state system«. I add that such colonial heritage includes a centralized state apparatus intolerant to local initiative and self-realizing political structures. The pervasiveness of the state hinges in an oscillation between coercive measures to curb discontent and resistance, on the one hand, and the state's adherence to faulty distributive mechanisms which perpetuate protest. As Doornbos (ibid. p.12), has correctly argued, »'state' and 'civil society', which in other contexts can be strongly interwoven and complementary, in deeply polarized situations can become each other's opposites and opponents, with shifting boundaries between them«. In that sense, African pastoralists more than other sections of the civil society have been in continuous opposition to the state since societal interests are more often misconceived, if not totally disregarded, by

the state. Popular resistance in the extreme form of liberation movements or the milder form of popular movements and the creation of corporate groups outside the state's domain of activity are only a few expressions of pastoralist's dissatisfaction with state policies and the interest groups behind them.

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Truly indigenous: the Berbers of North Africa

By Kusyel Tissas

The issue of indigenous peoples in Africa is a notoriously difficult one to address as many activists know. Although the African continent is far from blessed with an absence of exploitation of one ethnic group by another, what makes the situation so difficult is that in most cases, the parties to a conflict are all able to claim that they are indigenous. At any rate, this is true according to the very restrictive definition of the concept of »indigenous people« which includes the character of first nation. *The Gaia Atlas of First Peoples* (1) in its map (pp. 18-19) representing »where are first peoples«, lists a number of groups in Africa, but adds that »the distinct indigenous peoples of Africa (...) do not fall within the strict definitions of indigenous used in this book«. A clear distinction is thus made between indigenous peoples in Africa and indigenous peoples elsewhere. Of course, the enlarged (working) definition of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations which takes into account the marginalisation and isolation of certain groups who are not necessarily first nations is the one that is usually accepted for Africa.

Yet, true examples of the first group do exist. Apart from the obvious case of South Africa which, owing to its very seriousness, is rarely dealt with within the framework of indigenous rights, one can also consider

the populations of southern Sudan as falling into the category of an indigenous population »invaded«, or colonised, by outsiders; indeed more and more people today see the Nuba Mountains in this light. Still, this only works if one considers that all the so-called »Arabs« of Sudan are indeed of Arab origin, when in reality many, perhaps most, of them are arabised *indigenous* Sudanese. Nevertheless the situation is close enough to the stricter definition.


However, there is one case which, paradoxically, is so conspicuous that it is almost never noticed nor, indeed, recognised. It is that of the Berbers of North Africa. In spite of the millions of tourists from all over the world who flock to Morocco and Tunisia (if not to Algeria and Libya) every year and take delight in visiting not only Marrakech and Agadir but also the ancient villages of the Atlas mountains where they revel in centuries old culture, most people are comforted in their belief that North Africa is peopled by Arabs. Yet, in almost every respect, the Berber case resembles that of the first nations of the American continent.

In recent years much attention has been drawn to the plight of the Tuareg (2) and yet nowhere is it explained that the Tuareg are one of several groups which constitute the Berber nation, the indigenous popula-

tion of North Africa whose territory extended from the Atlantic Ocean to Egypt until the arrival of the Arabs in the seventh century (3).

The Berbers today live in a vast area, extending over several countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria. It is impossible to give precise figures of their numbers because, although they are not always in the position of a numerical minority, in all cases they are politically marginal. In the southern countries (Mali, Niger, Nigeria) the Tuareg have been, since independence, treated with contempt and excluded from much of national life, a fact which greatly contributed to the recent hostilities. In the northern states and in Mauritania their very existence has been denied, a not inefficient way of perpetrating ethnocide. The harshness of the treatment has in turn generated a resistance rooted in a national and cultural awareness which might have faded away had conditions not been so desperate.

The Berbers (4) are famous for their survival instinct. Thirteen centuries after the Arabs first came to North Africa, they have converted to Islam, learnt the language of the conquering culture, even helped spread Islam both northwards and southwards, and yet they have succeeded



in keeping intact their language and much of their very distinctive customs and social organisation, albeit in a state of semi-entrenchment.

Officially – that is when governments recognise their existence – there are around 17% of Berbers in Algeria and between 30 and 40% in Morocco; a tiny number in Libya and relics of Berber culture in Tunisia. The reality, however, is more complex. According to almost all historians today, the number of Arabs who came to North Africa between the seventh and the eleventh centuries was comparatively small (5). All demographic adjustments made, the percentage of people of Arab stock in present-day North Africa is almost insignificant. But a process of arabisation has taken place and a large number of North Africans see themselves as Arabs and identify with the so-called Arab world. Identity is a matter of awareness and in

recent years Berber identity has also made significant headway. Few people now refer to North Africans as Arabs and Berbers but as Berber speakers and Arabic speakers.

In the absence of statistics (no serious census ever took place even during the colonial period) one is reduced to guesswork. At the turn of the century, the colonial administration estimated that the two groups were roughly equal in number in Algeria. This was however before the conquest of the Sahara and only the northern Berber populations were taken into account. Several decades of underestimation of the number of Berbers, added to official policies which refuse to even acknowledge their existence, have made certain prejudices very hard to shake. Today, even Berber analysts themselves, perhaps in order to prevent any doubts being cast on their objectivity, greatly underestimate the per-

centage of Berber *speakers* in the population of North Africa (6).

If one can safely say that Tunisia is almost entirely arabised and that Berber speakers there can only be found in the island of Djerba and a dozen villages in the south – amounting to about 100,000 persons for a population of about 8 million – in Morocco and Algeria the situation is very different. In most estimates, only the populations of the *exclusively* Berber areas are taken into account. These pockets can be found all over North Africa and they are administratively easier to define. They are however regions of very high emigration and people who hail from them can be found throughout the Maghreb as well as in many European countries. There may be over half a million Berber speakers in France alone and Paris is today the most important Berber city in the world.

No allowance is made for a very high rate

of bilingualism and many areas outside the Berber pockets are usually considered Arab and treated as such in the »statistics«. As an example, Algiers is seen as an Arab city, if only because of its status as the capital of Algeria and the seat of the official Arab-Islamist ideology. Yet, it is only a stone's throw (about 50km) from Kabylia, the most important Berber area in Algeria, and an overwhelming majority of its population originates from there. In reality Algiers is a heavily bilingual city. Typically, most bilingual north Africans are considered Arabs. The percentage of Berber speakers in Algeria, therefore approaches 50% and in Morocco it is anywhere between 60 and 70% of the approximately 25 million population which is roughly equal to that of Algeria. Libya keeps a very opaque veil on its population statistics as on anything else, and in a country which vociferously proclaims its Arabness it is to be expected that the same attitude towards anything Berber prevails as in Algeria, particularly during the rule of President Houari Boumediene. All manifestations of Berber identity are savagely repressed by Tripoli, but large areas such as Zouara and Jebel Nefussa in the north, or Ghadames in the south, are still great bastions of Berber culture in Libya. Together with an unknown number of bilingual semi-nomads and an equally unknown number of Tuareg in the south, they form a sizeable proportion of the Libyan population, whose real importance can only be appreciated when a democratic regime is established – or if a major revolt takes place.

It can be derived from the above that unlike similar cases in other Islamic countries, the most notable of which being that of the Kurds, Berbers are not identified with a separate territory, rather with *territories* which are exclusively their own, within the region. They share the rest of the land with other, mostly Arabic-speaking, populations. These pockets are a product of both history and geography, and they account for a large part of today's differences between Berbers of different states. They also account for the lack, at least until very recent times, of a unified – universal – Berber identity.

Algeria has several such pockets. Kabylia east of Algiers, Aures south of Constantine, Chenoua near Cherchell, Ghardaia, Gourara further south, and the Tassili

and Hoggar mountains deep in the Sahara, are the main ones. In Morocco, the Rif in the north, the Higher Atlas, the Middle Atlas and the Anti-Atlas, in the centre, the Beni Znassen near the Algerian border, contain the bulk of the Berber population. In Mauritania many of the ruling tribes in the north and the south, although they use Hassaniya Arabic in their communication with the outside world, are still largely Berber-speaking in spite of an important stigma attached to the Berber language.

The indigenous inhabitants of the Canaries, the Guanches, were Berbers, a fact established recently (1992) by a discovery, in Tenerife, of a stone engraved with Berber characters similar to *tifinagh*, the writing system used by modern Tuareg. The Guanches were almost entirely exterminated by the Spanish invaders of the islands in the 14th and 15th centuries and their descendants have been assimilated to the Spanish-speaking population. They have converted to Christianity – much like the majority of north Africans before the Arab invasion. Evidence of the size of Berber territory before the advent of Islam can be found in one surviving Berber-speaking oasis in Egypt, Siwa, near the Libyan border. Southwards, the Tuareg, true nomads and renowned craftsmen, cover a vast area which extends to Nigeria. Altogether, there are believed to be about three million Tuareg.

This geographical fragmentation has helped the separate cultural and linguistic development of these various groups (7). A strong dialectalisation has taken place in the Berber language, and in some cases mutual intelligibility is difficult. The differences are only as important as one's ideology permits and they could be similar to those between Norwegian and Danish or Spanish and Catalan, perhaps more accurately, to those between the German dialects. The use of colloquial Arabic in larger communication, the division of the Berber territory into several nation-states, a long isolation of some groups and absence of communication between them, and above all, very repressive policies in practically all the states, all combine to produce a very weak sense of common identity, common history and common purpose among the various Berber groups. Until recent years.

The officially Arab identity of the north African states (excluding, of course, Mali and Niger) although established at inde-

pendence (1956 for Morocco and Tunisia, 1960 for Mauritania and 1962 for Algeria; Libya became an independent monarchy in 1949) is in fact the result of several conflicts going back to the nineteenth century. Its main origins are the Arab renaissance movement known as the Nahda which was used by some nationalists as a source of inspiration in the fight against colonial rule. The strongest impetus was given to it by the pretensions of Napoleon III, an admirer of Levantine culture, to create a vast *Arab kingdom* in northern Africa under his suzerainty. Later, although the anti-colonial movement was spearheaded by Berbers(8), panarabists succeeded in taking over, and in the case of Algeria, often by physically eliminating the Berber leaders. Once the Berbers nearly succeeded in establishing an autonomous state. Between 1921 and 1926, Abdelkrim Khattabi, succeeded in liberating large areas of the Rif mountains in northern Morocco from the Spanish colonial power and created what was known as the Rif Republic. He was only defeated when an alliance of Spanish and French forces outnumbered and outgunned him in 1926. He remains one of the great symbols of Berber, but also of North African, nationalism.

During the Algerian war, President Gamal Abd al-Nasser of Egypt and his sidekick Fathi ad-Dib, the head of the notorious Egyptian secret service, Al-Mukhabarat, managed to control – and manipulate – Ahmed Ben Bella(9) who became a great admirer of the Egyptian leader. At his release from a French prison in 1962, he made in Tunis the ominous declaration »We are Arabs! we are Arabs! we are Arabs!« And when, a few months later, Ben Bella forced his way into power with the help of a radical panarabist, the Al-Azhar (Islamic university of Cairo) and Zaytuna (Islamic university of Tunis) educated Houari Boumediene, he was sure to espouse all the ingredients of Nasser's flavour of Arab nationalism. Arab-Islamic nationalism became the official ideology of the state and remains so today.

With their distinct social systems and political ideologies, the north African states had Arab-Islamism in common. Mauritania whose existence was at one time threatened by Moroccan claims, soon fell under the influence of Algeria. Under Boumediene's guidance it embarked upon a process of arabisation which made no conces-

sions to Berbers, and Negro-Africans alike. The Halpulaar (Fulani), Wolof, Soninke populations were equally slighted and the regime under successive leaders came closer and closer first to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, then to Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Mauritania, Algeria and Libya espoused similar ideologies. The Berber issue brought them all closer to Niger and Mali. For, after Berber nationalist agitation in the north the Tuareg were becoming the next threat. Whatever the divergence of interests in these countries, they were united by a common threat and Algeria's role in this issue remains of central importance.

In Morocco, Berber nationalist feelings very early were embodied by a large populist party, the Mouvement Populaire (Popular Movement) and its charismatic leader, Mahjoub Aherdane. It is really rather a rural political party but since the overwhelming majority of rural populations are Berber, it is easy for the two concepts to overlap. After a series of revolts and attempts on his life, King Hussein learnt his lesson and proceeded to liberalise Moroccan political life, allowing a multi-party system to exist and a higher level of freedom of expression than in neighbouring states. By doing this he managed to ease most of the tensions including Berber nationalist claims.

In Libya and in Algeria the Arab-Islamic ideology suffered no dissent. In Algeria, a more sophisticated state by any standards, a long tradition of political resistance exists, with several landmarks such as the so-called Berber crisis in the nationalist movement in 1949(10). President Boumediene remembered it well and immediately began his own crusade – if not jihad – against any sign of heterodoxy. He ruthlessly suppressed any modest expression of Berber identity(11) and proceeded to implement an ambitious, ill-conceived and disastrous policy of arabisation. An illegitimate regime, Boumediene's tried to acquire legitimacy in several ways: Arab nationalism and staunch support of all Arab causes, development and socialism (12) and, of course, Islam and support of the Islamists. The latter is at the root of the development of the current Islamic movement. All these policies had only one purpose, one *raison d'être*, the »de-berberisation« of the country. Today, the Islamists often identify Berberists with atheism, de-

mocracy, and other similarly evil things. It is no surprise that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) during the municipal elections of 1990 and the first round of the legislative elections of 1991 were totally excluded from Kabylia and the M'Zab, two of the most important Berber regions of Algeria.

Throughout the 1970s Berber agitation in Algeria developed at a rate matched only by the repression of which young Berbers were the subjects. This so-called Berber Cultural Movement (MCB)(13) had ramifications in France and also in Morocco among the intellectual elite. When it culminated in 1980 with the insurrection of Kabylia(14), which became known as the Berber Spring and which nearly succeeded in bringing down the regime, ripples were sent throughout the entire region. Hassan II very quickly announced that he was to create an institute of Berber studies in Morocco(15). Clearly an exercise in damage control, this project is yet to materialise.

Having succeeded in putting down the revolt, first by promises which were quickly reneged on by the government, then, when sufficient control was regained, by repression, the Algerian government then began a process of dismantlement of the Berber movement. Many civil servants were removed from their jobs and replaced by Arabs, veritable contingents of Arabic speakers and Middle Eastern Arabs were given jobs in Berber areas in an attempt to change the demographic balance. But all the time, the eyes of the regime were turned to another potential threat which had always been lurking in the background: the Tuareg. Northern Berbers and especially the Kabyles saw the Tuareg in a way not very different from the European romantic myth of the Blue Men. They considered them the purest Berbers because the least arabised, and looked to them more than to any other group for support in the continuance of the struggle for Berber identity. This attitude is shared by the authorities in Algiers which exercised great caution in their dealings with the Tuareg. Although kept at arm's length, the Tuareg however always benefitted from a certain, albeit limited, indulgence from the Algerian state (helped sometimes by sympathetic Kabyle civil servants). Providing them with shelter in Algeria in times of drought in the southern countries, gave the Algiers regime a pretext for supporting policies designed to sedentarise them.

The outbreak of hostilities in Niger and Mali were seen with a worried eye by the Algerian authorities which did everything they could to mediate and reach a settlement. But in September 1990 a meeting in Tamanrasset (Algeria) of the heads of state of Algeria, Mali, Niger and Libya, clearly designated the Tuareg as a great regional security risk. The leaders differed only on the ways to eradicate the revolt. Algeria having succeeded in keeping peace with the Tuareg for many years wanted its example to be followed. But this is to ignore the degree of anti-Tuareg hostility which exists in Mali and Niger. Libya's Colonel Kadhafi who in the past tried to enrol Tuareg in his Islamic legion is too busy seeking ways of exercising pressure on Bamako and Niamey (whose uranium he covets) to sincerely desire peace. Mauritania, the most controversial of them, is worried about its own Negro-African population and has no sympathy for the rulers of Mali or Niger. Its granting shelter to the Tuareg will allow it to control the latter and perhaps, even, to arabise them.

The policies of arabisation have been disastrous to the education, the economy and generally to cultural life in all the countries where they were implemented. Algeria remains a showcase of that failure. Its economy is totally devastated and prospects for a recovery are very bleak. A huge proportion of its population is now under the age of thirty and almost totally uneducated and therefore incapable of taking over. An entire generation has been thrown into the arms of the Islamic extremists whose enemies are democracy, the West and... the Berbers(16). The official, so-called national, language is Classical Arabic (Modern Standard) which is the native tongue of no one in North Africa. In fact even Arabic speakers whose mother tongue is Maghrebi Colloquial are slighted by the policy. But Berbers are threatened with cultural death and sometimes with physical disappearance too. Often a minority, in some cases a politically-dominated majority, whether »closet Berbers« or aggressive activists for their cultural autonomy, the Berbers are fighting for their survival as a nation. They succeeded to postpone the end and slow down the erosion by maintaining an extremely lively culture, but at the age of rapid global communications, the end can be nearer. Or, for the first time in modern history the largest

and most threatened indigenous people in Africa will succeed in re-creating its identity and its – at least cultural – unity.


Notes

- 1) Julian Burger et. al. 1990. *The Gaia Atlas of First Peoples. A Future for the Indigenous World.* Foreword by Maurice F. Strong. London, Robertson McCarta Ltd for Gaia Books Ltd.
- 2) e.g. IWGIA Newsletter No. 62, December 1990.
- 3) For a good survey of the history of North Africa see Charles-André Julien. 1952-75. *Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord* Vol 1, *Des origines à la conquête arabe* and Vol 2, *De la conquête arabe à 1830*; also, 1952. *L'Afrique du Nord en marche.*
- 4) see Gabriel Camps. 1980. *Berbères aux marges de l'histoire.* Toulouse: Hespérides.
- 5) Gabriel Camps. 1984. «Avertissement. Les mécanismes de l'arabisation» in *Encyclopédie Berbère* I, p.43
- 6) e.g. Salem Chaker. 1989. *Berbères aujourd'hui.* Paris: L'Harmattan.
- 7) Most Berbers are identified, and identify themselves, by the region in which they live. Apart from those of the Moroccan Atlas who call themselves *Imazighen* (sing. *Amazigh*, fem. and name of the language *Tamazight*) and the Tuareg who use the same word pronounced differently (*Tamasheq*, *Tamazeq*), most others are called Kabyles (from Kabylia), Chaouis (from Aures), Shilha (from the Higher Atlas) or Riffis (from Rif). The word *amazigh*, the real Berber word for «Berber» which is a foreign derivation, is now universally used by Berberists. Its use is synonymous with awareness of Berber identity and with Berber nationalism. Hence the very utterance of that word in Algeria under Boumediene was punishable with prison.
- 8) Ageron, Charles-Robert. 1971. *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine.* Paris: PUF. Aït Ahmed, Hocine. 1983. *Mémoires d'un combattant.* Paris: Sylvie Messinger; Courrière, Yves. 1967-1971. *La guerre d'Algérie.* 4 Vol. Paris: Fayard; Harbi, Mohammed. 1980. *FLN, mirage et réalité.* Paris: Jeune Afrique; et esp.: Ouerdane, Ramdane. 1990. La question berbère dans le mouvement national algérien. Sillery (Québec): Septentrion.
- 9) It is extraordinary to see today, after thirty years and countless books and articles on the history of the Algerian War, that Ben Bella is invariably referred to as *the* leader of the struggle. In fact he was only one of the *Chefs historiques* (historical leaders) of the Algerian liberation party, FLN, and spent most of the war years in prison. The FLN leadership was collegial and the military zones inside the country (wilayas) were autonomous. Ben Bella seized power by force after independence and created the myth of his leadership. Once again, old habits die hard.
- 10) In the late 1940s a group of young and dynamic leaders within the main nationalist party PPA-MTLD, decided to oppose the panarab policies of the autocratic head of the party, Hadj Messali. The latter, who in the past (1934) had opposed a French government law in Morocco (Berber Dahir) which gave an important role to Berber customary law alongside Islamic law, claimed that the document was one stage of the Berberisation of North Africa; this in turn was a step further towards the «evangelisation of three fifths of Morocco». Messali strongly opposed the secular «Berberists» whom he accused of being atheist-materialists. The only way to combat them was therefore to arabise the country.
- 11) Young Berbers were arrested and often tortured only for saying that they were Berber.
- 12) Official policies were often described in an amalgamation of concepts such as Islamic socialism, Arab-Islamic culture with a socialist vocation etc., the simplest being the Algeria's specific socialism.
- 13) Since independence this very loosely structured movement is responsible for a veritable Berber cultural revival. A new, dynamic, Berber literature (written in Latin script), a new, modern, music as well as numerous sociological and linguistic studies are examples of the achievements. They are designed to prepare the ground for cultural autonomy which is, at the same time, sought by political means.
- 14) In April 1980, after several years of

government harassment and vexations Kabylia erupted. Under the pressure of the Islamists and the Baathists the authorities in Algiers had been eroding all remaining public expressions of Berber culture: they reduced broadcasting hours of the only Berber language station of Algiers radio and its watt-power, imposed a quota of Arab singers in popular festivals in Berber areas (where no one can understand them), prohibited the only tolerated course in Berber at the university of Algiers and arrested anyone suspected of «Berberism». The banning of a conference on ancient Berber poetry at the university centre of Tizi Ouzou (provincial capital of Kabylia) sparked off several days of riots. The history of this *Berber Spring* is still to be written but its significance in the development of a democratic movement in Algeria is undeniable (see Salem Mezhoud «Glasnost the Algerian Way. The part of the Berber Nationalists in the Political Reforms» in G. Joffe (ed.) *Forthcoming. North Africa and the Nation-State. Proceedings of the 1989 Conference. SOAS, University of London.* London: Routledge).

- 15) One of the main demands of the Berberists is the ability to study their language and culture even if only at university level in a first stage. A chair of Berber existed at the university of Algiers in colonial times but it was abolished by the government of independent Algeria. Many efforts to have it re-established, especially by Professor Mouloud Mammeri the last incumbent, were unsuccessful. For three decades Berber was taught in many foreign universities but nowhere in North Africa. In 1990, in the wake of the democratic process in Algeria, a course was created at the university of Tizi Ouzou (Kabylia). Independent and party newspapers also deliberately violated the press laws and published sections in the Berber language.
- 16) In 1990 a leader of the FIS called for a jihad against Kabylia and another complained that whenever he wanted to go from one side of Algeria to another he had to «cross Europe» (Kabylia).

□



- West Africa:** "The Tuaregs in West Africa", December 1990
"Tuareg Treaty", 1991:1.
- Botswana:** "Game Park vs. the San", 1991:1
- Tanzania:** "Hadzabe: Hunters in a Field of Corn", 1991:1.
"The Indigenous Peoples Question in Africa with specific reference to Tanzania", 1991:2
"Statement of KIPOC, NGO for Pastoral Peoples, Northern Maasailand, Tanzania", 1991:2.
"First Maasai conference on culture and development", 1992:1.
- The Horn of Africa:** Focus articles, 1991:3.
- Sudan:** "Destroying Ethnic Identity. The secret war against the Nuba", 1992:1.

in

IWGIA Newsletters

The Universal Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Mali's Peace Treaty; a comparison

By Gunnvor Berge

Is the violent conflict between Tuareg rebels and the Malian government moving toward a peaceful solution? After 2 years of fighting, insecurity, rebel attacks and army reprisals against the civil population, a peace treaty was signed on 11 April 1992. The peace treaty signed between Tuareg rebels and the Malian government demonstrates the relevance of the UN's »Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples« in Africa.


The Peace Treaty and the Universal Declaration compared

The Tuareg rebellion is one of the less known violent conflicts on the African continent (see IWGIA Newsletter no. 62, 1990, and 1/1991 for articles on the background and the development of the conflict). The Tuaregs are originally pastoralist people living in the Sahara desert and its fringes. Today they find their home territory divided between five different countries: Mali Niger, Algeria, Libya and Burkina Faso. The rebellion that started in Niger in May 1990 soon spread to Mali. The present fighting between government soldiers and rebels, and the extrajural executions, massacres and arrests of civilians have mainly been limited to these two countries. But the conflict touches several other bordering countries as the fighting has forced many civilian Tuaregs to flee, mainly to Mauritania, Algeria and Burkina Faso (1). Furthermore, one of the Malian rebel leaders has lately established a camp in a disputed area in Burkina, thus augmenting the tension between Mali and

Burkina Faso. The level of conflict and the scale of human misery are undoubtedly greater in countries like Liberia, Somalia or Sudan at present, however one should be aware that a reasonable fear of an escalation and a resulting »Libianisation, Liberianisation or Somalisation« is keenly felt in Mali today (Les Echos no. 208, 9. Nov. 1992:1).

Whereas the situation in Niger seems far from a solution, in Mali Tuareg rebels and the government signed a peace treaty, in Mali in April 1992 referred to as the 'Pacte National'. The aim of the peace treaty is to create peace in Mali's three northern regions, where the majority of the Tuareg live and at the same time save Mali as a state. This is to be accomplished through the Malian government accepting some sort of special status for the country's three northern regions. This rather unique peace treaty was ratified by Alpha Oumar Konaré, the first democratically elected president in Mali since 1968, in 1993, and the reestablishment of peace in the north is deemed the most important pressing issue to be handled by his government. In November, 1992, the peace treaty was given support by the large majority of Tuareg rebel movements.

The peace treaty, a 26-page document divided into 7 parts, lays out in general terms the final results of the peace process. It sets out examples of a peace process, such as a demilitarized democratic semi-sovereign Northern Mali where democratically elected northerners are in power, and where Northern Mali has equal access



with the rest of the country to important goods. It also suggests ways of achieving this, for example, by a (slow) withdrawal of Malian troops from the north; democratic elections; increased development efforts in the region both through the participation of foreign donors and NGOs; and by increasing the percentage of Mali's GNP to the area. Joint 'commissions' where rebels, Malian authorities and mediators are all represented, are to be created to ensure that the treaty is carried out.

Parts of the peace treaty have relevance only to the solution of the conflict in Mali. Other parts, however, easily lend themselves to a comparison with the United Nation's 'Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples' currently being drafted (see IWGIA Yearbook 1991: 149-156 for an overview of this declaration).

Of central concern to Tuaregs is of course the right to live in peace, regardless of ethnic origin. Operative Paragraph 6 of the Universal Declaration states that indigenous peoples have the collective right to exist in peace and security and to be protected against genocide, as well as individual rights of security of person. In the treaty, though not stated explicitly, this point is addressed through the proposed creation of 'mixed brigades'. An equal number of rebels and soldiers from the Malian army are to take part in these brigades. Through their mixed composition it is hoped that they will inhibit violence on both sides.

An oft-voiced Tuareg complaint against

the South is that the North has been left outside the common development efforts of the country. In part IV of the treaty this is officially accepted and amendments suggested. A special development programme with the explicit aim to level differences between the North and other parts of the country within a 10 year time frame, is to be formulated and implemented. Thus national unity is to be fulfilled. Draft Operative Paragraph 13 of the Universal Declaration states that indigenous peoples have the right to adequate financial and technical assistance from states and through international cooperation, to pursue their economic, social and cultural development. Equally relevant here is Draft Operative Paragraph 19: »The right to special State measures for...improving their (indigenous peoples') social and economic conditions«.

Operative Paragraph 1 of the Universal Declaration states that indigenous peoples have a right to self-determination. As mentioned earlier, the peace treaty grants the north special status within the frame of the Malian nation-state. Part III of the peace treaty provides details of what is meant by special status for the three northern regions of Mali. These are administration with elected offices to be responsible for, among other things, development issues. But it is not only elected bodies at the local level which are to be granted some autonomy. The three northern regions are also to have an elected body taking up issues of inter-regional relevance. Other parts of Mali have no such parallel body. Paragraph 27 in the Universal Declaration deals with the question of autonomy within a nation-state, as it states rights to self-determination in matters dealing with internal social and cultural factors, as well as administration and the use of land and resources. Finally, Paragraph 16 states indigenous peoples' individual and collective rights to own, control and use territories that they have traditionally exploited.


A controversial issue in the first peace treaty signed on January 6th, 1991, and soon broken by both parties involved, guaranteed the North the right to have decisive influence over negotiations with foreign donors, a right that is granted to indigenous peoples through Draft Operative Paragraph 20 of the Universal Declaration. This issue has, however, been left out of the present (and second) peace treaty of

11th April, 1992, showing just how controversial it is.


Another important issue in part IV of the peace treaty, is that the government is to make an effort to hire administrators from the North. Until now, the populations of the North have to a great extent been administered by people from the south, with little knowledge of the customs, traditions or language of the North. The right to be governed by one's own people are touched upon in several of the paragraphs

of the Universal Declaration (such as Draft Operative Paragraph 23, Draft Operative Paragraph 22 b, Draft Operative Paragraph 20), as it is seen as one of the measures by which indigenous peoples are to achieve real influence over their lives.

Several issues that are of great concern to the Tuaregs, while not dealt with in the peace treaty, are addressed in the Universal Declaration. The right to cross boundaries between states so as to maintain traditional trade and social exchanges (Draft



Tuareg. Photo: Gisle Grahl-Jacobsen



Tuareg people. Photo: Gisle Grahl-Jacobsen

Operative Paragraph 26) (2), the right to participate on equal footing with other citizens at state level (Draft Operative Paragraph 22), and the right to continue a traditional way of life (Draft Operative Paragraph 14) being cases in point.

As a curiosity, it can be mentioned that Paragraph 9 in the Universal Declaration states that indigenous peoples have the right to designate and maintain the original names of communities. Tuareg rebels generally refer to the area covered by the treaty as Azawad. In the treaty the question of the naming of Azawad is discussed. The government is willing to accept such a designation of the country's three northern regions, but only after a referendum where the majority of the votes cast accept the name.

Is a solution at hand?

Applying the concept of indigenous peoples to ethnic groups in Africa may easily lead the discussion astray. Whereas written history shows that Tuaregs inhabited the Sahara several hundred years ago, and tiffinagh rock writing -the written language of the Tuareg - dates as far back as the first millennium before Christ, there is much doubt as to whether Tuaregs were the original inhabitants of the area. The point in comparing the peace treaty and the Universal Declarations is to demonstrate the structural similarity between problems facing indigenous peoples and Tuareg nomads, and the fact that many of them need

to be solved at the state level. There are clear enough parallels for us to ask whether certain African peoples structurally can be said to be indigenous peoples. If the answer is yes, the next step is to discuss whether this structural similarity should imply that minorities more generally ought to be granted the same right and protection that the Universal Declaration now only 'offers' indigenous peoples.

This remarkable peace treaty, while not unique in an African context, demonstrates that African minorities, whether or not it is appropriate to refer to them as indigenous peoples, experience structurally similar problems to indigenous peoples in other parts of the world. It has never been easy for nation states, democratic ones as well as others, to legally open for different jural systems for particular groups within their borders. Can Sahelian countries and different ethnic groups find legally acceptable solutions that can handle social and cultural diversity and the right to land and resources within a state context? Can the Universal Declaration for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples serve as a tool for this process?

Most of the deadlines agreed on in the peace treaty (part VI) were less than 6 months from the signing of the treaty. Thus, it is at the moment quite possible to evaluate whether the treaty has been acted upon or not. Apart from short term issues, such as exchange of prisoners of war and the constitution of a commissariat for the


North, as well as the creation of four mixed brigades, very little has been done. Very few refugees have so far returned, but most continue to live in dismal conditions in the surrounding countries, hoping to, but not finding the conditions to enable them to return. Within the rebel movement there are many who argue that the Tuaregs should fight for no less than an independent state, basing this opinion on a total lack of trust in the Malian government's promises. If the Malian government continues to retard the implementation of the peace treaty, such a war will surely be the result. The misery and suffering that such a war will inflict upon the local populations, the fear of an escalation of the conflict and a resulting destabilization in the whole region, is what is a stake. The situation today is unstable and precarious. Support for the peace process is necessary.

1) *The official Mali number of Malian Tuareg refugees is now 100,000 (Les Echos No. 209, 13.11.92:6) or about one quarter to one fifth of the total population. Unofficial reports suggest that there are more than double this number.*

2) *The phrasing of this point suggests that those writing the declaration have had sedentary peoples rather than nomads in mind when writing. For many nomads, the need to cross boundaries is tied to their exploitation of seasonally available pasture, and not only to trade and social exchange.* □

Land Rights, Local Institutions, and Grassroots Development among the Ju/'Hoansi of Northeastern Namibia

By Dori Bixler, Megan Biesele, and Robert K. Hitchcock



Over the past twenty years, the plight of indigenous peoples in southern Africa has been underscored by the spectres of warfare, drought, dispossession, and widespread growing poverty.

Numerous groups were affected by civil conflict during the course of independence movements in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. In Botswana and Zambia, the expansion of the mining and agricultural industries have led to landlessness and declining socioeconomic statuses among rural populations. The anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa has claimed many victims.

The statuses of indigenous groups appear to be improving in some cases and deteriorating in others.

This is especially true for those populations that had depended, at least to a certain extent, upon foraging for their subsistence and income. Some of these groups have been denied access to land and natural resources. Others have been able to become specialized producers (e.g. guides for hunters) in the societies of which they are a part.

The largest group of former foragers in southern Africa consists of the *Bushmen* (*San*, *Basarwa*) people who in many cases speak languages containing click conso-

Table 1.
Population Data on Bushmen (San) in Southern Africa

Country	Population	Reference
Angola	8,000	Burger (1987:166 Table 1)
Botswana	45,120	Hitchcock (1992)
Namibia	33,000	Marshall (1989:4)
South Africa	4,500	Hitchcock (1992)
Zambia	1,500	Zambia National Parks and Wildlife Service data
Zimbabwe	1,000	Tsholotsho District Council Data
TOTAL	93,120	

nants and who are distinct culturally and physically from neighbouring groups. As Table 1 shows, there are over 93,000 people classified as Bushmen in six countries in Southern Africa.

There is some controversy over the names which should be used to refer to these populations. In the past, they were called Bushmen, which derives from the term *Bosjesman* used in the Cape by the Dutch. In the 1960s, anthropologists recommended that this term be replaced by »San« in order to avoid negative stereotypes. As it turns out, this term, too, has less than positive connotations. Still other researchers have suggested that individual

group names be used rather than an overall term (e.g. *Ju/'hoansi*, *G/wi*, *G//ana*, *!Xo*).

At an international conference on San populations held in Windhoek, Namibia in June, 1992, some of the participants argued that the term Bushmen should be ennobled. They said that they preferred this term to the others because it had been in use for a long period of time and was well-known internationally.

The status of some indigenous southern African San groups has declined to the point where they are eking out an existence in marginal areas. A number of them have sought assistance from development agencies, church groups, or individuals.




Table 2.
San (Bushmen) groups in Namibia

Group Name	Location	Population
Hai//om	Ovambo, Tsumeb,	11,000
(a) Xwaga	Grootfontein, Outjo	
(b) Karen	Districts	
!Khu	Ovambo, Kavango Districts	6,000
Ju/'hoansi	Eastern & Western Bushmanland, Hereroland	7,000
Khwe (Khoe)	Kwando, West Caprivi	5,000
Naron (Nharo)	Gobabis, District	1,500
//Khuu-//esi	Hereroland and Gobabis areas	2,000
!Xo (Mangog)	Aminuis, Gobabis, Mariental	300
/Nu-//en (Nusan)	Mariental District	100
/Auni	Mariental District into the northern Cape	200
Namib San	Namib Desert along the Atlantic Coast	0
TOTAL		33,100

Others have decided to initiate their own self-help efforts.

The area that is now Namibia (formerly South West Africa) was colonized in the late 19th century by Germany. South African forces seized the territory from German occupation in 1915, enforcing governmental control until protest and a brutal 15-year war brought United Nations sponsored elections, majority rule, and Namibian independence on March 21, 1990. In a Namibian population of 1.4 million, of which 86% are categorized as black, 8% white, and 6% mixed, the Bushmen make up the smallest category. There were approximately 33,000 Bushmen in the country in 1980 according to official government statistics (Table 2).

Bushmen are at the bottom of the socio-economic scale in the country. They tend to be extremely poor and lack access to land and social services. In the past, they did not have basic civic and property rights, and they had no voice in decision-making.

These people suffered severe human rights abuses at the hands of other peoples. Genocidal activities resulted in the near-extermination of Bushmen in portions of the country (Gordon 1992). Others became slaves on farms owned by whites where they had to work extremely hard. If they complained about their treatment, they were beaten. Many of these people

today face severe problems of poverty, poor health, and malnutrition (Marshall 1989; Biesele 1990).

One group of Bushmen in Namibia which has been buffered to some extent from the effects of dispossession and impoverishment is the *Ju/'hoansi* (*Ju/wasi*). Sometimes called the *!Kung* in the anthropological literature, the *Ju/'hoansi* are the indigenous inhabitants of the Nyae Nyae region of northeastern Namibia.

They have been the subject of intensive anthropological studies over a 40-year time period (Marshall 1976; Marshall 1989; Marshall and Ritchie 1984).

In the early 1950s, when the Marshalls began their investigations, there were some 19 bands of hunting-gathering *Ju/'hoansi* in the Nyae Nyae region. At one time the *Ju/'hoansi* moved over an area of 45,000 km². Each band had its own *n!ore* (traditional territory) which contained sufficient resources (food, water, and manufacturing and building materials) to sustain the group in the average year.

In 1959, a group of *Ju/'hoansi*, the */Aotcha* band, moved into a government-sponsored settlement at Tjum!kui »in search of a better life«. Whereas in the early 1950s the Tjum!kui *n!ore* supported a population of 25 hunter-gatherers (Marshall 1976:158), by the 1970s the Tjum!kui had as many as 800 – 1,200 people living

there. The high concentration of people led to severe social problems, including conflict, alcoholism, and high rates of infant mortality (Marshall and Ritchie 1984).

While operating under an illegal mandate, South Africa formally proclaimed a homeland system in 1970, which included drawing »lines« to define ethnic homelands throughout the country. All ethnic homelands in Namibia had a representative council called a »second tier« government, but the *Ju/'hoansi* were left out of the second-tier roster. Instead, they became wards of the State under the Department of Governmental Affairs.

This department was established to oversee the affairs of a people then deemed incapable of direction by any sort of chief, their own or an appointed one. For a number of years, the person designated to speak on their behalf was »Swani« Swanepeel, a white Afrikaner man who had once held a position as Minister in the Dutch Reformed Church.

One of the problems facing the *Ju/'hoansi* in the 1970s and 1980s was the expansion of military activities and recruitment of Bushmen in Angola and Namibia by the South African Defence Force (SADF). Bushmen Battalion 36 was established in western Bushmanland in 1978, and new Bushman groups were brought into the region, thus increasing population density levels and exacerbating social tensions. The high pay of the army helped contribute to greater stratification among the *Ju/'hoansi*, with some wealthy families surrounded by many others who were relatively poor. While the *Ju/'hoansi* were at Tjum!kui the Directorate of Nature Conservation of Namibia decided that the eastern Bushmanland area should be turned into a game reserve.

Opposition to the game reserve idea was expressed by the *Ju/'hoansi* and the people working with them, including John Marshall who, along with Claire Ritchie, who returned to Namibia to work in 1981. Eventually, the government backed down, dropping the idea of establishing a reserve, at least for the time being.

The game reserve controversy coincided with the beginning of an »outstation« or decentralization movement. Some *Ju/'hoansi* groups made the decision to go »back into the bush to regain their independence and self-sufficiency« (Ritchie 1988:36)

These groups re-established themselves in their *n!ores*. These territories were acquired by individuals through descent, marriage, or name relationships. Together they were part of a larger communal land area called *kxa/ho*. The Ju/'hoansi groups who moved out of Tjum!kui began building a mixed economy of hunting-gathering, small-scale livestock management, and craft production.

Integral to the Ju/'hoansi moves and re-establishment of land occupancy in Nyae Nyae were the efforts of a non-government organization, the Ju/Wa Bushman Development Foundation (JBDF) (now called the Nyae Nyae Development Foundation of Namibia, NNDFN). Since 1981, this group has assisted the Ju/wasi of Eastern Bushmanland with funds, tools, and technical advice. One of the most important contributions of the Foundation to the Ju/'hoansi was to encourage them to found their own grassroots organization. In 1986 the Ju/'hoansi established Ju/wa Farmers Union, a representational body with members from all of the communities in the region.

The purpose of the farmers union was »to represent the communities which had gone back to hold on to their land, and to enable dispossessed groups to settle on available land along the old *n!ore* lines of settlement and resource use« (Biesele 1991:8). Their decisions also concerned land management issues such as selecting locations where boreholes would be drilled and the distribution of cattle to start new herds. The farmers union (now called the Nyae Nyae Farmers Cooperative, NNFC) also represented its members at regional and national meetings.

Today, the NNFC has a council made up of 70 elected representatives, two from each of the 35 settlements. An Executive Committee, consisting of a Chairperson and representatives from each quarter of Nyae Nyae, is elected by the council. The cooperative has a paid manager, assistant manager, and other employees (e.g. the person in charge of the cooperative shop).

This organization has been a vital part of the re-establishment of *n!ores* in Nyae Nyae, as Ju/'hoansi have continued to move out of Tjum!kui. At first recognition of them by the government and responses to their request were sparse.

By 1988 the eastern portion of the Nyae Nyae area was designated a trophy-hunt-



Ju/'hoansi man watching over herd of livestock at /Aotcha in eastern Bushmanland, Namibia. Photo: Robert K. Hitchcock.

ing area, and a private safari company, Anvo Safaris, was awarded the franchise. According to the Ju/'hoansi, they were not consulted about this decision or even notified.

When a delegation of the NNFC went to the capital of Namibia 750 kilometres away to protest the action, they were told that they would receive some of the license fee revenues, but they have never seen the

money. The NNFC continues to grow, however, and it has become more active politically.

The Ju/'hoansi communities in the Nyae Nyae region have faced a number of constraints in their efforts to become self-sufficient. These constraints are both environmental and political. On the environmental side, the Ju/'hoansi have to contend with droughts which are common in the

In the past, people in remote parts of southern Africa viewed certain species of animals with some trepidation, elephants in particular. Elephants posed a major threat to the crops, water sources, and personal safety of Ju/'hoansi in the Nyae Nyae region. The Ju/'hoansi talk frequently of what they term »the elephant problem«. Whereas the decline in elephant populations is a serious issue in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and other parts of eastern Africa, the people of Nyae Nyae are faced with a very different problem: elephant numbers are on the increase. The elephants sometimes come to the Ju/'hoansi boreholes and break the pumps or destroy the pipes. They have also been known to chase people.

The issue of elephant population status is a particularly sensitive one. In October, 1989, the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), agreed to a ban on the marketing of ivory products. Southern African countries, including Namibia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe opposed the idea of the ban. Some Ju/'hoansi and other Bushmen have said that preventing the killing of elephants is tantamount to killing Bushmen. A number of people have had close calls with elephants, and they have had to expend enormous amounts of energy putting up electric fences and carrying rocks to place around their boreholes to keep elephants away.

The Ju/'hoansi, like other Bushmen, are hoping that their cattle herds will prove to be the answer to their economic problems. Many Bushmen express the desire to build up herds sizes, knowing full well that cattle are still the best source of investment in rural parts of southern Africa. Calving percentages indicate that the Ju/'hoansi are relatively successful pastoral producers. The diet of the people in the settlements is better than it was when the groups lived in Tjum!kui, especially with the addition of greater percentages of wild foods and milk.

With the independence of Namibia, and a new democratic constitution complete with parliamentary elections and a bill of rights, the Ju/'hoansi are in a position to be able to participate actively in their future. What acknowledgement they will receive, and what effects the new government's land reforms will have on their territory is still uncertain.

At the National Conference on Land Tenure and the Land Question held in Na-

Kalahari. They also have had to cope with overgrazing and resource depletion, especially in the area around Thum!kui, but also, to some extent, in those areas around their new settlements. Predators, especially lions, pose a serious threat to the livestock herds in eastern Bushmanland.

Herd losses to predators and, to a lesser extent, disease and drought, have been relatively extensive.

The Ju/'hoansi are not allowed to kill lions under existing legislation even if the lions prey on their livestock. It is somewhat ironic that non-citizen hunters from South Africa, the United States, Europe, and Japan are allowed to shoot the lions. Angered by the hypocrisy of the situation, one Ju/'hoansi man told the Namibian government and the media that »Lions are the dogs of Western conservation«.

mibia in June-July, 1991, delegates from the Nyae Nyae Farmers Cooperative spoke two times, presenting their arguments for land rights and the need for proper stewardship through their translator, Royal /O/oo. In their remarks, they suggested extensions of the *n!ore* concept to meet new circumstances in land tenure. Based on their own experiences, combined with what they have learned from their contacts with scientists, planners, government officials, and non-government organizations, the NNFC came up with the following suggestions concerning resource use and tenure on communal lands in Namibia:

1. Farmers should not be allowed to overgraze their own land and then move on to other peoples' land and ruin it.
2. Namibia is now free and open but permission must be asked from local residents by anyone wanting to resettle.

3. It is not good for the land to have too many cattle; it is better to take good care of a few cattle, offtake the rest, and use the proceeds to establish water points and support the health of the land.
4. The land we have is today reduced and we must protect it as best we can. Those who live on land and know it well are its best protectors.
5. In the case of Nyae Nyae, taking care of land means that some land must be set aside for wild animal breeding and some for wild plant collecting.
6. If we protect our land, it will support many more of our people, for example those who were taken to the Gobabis farms as slaves and those who went to South Africa with the SADF.

The Ju/'hoansi's presentations made at the Land Conference were recognized by the

then Namibian Minister of Lands, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation (MLRR) in verbal and press statements to the effect that the *n!ore* system would become the basis for land allocation in Nyae Nyae. Special protection for San land rights (under the category »disadvantaged communities«) was adopted unanimously by the conference participants (Republic of Namibia 1991).

Since that time, efforts of the NNFC have concentrated on making sure this recognition is legally formalized and that Ju/'hoansi are able to obtain secure status of land tenure under Namibian law. In the latter part of 1991, the land tenure situation became an even greater issue with the decision by a number of Herero pastoralists to move into the area with their herds. With support from the government, the Ju/'hoansi were able to convince them to leave peacefully.



Ju/'hoansi man decorating a wooden milk pail for sale to tourists. Photo: Robert Hitchcock.

A major goal of the Ju/'hoansi has been to establish broadly-based rural communities and a mixed-subsistence economic pattern to counter the recent shrinkage of their land base and natural resources. The changes this effort have meant have been far from easy. The Ju/'hoansi have struggled not only with lions and elephants but also with hostile SWA Administration officials who believed them incapable of development. They have also struggled within themselves, adapting the cultural rules and values that underwrote the old foraging way of life to the very different ones of agriculture and wage employment.

In the contemporary context, the Ju/'hoansi are in a position where they need to plan in a more concerted way for the use of their land and natural resources. They also are becoming increasingly involved in on-going activities of the various government ministries in Bushmanland (e.g. in wildlife management, agriculture, and local government). This process has been a positive one for the Ju/'hoansi in the sense they have learned more about the factors which potentially could influence their future and they are taking steps to deal with them. In order to do this more effectively, they will need some technical assistance and additional resources for carrying out applied research and community-based resource utilization programs. They will also support for additional training (e.g. of community game scouts).

At the Regional Conference on Development Programs for Africa's San populations held in Windhoek, Namibia in June, 1992, it was agreed by San representatives from both Nyae Nyae and Western Bushmanland that Bushmanland would be treated as a single entity for planning and development purposes. It was also noted that decisions would be made democratically through representational bodies, the Nyae Nyae Farmers Cooperative in the east and a yet-to-be-named people's organization in the west (Republic of Namibia 1992).

The main issues facing the people in Bushmanland today remain security of land tenure and sustainability of the land use systems being employed (Bieseles, Ford, and Hubbard 1991). The new government of Namibia has sought to ensure the Ju/'hoansi and other Bushmen in Bushmanland that they will not be evicted. They have also supported them in their efforts to

keep pastoralists from moving into the area. It is difficult to tell, however, what will happen in the future as population grows and demands for additional grazing, arable, and residential land increase.

The Ju/'hoansi and other Bushmen have expressed concerns about the numbers of tourists and safari hunters who enter their area. Under current legislation in Namibia, the people of Bushmanland do not have the right to receive the benefits from the tourism and safari hunting that takes place there. Bushmen peoples regard their handicrafts and their beautiful singing and dancing traditions, as well as their profound environmental knowledge, as cultural goods from whose promotion they should benefit. They know that for too long the profits and benefits from these things have passed out their hands in the form of exploitative pricing, unremunerative display for photographers, unpaid participation in media, and other misguided romanticizing of their way of life.

Today, the NNFC is promoting reliable markets for crafts of high standard, new items using indigenous materials which are known to have market appeal, and outlets for Kalahari bush products which may be marketed in a dignified and remunerative way. The hope is that these efforts will enable a larger number of people to earn income and be treated with respect.

The grassroots organizations that have been formed by the Bushmen in Namibia will undoubtedly play a key role in helping shape the future for the people of Bushmanland. The challenge will be to ensure that the participatory, consultative, and consensus-building processes continue and that everyone in the region benefits.

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The Peoples of the African Rainforest

By Espen Wæhle

Efe, a rainforest people from northeastern Zaire, are commonly known as the Mbuti pygmies. The photos shown here are selected from an exhibition at the Ethnographic Museum of Oslo Norway: *Peoples of the Rainforest – Efe, Chewong, Araweté.*








Botswana: The Inconvenient Indigenous Peoples

By Sidsel Saugestad



In the Parliament of Botswana, the Minister of Local Government, Lands & Housing was recently asked what programmes and activities his ministry has planned for the UN International Year of the Indigenous Peoples. His answer was as follows:

The Government has not planned any programmes or activities in commemoration of the international year of the indigenous peoples, which 1993 is in terms of a United Nations resolution.

This is because, as far as we are concerned, all Batswana are indigenous to the country, except those who may have acquired citizenship by registration. In addition, Government's development programmes and assistance schemes do not draw any distinction among the country's citizens (Daily News 05.03.93).

This answer is puzzling. Of Botswana's population of 1,325,000, an estimated 45,000 belong to a group of peoples that over time have been called Bushmen, San or Basarwa. More recently some have begun referring to themselves as N/oakhwe ('the red people'), to differentiate themselves from 'the black people', the Bantu majority. There can be little doubt that the N/oakhwe constitute an 'indigenous' population in Botswana, following the concept used by the UN, the ILO and other such organizations.

Being Indigenous

Archaeological finds date the presence of the N/oakhwe in the region back to the first traces of human settlement. They have tra-

ditionally based their subsistence economy on foraging (hunting and gathering), which is well adapted to the arid environment of the Kalahari. This they have combined with other activities as opportunities arose: e.g. trade, animal husbandry, agriculture and fishing in the rivers of the North-East. They are distinguished linguistically and speak dialect variations of seven or eight different languages within the Khoisan language group, all of which are marked by a number of phonetically complex click sounds. As contacts developed with the incoming Bantu cattle-herding tribes, they tended to be integrated at the bottom of the emerging social hierarchy, in a serf-like position. In their economic relations with cattle farmers they are mostly unpaid or underpaid (Data and Murray 1989).

None of the properties mentioned above are unequivocal in defining the Bushmen/San/Basarwa/N/oakhwe as a distinct ethnic group, and as an indigenous people (1). First of all these criteria are ambiguous: in Botswana in the 1990s the San practice a wide range of different economic adaptations. A growing number are bilingual and in some areas the use of a Khoisan language is declining. Coexistence over the centuries has certainly blurred any genetic distinction. Moreover, while the N/oakhwe are seen from the outside as one group with some common properties, from the inside they consider themselves a number of distinct peoples. The groups are mainly identified by territoriality, and/or speech communities. This accounts for rich variations in culture, but is also a constraint

to any effort to mobilise on a common ('pan-bushman') platform.

However, both the concepts of ethnicity and of indigenous peoples are relational terms. They are not based on any objective and fixed set of criteria, but on the social fact of one group having something in common that makes them different in relation to neighbouring groups. No one familiar with Botswana will be in any doubt at all that the distinction between Bantu and Basarwa (the official term) is a sociological reality which structures the interaction between the two groups, and makes their life chances different. It is also clear that according to the most commonly used criteria for defining a group as indigenous, namely pre-existence (first known inhabitants of an area), and non-dominance (do not control the national government), the Basarwa are an indigenous people (or peoples).

Whichever other criteria one might use to define the N/oakhwe, it seems that they are one of the poorest people in the country. And while there has been an overall positive economic development in Botswana since independence (1966), the socio-economic situation of the Basarwa is gradually deteriorating.

Government Policy: Non-Discrimination

How, then, can we understand the statement made by the Minister of Local Government, Lands & Housing (MLGL&H), to Parliament? First of all, we must assume that the Minister is not uniformed, either about the current meaning of the term 'indigenous' as it is being used within the

UN-structure, or of the historical and social realities of Botswana. If we assume that the Minister is not denying the facts, the statements made in Parliament appear more as a declaration of how the government would like things to be than about how they really are. In other words the Minister presented a political manifesto.

There are several aspects of official Botswana policy that in themselves are most laudable, but which make it difficult to address the N/oakhwe as a special group with special needs.


– When Botswana was established as an independent state in 1966 it was declared a non-racial, not a multi-racial, state. The distinction is significant. For a nation just free from colonial rule, and neighbour to the apartheid state of South Africa, this was a radical and forward-looking policy. The Constitution of Botswana guarantees and protects the rights and freedoms of all Batswana irrespective of race, colour, creed, ethnic origin or social standing.

– Moreover, Botswana has a good record in Human Rights, and there can be little doubt that there is no official discrimination in Botswana. There are no laws, or directives, that, as the Minister put it »draw any distinction among the country's citizens« (leaving aside, for now, the gender issue).

– Thirdly, Botswana has a democratic, multiparty system, that works. There are no formal restrictions on persons getting together and nominating candidates for the representative assemblies at district and national levels. Elections are held regularly every 5 years, and the next election is scheduled for 1994.

– Lastly, there is in Botswana, as in other countries of Africa, a fear of tribalism. It is always difficult to know if a recognition of tribal differences (for instance allowing different languages to be used as a teaching medium in schools) would represent any real danger to a functioning democracy. But the government invariably stresses its efforts to achieve a unified state, and encourages the people to forego tribal differences.

Each of these factors constitutes a justification for not singling out any ethnic or indigenous group for special treatment. Taken together, they explain the rationality behind the development programme that most directly addresses the problems of the Basarwa of Botswana: the Remote



Area Development Programme (RADP).

Government Action

The Remote Area Development Programme started up as a 'Bushman Development Programme' in 1974. The point of departure was the problematic situation in Ghanzi. While most land in Botswana is tribal land, the fertile land along the Ghanzi ridge had been allocated (from late last century) to individual owners as freehold tenure. As a result, an estimated 4-5000 people, mostly Bushmen (Naro), were left with no rights to use or live on the land, as they were squatters that might be removed at the owners' will. According to Liz Wily, the first Bushman Development Officer, »Hunting and gathering no longer being viable on the over-grazed and fenced area, the majority of San increasingly turned to begging, piecemeal and stock theft for survival; they were demoralized, drunk and apathetic« (Wily 1972:292).

At the outset, a programme to assist the Bushmen in Ghanzi was seen as politically acceptable because the situation was somewhat special: 1) the freehold leases had been granted by the former Colonial Government, 2) the farms were owned for the most part by Boers, 3) the farms were run on a commercial basis which differed from the traditional cattle keeping practised by

Tswana tribesmen more generally, and 4) there was land available elsewhere in the District. Therefore alternative areas for re-settlement could be provided (Wily 1972).

However, it soon became evident that the socio-economic problems of the Ghanzi Farms labourers/squatters, although perhaps most visible in Ghanzi, were in no way restricted to this particular District. And while recognising the need to address similar problems nationwide, it was no longer seen as politically expedient to define the target group as 'Bushman'.

A re-definition occurred in 1978 when the programme became known as the Remote Area Development Programme, and the target group was described following a number of socio-economic criteria:

All people living outside village settlements who

- tend to live in small scattered communities and are sometimes mobile, covering large areas;
- tend to reside far from basic services and facilities;
- tend to fall... outside the scope of other national development programmes;
- tend to be poor, lack adequate cash income or have the lowest wages;
- tend to rely heavily on hunting and gathering as a source of livelihood;
- tend to lack livestock;

- tend to have no, or inadequate, access to land and difficulties in getting land allocated to them;
- tend to have no, or inadequate, access to water and have few or no water rights;
- tend to be marginalized ecologically since the resource base upon which they depend is deteriorating;
- tend to be culturally and linguistically distinct, with another language than Setswana as their mother tongue;
- tend to have low level of literacy and little access to formal education;
- tend to have egalitarian political structures;
- tend to be a 'silent' sector politically, with no appointed leaders of their own and no representation in political bodies, including Land Boards (Economic Promotion Fund, guidelines 1989:6-7).

This list reads in part like a catalogue of social problems, and the RAD programme developed very much as a social welfare programme. The main objective of the programme has been to »facilitate the integration of the mainstream of the society and to develop rural settlements to a level that is comparable with that of other rural villages in the country« (Draft Policy, MLGL&H).

Initially, the activities of the programme focused on providing physical infrastructure: first and foremost, boreholes, small schools, and health posts. In many areas it has proved difficult to secure potable water, and other construction activities have been put on hold. But by and large, there has been significant progress as far as provision of basic services is concerned, although many people have not yet been reached.

Other components of the programme focused on the development of income-generating activities, and the promotion of leadership and adequate political representation for the people living in remote areas. An Economic Promotion Fund was set up as a component of the programme, with the purpose of promoting productive activities and the development of skills. For a number of reasons these objectives have been more difficult to achieve. Kann et al. in a comprehensive review of the RAD programme in 1990, conclude:

In its sixteen years existence, the RAD programme... has already achieved much, and the services and opportunities now

available to many RADs are far better than they were when RADP started in 1974. Much of the achievement has been in particular in the provision of physical infrastructure, e.g. schools, health posts, and water supplies, and in recent years the big strides made in these areas have been funded by NORAD through the RADP.

However, although there have also been some achievements in less tangible aspects of development, e.g. economic development and employment, the provision of land rights, and education and training beyond a few years at primary school, these achievements in such critically important areas are far less than can be observed in infrastructure development.

Much has been achieved – but even more remains to be done...

The five main issues faced by the RADs themselves, and therefore by RADP are POVERTY, INSECURITY, INADEQUATE EDUCATION AND TRAINING, WEAK INSTITUTIONS AND LEADERSHIP, and NEGATIVE PUBLIC ATTITUDES. (Kann et al. 1990:ix).

Very much the same concerns that were expressed in this report have been given by the MLGL&H as reasons for initiating a policy review of the programme in 1992:

- the ineffectiveness of education so far, in terms of employment and economic opportunities,
- complaints about unrepresentative leaders, who are said to be drawn from outside their communities,
- concern about land rights and competition with other land users,
- concern for exploitation as cheap labour, mostly as herders in farms and cattle posts,
- concern about negative attitudes towards Basarwa, who are depicted as backward, non-developed and generally uncouth,
- concern about inadequacy of consultations to determine the aspirations of the remote area dwellers (from a Briefing-note).

Basarwa or RADs

As the quotes above show, there is a fair amount of consensus in defining the types of problems that the RAD programme is trying to address. A national policy review seminar discussed these issues in Ghanzi in September 1992, and the MLGL&H is

presently preparing a revised policy paper, that will be presented to Parliament.

However, even if the problem-description is realistic, there is a basic ambiguity in the programme. The ambiguity does not lie in the description of symptoms, but in the analysis of the underlying causes of the present problems. The ambiguity is expressed also in the profusion as well as the confusion of terms that is being used to refer to the target group.

If the target group is described as Remote Area Dwellers (RADs), the problem is seen as matter of relative deprivation. The RADs are lacking certain services, but the more of these services that are provided, the better they will be integrated into 'mainstream' Botswana society.

On the other hand, if the target group is described as Basarwa (or Bushman, San, N/oakhwe) this is a description which calls for recognition of the special attributes shared by this group. It implies that in order to achieve the objective of equality in life chances and living standards, the measures of the development programme should be differentiated. This does not mean that the Basarwa should be given special privileges, but that the development programme should compensate for their special (and amply documented) problems. Moreover, successful integration is always dependent on respect and a process of mutual adjustment.

The distinction is not merely academic, it is empirical. A recent socio-economic survey describes the difference between Basarwa (in this case Balala) and 'other' RADs (Bakgalagadi) in this way:

It is anticipated that within 10 to 15 years, RAD Bakgalagadi will disappear naturally and this time period could be drastically and easily shortened by Government assistance.

One of the major reasons for this is that these Bakgalagadi are despised by the rich only because they are poor, not because of their ethnic background; they are seen as part of the community.

On the other hand, Balala are despised both because of their poverty and because of their ethnic background, and will find it much harder to be integrated in the general community. (Campbell 1989:14).

Much of the difficulty in establishing a constructive debate in Botswana today on the issue of RAD or Basarwa development may be explained by this ambiguity in the



Bushman settlement in Ghanzi District, Botswana. Photo: Jens Dahl.

terms used. For instance at the Ghanzi seminar, which addressed the RAD policy review, the debate oscillated all the time between statements made by, and on behalf of, N/oakhwe as a special category of people; and statements by politicians and government officials who insisted that they were talking about a regular economic development programme addressing all poor people in rural Botswana.

The ambiguity may be difficult to notice (and to acknowledge) because of the considerable empirical overlap between the two categories. Most, but not all, Basarwa are also RADs. But not all RADs are Basarwa. There is no denying that there are members of other ethnic groups that are equally in need of the kind of support that the RAD programme is designed to provide. Schematically, the situation looks something like this:

Remote Area Dwellers	⊖	Basarwa San N/oakhwe
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Speaking up at Gaborone Sun

About one year before the Minister of Local Government, Lands and Housing stated that all Batswana are indigenous, a very different comment was made on the position of the San/N/oakhwe in Botswana. The venue was a large workshop convened by the Botswana Society and the MLGL&H in April 1992, addressing the issues of »Sustainable Rural Development«. Komtsha Komtsha, respected elder

and elected chairperson of the Kuru Development Trust, looked down at the chequered carpet of the Gaborone Sun conference room and likened it to his ancestors' land in Ghanzi, now partitioned up in the same way with fences separating people from their resources and restricting wild-life.

Little of what he said was news to people familiar with the situation; but never had it been stated in Naro at a major national gathering. The venue, the imagery he used, and the interpretation into fluent English by another Naro, John Hardbattle, added impact to the words.

Komtsha's basic imagery was of a people overtaken by powerful neighbours, marginalised by the economic development, and left without name. On this last point he said:

By which name should the Basarwa be known?

Nobody has asked us what our name is and how we should be called.

All other tribes know who they are, and have a name that they are known by.

In his statements addressing the problem of terminology, he stressed that this was not a mere question of words. To paraphrase in more ordinary English: How can the government deal with us if they do not have a proper name for us? The terms they use, like RADs and Ba Tengnyanateng (Setswana for Remote Area Dwellers: literally, those who live deep inside the deep) are felt to be insulting. If they do not re-

spect us enough to recognise the names that we use ourselves, how can they be 'our' government?

Basically, Komtsha describes the problem in terms of social relations between different kinds of people: »God made the white man, the black man and the red man. Now they want us to change colour, like a chameleon. I am as Batswana as anybody else.«

The term he suggested for the San/Basarwa: 'N/oakhwe' meaning red people, would serve precisely the purpose of a good ethnic label: it singles out a group of people, not by any objective criteria (it is irrelevant to ask if they have red skin) but by contrast, in this case to the »black people«, the Bantu tribes. And he asked for the difference to be recognised: »With all respect, let me live in my environment and enjoy the wealth around me« (all quotes from field notes, See also Nteta and Hermans, eds. 1992).

Komtsha outlined three main types of problems: 1) that his people were closed in by fences and unable to use their ancestors' land, 2) that drinking was becoming a big problem; he wanted the government to restrict the selling of traditional beer, and 3) that »the daughters of our people« were getting pregnant by Batswana men (often due to drinking) and that these men failed to pay compensation or support for their children.

Roy Sesana, G/annakhwe from Molapo in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve, added to the picture:

You say that we are all the same. But there are some people of a stock called »wildlife«. These people make life uncomfortable for us because we have always hunted Eland (large African antelope), and cannot live without Eland for food. Now the animals drink the water (i.e. from boreholes provided by the Department of Wildlife, meant for the animals only) but we are deprived of the right to draw water. I do not want to learn that I should go to another place just to get water.

We want to be called by our name. The name of »Motswana« (i.e. citizen of Botswana, but it also means member of the Tswana tribe) makes it impossible for us to receive whatever assistance is available, because its comes to a Motswana even if it may be meant for a Basarwa. We want to be called by our name »N/oakhwe«.

The Dialogue that Failed

As a response to the statements made at the Sustainable Rural Development Workshop, the then Permanent Secretary in MLGL&H, Ms. Pelenomi Venson, invited John Hardbattle to bring some representatives of the Basarwa for consultations with the MLGL&H. Such a meeting seemed to be a most appropriate follow-up to the statements made; moreover, consultation is a valued element in the Botswana democratic tradition.

In addition to Hardbattle (Naro), the delegation included Komtsha (Naro), Roy Sesana (G/annakhwe) Saikuta (G/wikhwe), Tsao (Ju/hoan), Gomme Kgao (Ju/hoan) and Aron Johannis (Naro).

According to the newspapers, the meeting turned out to be a confrontation, more than a consultation. The delegation was met by top level politicians (Assistant Ministers, a Member of Parliament and Councillors) and was asked why they had not followed laid down procedures and approached their elected representatives (Daily News 21.05.92). The Botswana Guardian described the meeting as »deadlocked« (22.05.92).

The meeting was interesting in many respects, but here we will consider only one particular aspect: when the delegation tried to describe what they saw as the most basic problems, common to all N/oakhwe in Botswana, this was construed as implying the most negative aspect of tribalism, namely the threat of secession. According to the newspapers:



Bushmen from Botswana. Photo: Jens Dahl.

The delegation, among other issues, requested that they be allowed to secede from Botswana and form their own state as they alleged the present council does not represent their interest (Daily News 21.05.92).

Basarwa demand self-rule (Mmegi 22.05.92).

What they want is the establishment of Basarwaland and their own council (Botswana Guardian 22.05.92).

And some weeks later:

The Ghanzi District Council meeting reacted angrily to reports that some Basarwa communities wanted self-rule, saying this could have been instigated by some people who are not Basarwa. The reaction came after the District Commissioner...briefed the council about the eight-man Basarwa delegation from Ghanzi and North West districts who recently met with the two Assistant Ministers of Local Government, Lands and Housing (Daily News 15.06.92).

Is this what was actually stated at the meet-

ing? It is quite likely that one or two of the delegates might have expressed their wish to control their own territories and to have some land that they could call their own. After all, a large number of place names in Botswana describe the land as »belonging to« such-and-such a tribe. But no one has ever been known, before or after this meeting, to seriously advocate anything remotely resembling secession. Nevertheless, it was more than a month before a small paragraph appeared (Mokaedi 04.07.93) stating that »The delegation, however, underlined that they had been misquoted in the press and that they had never demanded secession from Botswana«.

Was this »exchange« in the press again a mere squabble over words? A simple communication analysis shows the meta-message as it appeared in the newspapers to be clear enough: what the Basarwa delegation was asking for is unreasonable. By implication it was saying: we do not need to take their demands seriously.

Maybe one should not be too surprised by the strong reactions expressed at this meeting. If we look at other democratic states with structurally very similar minority situations (e.g. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden) there is no instance where the government has readily accepted and recognised claims put forward for recognition on ethnic grounds. However, once reasonably representative indigenous organizations have been established, and leaders have come into a position where they are able to negotiate with their governments, it has been found that far from being a threat to national unity and political stability, such indigenous organisations contribute to the democratic process, and actually make policy formulation and implementation easier (Saugestad 1992). Devolution of power does not mean loss of sovereignty, but that more problems are taken up at a level where they also can be solved.

What now?

As this article shows, there are some good arguments for avoiding the term 'indigenous peoples' and to refrain from advocating 'compensatory' or 'affirmative' action. Not only the government, but many independent social scientists argue that the San are so obviously disadvantaged according to conventional socio-economic criteria, that the focus should be on improving their lot within regular government programmes (e.g. Williamson 1969). As the legal basis for equality is there, it is the implementation of the laws and regulations that must be improved upon.

The exchanges quoted above also show the extreme sensitivity of the government to any mention of the problems of the San being of a 'special' kind. This in itself might be a good reason for leaving the inconvenient concept of indigenous groups aside and concentrate on a simple class analysis, a social welfare programme and general human rights issues.

On the other hand, one should keep in mind that the concept of 'indigenous people', as it has emerged in international discourse, was actually coined to address the very type of problems that Botswana is facing, and to contribute to their solution.

By choosing to ignore the concept, the Government of Botswana is depriving itself of some arguments that are broadly accepted internationally and that the gov-

ernment might use to explain and to justify policy measures that would go to the core of the problems as described in this article. The basic purpose of the concept of 'indigenous peoples' as is most clearly stated in ILO Convention No 169, Concerning Indigenous and Tribal peoples in Independent Countries is, after all, to legitimise policies and programmes that at the same time can be effective and politically acceptable.

If we look across the border to Namibia, we find that this country has less problems in recognising the San as indigenous peoples. The Land Rights Conference in 1991 singled out the San as a specially disadvantaged group and President Sam Nujoma expressed his special concern and support at the opening of the 1992 Regional conference on Development Programmes for Africa's San Populations.

What if we look at the problem from the point of view of the N/oakhwe? Can they improve their situation by arguing their case as a 'simple' case of economic deprivation, as part of the emerging proletariat of Botswana? So far, 'integration' for the N/oakhwe has meant integration into the bottom of a stratified Botswana society. Compared to the 'major' Tswana tribes and other Bantu tribes, it is their lack of assets, be they land, cattle, traditional chiefs or other valued Setswana traits, that have been the most visible. What is valued in their own culture, in terms of competence, qualifications and cultural values, do not count as assets in the present scheme for integration. Not surprisingly, a common N/oakhwe reaction has been withdrawal. To the greatest extent possible, N/oakhwe tend to keep to themselves and try to avoid confrontations with their neighbours. Under the circumstances, this is a perfectly rational reaction, but unfortunately one which over time has left them continually on the losing end in the competition for territories.

As things stand, one may well ask if it is in their interest to accept the government's claim that there is nothing special about their situation. So far the government policy, well intended as it may be, has not really brought much benefit to the N/oakhwe. And so far the potential for development that lies in mobilising on the basis of common interests and common values, in other words looking for and building on the strength of N/oakhwe culture, has not been tried out.


If they were to come together as the first peoples of the Kalahari, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to avoid the connotation of 'indigenous peoples'. It would be a pity if this was seen as a threat to national unity. It could just as easily be seen as adding to the cultural diversity and enhancing the cultural heritage of Botswana.

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1. The reader will note that in this paper I am making a point to the effect that using the right terms is very important, but I have some difficulties in deciding which terms to use myself. Generally I use Basarwa whenever I refer to official Botswana policy or public statements, I use N/oakhwe when I refer to statements and actions by those calling themselves N/oakhwe, and I use San when I refer to more general anthropological observations.
Hopefully, over the next few years, one term may emerge that is acceptable and used by all parties. □

Drought, Environmental Change, and Development among the Tyua of Western Zimbabwe

By Robert K. Hitchcock and Fanuel M. Nangati



The year 1992 has seen one of the worst droughts in recent memory in southern Africa. Some analysts describe the environmental situation as being »the poorest in a hundred years.« saying that the lack of sufficient rainfall has been a serious problem. Others point to the problems of declining aquifers, soil erosion, and degraded range resources as being a product of abuse of the land by local people and their livestock. Still others say that the difficulties being faced by the people in southern Africa are a product of poorly framed development policies which have emphasized growth over equity.

The effects of the drought have been particularly problematic in Zimbabwe, which gained independence in 1980 after a lengthy war of liberation, and is a country that has had to contend with a number of major issues over the years. It has had to confront problems of social injustice, the legacy of racially based development strategies in the past. It has had to deal with certain amount of internal civil conflict. It has also faced stiff economic competition from its neighbours, particularly South Africa. After an economic slump following independence, Zimbabwe set about trying to expand economically while trying to resolve problems of landlessness and poverty.

Zimbabwe's president, Robert Mugabe, promised a policy of reconciliation and set about the formidable task of uniting and reconstructing the new country. The aim of Mugabe's development programme has

been to decrease reliance on expensive imports by establishing modest domestic activities as opposed to grandiose development projects. The government has pursued a mixture of government-sponsored programmes from all sides and has forced the government to pursue a middle of the road strategy.

Zimbabwe did relatively well economically in the 1980s; prices for its agricultural products (e.g. tobacco) were fairly good, and mineral sales were up. The one area where problems continued was in land distribution. In some cases, rural people felt that distribution of land was not being done quickly enough or in sufficient amounts. In the past two years, the Mugabe government has taken steps to deal with the land question, passing legislation that would allow the government to take over land and distribute it as it saw fit. It is clear that after twelve years of independence, Zimbabwe has had to overcome some formidable development constraints while at the same time paying attention to crucial social equity issues.

Rural Development in Western Zimbabwe


Like a number of southern African countries, Zimbabwe has concentrated a substantial portion of its resources on rural development. Some of the programmes have been oriented toward establishing social and physical infrastructure, including schools, health facilities, roads, and water

systems. Livestock production, agriculture, and small-scale business development have also been promoted. In addition, Zimbabwe has also placed emphasis on the strengthening of local groups and establishment of new political institutions such as district councils, ward committees, and village development committees.

A good example of the problems faced by Zimbabwe in enhancing the well-being of rural people can be seen in the case of Tsholotsho District in the western part of the country. Tsholotsho (known historically as the Nyamoandlovu District) is in Matabeleland North Province, one of the eight provinces in Zimbabwe.

Tsholotsho District is a relatively remote and underdeveloped area. It is a tree-bush savanna region bounded on the north and northwest by Hwange National Park, on the east by commercial farms, on the west by the border with the Republic of Botswana, and on the south by the Amanzanyama (Nata River) which separates it from Bulalima Mangwe district.

Tsholotsho was known historically for its abundant wildlife populations and for the fact that it contained an indigenous group of approximately a thousand *Bushmen* (*Batwa*, *Amasili*). At one point the area was occupied exclusively by Bushmen peoples, some of whom were known as *Tyua* (*Chwa*). These populations were mobile foragers who ranged into what is now the Hwange National Park and west into what is now Botswana. The influx of Iron



Age people into the region occurred some 2,000 years ago, and the region was occupied by *Kalanga* and other historically known peoples several hundred years ago. The *Ndebele* (an offshoot of the *Zulu* of South Africa) arrived in the 1830-1840 period, and European hunters, missionaries, and settlers began moving in to the region in the 1850s.

Settlement in the modern period expanded in the midtwentieth century, with people being evicted from then overcrowded districts of Matabeleland South (Filabusi, Matobo, Fort Rixon, West Nicholson and Rhodesdale in the Midlands near Kwekwe). The movements into remote western sandveld areas were instigated by colonial

administrators in order to resettle people and make way for commercial white farming. The area was the center of political unrest and so-called »dissident activities« that lasted from the beginning of the 1980s (post-independence) to 1988 with the signing of the Unity Accords. During these years the district outside of Tsholotsho town itself was practically inaccessible to government staff. Official development measures were suspended and traditional political structures – chiefs, headmen, and kraalheads – were the only authorities in practice.

The Tsholotsho District is 738,200 hectares in extent, and it includes forest reserve and dispersed settlements and cattle

posts. In 1989, the population of Tsholotsho was 139,750, and the population density was 17 persons per square kilometre. Male absenteeism is high, which one village having 54% of males absent. Some of the males work in towns outside the area, while others go to the mines. Many adult male *Tyua* had worked in the gold mines of South Africa.

Poverty is widespread in the district, especially among *Tyua* households. A third of the population does not own livestock, the major source of rural income in western Zimbabwe. Many of the people do not produce enough for subsistence. They sometimes get drought relief food which is 10 kg of maize grain per month, which is pro-

vided under food-for-work programmes. Some people are dependent on public assistance administered by the Department of Social Welfare.

The Tsholotsho area is administered by a district council, made up of 19 councillors elected in terms of the District Councils Act of 1980. The council is responsible for all development programmes in the district. Contact with the central government is maintained through a District Administrator who is the chief executive officer appointed by government through the Ministry of Local Government, Rural, and Urban Development.

Since the district is made up of communal land, people do not have title to it. Arable land is held individually while grazing and woodland areas are held as common property in lower administrative units, villages and wards. A recent development in land ownership in communal areas in Zimbabwe is the granting of title deeds at »growth points«, of which the village of Tsholotsho is one.

Approximately 95% of the district is covered by aeolian Kalahari sands. They are characterized by low silt and clay content and have little or no weatherable minerals. Soils in the district in general are seen as being of low fertility. The region receives insufficient rainfall for agricultural purposes. The rainfall averages between 450-650 mm annually, and drought and dry spells are common during the rainy season (November-March). Records indicate that the district receives only one reasonably good rainfall season for crop production every ten years. Government extension workers and local people believe the district to be suitable only for semi-intensive livestock farming. The district is among the poorest in Zimbabwe due to the poor environmental conditions.

The vegetation consists of shrubs and stands of forests, some of which include hardwood trees such as mukwa, teak, and mahogany. The area is well endowed with exploitable timber for domestic use and for sale. All households use timber for house construction and for fencing of homesteads and fields. Fuelwood is the major source of energy. With abundant dead wood in the area, fuelwood is still being collected in the form of dry, dead wood. As population grows, however, this situation will change, and more trees will be cut for fuel. Land degradation is not

pronounced except close to the river and in areas along cattle and car tracks, which turn into drainage channels as the highly mobile Kalahari sands are disturbed constantly. Exploitation of wood also facilitates soil erosion.

Commercial logging has gone on in the area for years, though much of it ceased in 1991 due to depletion of hard wood species. Wood consumption for beer brewing, a major economic activity in the area, was estimated at around 6,200 cubic meters per year over the area. The local authority has put into place control measures, especially on mukwa which currently is not being cut. The Natural Resources Committee of the District also monitors forest utilization in the area and discourages wasteful practices. Woodlots have been introduced in the area, and local schools have a Schools and Colleges Tree Growing and Tree Care Program.

The Tsholotsho area contains wildlife not found elsewhere in Zimbabwe. Poaching is not uncommon in this region, and efforts are being made to promote wildlife management for the benefit of local communities. Areas in the west of the district are benefitting from a well orchestrated wildlife management programme organized through CAMPFIRE (the Communal Management Program for Indigenous Resources) starting in 1990. A basic principle behind CAMPFIRE is the re-empowerment of local communities through providing them with access to, control over, and responsibility for natural resources. A second principle is that local communities should have the right to make decisions regarding those natural resources and any activities that affect them. A third principle is that communities should receive the benefits from the exploitation of natural resources.

In past Zimbabwe, all moneys generated from safari hunting went to the state and to the companies taking the clients into the field. In the 1980s, legislation was introduced (*the Parks and Wildlife Act*) which enabled district councils to get funds derived from the use of wildlife resources. The CAMPFIRE programme aims at providing long-term solutions to resource problems and encourages districts and communities to establish appropriate institutions under which resources can be managed and exploited for their own direct benefit (Martin 1986). Given the socioeco-

nomical and environmental diversity in Zimbabwe, no one model of community empowerment is appropriate to all situations. Whereas Nyaminyami District Council has its own wildlife trust, other districts have chosen to have only wildlife steering committees. Some of Zimbabwe's districts have provided benefits to households whereas others have maintained the revenues at council level and have used those revenues to underwrite development projects in the various wards.

CAMPFIRE is seen as a rural development programme by many of the districts in Zimbabwe. It is also seen as a useful means of raising revenues for investment in development activities. In the case of Tsholotsho, two companies, Ngamo Safaris and Matabeleland Group, currently are running safari operations in the area. In 1990, Ngamo Safaris paid a total of Z\$192,751. The money generated through safari hunting is held by the Tsholotsho District Council, and communities in the various wards where hunting was done have the option of drawing down on the funds in order to pay for local development projects (e.g. road construction and maintenance, school rehabilitation and clinic construction) which benefit the whole community.

One of the problems with CAMPFIRE and other rural development programmes in Zimbabwe is that many of the decisions about resource management come from outside the producer community. This can be seen, for example, in those cases where the district councils make suggestions to lower-level institutions as to how they should spend the money obtained from wildlife revenues. This occurred in the case of Tsholotsho, where the council informed wards that they had to use their moneys to build a road. It should be stressed, however, that some of the people at the ward and village level have begun to lobby hard for greater decision-making power, something that district councils have begun to take greater notice of. Even if the situation in Zimbabwe cannot present be described as one in which communities have been empowered, it is not unlikely that the trend is toward increased participation in decision-making at the local level.

Another problem with CAMPFIRE as it has been implemented in Tsholotsho, according to Tyua and other local people, is that community members are not receiv-


ing full benefits from the wildlife exploited by non-local hunters. In 1991, the district councils received Z28,000 (about US\$5,600) per elephant, even though hunters for safari companies pay US\$250 per day and additional amounts for the trophy. Pressures are building for district councils to increase the amounts of money that they get from safari companies doing business in their areas.

One of the goals of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe is natural resource conservation. A major assumption behind the programme is that local people will be more willing to conserve resources if they are able to derive direct benefits from those resources. An example of how this might occur can be seen in the case of elephants. According to Tyua and other residents of western Zimbabwe, elephants represent a major problem. They destroy crops in their fields and harass people and livestock, sometimes even killing them. In addition, the only people who got any money from elephants were the safari companies. One result of this situation was that people looked the other way when poaching of elephants occurred. There were also numerous requests for the shooting of problem elephants (ones which destroyed crops) by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management.

A major environmental problem in Africa has been the decline in the numbers of elephants. One reason given for this situation is that people have no incentive to prevent poaching. Table 1 shows the rate of decline of elephant populations in various African countries.

This decline is due in part to illegal hunting. The reduction in elephant numbers has also come about because of habitat changes occurring as a result of drought and human and animal impacts on local ecosystems.

It is interesting to note that these population trends among elephants are not evident in southern Africa, where the numbers have increased substantially over the past century. In Zimbabwe there are five to seven times as many elephants today as there were in 1900. A reason given for this situation is the kinds of management program employed by the Zimbabwe Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWM) and the country's private sector. Under CAMPFIRE, funds derived from elephant hunting go to district



Tyua children getting water.
Photo: Robert K. Hitchcock.

councils which use those funds for development purposes. Local people are able to see the utility of conserving elephants, since they and their children are able to benefit from the schools, clinics, and roads that are constructed with the aid of these funds. As a consequence, there is a greater tendency for people to bring social pres-

sure to bear on poachers and to find alternatives to having game scouts shoot problem elephants.

Since CAMPFIRE was initiated in Zimbabwe, people in some of the rural areas have lobbied for greater protection of elephants. One way of maintaining biological diversity is to conserve a representative

array of ecosystems. This has been done in Zimbabwe by establishing national parks, safari areas, botanical reserves and gardens, recreational areas, and specialized sanctuaries. Zimbabwe has set aside a significant percentage of its land as Parks and Wildlife Estate (see Table 2).

Individual districts have also set aside areas for wildlife protection purposes, something that has been considered in detail by the Tsholotsho District Council. Plans have been outlined to establish a wildlife management area in the western part of the district in the area where the majority of Tyua reside.

The decision to establish a wildlife area in Tsholotsho was prompted in part by the drought problems faced by people in the district. Drought has had a significant effect on livestock in western Zimbabwe. As grazing quality deteriorates in the more heavily stocked eastern part of the district, people move their herds to the west, close to the Botswana border, where they keep them on cattle posts that are managed by Tyua labourers. When the rains begin, they move the cattle back to the east. This transhumant pattern is known in Ndebele as the *Lagisa* system.

This year, with the drought having resulted in serious deterioration of the grazing and lowering of the water table in Zimbabwe, people have tended to keep their cattle herds close to home. This has meant that Tyua do not have access to milk from the cattle, which has affected their nutritional status. In general, the effects of the drought on the well-being of Tyua in Zimbabwe have been significant. The fallback

strategies that they use have used in the past in drought periods such as the exploitation of wild plant resources are not as effective as they once were. Relatively few wild plant resources have escaped unscathed from the drought. This is a particularly true around villages, where utilization pressure is high.

Tyua and other rural people in western Zimbabwe have responded to the drought and deteriorating economic conditions in a number of ways. Some of them have diversified their economic system, expanding the production of goods such as baskets for sale. Some households have broken up, with adult males going to towns to seek work. Livestock sales have increased as a means of generating income to purchase food. Some local people joined projects sponsored by non-government organizations involved in rural development. A number of people have moved out of the area, some of them going to Botswana or South Africa.

It is interesting to note that in spite of the drought and environmental deterioration in western Zimbabwe, Tyua and other people have called for greater efforts at resource conservation and management. Some communities have requested that they be allowed to control the exploitation of wild resources such as vegetable ivory palm (*Hyphaene ventricosa*) since it is such an important resource for basket-making, a major source of income for Tyua and other rural women. Others have recommended that limits be placed on the numbers of elephants and other wild animals being taken by safari hunters in order to

ensure that there are sufficient numbers of animals after the drought is over. Still others have pushed for an expansion in the number and distribution of water points so as to spread livestock and wildlife out as a means of reducing grazing and browsing pressure.

Conventional wisdom about drought responses among hunter-gatherers and agro-pastoralists holds that people tend to employ a variety of economic and social strategies in order to get through periods of resource stress. This is certainly the case among the Tyua in western Zimbabwe. It is also the case among the Doma in Kanyemba Ward of Guruve District, people reputed to be Zimbabwe's only remaining full-time hunter-gatherers. Although poverty and malnutrition has increased among Tyua households in western Zimbabwe, this has not prevented them from engaging in resource management and development activities that promise to assist them in post-drought recovery.

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Table 1. Rate of Decline of Elephant Populations in Selected African Countries

Country Name	Percentage Decrease	Elephant Population
Niger	45%	440
Sudan	84%	22,000
Somalia	92%	2,000
Kenya	75%	16,000
Zaire	70%	112,000
Tanzania	70%	61,000
Mozambique	69%	17,000
Zambia	90%	32,000


Note: Data obtained from the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Washington, D. C. and the World Conservation Monitoring Center (WCMC), London

Table 2. Land Categories in Zimbabwe

Land Category	Area (sq. km.)	Percentage of Country
Parks and Wildlife Estate	49,695	12.7%
Communal Lands	16,365	4.2%
Large-Scale Commercial Farming Areas	11,712	3%
Small-Scale Commercial Farming Areas	1,239	0.3%
Forest Reserves	9,060	2.3%
Resettlement Areas	3,290	0.8%

The Bleak Future of the Iparakuyo Pastoral Society

By Melkiori S. Ole Matwi



The name *Iparakuyo* will most probably not ring a bell to many readers of this article simply because they have been a little-known community to outsiders. I am not going to go into the details of the history and culture of the Iparakuyo here, but would rather like to just point out some factors that are of importance for understanding the current vulnerable situation of the Iparakuyo people.


The Iparakuyo number some 30,000 people, and are one of the sections of pastoral communities in Kenya and Tanzania which make up the Maa-speaking community popularly known as the Maasai. Other sections are the Ilkisongo, Ilaitayok, Illoita, Ilpurko, Ilsambur and Ilarusha.

Quite an extensive amount of literature has been written about Maasai peoples both in Kenya and Tanzania, but relatively little has been written about the Iparakuyo and their specific situation.

Presently, the Iparakuyo as a group, live dispersed and occupy areas in several regions of Tanzania. Kilimanjaro, Tanga, Coast, Morogoro, Iringa, Mbeya and Dodoma. The land they utilize is generally ecologically marginal, arid and often tsetse infested and thus unsuitable for livestock keeping. The Iparakuyo, however, have tried to eke out a living under these circumstances but have, due to a number of reasons, not been very successful.

First, as noted, they have not been properly known by the international community because their identity has been misguided.

Until just a few years ago, they have been known by all kinds of misleading and confusing and, to them, hilarious terms



Iparakuyo dancers from Usangu, Southwestern Tanzania. Photo: Jens Dahl.

such as Wakwafi, Iloikop and Walumbwa. The use of several names give the impression that the Iparakuyo are different people. Second, as they live scattered it makes it very difficult for them to solve the most current and pressing problems as a unified group. The result has been that those living in one area try the best they can to solve problems facing them in that particular area. Third, they are considered as foreigners, immigrants or intruders by the indigenous groups in the regions they have moved into. Fourth, the Iparakuyo are suffering an acute lack of formal education. To date, the writer of this article is the only Olparakwoni who has been able to attain a university degree. Fifth, among other things, to lack of missionary activities, they have not had the opportunities to develop, as have many of the other Maasai sections.

Presently, the Iparakuyo are faced with more serious problems, particularly concerning land tenure rights, than ever before. During the colonial period and long before, they have always solved problems related to their herds by a nomadic way of life. That is probably one of the reasons why they are found scattered to such an extent today. It is not possible any longer, however, to solve problems of grazing, water or cattle diseases through the method of territorial mobility. The state policy has through the Villagization Act of 1975 forced people to live a sedentary way of life which made it necessary to divide land and fix boundaries between individuals, villages, wards, divisions, districts, regions and nations. Crossing over these boundaries for the purpose of settling without clear

and tangible evidence of permission by the authority concerned would be liable to punishment or conviction by a court of law. Being pastoralists by occupation the Iparakuyo have suffered greatly from the establishment of such boundaries without having had any alternative solution.

This situation has not always made things easy. From time to time in many of the above mentioned areas, there have been conflicts between pastoralists and farmers some of which have brought about brutal killings and bitter feelings. The worst affected areas are those in Kilosa district in Morogoro region. For many years, there have been retaliating attacks taking place between the Iparakuyo and the Kaguru, which is a major agricultural group in the area. These conflicts, however, have been happening without much information about them reaching beyond the area concerned.

In an effort to reorganise and try to solve some of their problems, the great *oloiboni* (ritual expert, diviner) of the Iparakuyo, Mutari Koyesa Moreto, called the first Iparakuyo Congress to address the issues facing them as an ethnic group, their current problems and their future.

This Congress was organized under the name of "The Cultural Council of the Maasai Community" (Baraza kuu la mila za Kimasai). It brought together, representatives (at least 5) from each of the regions that Iparakuyo presently inhabit. A total number of 85 individuals met at the *oloiboni's* residence on 14 January 1991 to discuss these issues under his chairmanship. Together with a lot of things discussed, an Executive Council was created

which included members from all Iparakuyo areas.

Mr. Paulo Moreto, brother of the *oloiboni* was chosen to be the secretary of the Council. He was the sole candidate present with secondary school education. He was selected so as to be able to record proceedings, organise and coordinate activities of the Council interregionally.

One of the most important tasks of this Council was to re-examine their own culture and to identify those customs which they thought were outdated, and, further, to discuss and plan ways of development in the Iparakuyo communities, recognizing that they were lagging terribly behind almost all other societies in the country.

In December 1991, I received with shock and deep sympathy the news of the brutal murder of Paul Moreto, the Council's secretary. He became a victim of the inter-ethnic conflicts that had been going on for a long time in his home area Kilosa. One day he was slashed to death by machetes. Because of his ability of communicating and publicizing the ideas and wishes of his people, he became a threat to those outside his own community. His death has brought to a standstill all efforts which were begun by the Iparakuyo and which he with his knowledge and education could have served fruitfully.

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□

On 12th January, 1993: At Katesh!

By Getakanod, D.M.D.



I am a Datoga by tribe living at Katesh in a newly established Barabaig District of Hanang.

I was born at Dongobesh in Mbulu in June, 1935 where my mother's father was a Chief, in both German and British rules in 1910-1919, after the hanging by Germans of our famous Chief called GIDAMOU-SA in 1910.

Gidamou was not the only Datoga victim, but a number of Barabaig were arrested and sent to Kwa Muhoro in RUFJI District for detention. A number were castrated when they came back during British rule.

My father GETAKANOD FALLA took from my mother's father the Barabaig chieftain of Dongobesh, Masabeda and Marembeda (Bassotu) rule. He ruled till 1944 when he was retired. In his rule and before, the Bassotu Division was under him, till 1936 when it joined to be part of Mongochi chiefstain.

When British came, the concept of Datoga hangings continued. In 1936 a number of Barabaig were hanged and their cattle confiscated to compensate the WANYATURU for cattle raided. In course of our independence the Barabaig has also suffered the same fate. In 1968, due to one Nyaturu teacher killing by one Barabaig the whole Datoga tribe was punished by detaining a large number of youths for six months. In 1976, after nine Barabaigs killed by Wanyaturu, the Barabaig in retaliation killed 23 Nyaturus. Although the

Barabaig themselves handed over the 23 Nyaturu killer to the Tanzanian Government. Yet there were a whole sale confiscation of cattle and youth arrests from among the Datoga tribe, wherever they were in Tanzania by the Government irrespective of where they reside in Tanzania i.e. mass confiscation and arrests. This arbitrary arrests of the Barabaig was partly due to lack of information on Barabaig and partly because no one was on their side.

This therefore, brought in the sympathizers. One among many was the then late Prime Minister, Hon and Comrade Edward Moringe Sokoine. He called a Barabaig elders meeting held at Babati in 1978, out of which the famous Barabaig Operation was initiated.

The Barabaig vilagisation Programme started immediately. In Hanang District 23 villages were earmarked for the Barabaig Development, irrespective of other areas of Mbulu District: Doloma, Shinyanga and Singida Regions. Besides the Social, Economic, Educational and Health Services developed by the Government offered funds: The same Barabaig village areas were given to Government Parastatal called NAFCO. A large tracts of land was taken by this Parastatal without Barabaig consents. So, the 4,865 families with 302,200 cattle, 142,473 Goats, 129,054 Sheep, 7,759 Donkeys were forced to leave behind their land taken by force by NAFCO for wheat production. The NAFCO had the following programme:

1978/80 Nafco is to cultivate 24,000 Acres prod. Tons 13,120

1980/81	→→	37,500	→→	23,625
1981/82	→→	47,500	→→	27,925
1982/83	→→	57,500	→→	36,225
1983/84	→→	67,500	→→	42,825
1984/85	→→	72,500	→→	45,675

To date Nafco is cultivating 101.000 acres producing tons less than 50.000 tons of wheat. Yet the expansion is still today.

The habitual, sometimes brutal and forcible eviction, has caused crises in both legal and political areas. In areas so to be expanded this time, there seems to be no end. Hence people's appeals and cry. No one knows where Nafco's boundary is. This expansion is threatening 200 families tight now in Mogitu, Ghama and Gehandu villages. The Barabaig are deeply concerned of the take over of the areas fully developed with tape waters, Dams, lakes, Veterinary Services. Yet a number of the villages were then wheat producers. They can ill afford to loose these vital areas.

This has caused Barabaig migration to other areas in Morogoro, Dodoma, Mbeya and Iringa Regions forcibly. Migration is always possible for the people with large herds. But is intolerable for the poor pastoralists. Those who remain near the farms, when attempting to reach water and pasture are subjected to torture, rapes, arbitrary arrests, confiscation of their animals by the Nafco Farm employee, exerting fines, put in remands without bail, for a time in Police custody (for a minimum of four week without bail), and finally brought to court for heavy fines (for adults) and corporal punishment (for the children of under 15 years).

The fines usually paid in minimum T. Shs 3.000/= to T. Shs. 496.000/=, sometimes this includes compensation. Failure to pay the fine, alternate is imprisonment from 4 months to years, for a simple criminal trespass case. These fines are paid in court, irrespective of the amount paid in Nafco farms to get back ones' cattle. (Nafco receipt attached).

These abuses are ever present since Nafco's inception in our area. Any one caught as a criminal trespasser, kowns'no mercy, other than sale of his cattle to recover his remanded and confiscated cattle and oneself. Some of these punishments have been accepted formally, though painfully. Our worries are Nafco's technicality of an ignorant to an educated. They are being taken advantage of e.g. signing documents without knowing the effects of its consequences: A number have signed documents which indiscriminate them onto harassments, arrest, detention and like wise, demands for compensation on property destructed or destroyed by cattle (which have

not been done by them). In one case, it was claimed in the District court by the Nafco management, that, the Barabaig must pay 2 bags of wheat whenever, the Barabaig (cattle) are brought to court on criminal trespass charges, for their cattle reducing the soil fertility on an acre (demanded) of land that was passed on by the Barabaig cattle. And therefore, the area demanded on that day in the court was over 100 acres of land by 4.000 herd of cattle and reduction of 2 bags wheat production per acre. The amount needed was over 24 million T. Shs. I had to volunteer to voice the Barabaig grievances by writing to higher Authority. This has been done ever since the first Barabaig eviction. I have been explaining to both Government and Party Political Leaders on these unlawful evictions. Hence, my invitation to address the PARTY SECRETARIAT on 15th February, 1985 in Dodoma and subsequently: I was approved to join the CCM Ideological College at Kivukoni in Dar es Salaam for a year course in 1985.

After the Dodoma meeting: in June, 1985, the Government announced the formation of new Barabaig District, called Hanang. The Government Thought, through the formation of the District with its tribal leaders, most, if not all, of the local problems will be solved once and for all. Thanks God, had it not been for the correspondences and the public cry of their grieves, the Barabaig could have suffered more a lot than they have been mistreated now.

To date, although the illegal evictions of the indigenous Pastoralists by Nafco is still on, despite abuses, there are other serious things occurring. The Barabaig women who are caught collecting after harvests are forced to mate with their children; five are serving a term of 5 years jails sentence (see Barabaig revolt report attached).

Barabaig have made appeals for help to their local leaders. Nothing better has come. There are 762 individual accused in various criminal trespass cases in all District and Primary Courts of Babati, Katesh and Bassotu in five years only. An average of 152 people every year. A number imprisoned.

In 1987 six people were arrested for murder they never committed. One is our vital witness in our Civil Land Case now in High Court in Arusha against NAFCO for illegal occupation of Barabaig lands. Because

he was seen with us investigating Barabaig matters, in NAFCO Areas.

Our local leaders are aware of all these, including our MP because we have been reporting to them without help. In fact the situation is worsening and seems to be out of the control now.

Because of these, the Barabaig had to decide to go to court to open a Civil Land Case against NAFCO. There are two Land Cases in the High Court in Arusha, assisted by Legal Aid Committee of University of Dar es Salaam as our Lawyers. It is six years since we started the case. At the same time the Barabaig Customary Lands Rights have been revoked by the Government Notice No. 260 published on 28/7/89 on retrospective basis, just after the two Civil Land Cases were filed in Arusha High Court. Despite, these two Civil Land Cases in High Court and the Criminal Trespass Cases, our people do not get facilities to water their cattle easily at the dams built by themselves, in natural lakes, natural valleys near them, but in Nafco Farms. On doing so they are subjected to pay heavy fines.

Few can afford to pay heavy fines, to most of poor Barabaigs it is impossible. When sent to court, they are not represented. They do not know to defend themselves in court. Nafco on the other hand, has a Professional Public Prosecutor and Educated Management Personnel to give evidence in Court. The evidence given is always one sided. The Barabaig is subjected to despises and threat to both Police and in Court of Law. The Barabaig are always intimidated on the ignorance of their rights.

Our efforts to seek Legal Aids Committee's help to attend these cases failed for lack of funds; because of the distance and large number of cases. Katesh is 20 km from the farms while Arusha is 260 km away Dar es Salaam is 900 km from Katesh, where District Court proceedings are always held. In these, despised Barabaig are subjected to torture and imprisonment without a Lawyers representation. After all, they cannot afford to pay. We therefore ask the Committee to help us:

1. A hope to live harmoniously and in peace as other tribes of Tanzania are.
2. We have lost our wealth through intimidation, torture and forfeiture of our property by the Government in 1976 and from 1979 to by date NAFCO: By:

- a) Confiscation of our cattle and impounding them in their Camps for nights without their calves, Barabaig children are deprived of their night food. These acts be stopped.
 - b) The cattle deaths due to long distances for finding water as well as pasture: Be reduced and cattle tract widened.
 - c) Our Birth Rate has been reduced by our women aborting for carrying water on their backs for long distances: usually 20 km to and fro for half of the year in dry season. Be reduced by offering water near them.
 - d) The Barabaigs do not have land nor property now, and therefore be given fair compensation for the appropriated Land and cattle lost.
 - e) The desecrated graves and destroyed Sacred trees be installed as they used to stand before.
3. Barabaig have lost many animals due to lack of water and sufficient grazing areas. The lost animals be compensated, though at minimal rate.
 4. The imprisoned Barabaig be released immediately and unconditionally: especially the five women in prison for
 - a) stealing wheat, though, it is know they were collecting after wheat harvests.
 5. The rights of ways, use of natural water in valleys be observed and looked after to avoid siltation of dams and lakes.
 6. The Nafco tape water be allowed to be used by the Barabaigs too. The Barabaigs are not allowed to draw tape water in Nafco areas.
 7. The affected Barabaig women, the beaten Barabaig people and Emanuel Hamri who was electrically tortured be given fair compensation after medical assessment of their health and the culprits brought to court.
 8. a) Bassotu Lake as a sacred place for the Barabaig, be honoured, as church is to the Christians.
b) Gidagamowd dam be well looked after to avoid siltations. The Nafco people have obstructed valleys by making contours the water ways into the dam: Be allowed.
 9. During and in particular this year when there is hunger helpless Barabaigs be given an allowance or wheat at a subsidized price.
 10. The Barabaig be given a chance in NAFCO Board of Director' meetings to voice their grievances.

11. The Barabaig get chance to be employed in Nafco shambas and receive training as any other Nafco employee. There seems to be discrimination present.
12. The Barabaigs who are in other areas in Tanzania by treated fairly as any other Tanzanian without discrimination.
13. For immediate help to Barabaig:
 - a) The hardships inflicted on them anyone be stopped immediately.
 - b) Local Leaders, including Police, should stop to help NAFCO to arrest the Barabaig trespassers.
 - c) NAFCO should from expanding forthwith as agreed before the CCM Secretariat of 1985.
 - d) NAFCO should stop further bush clearing and Land appropriation until the Barabaig fate in known.
 - e) NAFCO employees stop taking law in their hands.
 - f) NAFCO employees sympathetic to Barabaig cause who have been sacked be re-instated immediately.
 - g) NAFCO be educated to regard Barabaig as their equals and humans too.

Barabaig women revolt to their husbands against NAFCO abuses

On 4th September, 1992; a council of council of women convened a meeting in Mityng'enyi village of Gehandu near NAFCO Farms of Hanang District. They were discussing the incidences of August 28th and September 2nd 1992 on two different occasions.

The 28th August incidence occurred when the NAFCO employee were on their usual patrol to look for Barabaig trespassers. It was an unfortunate day for ten Barabaig women and six youths who were arrested in NAFCO Warret Farm for what NAFCO call theft, but in real sense is the collecting of after harvests of Wheat.

The NAFCO Land Cruiser chased three Barabaig youths between 16 and 18 years of age, until one of them fell in-front the Land cruiser. The other two youths escaped. GINADI CIDAGUEDA, the boy who

fell, was beaten and sent to where women and two other youths were to a nearby combine which was harvesting wheat. On arrival at the combine the now three boys youths, with the three women were told to commit adultery under the supervision of a NAFCO Warret Assistant Manager and Agricultural Field Officer, and they committed adultery in broad day light. After the action two youths escaped, GINADI GIDAGUEDA (picture enclosed) was left with the three women and went back to where the combine was ordered to lie down with his buttocks up and the women were told to beat him. When they didn't beat hard the women themselves were then beaten by the two NAFCO employee; while others were observing.

A woman called UDAGHADOWED, with her child was collecting wheat nearby

and were told to have sexual intercourse. The boy refused totally to commit this sinful act with her mother. And was also beaten hard. Another woman, who was caught by NAFCO, had a stick forced between her legs to vagina. She was then ordered to commit adultery with another Barabaig youth. The refused.

After some hours of these actions, the NAFCO employee left with their combine harvester to the Waret camp to where they spent night. The sufferers were left at the scene of the beatings; some of them with severe wounds and others who were even unable to stand on their own without assistance. GINADI was helped by the three women to a nearby house where he received first aid service by being washed with cows urine.

And therefore, on 3rd of September a

WARRET WHEAT FARMS LTD.
(A Subsidiary of NAFCO)
P. O. Box 266 BABATI

OFFICIAL RECEIPT No. 3274
Date 21-5-92

RECEIVED from Lukumei Aswari
Address
The sum of Shillings Twenty thousand only
In respect of Kwa ajili ya kuchinga ng'ombe sikirotay kuu kwa
na kuchinga maiku katika kampala Warret
WITH THANKS
Shs. 20,000/=
Cash/M.O./P.O./Cheque No.
STAMPS DUTY
for Warret Wheat Farms LTD.

Barabaig are heavily fined for herding their cattle on land occupied by statefarm or even for driving cattle over the statefarm.

WARRET WHEAT FARMS LTD.
(A Subsidiary of NAFCO)
P. O. Box 266 BABATI

OFFICIAL RECEIPT No. 3275
Date 22-5-92

RECEIVED from Aidamis Anna
Address Box Mogeru
The sum of Shillings Fifteen thousand only
In respect of Kwa ajili ya gharimu ya kumbungu ya kumbungu
ya kumbungu ya Warret na kuswaga kutoka Shamba la
Kombungu
WITH THANKS
Shs. 10,000/=
Cash/M.O./P.O./Cheque No.
STAMPS DUTY
for Warret Wheat Farms LTD.

council of women was called and convened a meeting. On the following day, of September, 4th the elders met the women who were complaining about three things:

1. That their husbands were not helping them to tackle these problems where-by:
 - a) Women were forced to beat and commit adultery with their own children.
 - b) A woman was forced to mate with her child.
 - c) Women have been imprisoned for five years.
 - d) Use a stick to copulate women to conceive.
2. That they are being stricken by poverty on NAFCO conception than ever before.
3. That they don't get an access to water in dams and, if they do, they are harassed and sent to court to answer trespassing. Thus they are calling their husbands to help them in this struggle.
4. The Women are also intending to bring two Barabaig women to go to the High Court in Arusha to testify of the harassment, sexual abuses and intimidation on their land. The Council of women has also elected six women as their representatives in Barabaig elders meeting, in land struggles matters.

On 9th September the council of women; with the help of a Divisional Secretary Mr. Michael Tlaghwe ordered a NAFCO Driver to send the injured to a Health Centre in Katesh for treatment, examination and arrest of the alleged persons. No one so far has been arrested to date, though the accused are known to the injured and have been identified before the Police. The alleges are: Mr. Shoo Assistant Manager and Mr. Kshangaki of both NAFCO Warret Farm.

In August, 1992 a council of women met in Bassotu to discuss among other things, how to tackle and give assistance to the six imprisoned women, who are serving 5 years term of jail on theft charges of wheat after harvests. Two others were also convicted and sentenced to 5 years, on the same counts. As the Council of women and husbands were unable to help themselves, they called me at their meeting. I attended and discussed the problem with them. We all decided, at that meeting to appeal against the conviction and the sentence. Their names are mentioned in CC 72/92 in the records list of the cases. □

» Brigadier very Generous to Tanzania «

A hunting pact in the Loliondo Game controlled area between the Ngorongoro District Council and a United Arab Emirates Deputy Minister of Defence, has sparked a lot of comments and fears on the prospects of Tanzania Wildlife Conservation policies. Sunday News Staff Writer, John Kulekana, recently interviewed the Minister for Tourism, Natural Resources and Environment, Ndugu Abubakar Mgumia, on the issue.

Question: A recent hunting pact in Loliondo has attracted widespread criticism. Some people are suspecting foul play and questioning if the move is in line with country's wildlife conservation policies. Mr. Minister tell us, what is the problem?

Answer: There is a memorandum of the understanding between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Deputy Minister for Defence, Brigadier Mohamed Abdulrahim al-Ali and Ngorongoro district council on behalf of six villages in the district.

The agreement is wildlife conservation, management and rural development of the Loliondo game controlled area south and north, which covers 4,000 square kilometres.

The six villages covered in the pact are Olooso, Kwan, Esoit-Sambu, Oloperi, Olorieni, Oloo-Soito and Arash.

Hunting activities in the country are governed by the Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974. The agreement, which some people are disputing, was signed in line with the provision of this law.

The law categorises wildlife areas into four groups. First, are national parks, such as Serengeti in Mara Region, Mikumi in

Morogoro and Katavi in Rukwa, where hunting is strictly not allowed.

The second and third categories are game reserves and game controlled areas, where tourist hunting is allowed. Loliondo is one of them as it was gazetted in 1959 under the then Fauna Conservation Ordinance. Since then, it has been used for tourist hunting.

The fourth category are open areas where nationals are allowed to hunt.

Game reserves and game controlled areas are divided into blocs. Loliondo for example is divided into north and south blocs. The government gives concessions for their use, normally for a term of five years that is renewable.

Question: Are there any agreements of that kind?

Answer: In Tanzania there are several other game reserves and game controlled areas, divided into 100 hunting blocs. According to our records they are used by about 30 different hunting companies.

The nationality of the operators of those companies, include Tanzanians, United States citizens, French, Germans and many others. But this was the first time operators from the UAE to come in.

Question: Are there any conditions required for one to get such a concession?

Answer: There are several, but mainly the operators are asked to assist in the development of the area they are conducting business. The assistance could be development of roads, bridges and even some social facilities.

Further to that the operators are asked to

involve the people in the vicinity. This is aimed at making villagers enjoy the benefits of living near a game reserve or controlled area, which could entail access to game meat and employment opportunities.

However, I must admit, that not much has been achieved in as far as this policy is concerned. That is why the government recently decided to give 25 % of the proceeds arising from tourism, including hunting to finance development projects in those areas.

Question: You said the government gives concessions of five years. But it is understood that the brigadier's agreement is for 10 years. Is that in order with the law?

Answer: The brigadier was given 10 years concession as a special case. The package which he had offered is more beneficial to Tanzania and the Ngorongoro District Council authorities gave him 10 years to operate initially.

The brigadier came with application to the government seeking a lease of 20 years, in which he wanted to use the Loliondo game controlled area for hunting.

He pledged to assist the government in wildlife conservation by providing vehicles, uniforms and telecommunications equipment for curbing poaching activities.

He also offered to provide assistance in rehabilitation and development of the infrastructure and socio-economic amenities in the area like dispensaries and schools.

The government on receiving and considering the application, asked the brigadier to go back to Ngorongoro and negotiate the deal with the district council, since Loliondo is in the district.

Ngorongoro District Council authorities refused to give a 20 years lease. They, however, ended up with an agreement for 10 years renewable concessions.

The agreement was later endorsed by the Arusha Regional authorities, before was brought again to my ministry, where we approved it.

But the government will be monitoring to conduct of business during the whole period of 10 years to see to it rules and regulations pertaining to wildlife conservation and hunting were observed.

The brigadier was asked to form a hunting company before a formal permit for using the area for the purpose of tourism hunting is issued with effect from April 1, 1993.

This is because the Loliondo Game Controlled Area is currently under the Tanzania Wildlife Corporation (Tawico) until the end of this month, March 31, 1993.

Although the brigadier has not started hunting in Loliondo, he has already shown seriousness in giving development assistance. He has provided four water pumps and medicines worth 30,000 US dollars.

Question: There are reports that the brigadier was involved in reckless killing and capturing of live animals in Longido. First, is that true?...and if so does the law allow?

Answer: There is some truth, but this is a separate case, involving another person. The man behind the Loliondo agreement is UAE Deputy Minister for Defence, Brigadier Mohamed Abdul Rahim al-Ali.

While, the person who was involved in hunting in Longido was UAE Minister for Defence, Sheikh Mohamed bin Rashid al-Maktoum. This UAE minister had applied to go to Longido in January this year for hunting.

In his application, he indicated that he would be accompanied by his deputy, Brigadier Al-Ali and the Tanzania Ambassador to the UAE, Dr. Abdulkadir Shariff.

All three of them were given presidential (VIP) permits to hunt in Longido as provided under the Wildlife Conservation Act of 1974. The Longido bloc which is in Arusha Region is controlled by a company called Northern Hunting Enterprises.

The VIP hunters arrived in the country during the second week of January and left after a week. It was a group of 67 people, including bodyguards, cooks, aides, friends and about 20 children.

They were armed with seven guns and a pistol. They had five motor vehicles which were used during the hunting expedition from January 14-17.

I admit that during the expedition there were excesses, including reports that some

live animals were picked without the express authority of the government.

The live animals reported to have been picked are two zebras and two gazelles, one of which dropped dead at the Kilimanjaro International Airport (KIA).

However, it was later learned that the permit given to the minister was erroneously not in order. His permission was by a clerical open slip as none of the words hunting, capturing and photography were not deleted.

This made the brigadier think that he was allowed to do what ever he liked. In the other two permits, however, the word capturing and photography were deleted.


Another irregularity was that they had more firearms other than those registered along with their permits.

However, the Brigadier was very generous to Tanzania. After his hunting expedition he offered 200,000 US dollars (87m/-) for wildlife conservation activities in Tanzania.

Earlier in 1991, the same UAE Defence Minister gave 300,000 US dollars (130m/-), which the ministry used for buying a grader for Tanzania National Parks Corporation (TANAPA).

Source: Daily News. 21/3/1993. □

Human Rights Abuses and Mass Deportations in Central Sudan



The reports in early 1993 that large numbers of Nuba villagers have been massacred at Jebel Heiban in the Nuba Mountains are the latest in a series of accounts of atrocities by government forces in the Sudan against politically marginalised peoples.

Despite international statements of condemnation of its behaviour, the Sudan government appears to be pressing ahead with policies that displace and destroy the social fabric of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians.

The Nuba Mountains are closed to outside observers, while government-armed militias and the regular army conduct what is referred to as an Islamic »jihad« against Nuba supporters of the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). An extra 45,000 government troops, including tank battalions, reportedly entered the region in January 1993. The military capacity far exceeds the scale of the »rebellion«. All indications are that under cover of war there has been wholesale destruction of villages, seizure of assets and land, and forced relocation of tens of thousands of civilians. The scale of the latest killings appears to equal earlier confirmed massacres of Nuba people in areas including Heiban, Lagowa and Dilling. Protests from the Nuba community to the authorities have themselves led to persecution, and the arrest and disappearance of scores of educated Nuba continued throughout 1992. The emergence since June 1992 of evidence of a systematic, large-scale campaign of dispersal suggests that the ruling

regime is intent on eliminating the distinctive cultural identity of the Nuba people as well as destroying the rural economy on which their livelihoods depend.

At the 1991 session of the Commission of Human Rights, Survival International drew attention to the genocidal violence being used by pro-government forces against the Nuba in Central Sudan, and other indigenous peoples of northern Sudan. The fear expressed by Survival that the coming year would see further oppression of these groups has been proved tragically correct, and the news from Heiban in early 1993 must prompt a full and thorough investigation.

Background

The term »Nuba« describes a culturally vivid and physically diverse ethnic group of about one million people with some 40 linguistic dialects, who in recent centuries have lived in the central Sudanese region of South Kordofan. Unlike the politically dominant northern Sudanese of the Nile Valley, from whose invading Arab ancestors they withdrew to these inaccessible hills, their historical roots are entirely in the Sudan. Analysis of their language shows ancient links with the people of the Meidob Hills in distant north Darfur, and with the Nubian language in the region of the Egypt-Sudan border.

Traditionally famed for their wrestling, Nuba have from the time of the Mahdi until recently made up a high proportion of the armed forces. They may be found working as agricultural labourers across

the country, and in urban areas they often play a key role in the modern sector as mechanics, drivers and builders. Like the Southern Sudanese, they are generally ascribed second class status in their own country, suffering frequent acts of discrimination over education, employment, housing and civil rights. Under the Anglo-Egyptian condominium the Nuba Mountains were, like Southern Sudan, »closed districts« for a long period, ostensibly for the protection of the indigenous people. This »protection«, and the almost total absence of educational facilities, had disastrous repercussions for the people of these areas when they were reopened in a poorly-prepared post-Independence Sudan. Superficial efforts to »civilise« the Nuba were intensified when they became an attraction to foreign photographers.

The failure of successive political regimes in Sudan to come to terms with the ethnic and cultural diversity of the country has helped to generate almost continuous conflict. The absolutist attitude of the current National Islamic Front regime takes this attitude to an extreme by applying unprecedented pressure on the Sudanese to conform to a contrived Arab Islamic identity, and exploiting pre-existing tensions to its own ends. By arming and training militias from the local Baggara tribes, who are pastoralist Arabic-speakers, against the Nuba, who are sedentary farmers, the Sudan government is also setting two disadvantaged peripheral groups against one another. In the process the rich farmland traditionally inhabited by the Nuba is seized and reallocated, either to

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wealthy businessmen-farmers or retired figures from government, with some going to the local militias, the so-called »Popular Defence Forces« (PDF).

Although the Baggara and Nuba have competed for generations over water and land, they previously found ways to limit and resolve conflict, and succeeded in trading and even inter-marrying. The massive scale of the current conflict is the result of outside forces and modern weaponry. In the last two decades the indiscriminate extension of large scale mechanised farming schemes across the fertile land in Southern Kordofan has drastically reduced the pastoralists' freedom of movement with their herds, as well as resulting in Nuba farmers being thrown off their own land. Resistance by the Nuba is nowadays automatically regarded as alignment with the SPLA, and punished by the elimination of entire villages. The fact that some 40% of the Nuba are themselves Muslims does not save them from the onslaught.

Many Nuba end up as impoverished wage labour on the farms of absentee landlords. Drought and environmental degradation – often accelerated by the widespread felling of trees and deep ploughing for mechanised farms – have added to the motivation for conflict as water and soil resources dwindle. The apparent willingness of the present regime in Khartoum to use extreme social engineering measures and its indifference to the rights of its own people have created a disaster out of an existing crisis. Indeed, in view of the profits gained in certain circles, the regime seems to be manufacturing disaster in order to enrich its own constituency.

Events in 1992

The year began with the declaration on 7th January 1992 by the governors of Kordofan State of a »jihad« in the Nuba Mountains. Repeated claims were made that »rebel remnants« were being dispersed. The »New Cush« battalion of the SPLA was forced into retreat, while Colonel Ismail Adam, commander of the »Popular Defence Forces« said his men were ready to »cleanse every stretch of territory sullied by the outlaws«. Helicopter gunships were repeatedly used against SPLA bases in the south of the mountains and at Jebel Tuleishi. Other »counter-insurgent« attacks

meant the burning of entire villages, and the harvesting of their crops by the PDF. Attempts by some military and police commanders, as well as the then Commissioner of South Kordofan, Mohamed al-Tayib, to moderate the ferocity of the campaign were in vain.

Despite a continuing ban on access to the Nuba Mountains for all except selected guests of the Government, reports of atrocities continued to leak out. At the end of 1991 villages in Kowalib-Um Heitlan in the north of the mountains were abandoned, and their displaced inhabitants selectively executed at Kurgol, on the Dilling-Kadugli road. In March 1992 the villages around Jebel Abu Januq, north of Lagowa, were evacuated with 72 hours notice, and the southern-central village of Karalaj was destroyed. Dozens of others in the central mountains were also razed, with villagers fleeing to camps on the outskirts of Kadugli, the provincial capital. Medical and social facilities have been closed down or confined to army and PDF members. In June 1992 at least 16 civilians, possibly up to 100, were killed after a battle between the SPLA and the PDF.

Mass relocation of displaced people from transit camps to distant small towns in North Kordofan has been in evidence since June 1992. Tens of thousands have been removed so far. In the government-run transit camps for the displaced around Kadugli, Dilling and Lagowa, only Islamic aid agencies friendly to the regime are permitted access. At these centres people are crowded on to trucks and taken away in convoys under military escort, with inadequate food and no medical provision. Their destinations include so-called »Peace Camps« at Um Rawaba, where ten a day were reportedly dying, Bara, En Nahud, Er Rashad and Sodiri. In El Obeid in July, two people died in a convoy of 635. By removing them so far north, the government is making their return effectively impossible.

Kordofan government sources say that a screening procedure is intended to separate out the »productive« able-bodied men and send them to work on the mechanised farming schemes, while women and children are to be taken in by northern Sudanese families, effectively as unpaid domestic labour. This threatened splitting up of families will also contribute to the elimination of the Nuba as a distinctive people.

The arrest and disappearance of educated Nuba, regardless of their political affiliations, continued throughout the year. In December 1992 the Sudan Human Rights Organisation published a list of 156 named Nuba individuals whom it alleged had been extra-judicially executed. At the same time 28 men, mostly Nuba, were transferred to Suakin prison from other prisons and detention centres, where they had been held without trial. The outcome of visits by United Nations representatives to the area in late 1992 is not yet known. The Sudanese government has denied all the allegations levelled against it; they should be prepared to substantiate these denials by allowing free access for outside observers to the Nuba hills region.

Conclusion

If this systematic violation of human rights continues, the Nuba will cease to exist as a people with ways of life and an identity of their own, and the individuals who survive risk being reduced to a permanent subclass of displaced and uprooted people.

Source: *Survival International*. □

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Tanzania: Off our land, Maasai elders tell hunter

The Maasai elders in Loliondo District, Arusha Region, have refused one royal Arab family entry into their land for opening a hunting business centre.

Speaking from Arusha, sources said that the Maasai elders took this measure after they learnt that part of the land allocated to the hunting Sheikh was part of the land in respect of which they held Title Deeds since July 1, 1990.

The sources said that what surprised the Maasai elders is that the government differed with Loliondo District councillors who were opposed to the move.

Following the councillors' rejection of the move, Regional District government leaders held several meetings in the area to try and convince the people of the Sheikh's project.

The Sheikh responsible also, met the elders and told them that his project would give them a chance of benefiting from his ventures by drawing up development projects from his business revenue.

It was at this juncture that the Maasai elders took a categorical stand of refusing the Sheikh entry into the area because they said there could be no relevant development plans that denied them the right to their land in whose respect they held Title deeds from the same government.

The Maasai pastoral villages were surveyed by the Regional Surveyor in Arusha with funds from the Arusha Diocese Development Office (ADDO) and the Serengeti Regional Conservation Strategy Project of the Natural Resources ministry.

Meanwhile, it was been learnt that the chairman and executive secretary of a non-governmental organisation working among the pastoralists in northern Tanzania (KIPOC) will be going to New York to take part in the celebration of the Indigenous Peoples Year early next month.

Chairman Daniel Murumbi and Morinje Parkipuny will be representing the Barbaig Sand Maasai pastoralists.

Sources: *The Express*, November 26-December 2, 1992. □

East Timor: Resistance leader captured

Xanana Gusmao, 45, leader of the Timorese resistance and commander of its armed wing, Falintil, was arrested on 20 November 1992, having evaded the Indonesian military for the last 16 years. The Indonesian government has attempted to use his arrest to weaken the political morale of the pro-independence movement.

Gusmao's arrest followed a dawn raid on the Dili home of the mother and sister of Abilio Araujo, the Fretilin leader based in Portugal. In line with regular practice in East Timor and Indonesia, he was taken to a military detention centre and interrogated.

Access to lawyer was denied in contravention of Indonesia's own Code of Criminal Practice. The International Committee of the Red Cross was also denied access until 7 December. The two ICRC visitors would not comment afterwards on the condition of the prisoner.

On 24 November, Armandina Gusmao and Gilman Exposto, Xanana's sister and brother-in-law, along with two of their children, were also arrested, giving rise to fears that they would be used to exert additional pressure on Xanana.

The arrest were the culmination of an intensified campaign by the occupying Indonesian forces around the first anniversary on 12 November of the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre. Hundreds of East Timorese were detained and interrogated and, at the time of writing, it was feared that some of the detainees were still in incommunicado detention.

Video pressure

Xanana was initially taken to Denpasar in Bali, before being moved to Jakarta. At the beginning of December the Indonesian authorities released a video, made by the Indonesian army, in which Xanana, speaking in Portuguese, recognises that East Timor belongs to Indonesia and calls on the guerrillas in the mountains to give up the struggle.

The blatantly edited video, in which Xanana appears sitting with Jose Abilio Oso-

rio Soares, the new governor of East Timor, shows a pallid, beaten man, clearly under extreme pressure.

The video was intended to compound the desperate sense of demoralisation felt by the East Timorese since Xanana's arrest. Xanana has been an inspiration to the East Timorese since he took over the resistance leadership from Nicolau Lobato, who was killed by Indonesian forces in 1979. The Indonesian military had been hunting for Xanana for years and his capture is a great prize. According to a recent report in the Jakarta Post, the military involved will be rewarded with decorations.

Xanana, along with two other survivors of an attack by the Indonesian military in 1979, had succeeded in regrouping the decimated resistance to make it an effective guerrilla army again. And in 1989 Xanana reorganised the movement internally, distancing himself from Fretilin to become chairperson of a broader umbrella structure, the National Council of Maubere Resistance, which included the UDT as well as Fretilin.

Most of the time Xanana remained hidden in the mountains, coming to Dili occasionally, at night and under cover. He was interviewed face to face by the foreign media only once, in 1990, when Australian lawyer Robert Domm reached him in his mountain retreat.

Concern

Xanana's arrest was greeted with dismay by supporters of the Timorese cause across the world. Human rights groups like Amnesty International called on the Indonesian government to allow the ICRC access to all Timorese prisoners and to permit immediate access to lawyer of their choice in accordance with Indonesian's own criminal code.

The Portuguese government issued a statement on 25 November appealing to the international community to act without delay to »achieve the freedom and ensure the physical integrity of Xanana Gusmao, and guarantee that his rights as a human being be completely respected by the authorities of Indonesia«.

The international Platform of Jurist for East Timor (IPJET) wrote to the UN secre-

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tary-general quoting the fourth Geneva Convention, which Indonesia ratified in March 1961. »Anyone arrested under suspicion of having committed a criminal offence«, the letter said, »is not only protected by non-derogable human rights but also by the rights provided under the Humanitarian Laws of War, including those set out in articles 64-76 of the fourth Geneva Convention...

»We urge to monitor his treatment so that can advise all the member states who are signatories to the Geneva Conventions of any breaches so that they can make arrangements to arrest and bring to trial those involved in committing these breaches. This would be in accordance with the practice which member states were invited to follow in the case of Iraq's occupations of Kuwait (Security Council Resolution 674 of 29 October 1990). We urge you to bring this matter to the attention of the Security Council, where a resolution in the appropriate terms could be passed«.

For its part, CIIR appealed to the UN secretary-general to intervene personally in relation to the arrest of Xanana. »We are sure that you share our concern that the Indonesian authorities include East Timorese participation in the bilateral talks currently taking place between the Indonesian and Portuguese governments, and that Mr. Gusmao's future be seen in this context.« the letter said.

Demoralising effect?

It is still too early to assess fully the consequences of Xanana's arrest for the resistance inside East Timor. The pro-Indonesian press has reported the widespread surrender of up to 1,000 guerrillas. This figure is somewhat at variance with the 200 or so guerrillas regularly quoted by Indonesian military sources as still remaining in the mountains.

It is likely that many of those »surrendering« have been non-armed members of pro-independence youth and student groups rounded up in the November crackdown. They may have been forced to sign »surrender statements« and it is feared that some may be made to testify under duress against Xanana in what is almost bound to be a show trial.

According to sources in East Timor, the detainees are being subjected to ill-treatment and intimidation. Several East Timorese businessmen have gone into hiding, as they are suspected of having supplied Xanana with his needs in his hideout.

According to the pro-Indonesian paper Jawa Post, an East Timorese youth organization, Fitun, used a bizarre oath-taking ceremony similar to those described in the article on pp.7-8 to dissolve itself in early December 1992. The youths reportedly swore, in the presence of the local military commander, Lt. Col. Syarifudin Zein and religious figures and community leaders, to disband, not to form a new organisation with the same guidelines as Fitun, and to join the youth organisations legally approved by the government and unified state of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila (Indonesia's state ideology) and the 1945 Constitution. However, it is known that the Indonesian military set up many of these organisations in the first place.

Torture denials doubted

General Try Sutrisno, commander of the Indonesian armed forces, has denied reports that Gusmao was tortured. But Mario Carrascalao, who was recently replaced as the governor of East Timor did not believe him. »Sorry, but we're not that stupid...I am against Fretilin, but when I saw that statement I was ashamed as a Timorese. It was an insult to my intelligence as a Timorese« Carrascalao, as reported in the Washington Post of 19 December, said that the arrest of some of Xanana's close relatives had probably put him under pressure.

Timorese refugees, giving their impressions recently in Lisbon, were not taken in either. Gregorio Henriques, another resistance fighter captured by the Indonesians in 1978, was also forced to »change sides«. He explained Xanana's conduct this way: »It must be so as not to endanger his relatives and friends arrested at the same time as him, and to not put the resistance and his own life at risk...To resist you have to be alive. If he died he would no be able to fight on«.

For some Timorese, the spirit of Gusmao's resistance may live on despite his

arrest. Donaciano Gomes, also living in Lisbon said: »The person they captured was Jose Alexandre Gusmao, not Xanana«. Xanana is already in the soul, the body and the spirit of the Timorese People«.

In a letter received in Britain at the end of November, Timorese exiles living in Bali described themselves as »a little broken-hearted with the news of Xanana's arrest« and fearful of his recantation at the hands of the military. But they affirmed their confidence that their people would continue their struggle under new leadership.

The resistance has apparently chosen Ma Honu, who was second in command to Xanana, as their new leader.

Trial opens

Xanana's trial opened in Dili on 1 February. Some reports suggested that he would be charged with subversion, which carried the death penalty, while others claimed that he would be tried under Indonesian criminal law, which might spare him death, but condemn him to life imprisonment.

Jawa Pos reported on 14 December that lawyers from the Indonesian Foundation of Legal Aid Institutes and Ikadin, the Bar Association, were ready to defend Xanana. The Jakarta-based Legal Aid Institute offered its services, which, according to Indonesian newspapers, were turned down by Xanana. The AFP and AP news agencies reported on 5 January that an Indonesian lawyer called Sydjono had been appointed to represent Xanana- by the Indonesian police.

Sources: *Timor Link*, N° 25, March 1993. □

Australia: The Mabo Case

Following is the material provided to the Prime Minister and other ministers by the Torres Strait Islanders for the historic April 27 meeting:

Items for discussion by Torres Strait Islanders with Prime Minister and Cabinet. On April 27, 1993.
Prepared by the Island Coordinating Council (ICC), Torres Strait.

Islanders welcome the historic opportunity provided by the *Mabo* decision to discuss the future of our people and our region.

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We appreciate the commitment of the Prime Minister to using this opportunity to look at the wider implications of indigenous-government relations. This is an unprecedented meeting, and we hope that it will begin a new relationship between government and Australia's indigenous peoples.

We believe that together we can resolve long-standing grievances and break the cycle of social and economic disadvantage afflicting our people. In this International Year for the World's Indigenous People we in Australia can take steps, as other »first world« countries have done in recent years, to use political and constitutional processes and arrangements creatively to

1. The first need is for a clear commitment by the federal government to oversee and guarantee »native title« - that is, the indigenous rights of Torres Strait Islanders and Aborigines. Unless the often divisive policies of the State and Territory politicians on indigenous rights and indigenous needs are given the umbrella of federal leadership as provided for in the 1967 constitutional referendum, Australia will continue to be vilified in the world for backward policies and racist attitudes.
2. The main practical political need is for continuing dialogue at the highest levels to ensure persistence by governments in joint problem-solving with us. *We would recommend that the Prime Minister and his colleagues responsible in his portfolio for indigenous policy form an executive committee together with Islander leaders to direct, monitor, oversee, and approve subsidiary policy processes and negotiations directed to specific issues.* As processes in other countries have shown, without such a high-level »steering« group, work falters or is quietly eroded by officialdom.
3. Principal areas for work conducted under the auspices and oversight of the executive committee outlined in N° 1 would include
 - local and regional government powers, structures, and revenue sources in Torres Strait;
 - resolution of Islander claims to islands, marine areas, reefs, etc.;
 - implementation of a marine strategy

for Torres Strait along the lines explored in a discussion paper published this month by the Island Coordinating Council with the assistance of the North Australia Research Unit, ANU;

- the effectiveness and/or adequacy of social, health, education, economic, and employment policies and programs by all levels of government as seen in outcomes for Islanders rather than the good intentions of their designers, and re-organisation of re-targeting needed to make them more effective;
 - economic development mechanisms targeting Islander needs and their relationship to the institutional structure of Torres Strait;
 - the need for facilities and infrastructure such as a Torres Strait museum and cultural centre;
 - review of ATSIC in relation to Torres Strait needs, and the question of a separate Islander entity;
 - the Torres Strait Treaty whose mechanisms and implementation have, with the benefit of experience to date, been insufficient in protecting Islander and general Australian interests; and
 - recognition of Torres Strait Islanders and their rights in a renewed Australian constitution.
4. Islanders will require multi-year funding to carry out independent work, particularly research, legal advice, meetings, community information and consultation, etc., necessary to effective participation in these processes. The experience of indigenous peoples in other Western countries has been that unless they can participate as equals in such fundamental political and policy discussion with the benefit of expert advice, the outcomes are unsatisfactory.

Nowhere on earth have sub-national governments such as provinces, states, or territories dealt justly with indigenous peoples unless national constitutional and political pressure was applied to them.

Many Australians do not understand that indigenous autonomy is a recognised world

standard for public policy. Indigenous people are not simply another immigrant group to be assimilated. Rather, we are distinct cultures with a will to survive and thrive in our traditional territories. *There is irony in the fact that in order to participate fully in the opportunities and life of Australia we need more autonomy and self-government.* today, the countless programs provided by some 35 government departments and agencies in Torres Strait result in lack of coordination and concerted impact. Accountability to local people is essential for effective socio-economic policy-making.

We find in both operating and emerging institutional arrangements abroad many models for consideration. Our purpose is not to import or copy a foreign model, but to recognise that practical models exist and that the dangers in indigenous autonomy and self-government feared by some Australians have not occurred elsewhere. □

Sweden: Elections for the Saami Parliament

By Mette Duekilde

On Sunday the 16th of May the first election for a Saami parliament in Sweden will take place. The 31 members are elected in a nationwide constituency. To obtain the right to vote Saami have to register as Saami (see Newsletter 1/93).

The law for the Saami Parliament was passed the 15th of December 1992 and the final date for registration was set for the 25th of January. This short period of registration has been much criticised. As the Christmas holidays in Sweden last till the 6th of January, Saami organizations only had a couple of weeks to inform the saami population about the registration. In view of this 5,300 voters registered out of approximately 17,000 Saami in Sweden is seen as a success. Information has been spread through newspaper ads and on the public information programme on national television. In areas with a high percentage of Saami information was distributed to all households by the local Saami organizations, but there was no time to discuss the matter with people. Many older people do

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not understand why they should suddenly have to register as Saami, others see no need to pursue special Saami rights, when they are farmers just as their Swedish neighbours. A large group of people, who have left traditional Saami occupations, do not want to recognize their Saami origin, because there has been much discrimination against Saami.

In the northern town of Kiruna, where the parliament is preliminarily located, the municipality hired someone to trace all Saami and get the information out and persuade them to register in time. This yielded good results. Outside Sapmi, among Saami that have moved to southern Sweden, the registration turn out has also been relatively high. All in all, there is hope for a much larger electorate for the next election in 3 years.

The Saami parliament has not been granted the legal status that was hoped. It is, in the eye of the law, a state authority. This means that the government appoints the chairman of the parliament and regulates its sphere of influence. The Swedish Saami have not gained more influence, their influence on culture, education and Saami occupations has just been given a new forum. In spite of many protests over the law passed on the 15th of December (see Newsletter 1/93), there has been no organized boycott of the electoral registrations and none is planned for the elections. It is hoped that the parliament will augment its status through its work, once it is in operation. A good chairman of the parliament will be able to give authority to the institution.

13 lists of candidates are contesting the 31 seats. The main part of the votes is expected to go to the large Saami organizations Svenska Samernas Riksförbund (SSR, Swedish Saami National Association) and Same Átnam. The local oppositional organizations, Landsföreningen Svenska Samer (LSS, Association of Swedish Saami) and Renäegerförbundet (the Reindeer Owner Association, a brake away from SSR), are putting up their own candidates as well. There are no national political parties among the 13 lists of candidates, as is the case in the Norwegian Saami Parliament, but there are Saami political parties

taking part in the election. Samernas Vål (Welfare of the Saami) is a well established political organization, that already holds seats in the municipal council of Jokkmokk. Samerna (the Saami) is a newly established party that claims to be a pan-Saami movement. Another organisation putting up candidates is Samisk Solidaritet (Saami Solidarity). It is expected to take votes among youths and among people that are not otherwise active in Saami questions. It has the national Swedish hockey star Börge Salming as one of its candidates. To people that only reluctantly admit their Saami origin, it means a lot that he stands up for his Saami identity.

The fishing Saami and the forest Saami are each have a separate list of candidates, though they are not normally separately organized. They are hoping for the opportunity to voice their particular interest in the parliament. The youth organization Saminuorra presents a special list of candidates called Min Geaidna, our way. The remaining lists are locally based.

There are critical voices against organizations such as SSR and Same Átnam and there has even been criticism of the way Same Átnam nominated its candidates, but it remains to be seen if any substantial number of voters will choose the alternative lists or if the Saami in general want their parliament established through the well-known organizations before it is made an arena for internal political struggle. □

Philippines: Mount Apo – Urgent Action Needed!!!

New Emergency Powers

on 5 April 1993 President Ramos was granted »emergency powers« as part of an »Energy Crisis Act«. The Philippine President now has personal control over the future of power generation projects. Several controversial schemes which pose severe environmental and social threats and which have been halted by local protests may now be imposed by Presidential decree backed by force.

Prominent among the controversial en-

ergy projects is plan of the Philippine National Oil Company to build a *geothermal power plant* on Mt. Apo. The *Lumad* backed by a broad coalition of church, farmers, and environmental organizations have held up the project since it was first proposed in 1987.

Rights violations

Over the last months the Philippine Government has exerted forceful pressure to try and suppress local opposition. Military and paramilitary activity in the area has increased rapidly. Whole indigenous communities are being forcibly evacuated and the record of human rights violations (including killings) is growing fast. The *PNOC* has been trying to impress the international community with heavy publicity on the endorsement of the project by President Ramos and reports of »agreements« with so-called Lumad representatives.

Silencing Protests

All of these measures are seen as part of an *intimidation strategy* aimed at silencing the local opposition to free the way for international banks and companies to get openly involved in the project. It is therefore *now more important than ever* to pressurise the Japanese Export Import Bank (identified as the major potential funder at the moment) and the government of the Philippines to abandon this environmentally and developmentally unsound project.

ACT NOW! WRITE TO PRESIDENT RAMOS!

Please send letter of protest to:
Masaki Horiguchi
Director General, Loan Department I
The Export-Import Bank of Japan
4-1 Ohtemachi 1 – Chome
Tokyo, JAPAN
Fax: +81 (3) 3287-9539

Secretary Angel Alcala
Department of the Environment
and Natural Resources
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